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Abstract
Democracy and its promotion are embedded in the United States (US) and in Europe, 
defining their distinct roles in International Relations (IR) but also maintaining a 
common basis for transatlantic relations. With the end of the Cold War, democracy 
promotion became an increasingly important phenomenon, while transatlantic 
relations seemed to evolve in an ambiguous “drift and rift”. This raised the question 
of whether American and European democracy promotion differed, and whether this 
mattered both regarding their roles in IR and the challenges arising on the ground.
This thesis documents and compares the democracy promotion strategies adopted in 
the US and the European Union (EU), and argues that they contributed to the 
development of “rival universalisms”, i.e. international narratives grounded on their 
own identity, external objectives and policy capacities. It tests this argument with 
three case studies that illustrate and nuance democracy promotion as an eminently 
political process, opposed to conventional emphasis on technical expertise.
The first part of the thesis depicts the origins, characteristics, and policy-making 
processes of American and European democracy promotion: turf wars and 
conflicting ideologies offer inconclusive pictures. In the US, the “new” post-Cold 
War mission still tied democracy to national security and Modernization; in the EU, 
“normative power” and utopian arguments in the definition of Europe did not 
substitute for the core tension between supranationalism and Member States’ 
influence regarding external affairs.
In the second part, the thesis checks the “rival universalisms” against US and EU 
policies actually undertaken on the ground, with case studies of a country 
(Democratic Republic of Congo), a region (Middle East and North Africa), and the 
world (Community of Democracies). In all, democracy promotion seemed elusive, 
and raised wide-ranging conceptual and pragmatic challenges. The cases 
demonstrated the limits of the US and EU “rival universalisms” as policy projections, 
and gave evidence of the political (and not technical) choices and trade-offs involved 
in democracy promotion.
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Introduction
A great democratic revolution is taking place among us: everybody sees it but nobody analyzes it the 
same way. Some see it as something new and intend to stop it, thinking it is only an accident.
Others believe it is inevitable, because they identify this phenomenon as the oldest, the most
constant, never-interrupted trend we have known in history.
Alexis de Tocqueville, 18351
Democracy is a fascinating topic of study, as it brings together ideas of individual rights 
and political order, and translates into practices as complex as they are diverse. Its 
international promotion poses a number of additional questions: can democracy be 
promoted and if so, why and how? The discipline of International Relations (IR) is 
relevant here to grasp the links between the domestic and the international spheres 
(Pridham, 1991; Putnam, 1988): democracies influence the international system, and the 
system influences states. Democracy involves social aspirations and political 
organization that can only be realized if there is internal acceptance and will. Yet its 
promotion necessarily involves an external realm, as principles and reforms are fostered 
from the outside-in and sometimes under coercion (Peceny, 1999). Western polities 
have sought to promote democracy both because of internationalist ethics and ideology, 
and because of self-interest and convenience. Arguably, democracy promotion has been 
more prominent than ever in the post-Cold War period, and the United States (US) and 
the European Union (EU) have led this quest. This thesis substantiates this claim, and 
explores two aspects of this complex phenomenon.
On the one hand, focusing on the promoters’ foreign policy, democracy 
promotion contributed to the construction of the international roles of the United States 
and Europe. This thesis argues that this was the case even if democracy promotion 
could hardly be isolated as a clear and strategic goal, and was always in competition 
with other interests. This construction involved identity and fundamental characteristics, 
international projects, and prescription for international action, leading to distinct 
American and European “universalisms”. These narratives were shaped in relatively 
new ways in the post-Cold War period, embedded in the multiple layers of policy­
making processes, and led to a range of positions and policies to defend and foster
1 My translation (de Tocqueville, 2000, p. 31).
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democracy2. It was not obvious whether such a common value -to  promote democracy 
abroad—translated into stronger transatlantic relations and united action. Indeed, this 
thesis argues that democracy promotion contributed to the development of “rival 
universalisms” where the US and the EU diverged.
On the other hand, democracy promotion involves specific initiatives and 
processes on the ground, with objectives in accordance to each case. These are case- 
specific problems, conceptual challenges and pragmatic trade-offs of democracy 
promotion, driven by the dynamics on the ground. Arguably, these realities affected 
democracy promotion independently from the promoter. In addition, democracy 
promotion has proven to be an elusive practice. Along these lines, the thesis observes 
four general arguments that illustrate the gap between promoting democracy in principle 
and in practice: the premise of positive links among security, economic and democracy 
policies, the efforts to arrive at a universal consensus on democracy, the attempts to 
revert democracy promotion of a clout of “technical expertise”, and the flexibility and 
trade-offs imposed as promoters are “learning by doing”.
Accordingly, it was necessary for this thesis to assess how the American and 
European universalisms translated into policy, and how the practical dynamics affected, 
in turn, the policies’ evolution and the effective construction of the universalisms. The 
thesis checks US and EU democracy promotion against the realities on the ground in 
order to explore the rise of the “rival universalisms”, but also their shortcomings in 
practice. The thesis is however not devoted to assessing the policies’ impact or whether 
the US or the EU strategies “worked”.
In this way, the thesis explores democracy promotion from a double perspective, 
complementing its study as an element of US /EU foreign policy (related to their 
identity and role-construction) with a view of democracy promotion as a process on the 
ground. In order to test these arguments, the thesis analyzes three case-studies: the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, the Middle East and North Africa region, and the global 
Community of Democracies. This introduction now outlines the main contributions of 
this thesis, its premises and methods (conceptual framework, case studies), and the 
organization of this research project.
2 1 am following some basic premises from Constructivist analysis of International Relations, which I find 
useful to frame the complex empirical realities we analyze in Social Sciences in terms of agency and 
structure, and of ideational and material interests. Following Wendt, my research questions focus on 
“what there is” regarding democracy promotion (Wendt, 1999, pp. 33-40).
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Contribution
The thesis addresses the following puzzle: were US and EU democracy promotion 
different and if so, how did this affect their roles in international relations and translate 
into processes on the ground? This is relevant for two research agendas: one regards the 
evolution of the US and the EU as international actors and of their transatlantic relations 
during the post-Cold War period; the other regards the dynamics of democratization and 
the role of international factors in these processes. The thesis will be considering two 
hypotheses with the intention of building up our knowledge in those two areas. The first 
hypothesis is that US and EU democracy promotion have not constituted a common 
front and that there have been divergences -this hints at the limits of transatlantic 
common values and cooperation. The second hypothesis is that US and EU democracy 
promotion faced similar problems regarding conceptual and pragmatic challenges -this 
hints at an ongoing gap between the promoters’ premises (bureaucratic and political 
choices) and the processes on the ground. A broader hypothesis underlies and connects 
these two: that democracy promotion was more about US and EU role construction as 
international actors than about impact on the ground -this idea is discussed further in 
the Conclusion . Along these lines and as a contribution to the existing literature, this 
thesis puts forward the following arguments.
First, the US and the EU have been developing separate and somewhat conflicting 
“universalisms” as democracy promoters, i.e. international projections grounded on 
their own identity, external objectives and policy capacities. American and European 
democracy promotion resulted from distinct historical experiences, institutional 
backgrounds and distributions of political power. These were not static and depended 
mostly on internal dynamics that, importantly, not only represented feedback but also 
“feedforward” of democracy promotion in foreign policy4.
The universalisms also depicted American and European premises and methods 
on what to promote and how to do it, but most importantly they constituted 
differentiated narratives for the transatlantic partners. This thesis argues that the 
differentiation was due to the development of a new universalism on the side of the 
European Union, and discusses its main characteristics and how they suited the EU’s 
role as a democracy promoter: civilian (and normative) power, regional cooperation,
31 am thankful to M. Smith and M. Kaldor for helping me clarify this argument.
4 1 not only observe how policies originate but also how they “feedforward” i.e. motivate and shape 
subsequent international action. This analysis follows Carlsnaes’ framework of “dynamic synthesis” 
between agency and structure (Carlsnaes, 1992, pp. 264-265).
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multilateralism, socialization. This universalism underlined EU peculiarities but also its 
uniqueness, and justified (as well as motivated) EU action in the contemporary world, 
notably vis-a-vis the United States. This argument corroborates that the post-Cold War 
era has meant an “institutionalization of difference” (M. Smith, 2004) where the EU is 
cementing its independent, distinct role in IR, and a logic of “EU identity construction” 
where the US plays the role of an “Other” (Diez, 2005). Hence, on the one hand 
democracy promotion featured in both US and EU policies and it was celebrated as a 
common value in the transatlantic relationship, which seemingly drifted along. On the 
other hand it illustrated that a transatlantic rift was at stake5.
Second, democracy promotion was part of a broader set of preferences, including 
values and interests, and both American and European policies involved controversies 
and trade-offs. Most importantly, democracy promotion was an elusive practice, and our 
knowledge and assessment of “success” remained limited and relatively controversial 
(Burnell, 2007; Center on Democracy Development and the Rule of Law, 2008). Thus, 
the definition of democracy and the dynamics of reform and democratization faced 
important problems in theory and in practice, and these affected both US and EU 
approaches. The literature of “Transition studies” addressed these problems. They are 
relevant here in that they challenge the specificities of American or European 
universalisms, bringing our attention to generalized problems in the practice of 
promoting democracy in international relations.
Arguably, Transition studies shaped practices on the ground, contributing towards 
a paradigm that focused on elections and, following Rustow, underestimated long-term 
and socioeconomic factors (Carothers, 2002)6. This thesis explores democracy 
promotion against this background and criticizes, more specifically, four problems 
visible in the post-Cold War period. One problem was the tension between the 
universality of democracy and its potential specificities, both cultural and institutional 
(role of elections, parties, good governance, checks and balances). The thesis argues 
that democracy promoters sought to redress that tension and defended the universality
5 As different European states reacted differently to the American-led war in Iraq, observers from 
academic and policy-related circles underlined there was a transatlantic crisis or “rift”. My argument goes 
beyond this contingency and substantiates that the rift is structural, affecting the transatlantic relation 
itself.
6 Rustow’s article “Transitions to democracy: towards a dynamic model” exhorted comparativists to 
focus on genetic enquiry: cases where transition had happened over a short time, and he thought that a 
model of the type of transition could be derived from two or three empirical studies and tested by 
application to the rest (Rustow, 1970, p. 347).
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of democracy promotion, but in practice the model of liberal democracy and the 
Western experience dominated. Another problem was the complex linkages in the 
promotion of democracy (including human rights and the rule of law), peace and 
economic development, and the nature and pace of political change, which was often 
long-term . In this regard, the thesis argues that international democracy promotion 
policies were often conceived as if there was a “virtuous circle” (an ideal opposite to 
“vicious circle”), but this was challenged by political difficulties and trade-offs on the 
ground.
Finally, the thesis identifies and throws light on two more problematic dynamics 
that have shaped democracy promotion on the ground: a tendency to technicality, and 
“learning by doing”. The thesis gives evidence of how policies were artificially framed 
as neutral and technical, while they were a clearly political intervention. Indeed, calls 
for expertise and professionalism tended to disregard the politics that actually 
determined the policies’ success8. The thesis also builds the argument of “learning by 
doing”, noting that practitioners on the ground, but also officials in earlier stages of the 
policy-making process, lacked experience or failed to include lessons from other cases9. 
They based their work on principles from the academic and think tank world (which 
emphasized technicality), but “learning” was limited in view of bureaucratic processes, 
the volatility of funds, and the shifting goals and strategy. In practice, democracy 
promotion imposed a flexibility and trade-offs that led to situations sometimes (easily) 
criticized as hypocrisy or double-standards.
Conceptual framework
The topic of democracy promotion has been studied from two main perspectives. On the 
one hand it has been considered an element of American or European external relations,
7 Similarly, many of the methods used were also complex and not automatically positive and mutually 
reinforcing: conditionality, “carrot or stick”, military means, reform of laws, training of elites, funding of 
specific civil society programs and beneficiaries, etc.
8 The de-politicization of democracy promotion was similar to the way development aid was sometimes 
portrayed as if international economic aid and cooperation was a matter of efficiency. Instead, it is clearly 
influenced by the politics both on the side of the promoters (for whom its one element of foreign policy, 
among other goals or methods) and on the side of the target-country (where power politics and a number 
of actors will influence each case). Democracy promotion emanated and remained connected in many 
cases to development aid and cooperation, and it was affected by similar dynamics. As Chris Hill argues 
(2003, p. 10), foreign policy must be understood “not as technical exercise but as an important form of 
political argument”.
More generally, the rise of democracy promotion activity since the end of the Cold War meant that new 
policies were needed. My point here regards the failure to accumulate knowledge (as far as this was 
possible) on best practices.
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as an issue-area in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) (T. Smith, 1994; Youngs, 2001a). On 
the other hand, it has been considered an independent variable to explain transition and 
democratization processes (Burnell, 2000; Schmitter & Brouwer, 1999; Whitehead, 
1996). For the latter, it was an instance of the (limited) role of international factors in 
these processes, and country or regional experiences were studied in the context of 
Comparative politics (Herman & Piccone, 2002; Schraeder, Taylor, & Hook, 1998). By 
contrast, this thesis aims to bridge the divides between these literatures and restores 
democracy promotion as a “multi-faceted” international phenomenon as suggested by 
Burnell (2005) and Carothers (1999, 2004). My goal is to focus on the American and 
the European approaches, while remaining sensitive to how the policies faced similar 
challenges on the ground. US and EU democracy promotion emanated from their 
complex foreign policy dynamics, and despite their Western values and common 
interests, distinct approaches emerged. Nevertheless, transition and democratization 
depended largely on dynamics at the target-level: history, socioeconomic conditions and 
domestic politics. As “rival universalisms”, distinct US and EU democracy promotion 
materialized, but their impact was limited and the challenges were common.
The thesis is based on the assumption that the US and the EU can be compared as 
international actors10. One premise in this thesis is that the European Union is a polity 
with external action, notwithstanding its peculiarities and differences between Member 
States (MS) (Carlsnaes, Sjursen, & White, 2004; Knodt & Princen, 2003). The thesis 
freely adopts White’s (2001) view of European foreign policy as one entity’s, even if 
“non-unitary”11. The empirical analysis focuses on EU positions and policies, but I do 
not take for granted that these exist outside the initiatives and tensions of Member 
States’ foreign policies (M. E. Smith, 2008)12. The thesis does not undertake a 
comparative analysis of the US-EU at the bureaucratic level, but Chapter 3 depicts how 
the internal dynamics in the policy-making processes shape democracy promotion.
10 My subjects of analysis are the US and the EU as two actors in a (Transatlantic) relationship, and not a 
singular transatlantic community.
11 White differentiated between Community foreign policy (emanating from Brussels-centered 
institutions), Union foreign policy or CFSP broadly, and Member State foreign policy. Though I do not 
systematically use this division in my analysis, I am sensitive to these distinctions and give evidence of 
how Community (supranational decision), Union (intergovernmental) or Member States have shaped 
European democracy promotion. I am not using “Europe” and “European Union” interchangeably, though 
I am calling the policies created in this space “European”.
12 Smith argues that middle-range approaches are more convenient for empirical analysis because they 
allow us to study the role of the EU as an increasingly important actor in European foreign policy while 
identifying member states’ agency. I found this was especially pertinent regarding democracy promotion.
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In choosing and designing case studies for this project, I considered their 
relevance to the thesis objectives described above, their value-added to answer the 
research questions, and their feasibility (George & Bennett, 2005; Punch, 1998). I have 
considered it imperative to study US and EU democracy promotion at three different 
levels of analysis: by country, by region and at the international system (a “global” 
institution) [Table 1]. This framework was especially adequate to test how the “rival 
universalisms” fed into national, regional and global politics. Democracy promotion is 
thus framed as a phenomenon of IR, which differs from a Comparative politics thesis 
where one would compare one (democratizing) state to the next.
Table 1. Levels o f analysis to frame democracy promotion as an International Relations 
phenomenon and case studies in this thesis
Democracy promotion in International Relations Case study
Analytical level 1 Country Democratic Republic of Congo
Analytical level 2 Region Middle East and North Africa
Analytical level 3 International system Community of Democracies
This approach constitutes one of the original contributions of this thesis. First, it 
portrays democracy promotion as a pervasive element in US and EU action abroad, 
corroborating the idea of “(rival) universalisms”. Indeed, democracy promotion was 
conceived not only vis-a-vis certain states. The fact that it happened at country, regional 
and global levels strengthens the argument that broader, promoter-based, universalisms 
existed in the US and Europe.
Second, this framework allows documenting the arguments raised above i.e. the 
universality of democracy, the assumption of “virtuous linkages” between peace, 
democracy and development, and the policies’ technical emphasis together with a 
“learning by doing”. Interestingly, these could be observed across levels, even if the 
policies conceived democracy within the framework of the state.
Case studies rationale and fieldwork
Three criteria underlie the case selection and design of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA) and the Community 
of Democracies in this thesis. First, all three are cases of democracy promotion, even if 
the actual democratization of the DRC, MENA and the international system are
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questionable, as discussed in the Conclusions. Instead of choosing positive cases where 
progress was clearer (e.g. Poland or Eastern Europe), the “negative” cases were a more 
powerful test of US and EU efforts and of the existence of “rival universalisms”. With 
these cases the thesis also tested the arguments on the challenges in democracy 
promotion, instead of measuring success.
Second, the US and the EU have both played a role in these cases. In this regard, 
this research has avoided cases of disproportionate EU or US leverage in relation to its 
counterpart. Examples of this would include Egypt (where the US has funded many 
initiatives) and the Palestinian Authority (a case of special EU support) and EU 
potential Member States. Though I chose cases of US and EU involvement, it was 
unrealistic to assume this involvement was equal. For instance, it is reasonable to 
consider the Community of Democracies as a US initiative, and admittedly the EU has 
contributed with more funds and operations in the Congolese process. Indeed, assessing 
the levels of US and EU involvement and unraveling their implications was part of this 
research.
Third, the three levels of analysis enabled us to analyze the specific ways in which 
the US and the EU promote democracy towards a country, a region or globally. Two 
pertinent questions were 1) whether elements of the US and the EU “rival 
universalisms” existed across levels or were specific to policy-making in each context, 
and 2) whether the dynamics proper to the country, the region and global initiative 
imposed uni vocal trends and similar challenges for both promoters. The first question 
would throw light on the US and the EU approaches and the implications for 
transatlantic relations; the second question would document the common difficulties on 
the ground. The thesis argues there was a tension between these dynamics: while 
democracy promotion asserted American and European distinct roles, they confronted 
similar challenges regarding what to promote and how to do it.
The case studies involved ample research on their own, but their focus was 
narrowed and a parallel structure was designed across chapters. These chapters 
grounded the thesis’ empirical findings, addressing the central question: were there 
differences in American and European democracy promotion? The case studies were
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framed as three instances of democracy promotion and must not be considered 
narrowly-worded pronouncements of US and EU policies13.
The chapter design was as follows. Each of the case studies (Chapters 4, 5, 6) 
starts with an assessment of what democracy promotion involved at that level and a 
discussion of the American and the European policies and positions. Then the chapters 
move on to discuss the main objectives of democracy promotion [Table 2], making up 
main sections (three) in each of the case studies. These sections assess the US and EU 
positions but focus on the content of the policies and their shortcomings; they constitute 
the heart of my empirical analysis.
The “objectives of democracy promotion” [Table 2] must be understood in the 
contexts of the country, region and global cases that shaped them; they were refined as 
my insights of each case deepened, and constitute in themselves original arguments to 
discuss these cases (my own interpretation). The arguments emanated from the case- 
study, but they helped grounding the analysis of US and EU policies and involved new, 
important perspectives on the hypothesis of “rival universalisms”.
For the Democratic Republic of Congo, I discuss how democracy promoters 
sought to 1) “broker democracy” with negotiations, 2) foster security through 
democracy promotion and 3) implement transition measures in active ways. For the 
MENA region, I argue that promoters sought to 1) overcome the premise whereby 
democracy could be considered incompatible with Islam, 2) construct a region in a 
somewhat artificial way (countries lacked cooperation among themselves and to an 
extent resisted democratization) and 3) privilege security and economic interests in 
partnership with incumbent regimes. Regarding the Community of Democracies, I 
argue that the objectives were to 1) substantiate democracy’s universality and non- 
Westem options, 2) arrive at a definition of democracy and its promotion and 3) 
entrench this dynamic in an international institution.
13 Three specific reasons justify this methodological choice. First, my conceptualization of democracy 
promotion (combining the view from Transition/Democratization studies and from Foreign Policy 
Analysis) required me to ask a broader question about the process in the field and not only about the 
promoter’s programs. Second, my approach does not assume that democracy has been promoted, 
remaining open to identify what the promoters did not do (which is also meaningful), and to the meaning 
of policy-selection. Third, my questions allows me to explore a variety of motivations of US and EU 
democracy promotion, and rhetoric and practice, which is needed to unravel its role in their foreign policy 
and the implications for the transatlantic relations. By contrast, a different approach could have involved 
the question “what have the US and the EU done to promote democracy?”, focusing on the “what” and on 
specific programs. This would have led me to focus, for instance, on the electoral process for the case of 
the Congo, on the MEPI and MEDA funds allocated to MENA programs, or on the United Nations 
Democracy Caucus. I disregarded this and chose cases and designed the case-studies in better accordance 
with my questions in this thesis.
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Table 2. Analysis o f democracy promotion in the case studies: what objectives were 
pursued?
Case study Objectives of democracy promotion 
(main sections in the case study chapters)
Democratic 
Republic of Congo
Brokering democracy 
Fostering security 
Facilitating implementation
Middle East and 
North Africa region
Overcoming the premise “democracy vs. Islam”
Constructing a region (common values, cooperation)
Addressing security and economic interests within “partnership”
Community of 
Democracies
Universalizing and “de-Westernizing” democracy promotion
Defining democracy promotion
Institutionalizing democracy promotion in the world
These objectives allowed a focus on the empirical case at each level, as well as an 
analysis of what the US and the EU did more specifically, including the policies’ 
shortcomings. Instead of narrow, predefined criteria to compare the US and the EU 
from a promoters’ perspective only, the thesis uses these objectives as entry-points for 
the research14.
Finally, the conclusions in each case-study pick up the central theme of US and 
EU “rival universalisms” and how this affected the transatlantic relationship. This is 
further developed in the final Conclusion, which assesses the cumulative impact of the 
findings regarding the promoters, as well as the success of democratization (or lack 
thereof) at the three levels.
During fieldwork for his thesis, I gained first-hand information and more nuanced 
assessment of the American and European policy-makers’ environment and the three 
cases studied. This included seven study trips to Brussels and five events (policy- 
oriented workshops on democracy promotion and on European-Mediterranean relations) 
in London, Paris (two), Barcelona and The Hague between September 2004 and June
14 These entry-points are the subsections in each Chapter, and they framed democracy promotion from the 
perspective of dynamics on the ground. I preferred this to a division into “US policies” and “EU policies” 
for the whole chapter, which would not allow me to discuss the challenges that appeared in the DRC, the 
MENA and the CD. The documentation of the “rival universalisms” was this way better connected to the 
empirical case-study, resulting in a more nuanced analysis.
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2008. Fieldwork included visits to EU institutions (Commission, European Parliament, 
Council of the EU), think-tanks, NGOs and party foundations (German, British, Dutch, 
French). It also included a study trip in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Kinshasa 
and Equator-province, October-November 2006), where I engaged with EU and UN 
officials, electoral observation missions (EU and The Carter Center) and NGOs. Finally, 
I attended the 4th Ministerial Conference of the Community of Democracies in Bamako, 
Mali (November 2007) during three formal sessions and the whole Non-Govemmental 
Process15. This fieldwork gave me access to some important documents, notably the 
drafts on the creation of a European Foundation fo r  Democracy Promotion, the Council 
of the EU document Food for thought: European democracy promotion, and the 
documents agreed by governments (the Bamako Consensus) and by civil society at the 
Community of Democracies. When authorized, personal quotes and sources of 
information have been attributed.
Chapter organization
This Introduction has set out the main questions and objectives of this project, as well as 
some methodological premises, scope and limits. It has presented the main hypotheses 
and the research framework, including the justification and design of the case studies.
The thesis is organized in seven chapters. The first three chapters form my 
analysis of American and European democracy promotion. Rather than preliminary, this 
analysis fulfils one of the thesis’ objectives: to document the American and European 
approaches to democracy promotion, explain the similarities and differences, and 
unravel the implications for transatlantic relations and for policies on the ground.
Chapter 1 introduces the context and main questions in the academic study of 
democracy promotion, establishing the definition of “democracy promotion” used in 
this thesis and the importance of historicity (post-Cold War International Relations) in 
this analysis. The chapter also summarizes the conceptual and practical debates on 
democracy and its links with promoting peace and development among others; this
15 These experiences gave further opportunities for telephone interviews and email exchange with 
American officials and experts from USAID, Freedom House, party foundations (NDI and IRI), The 
Carter Center, Brookings Institution, Woodrow Wilson Center. Personal semi-structured interviews 
included diplomats or foreign ministry officials (British, Chilean, Egyptian, French, Irish, Malian, 
Moroccan, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Spanish, Venezuelan), UNDP officials (in Timor-Leste and in 
Congo) and democracy promotion “activists” from civil society groups and think tanks (American,
British, Cameroonian, Congolese, Czech, Dutch, Ethiopian, Egyptian, Kenyan, Korean, Malian, 
Moroccan, Philippine, Tunisian, Vietnamese).
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illustrates American and European trends as well as the complexity of implementing 
these policies. Chapter 1 contends that democracy promotion has been characterized by 
an artificial de-politicization and premises on the positive links between policies to 
promote. In this regard, it discusses the challenges to establish a universal consensus 
over democracy promotion and the ongoing, imperfect “learning by doing” on the 
ground.
Chapter 2 shifts the focus from the subject of democracy promotion to the 
promoters themselves: the United States and the European Union. This chapter 
introduces the argument of rival universalisms, combining the study of role and identity 
politics. Historically, the Western partners shared the value of democracy and the goal 
of promoting it, and maintained this in their rhetoric of cooperation. Yet each 
distinctively and independently undertook some policies, and in the post-Cold War era a 
universalism of sorts arose. In the universalisms, democracy promotion was linked not 
only to what each does in International Relations but also to what each is. The chapter 
argues that some particularities were stressed in EU undertakings of democracy 
promotion, and that the European Union attempted to become a democracy promoter 
clearly different from the United States; it critically assesses so-called EU attributes as 
civilian and normative power, multilateralism, and socialization. Democracy promotion 
was used in the development of a EU role and identity precisely during a period of 
American hegemony and of American emphasis on democracy promotion under the 
Clinton and Bush administrations, and in contrast to the American policies after the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (in this thesis, “9/11”). This explains the image 
of “drift” but also “rift” in post-Cold War transatlantic relations.
Chapter 3 adopts an original FPA approach and compares American and 
European policy-locations in democracy promotion along four stages: inspiring, 
informing, designing, implementing policies. It identifies the main actors in the 
processes, their input in the different stages or facets of the policies, and the potential 
competing interests. This analysis unravels the politics of democracy promotion and 
some contingencies in US and EU policies. The chapter discusses the politics of US 
administrations vis-a-vis Congress, USAID and the National Endowment for 
Democracy, among others. Regarding the evolution and interactions within the EU 
approach, the chapter illustrates that the Commission’s influence on democracy 
promotion (as an element of Development and Cooperation) was increasingly 
challenged by Member States and the realm of Common Foreign and Security Policy.
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The European Parliament’s role and the overall Europeanization of democracy 
promotion was indeed limited (the case studies illustrate this further). Both the US and 
EU approaches were affected by diverse and relatively independent views and programs 
of non-governmental actors. The chapter underlines that transnationality (networks of 
knowledge and implementation) underpinned contemporary democracy promotion, 
though it does not detail the roles of the many and diverse actors.
In the second part of the thesis, I examine the case studies of US and EU 
democracy promotion in a country (Democratic Republic of Congo), a region (the 
Middle East and North Africa), and the “global system” (Community of Democracies) 
in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. As described above, these chapters discuss what I found were 
key features of the international democracy promotion policies. Each chapter introduces 
nuances on the nature of American and European approaches (and the extent of 
transatlantic cooperation), and the political difficulties that challenged democratization 
in these cases. Chapter 7 compiles and develops the arguments that derived from the 
case studies, reconsidering those two main themes in the thesis, relevant conclusions, 
and some prospects for further research.
Rather tellingly, the US and the EU have come to diverge over an issue that is at 
the base of their common Western identity and repeatedly features as a common 
principle and purpose in their rhetoric; an issue central to post-Cold War global politics. 
In this sense, American and European promoters translated a wavering political will into 
a usually idealized exercise. Then, democracy promotion on the ground ran into 
difficulties and paradoxes that practitioners and scholars tried to work out. The thesis 
analyzes these questions with the intention to contribute to a better understanding 
democracy promotion and the controversies around this phenomenon, and eventually to 
inform better, though still complex, policies.
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Chapter 1. The study of democracy promotion in post-Cold 
War International Relations
“The European Union and the United States believe that the spread of accountable 
and representative government, the rule of law, and respect for human rights [...]
are a strategic priority as well as a moral necessity. 
We will continue to work together to advance these priorities around the world.” 
Joint Statement “Working together to promote democracy ” (EU-US, 2005, pp. 21-26)
This Joint Statement of the European Union and the United States sets out a goal 
repeated in numerous celebrations of the Transatlantic relationship: to work together 
to promote democracy. This 2005 document and the one published in 2006 
{Promoting the advance o f freedom and democracy around the world) were issued 
at EU-US summits; they underlined democracy promotion in the context of 
amending diplomatic relations after the 2003 dissensions over military intervention 
in Iraq. As in many other declarations, democracy promotion was found to be a 
common transatlantic principle and interest, but the question remained whether a 
strategy of cooperation and joint policies would actually materialize.
Moreover, even word choice and terminology posed difficulties as, according 
to a European official participating in the drafting of the 2006 document, “we 
explicitly opposed using the term “democracy promotion” for its American 
connotations”1. This hinted at European resistance to align to what seemed a 
fashionable topic on the Bush agenda. In addition, this showed that the EU and the 
US shared the belief but pictured “democracy promotion” differently in practice: for 
example, Europeans often insisted on explicit references to “accountable and 
representative government, the rule of law, and respect for human rights” in the 
draft negotiations.
This example illustrates that democracy promotion had a place in the rhetoric 
of US and EU action abroad, raising questions (and potential disagreement) about 
what these policies should actually be. This set the context to understand democracy
1 Interview with French official in the diplomatic delegation participating in the summit (Paris 7 
July 2006).
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promotion through the perspective of US and EU “rival universalisms”: 
considerations on what democracy promotion meant, and especially how a 
European approach differed from an American one. At the same time, some 
questions were general and potentially influenced both American and European 
policies. They related to real and legitimate concerns over how to promote 
democracy efficiently, and to the (contested) meaning of concepts and theories.
This chapter will unravel what “democracy promotion” means and how its 
study has depended on perspectives from Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and from 
Transition studies. Section 1 discusses these approaches and proposes a working 
definition of “democracy promotion” for this thesis. It suggests that the approaches 
can be reconciled, and that this allows for a critical analysis of US and EU “rival 
universalisms”.
Section 2 explains why the thesis is devoted to democracy promotion during 
the post-Cold War period, and poses a general question about what this turning 
point changed. Importantly, it underlines that this phenomenon needs to be studied 
in its historical context, and that theories and models should not disregard 
historicity. Section 3 discusses the academic debates on the definition of democracy 
and on the links and sequencing of democracy and human rights, the rule of law, 
economic development and peace. These conceptual and practical debates have 
informed this thesis and will be brought up in the case studies. Finally, Section 4 
argues that democracy promotion has also been characterized by the implementation 
on the ground, which sought to reconcile principle and efficiency. In this, 
democracy promotion was portrayed as an apolitical enterprise, and strategic 
guidelines on “bottom-up” or “top-down” were considered.
1. “Democracy promotion” as a study subject: political
understandings, academic perspectives and a working definition
Though uncontroversial in America and Europe at first sight, “democracy
promotion” raised important questions as a term, notably in Europe. This thesis 
underlines that there were political understandings, and diverse uses, of what this 
should make reference to. The following working document illustrates how the 
Council of the EU sought to define a European approach.
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Box 1. European doubts about the term “democracy promotion ” and illustration o f 
political understandings in a document from the Council o f the EU
“As a general concept, “democracy promotion” encompasses all measures designed to facilitate democratic 
development, but despite an underlying convergence of objectives within the EU, there has been 
little consistency in public discourse and terminology, neither within and between Member states and 
within EU institutions, nor generally in the international community. “Democracy” is not frequently 
used as an umbrella term within the EU.
Though few contest that democracy lies at the nexus of peace and security, human rights and development 
objectives, the term has sometimes been considered too ambiguous and political to be used in 
isolation. In the context of EU development cooperation (following the practice of the OECD DAC 
and the World Bank), the term democracy is sometimes referred to, along with rule of law, human 
rights, civil society development, public administration etc. as a component of “governance”. In an 
ESDP context, and in general foreign policy discourse, concepts of peace building, security and the 
protection of human rights tend to have more prominence. The alternative term “Democratic 
governance”, as used by UNDP, could provide the formulation which characterizes EU support for 
democracy”.
Source: A European approach to democracy promotion: food for thought (Council o f the European Union, 
2006b, p. 3)________________________________________________________________________________
This EU document acknowledged that there has been little consistency in the use 
of “democracy promotion”, and warned that alternative terms might be preferable 
because “democracy” can be “too ambiguous and political”. The document 
underlines that Europe (already) supports democracy, but it also presents doubts 
about the scope and meaning of “democracy promotion”.
Political actors also used “democracy promotion” freely, but in rather 
imprecise ways. This was evident in speeches, some making a point of the 
transatlantic connection, others indirectly establishing a distinction from the US. 
For example, the Danish prime minister enhanced the transatlantic common goal 
(Rasmussen, 2008), while the Spanish foreign minister downplayed democracy 
promotion among the many complexities and contingencies of policy-making 
(Moratinos, 2007). These political uses create a starting point for our study of this 
subject and its potential in the construction of international roles both for the US 
and for the EU.
At times, the importance of democracy promotion in role-construction was 
downplayed, and the focus was shifted to its potential impact on the ground. In a 
2008 lecture titled The democratic imperative, UK Foreign Minister David 
Miliband claimed: “we should not let the genuine debate about the how of foreign 
policy obscure the clarity about the what” (Miliband, 2008). On the one hand he 
saw the unending debates about the “how” to promote democracy; on the other, the
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clarity of conducting such foreign policy as if such a role was inherent and 
indisputable, in this case regarding UK external action. This kind of discourse 
separates democracy promotion as two different realities: a principle of ethical 
foreign policy and a policy to be implemented. This way David Miliband, as many 
other Western politicians, may believe there is no question about promoting 
democracy, while research can be done on the “how” to do it successfully. This 
division over a “what” and a “how” proper to a positive political understanding of 
democracy promotion has actually been replicated in its study, creating two 
empirical objects of analysis that led in turn to two bodies of literature relating to 
Foreign Policy Analysis and to Transition studies.
1.1. Two academic perspectives: an element of foreign policy, a factor 
influencing transition processes
One first body of literature sought to understand the role that democracy promotion 
played in an international actor’s external action, mostly as an ethical justification 
for intervention. Because democracy promotion was, for many analysts, a marginal 
when not an outright duplicitous element of foreign policy (notably, in Realist 
calculations) this approach often underlined the conflicts among objectives. It was 
also corroborated by a history of double standards and of difficulties in putting 
idealist motivations into practice, both in the United States (W. I. Robinson, 1996b; 
T. Smith, 1994) and in Europe, the latter often referring to colonial times (Bancel, 
Blanchard, & Verges, 2003; Mayall, 2005b; Vanthemsche, 2007). Scholars have 
convincingly criticized the disputable “clarity” and complex meaning of such 
ethical quests, and importantly for this research, they have often identified 
democracy promotion as a Western foreign policy (Brown, 2001; Chandler, 2003; 
Light, 2001). Focusing on FPA or North-South relations, contributions in the realm 
of IR usually involved illustrative case studies, while enriching our knowledge 
about democracy and globalization (Cox, Ikenberry, & Inoguchi, 2000; H. Smith, 
2000b).
The second body of literature, related to the “how to” promote democracy, 
sought to identify explanatory factors and patterns of success in democratization 
policies, drawing on Transition studies. Under “Transition studies” I refer to the 
literature on regime change and democratization that some called “Transitology” 
and has been concerned with 1) defining democracy and autocracy, 2) classifying
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and studying political regimes and their links with economic and social aspects and 
3) unraveling the generalities and peculiarities of transition processes in a diversity 
of countries/regions2. In the 1990s and 2000s, a transnational epistemic community 
developed in the US and Europe, concerned more specifically with “whether and 
how” democracy could be promoted . Part of this literature was focused on case 
studies and was to a certain extent policy-oriented, in contrast with more theoretical, 
purely academic analysis that increasingly used quantitative methods. Though 
Transition studies had been traditionally focused on domestic factors, the transitions 
of the post-Cold War period seemed to emphasize the role of international factors in 
the third wave of democracy (diffusion, conditionality), mainly in the context of 
sub-regional or regional contexts and in the light of the cases of Eastern and Central 
Europe (Huntington, 1991b; Pevehouse, 2005; Pridham, 1991; Whitehead, 1996). 
However, when this research discussed democracy promotion, it often ignored the 
promoters’ role in itself, focusing on what policies were working or not, and mainly 
resorting to local explanations.
In my view, a combination of these two academic perspectives results in a 
much more adequate framework for democracy promotion as a research subject. On 
the one hand, FPA perspectives often failed to grasp that democratization is driven 
by complex dynamics where the role of a specific promoter may not have so much 
influence, and ignored how the intrinsic contestation of democracy affected its 
promotion. On the other, Transition studies failed to grasp that democracy 
promotion is an international political venture, driven by multiple motivations and 
means, and that it matters even when “it doesn’t work”. The combination of these 
perspectives allows this thesis to unravel American and European democracy 
promotion as foreign policies, while checking them against the actual challenges to 
make democratization work.
2 In this literature, that drew from Modernization studies and often linked democracy with 
development, key contributions have been made by: Robert Dahl, Adam Przeworski, Sartori, 
Gerardo Munck, Collier, Schmitter, O’Donnell, Whitehead, Alfred Stepan, Levitsky, Limongi, Juan 
Linz... and previously Barrington Moore, Seymour Lipset, W. Rostow. This research often appeared 
in American journals of Political Science and Comparative politics.
3 In the light of what I call “democracy hype” of the post-Cold War period, policy-makers developed 
programs and more research was needed. Think tanks, consultants, and professors and researchers 
from the academic world engaged in this demand, actively participating in the policy-making circles 
while worrying about the scientific study of the subject, too. Much work by Larry Diamond, Thomas 
Carothers (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Peter Burnell, Richard Youngs, etc. is 
better understood in this light.
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The thesis sets out to understand democracy promotion in the construction 
of American and European “rival universalisms”. This hypothesis is better framed 
from a perspective of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) as I analyze democracy 
promotion as an element of foreign policy, and this is the empirical grounding of 
this research. FPA has been pulled in very different directions in the 
epistemological and methodological debates of the past few decades (Carlsnaes, 
2003; Goldstein & Keohane, 1993; Putnam, 1988; Rosenau, 1971). Some of these 
debates influenced the framework of this study of democracy promotion and this 
thesis broadly. Notably, the thesis is sympathetic to the complex relation between 
agency and structure (Carlsnaes, 1992) and to both the domestic and foreign 
influences in policy-making (Pridham, 1991)4.
More specifically this thesis adopts Chris Hill’s (2003, pp. 3, 188) approach 
to foreign policy to frame American and European democracy promotion, picking 
upon three important qualifications: comprehensive, purposeful (“seeks to shape the 
international environment”), and expressive (“projects the fundamental concerns of 
the society from which it derives”). With this framework, the thesis explores the 
hypothesis of US and EU democracy promotion in the development of competing 
universalisms. In adopting a comprehensive view, this thesis considers democracy 
promotion as a “sum of official external relations” and not just the executive’s 
policies or specific budget lines. This will be the approach in the initial description 
of US and EU democracy promotion for each of the case studies, and this broader 
scope also underpins Chapter 3’s analysis of the policy-processes. The 
characterization of US and EU democracy promotion as purposeful and expressive 
is useful to ground the concept of universalisms, both to study the projection and the 
origin and generation of the policies. I found these hints useful to frame my 
empirical analysis of US and EU policies.
This conceptual framework underpins the discussion of US and EU rival 
universalisms in Chapter 2 as well as the conclusion sections of the case studies. 
This approach is not inconsistent with the notion of “role construction”, that usually 
takes an interest in the links between identity and foreign policy (Aggestam, 1999).
4 Regarding agency-structure in the phenomenon of democracy promotion, my underlying argument 
is that the US and EU as “agents” shape the structure of post-Cold War International Relations, and 
that this democracy-favorable “structure” reinforces agency, too. The debates on domestic- 
international linkages served as basis for this thesis overall, as I explore how domestically 
democratic polities (the US and the EU) promote democracy at different levels of International 
Relations: country, region, global.
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Goldstein and Keohane (1993, p. 3) conceived “role conceptions” as sets of norms 
that indicate expectations on foreign policy behavior. By contrast, this research 
suggests that US and EU democracy promotion both resulted from the “rival 
universalisms” and contributed to them. While the literature on role conceptions 
tends to focus on identity explaining action, the thesis argues that doing democracy 
promotion in determined and purposeful ways helped to forge an international role. 
This is observed especially for the European Union in the post-Cold War period -an 
argument that will be picked upon in Chapter 2.
The thesis is also open to the debates from Transition studies, notably in the 
discussion of the cases. This allows for deeper and more accurate insights on the 
shortcomings of democracy promotion, and substantiates the hypothesis that the 
distinctions among promoters tend to wane as the challenges pertain to the 
dynamics in the country, region or global politics. In this regard, I found Carothers’ 
(2002) criticism that “the Transition paradigm is outdated” very valuable, especially 
in how it identified the limits of procedural definitions of democracy and the 
assumptions about a virtuous process of democratization. I used this as basis for my 
critique of the policies that assume positive links between security, development 
and democracy and the promoters’ insistence on “technical” expertise. Overall, my 
work has been more receptive to classical studies and the non-quantitative literature; 
this work is not applying nor creating a model, though I found some contributions 
along these lines most insightful (J. A. Robinson & Acemoglu, 2005).
1.2. The working definition of “democracy promotion” in this thesis
In a 2004 lecture, Professor Lawrence Whitehead claimed “scholars have not
defined democracy promotion yet”, as if the academic analysis could eventually 
provide a substantive concept and establish how it worked5. Though such an attempt 
was understandable in the framework of scientific research, it referred to the “how” 
of democracy promotion, ignoring the normativity intrinsic to the policy from an 
FPA perspective, and the politicization of some of the categories.
Many studies of democracy promotion have sought to define their research 
object a priori, but this led to assumptions that, in my view, hindered an adequate
5 Lawrence Whitehead, Some new developments in the comparative study of democratization, 
Lecture at CERI-Sciences Po Paris, 17 May 2004.
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understanding of the phenomenon. For example, Schmitter and Brower (1999) 
excluded “covert action”, though many of the democracy promotion policies are 
“secret” (this was generally the case in the Cold War, and is still so in such 
contemporary “hard cases” as Cuba, Zimbabwe or Myanmar); most policies are 
implicit or create preconditions for democracy. Indeed, if only open and material 
policies are analyzed, it is difficult to assess the role of international factors (e.g. 
regional contagion or attraction). In addition, all researchers encounter difficulties in 
pinning down categorizations, budget allocations, money actually spent (or not), 
and to assess whether and how democracy promotion is actually working (Burnell, 
2007).
The literature has sometimes preferred terms as “democracy assistance” or 
“democracy support” to “democracy promotion” (Burnell, 2007; L. Diamond, 
Hartlyn, & Linz, 1999; Linz & Stepan, 1996; Munck, 2001; Whitehead, 2002). 
“Democracy assistance” has usually referred to explicit programs, as “political aid” 
that, hand in hand with economic/development aid, was targeted to groups working 
on expanding freedoms (most commonly NGOs) or as political opposition. For 
some researchers, such democracy assistance constitutes an empirical reality that 
one can frame (budget lines, disbursements, programs or groups funded) and study 
more consistently, compared to other notions. Along these lines, “democracy 
support” can be considered one of the broadest terms, purposely used to remain 
ambiguous about the policies [see discussion on a 2009 paper on “democracy 
support” in the Conclusion]. Other terms as democracy “advocacy”, 
“dissemination”, etc. have appeared in publications that sought to make more 
specific points (Acuto, 2008).
Conversely, this research adopts “democracy promotion” as preferred term 
precisely to remain open to the potential content, scope and meaning of the policies, 
and to cover rhetoric as well as particular programs or budget allocations. 
Democracy promotion is a controversial, political endeavor often undefined by the 
promoters themselves, open-ended, and difficult to measure and assess 
quantitatively. The thesis proposes the following working definition [Box 2].
Box 2. A working definition o f “democracy promotion ”
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Democracy promotion is a purposeful element of foreign policy where the promoter 
seeks to advance the values and functioning of democracy externally. 
Composed of rhetorical and/or practical aspects, democracy promotion can be 
understood as an ethical motivation or as a means to achieve other objectives 
(peace, security, stability, prosperity, improved relations, legitimacy, 
economic advantage, control, etc.).
This definition privileges a Foreign Policy approach because this is more 
convenient for the purposes of this research on American and European democracy 
promotion. I preferred this term to democracy assistance or support because these 
usually refer to specific instruments. In contrast, this research considered the role of 
discourse and narratives as well, unravelling potential inconsistencies, side-purposes 
and “hidden” intentions6.
Five premises derive from this definition and are important for this thesis’ 
framework. First, “democracy promotion” does not imply a fixed definition of 
democracy and its components, nor of democracy as process or an outcome (D. 
Collier & Levitsky, 1997; Huntington, 1991a; Munck & Verkuilen, 2002)7. Second, 
it may indeed be promoted as an overall, declared objective but without precise 
means or strategies regarding top-down and bottom-up approaches8. Third, it may 
include diverse manifestations and be linked to the promotion of human rights, 
economic development, human development, good governance, human security, the 
rule of law, civil society, conflict resolution, etc.9 Fourth, this definition allows the 
historical discussion of US and EU democracy promotion in the post-Cold War 
period without constraining it. Fifth, it reconciles rhetoric and practice of democracy 
promotion as two sides that need to be considered to truly comprehend the 
phenomenon.
6 This is the main difference between my definition and that of Peter Burnell and of Philippe 
Schmitter and Imco Brower, who explicitly avoided covert assistance and programs with a potential 
“double purpose”. For me, these dynamics make up part of the phenomenon of democracy promotion 
and define it as a political phenomenon (the analysis of those politics is the heart of this research).
7 Transition studies have thrown light on the conceptualization and definition of democracy, but if I 
adopted any specific definition (e.g. Robert Dahl’s) I would be constraining my research of 
American and European approaches. Such an exercise would be useful, by contrast, if I had sought to 
evaluate to which extent their policies have actually fitted and fostered democracy as defined in x 
way.
8 Top-down is used to refer to democracy promotion policies focusing on the state, the bureaucratic 
structure and/or the incumbents that will undertake reform; bottom-up would focus on civil society 
and popular movements. This aspect has been key in designing democracy promotion and it has been 
used to analyze whether the American and European policies underlined one or the other.
9 This was important for the critique on how positive links may be assumed as in a “virtuous circle”.
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This definition is applied to the case studies as they focus on the purposeful 
objectives of democracy promotion policies. This compounded definition informs 
the rest of the thesis and allows comparisons of the American and the European 
approaches from a diversity of angles. For example, the complex network of actors 
influencing US and EU policy-process at different locations are discussed in 
Chapter 3.
2. Historical delimitation of democracy promotion: post-Cold War 
democracy triumphalism
This section argues that the post-Cold War years led to a context of “democracy 
triumphalism” that in turn enhanced democracy promotion in rhetoric and practice. 
Nevertheless, democracy promotion had been pursued in the past and such a history 
influenced the American and the European approaches, and specific events and 
actors also played in the definition of policies [this will be discussed in Chapter 2].
2.1. Triumph of democracy, end of history, and blossoming research 
agendas
An important idea that underlies the IR framework in this thesis is how the post- 
Cold War world was characterized by the “triumph of democracy” and the “end of 
history” in the words of highly influential scholars (Fukuyama, 1989; Huntington, 
1991b). For example, Fred Halliday pointed to such a Western triumph of 
democracy to explain a post-Cold War change in the IR system. In his view, this 
change was characterized by increasing conformity to the prevailing hegemonic 
order, that underlined democracy, rather than new or revolutionary ideas (Halliday, 
1994, pp. 213,216-235).
The arguments on democracy and the post-Cold War period were 
corroborated in the International Relations literature of the 1990s (Hogan, 1992). 
Indeed, though Fukuyama’s and Huntington’s work was criticized and nuanced, the 
points they raised on the rise and expansion of democracy seemed empirically true, 
as elections in more and more countries took place and transitions to democracy 
multiplied, notably in the post-Communist space (Berg-Schlosser & Vetik, 2001; 
Dawisha & Parrot, 1997; L. Diamond, 1992).
38
This characterization heralded an era of a global rise of democracy, as “new” 
arguments substantiated that democracy was a universal value, and new initiatives 
on democracy and on intervention were also conceived in the United Nations10. 
Nevertheless, this did not mean automatic global expansion. Indeed, the rise was 
challenged by the many kinds of “fagade democracy” that could actually mislead 
observers (D. Collier & Levitsky, 1997; Zakaria, 2003). In addition, by the late 
2000s, arguments on the “resistance” to democracy and cases of backlash 
proliferated (Acuto, 2008), but this was not so unexpected as Huntington (1991b, p. 
15) had already observed that waves were usually followed by “reverse waves”.
The academic world echoed the empirical (yet complex) evidence with the 
multiplication of research agendas and publications devoted to this topic, and 
notably with the appearance of two academic journals: Democratization and the 
Journal o f Democracy. These journals have given ample evidence of the global 
trend of democratization and have been key in the development of the discipline 
from diverse perspectives11. Democratization was created in 1994 and is hosted by 
the Centre for the Study o f Democratisation at University of Warwick, itself created 
in 1992. The Journal o f Democracy was created in 1990 and is hosted by the 
American National Endowment for Democracy. Though of course it is a critical, 
open and mostly peer-reviewed journal, the Journal o f Democracy is also explicitly 
pro-democracy. In a fierce critique, Florent Guenard saw in it an American 
ideological enterprise in which “it was impossible for the editors to separate the 
scientific study of democracy from the normative undertaking of promoting it” 
(Guenard, 2008). This is an overstatement, but many Journal o f Democracy articles 
arguably reinforced some premises, e.g. democratic universalism, the liberal 
principles of individual freedom (instead of economic and collective rights), 
Modernization as a valid theory for economic development, and the compatibility of
1 7democracy with non-Westem cultures, notably Islamic . This strengthened 
perceptions on the positive links and democracy promotion as an “expertise”.
10 This idea is discussed further in section 4 below, as an illustration of the difficulty to arrive at a 
compromise between universality, the Western origin of democracy, and cultural specificities.
11 The many articles on democracy and on case studies appearing in other journals (general or 
geographic area-specific) also gave evidence of the literature’s expansion.
2 The journal spotted and addressed the questions and debates that became central in the post-Cold 
War “democracy hype”. In addition, it often served as a tribune for “promoters”, including political 
leaders and field practitioners (from the NED director Carl Gershman to Egyptian-American civil 
society activist Saad Eddin Ibrahim). The journal also selected “Documents on democracy” in a very
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More critical analyses of the academic literature on democracy also 
mushroomed, and it was notably argued that the post-Cold War period privileged a 
specific definition of democracy as well as ideological premises, underlining the
13liberal model of democracy and the (limited) role of the state (H. Smith, 2000b) . 
This thesis was informed by such critical analyses, and remains alert to such 
potential “bias” though it does not have as an objective to develop such critiques 
further. Instead, it discusses the presence of such premises as they appear in the 
promoters’ narratives and policies and in the case-studies [a preliminary assessment 
of the contested definitions of democracy and the process of democratization also 
follows in Section 3 below].
2.2. Continuity and change with the end of the Cold War
Significantly for this thesis, the end of the Cold War strengthened the image of the
West as a cohesive bloc (at least regarding democracy). In theory, the failure of the 
Soviet model and the demise of the Communist world would indirectly bolster 
common transatlantic democracy promotion. A majority of the transatlantic 
documents of this early period corroborated this idea, including the Rhodes 
American-European Declaration (3 December 1988), the Joint Declaration on 
European Community-United States Relations (22 November 1990), and the New 
Transatlantic Agenda (Madrid, 3 December 1995). However, the transatlantic 
relationship would be affected by the fall of the “common Communist enemy”, and 
the literature also documented challenges and even an “end of the West” (J. 
Anderson, Ikenberry, & Risse, 2008) as a result. The “hype” led, most importantly 
for this research, to open and unprecedented discourses and efforts of democracy 
promotion in the US and in Europe.
This context brought to this research a legitimate question: what changed, 
and to what extent and how, with the end of the Cold War? The thesis substantiates 
the claim that the international historical context affected US and EU democracy 
promotion: the case studies can only be understood against the background of a 
“democratic hype” and the evolving transatlantic relationship. The thesis argues that
interesting regular section gathering “pro-democracy” speeches, statements from institutions and 
from civil society organizations, etc.
13 An illustration of this could be how Huntington’s definition of democracy was clearly 
Schumpeterian and privileged procedures.
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the historical context helps explain democracy promotion policies, which were not 
random or contingent. Yet it does not claim that the end of the Cold War caused 
these policies.
In this way, American and European democracy promotion in the DR 
Congo changed with the end of the Cold War (support for Mobutu faded), 
democracy aspects were first introduced and developed in relations with the Middle 
East and North Africa region in this era, and the global Community of Democracies 
was sponsored by a hegemonic United States rallying new democracies such as 
Poland. Nevertheless, this question and this thesis’ approach do not presume there 
was a radical breakthrough or disconnection from earlier periods or even with long­
term history. Indeed, Fukuyama resorted to long-history and Hegelian perspectives, 
and Huntington signaled that the Third wave of democratization started with the 
cases of Portugal and Spain in 1974 (the same wave then traveled to Latin America, 
then the post-Communist Central and Eastern European countries and South-East 
Asia and Africa). Yet the pace and scope of reform programs and the high level of 
conditionality in ECE belonged in the context of the post-Cold War “democracy 
hype”, while in Southern Europe the policies had targeted the erosion of 
authoritarian regimes and gradual transition14.
3. What constitutes “democracy promotion”? Definitions, links
This section discusses the content or characteristics of democracy promotion,
complementing the definition adopted for this research in Section 1 above. A series 
of conceptual and pragmatic problems arose from the facts that democracy is a 
concept contested politically but also academically, and that there was no univocal, 
transparent and conclusive explanation about when, how and why it occurs and is 
consolidated. Importantly, this affected both American and European approaches, 
creating common challenges on the ground.
The first subject of debate was the definition of democracy itself, an 
“essentially contested concept” (D. Collier & Levitsky, 1997; Whitehead, 2002, p. 
7). The second subject, connected to it, concerned the debates on fundamental
14 In Spain, for example, European political party foundations had supported the opposition for a 
long time, while the levels of institutional conditionality were less important in the early 1980s.
41
aspects or preconditions for democracy i.e. what it should refer to and how to make 
it happen. Some of these elements were arguably more characteristic of either the 
European or the American approach (e.g. the European references to the rule of law) 
and this is discussed here. However, it is argued that these were mostly common 
questions affecting US and EU policies; this section underlines the challenges 
arising in this regard, which the case studies will illustrate in turn.
The diverse and rich academic literature dealing with these questions has 
not arrived at consensual definitions of democracy nor of the transition process, and 
these continue to constitute the heart of our academic research agendas (Munck, 
2001). This thesis further documents this lack of consensus, and suggests that 
conceptual and pragmatic problems were embedded in democracy promotion 
policies.
3.1. Defining democracy: procedural notions and “content-rich” 
democracy
The debates on the definition of democracy go back to Aristotle’s writings and 
nothing makes us presume that they will be concluded soon, but an overview of this 
question is essential to frame this research. A first, intrinsically problematic, aspect 
was the fact that democracy is a deontological concept, as Giovanni Sartori put it in 
1962: what it is cannot be separated from what it should be (Whitehead, 2002, p. 
20). These conceptual and normative questions were imported into “democracy 
promotion”.
A strict etymological understanding of democracy refers to “government 
by the people”, so this often emphasized how democracy worked (who had the 
power) rather than the premises, content, and purpose of democracy. Highly 
influenced by the work of Schumpeter and of Robert Dahl, for the past few decades 
academics often attempted to conceptualize democracy as a model that, for 
theoretical or comparative purposes, has tended to detach it from democracy as a 
historical experience (Rosanvallon, 2007)15. For democracy promotion, this could 
translate on a focus on procedural notions (notably elections) rather than on
15 This trend is evident in the academic literature, and my own experience of international academic 
exchanges (International Studies Association annual conventions of 2005-9) allowed me to confirm 
the domination of modeling as a methodology to study democracy and its promotion (widespread in 
American political science, but not only), many models being a-historical or involving outrageous 
assumptions as a result of a disconnection with the experience in the field.
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preconditions and civic participation of a “content-rich” democracy. The notion of 
“content-rich” I use here, in contrast to the procedural notions, refers to democracy 
providing citizens with the rights and opportunities to control policies (and policy­
makers) and empowering them -the substance that Diamond and Morlino (2005, pp. 
x-xii) sought to conceptualize in their assessment of “quality democracy”16.
Carothers (1991, p. 115) claimed that democracy promotion practitioners 
did not give much consideration to theoretical challenges and had a very limited 
definition of democracy i.e. elections, but I found this criticism was not totally fair. 
First, procedural notions of democracy should not be totally disregarded, because 
procedures seem necessary to guarantee “content” (Bobbio, 2003, pp. 449-462; Karl 
& Schmitter, 1991). Second, because of practical imperatives, policy-makers and 
practitioners had limited opportunity to discuss theoretical questions, but most 
shared the view that “elections are not enough”17. Arguably, supporting formal 
projects and notably electoral processes was more visible, but not the only objective 
of democracy promotion.
Keeping these premises in mind, one important question was whether 
promoters adopted different approaches. As the US and the EU developed their 
policies, their own experiences influenced their approaches on what should be done, 
raising the question of distinct “models” of democracy. Nevertheless, the many 
points in common and cross-influences between the American and European 
democracies (Elazar, 2001) did not allow establishing that there was a “European” 
or an “American” model of democracy. The polities (US and EU) are complex
t  Sinstances of democracy themselves, and the diversity within Europe is substantial ;
16 The term “content” is also used by Diamond and Morlino, and I am expanding my discussion of 
this “content-rich” democracy promotion with 3.2. below. That section picks upon the main elements 
(“what to promote”) in “content-rich” democracy as human rights and the rule of law as well as other 
conditions -economic development and security- that without making part of the definition of 
democracy, were put forward in democracy promotion strategies.
17 This was the overall perception I assessed during fieldwork (interviews with Executive Director, 
Democracy Coalition Program, Bamako 15 November 2007 and NGO director, Kinshasa 22 October 
2006). The numerous publications, internal papers and debates at think tanks and institutions such as 
Open Society also confirmed this.
8 Many national characteristics and experiences have input in the European approach: the 
importance and financial power of German party foundations is unmatched, Nordic countries 
underline human rights more systematically, countries that experienced recent transitions (notably 
ECE) claim their legitimacy and argue they have practical knowledge, the French conception of the 
welfare state is contested, etc. A number of publications have attempted to disaggregate and assess 
these influences (NIMD Europe Conference, 2004; Youngs, 2006). Chapter 2 develops further 
insights on how “European” democracy promotion is understood in this research.
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thus the idea of “models” should not be overemphasized and will not be supported 
in this thesis.
More accurately, debates about “what” democracy is and the process of 
“how” to make it happen were generalized and affected both European and 
American policy-making. It can be argued that democracy promoters were 
interested in the efficiency of the policies more than in the conceptual debates, and 
that this led to multi-faceted democracy promotion. The case studies will test 
whether the focus on elections disregarded more substantial “content” in democracy 
promotion, but a prior overview of these questions is in order. In determining the 
“content” of democracy, the participation of the people and not only of political 
elites seemed necessary, and elements as human rights and the rule of law seemed 
intrinsic; in establishing democratization, links with economic development and 
security seemed to apply.
3.2. Assessing the links between democracy and civil society, the rule of 
law, human rights, economic development, and security
It is beyond the scope of this research to examine the vast literature on civil society
the rule of law, human rights, economic development and security, but an overview 
is necessary to understand the diversity and complexity of democracy promotion 
policies. This discussion also offers interesting hints on potential commonalities and 
differences between American and European approaches.
Since the mid-1990s, multiple publications with a policy-making focus 
emanated from the United Nations (especially the UNDP), the World Bank (notably 
regarding good governance) and the OECD. These influenced democracy promotion 
and complemented the ever-growing academic literature (Beetham, 1999; Burnell & 
Calvert, 2004; Carothers, 2004; Dahl, 1997; L. Diamond et al., 1999; Donnelly, 
1999; Evans, 2001; Goodhart, 2005; Hasenclever & Wagner, 2004; Jordan, Wurzel, 
& Zito, 2005; Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2005; Langlois, 2003; Linz & 
Stepan, 1996; Lippman, 2001; Mansfield & Snyder, 1995; O'Donnell, Schmitter, & 
Whitehead, 1986; Schmitter, 1994; Sorensen, 1998).
Civil society. One first challenge in defining what to promote and how to do it, was 
whether to target institutions and political elites, or citizen participation. The latter
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came to be known, in general terms, as promotion olf “civil society”, and became 
increasingly important in the light of the transitionss in the Central and Eastern 
European and post-Soviet space. These democratizattion processes drew strength 
from people’s movements, and this had a long traditimn in the history of democracy 
(R. Collier, 1999). Regarding international support ffor civil society, this differed, 
nevertheless, from other experiences and certain modlels of democracy promotion, 
which targeted political elites and institutions. Among these, the “pacted transition” 
in Spain often served as example to trigger and desigm reform (Linz & Stepan, 1996, 
p. chapter 6). The focus was here on which actors and! dynamics that could lead and 
establish a path towards democracy.
A relevant side-issue in this conceptual debater was that the focus on either 
institutions/political elites or on civil society usually {presupposed the existence of a 
functioning state19. In such cases, democratization raissed questions of reform and of 
a re-conception or re-balancing of roles among politiical and civil society actors in 
the regulated framework of the state. By contrastt, some cases in Africa and 
international interventions such as the ones in Camtbodia, Bosnia or Timor-Leste, 
made democracy promoters confront the underlying challenge of a dysfunctional 
state framework.
In the framework of this thesis, a pertinent question was whether American 
and European democracy promotion addressed refomn through institutions and new 
political elites or focused on civil society, and \whether this led to diverging 
approaches. For some analysts, the European approach would in theory focus on 
institutions, and more specifically on a system of gowemance that includes multiple 
levels, favors negotiations, and produces norms (MI. Farrell, 2005), compared to 
republican checks and balances in the US. The Aimerican approach, by contrast, 
would underline representative democracy both iin the institutions and in the 
electoral process20. This argument is based on the focus on procedure in Dahl’s 
“polyarchy” definition of democracy (Dahl, 1971),, which created the ground of 
Transition studies and thus influenced democracy promotion. However, many 
analysis have substantiated that participative democracy is typically American, as
19 The functioning state was often an assumption in Transition sttudies, as they first addressed Latin 
America and Southern Europe and ECE. By contrast, this topic >was at the heart of a vast literature in 
Sociology, and this opened new and still relatively weak interdissciplinary channels for the study of 
democracy in the 2000s.
20 A related argument would be that a European model is more ssympathetic to welfare state- 
democracy (Rifkin, 2004).
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observed by de Tocqueville and underlined in critical writings by Putnam and 
Skocpol. Indeed, in the United States, discourses on democracy were never rid of 
both aspects of democracy: the power of/for/by the people (participation) and the 
political regime of representation (Dupuis-Deri, 2004; Kloppenberg, 2003).
The division regarding a civil-society focus in European and American 
democracy promotion policies did not seem substantiated. Both seemed affected by 
the same questions and debates on what content and target would be more adequate 
in a specific case. Indeed, democracy promotion policies incorporated the focus on 
civil society if they did not have it (as was the case with the EU’s EIDHR policies), 
but also considered incumbents and political opposition, together with institutional 
dynamics. In this, flexibility and adaptation to each case was part of the dynamic of 
“learning by doing”. Finally, as discussed in Chapter 3, democracy promotion 
proved to be increasingly transnational as it got closer to the target, so distinctions 
between American and European promoters got increasingly blurred as the policies 
engaged the civil society actors.
Human rights and the rule o f law. Though political rights and the mention of 
elections in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights establish the link with 
democracy, and it is not conceivable to have a democracy without human rights, 
these should not be equated because they have different objectives and have a 
different status in international law. Indeed, some human rights defenders argue that 
the combination with democracy promotion is inadequate (because of their different 
legal status) and even negative because there is too much politicization around the 
latter, as I explored elsewhere (Barrios, 2005). Nevertheless, many argued that 
democracy had been artificially isolated during the Cold War and that it should be 
brought back as a universal right (Goodhart, 2005; Langlois, 2003). Indeed, it can 
be argued that CSCE policies or the emphasis on human rights during the Jimmy 
Carter administration also targeted -implicitly—democracy promotion21. In the 
post-Cold War period, the promotion of human rights has also seen the development
21 Interview with Steven Hochman, Special Assistant to Jimmy Carter since 1982 [Atlanta 9 August 
2004].
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of more specific policies, notably to protect minorities and to defend and enhance 
the role of women22.
The link between the rule of law and democracy is more pragmatic than 
ideological, though there are similar controversies about their prioritization, i.e. to 
which extent democracy can really exist without it. The rule of law, though defined 
differently in different countries and in civil- and common-law traditions, refers to 
the independence and supremacy of a legal system (body of laws and institutions) 
that binds political actors and guarantees rights. In practice, it is necessary for an 
effective functioning of democracy (Ignatieff, 2002; O'Donnell, 2005). 
Nevertheless, critics of the promotion of rule of law abroad have argued that the 
conceptual foundations of the policies are contentious, and that the policies have 
been minimal and state-centered (Golub, 2006; Kleinfeld, 2006)23.
The promotion of human rights and the rule of law doubtlessly contributes to 
democracy, and are arguably their prerequisites; both relate to profound and long­
term changes in the political and even societal systems. Yet they often became 
controversial in their link with democracy promotion policies, because to a certain 
extent they became simply part of “the language” in the calls for offers from 
American and European donors. Indeed, many of these definitions and strategies 
were not thought out, and criticism arose from practitioners in target countries. 
First, an ideological politicization may make policies backfire, e.g. China regularly 
complains about human rights as “Western” promotion in EU-China or US-China 
diplomatic exchange, though it has agreed to them in international documents. 
Second, narrow policies of rule of law have often privileged some aspects such as 
commercial law, defending international interests more than the people’s 
democratic rights. Finally, some policies focused on bureaucratic standards/rules
22 Some of the policies in these fields may have a more direct link with democracy, as the programs 
to foster political organization and participation, while others target economic or cultural rights. The 
observations I gathered during fieldwork were inconclusive, in this regard. In a conversation with a 
Rwandan female parliamentarian who acknowledged the important role of international policies for 
her case, she underlined that “the promotion of women was the promotion of democracy” [Paris 10 
December 2006]. By contrast, an official from a Congolese minister told of how she “had learned the 
language of women rights” and used it to get funds from international donors [interview with 
consultant UNDP, Kinshasa 22 October 2007],
23 The link between the rule of law and the state is complex, but it can be established that the state is 
a precondition, and that in the democratic state, the rule of law is guaranteed within it (there are no 
“brown areas”) and by a series of institutional structures that are intrinsic to the state (though not 
necessarily at federal level).
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and ignored or misrepresented the reality of the country, so the judiciary and the 
police of a not-so-democratic regime could end up stronger.
Many American documents acknowledged the links between human rights, 
the rule of law and democracy, especially in the pragmatic design of programs and 
larger strategies (USAID, 1998a, 2000). Nevertheless, the policies of democracy 
promotion were rather independent (this was strengthened under the rhetoric of the 
Bush administration), and this differentiated them from the European approach. The 
rule of law and human rights appeared consistently in European documents and set 
the ground for EU policies: the TEU (Treaty of Maastricht) and Commission 
communications almost systematically mentioned them together with democracy 
promotion (Commission of the European Communities, 1995a, 1995b, 2000b). The 
premise that democratic rights had to be guaranteed vis-a-vis all-too-powerful 
legislatures and state-authority clearly derived from the European experience of 20th 
century authoritarianism and the post-World War II European institutions to defend 
human rights, notably the supranational European Court of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg. In the post-Cold War period, European states insisted on the triad 
democracy-human rights-rule of law when drafting the Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action at the World Conference on Human Rights of 1993 and the 
CSCE/OSCE documents of the early 1990s (Leben, 1999, pp. 93-95).
Economic development and good governance. The link between economic 
development and democracy promotion goes back to the post-World War II 
paradigm of Modernization. This theory postulated that economic and political 
development go hand in hand in stages; economic growth is otherwise considered a 
precondition for democracy (Lipset, 1959; Rostow, 1960). However, the most 
important aspect in Modernization theory was the fact that this model of economic 
development was capitalist; Rostow’s work was subtitled “a non-Communist 
manifesto” and this promotion of democracy “plus” economic development could 
only be understood as an imperialism of sorts that was proposed by the West in 
contrast to the Soviet model (Mayall, 2005a, p. 36). This constitutive relationship of 
market economy and political freedom had roots in Lockean theories of democracy 
and pervaded the Western liberal tradition on both sides of the Atlantic. However, 
this was especially central in American political ideology of the 1950s and 1960s,
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when it was exported from the US core into Europe too, notably with the Marshall 
Plan24.
This way, in 1957 Millikan and Rostow clearly set the basis for democracy 
promotion universalism; they argued the keys to an effective American foreign 
policy were:
i) increasing the awareness elsewhere in the world that the goals, 
aspirations and values of the American people are in large part 
the same as those of peoples in other countries; and
ii) developing viable, energetic, and confident democratic 
societies through the Free World (Millikan & Rostow, 1957)25.
The democratic triumphalism of the post-Cold War period only confirmed the 
validity of Modernization now that the Communist alternative was eliminated. 
Along these lines, it can be argued that the Modernization paradigm permeated 
democracy promotion policies (Jahn, 2007). When Rostow’s book was reedited in 
1990, International Relation scholars such as Snyder insisted on the validity of this 
structural and seemingly non-ideological paradigm (Snyder, 1996, 2007) . 
However, there were two major problems in that economic development continued 
to be a challenge for many of the Western allies in the “third world”, and in that 
Modernization had suffered terribly from double standards in Latin America 
(Latham, 2000).
Coming back to the links between democracy and development, it can be
argued that even though this model of promotion had shown shortcomings,
Modernization permeated American and European policies and more generally 
development policies worldwide during the post-Cold War period. Through 
USAID, this paradigm permeated American democracy promotion through the 
decades, but it must be noticed that during the Republican administrations of 
Reagan and George W. Bush, more ideological (conservative) “democracy
24 This was the basis for the Latin American initiatives under Kennedy too, notably the Alliance for 
Progress (Lowenthal, 1990).
25 This is also an early example of the links between democracy promotion scholarship and policy­
making, as this book resulted from discussions at the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (Professor Millikan corresponded with President Kennedy on economic aid, 
Professor Rostow served as advisor for both Kennedy and Johnson and was specially involved in the 
Alliance for Progress).
26 Modernization as a path to development was however a clear ideological victory, too. In that 2007 
lecture, Snyder presented Modernization as the path for economic performance that would also 
redress conflict in Africa: these structural explanations tended to ignore contingent political realities.
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promotion” positions coexisted with it27. In Western Europe Modernization was 
also generalized in economic development and cooperation agencies and ministries, 
despite the particularities of national cases28.
The principles of socio-economic development as preconditions for 
democracy informed United Nations policies, the Millennium Development Goals, 
and the UNDP reports. However, many policy-makers in the development-aid world 
still distrusted the politicization and actual efficiency of such links, so further and 
(what seemed to be) more technical research was developed to address these 
questions. In this regard, two elements became central in the new era: good 
governance and conditionality. In sum, it can be argued that the World Bank’s 
concept of good governance came to substitute the politicized view of “democracy” 
in the development paradigm. It targeted accountability and focused on rules and 
methods instead of political regime characteristics, and is better understood in the 
language of managers’ good practices than that of politics. This increased 
technicality was obvious in the ever more complex indicators developed through the 
1990s (Santiso, 2001). In a way, “good governance” sought to overcome the 
contestability and blurring of the concept of democracy, but the difficulty and 
debates on the links with economic development were not totally solved (Leftwich, 
2005)29. The assumption had led to increased conditionality of development aid to 
good governance or other democracy-factors; this spread quickly throughout 
development ministries and financial institutions (international loans and grants). 
Conditionality became the norm, despite ongoing critiques about it being harmful to 
the people and useless for development or for democratization (International Herald 
Tribune, 2006; Neumayer, 2006; Sorensen, 1993). Overall, this trend was common 
to European and American democracy promotion.
In sum, economic development and good governance add important factors to 
the democracy promotion debates, and the thesis explores the extent to which the
27 To a certain extent, the focus on economic development was overcome by the inflated rhetoric of 
Reagan and Bush’s approaches.
28 This depended on die histories and bureaucracies of the different states. For example, in 1990 
Mitterrand made a famous speech at La Baule where he mentioned how democracy was to play a 
more important role in France’s aid policies. In the Nordic countries, development agencies were 
quite independent from the governments and focused on the ground; they also had more autonomy to 
decide on human rights policies, traditionally. Other countries, such as Portugal and Greece, only had 
very small budgets for aid.
29 There is an open debate on the pertinence and shortcomings of “good governance”, especially 
criticized because it may insist on legal structures and accountability but not on citizens’ freedoms, 
and because authoritarian incumbents may find ways to abuse these rules.
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Modernization paradigm brought the US and the EU together, for it drew on 
Western liberal history and was shared by development aid policymakers and 
practitioners. At times, value-based democracy promotion and securitization seemed 
to take over the generalized inputs from Modernization theory.
Security: the Democratic Peace thesis. A final aspect to consider is the link with 
security, most importantly derived from the Kantian argument that “democracies do 
not fight one another”. This argument tied in well with post-Cold War liberal 
triumphalism, establishing that there is a strong correlation between democracy and 
peace (Doyle, 1996; Russet, 1993). Research on the Democratic Peace has been 
explored with a series of models in American political science (Bennett & Stam, 
1998; Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, & Smith, 1999), but at times these 
models imported the assumptions from the assessments of democracy they used 
(often Freedom House’s) or arrived at very obvious conclusions . At times, the 
research focused more on the methods than the actual pertinence of hypothesis and 
findings. Indeed, and much more importantly for our knowledge, the Democratic 
Peace has been established as a correlation; yet it was difficult to establish 
causation between peace and democracy (Mueller, 2004; Ray, 1995). Similarly, it 
was difficult to establish the sequencing of peace and democracy. The normative 
question that derived for democracy promotion was, then: should security be 
targeted first, or democratization? Case-studies hinted at complex and nuanced 
conclusions [in this thesis, this argument is elaborated in Chapter 4].
In the 1990s and beyond, the cases of international intervention for 
peacekeeping and the changing nature of conflict (compared to traditional concepts 
of war) presented additional difficulties to implement positively reinforcing 
policies. Famously, Mansfield and Snyder (1995) postulated that democratization 
led to conflict because of the political and economic destabilization. However, 
democracy promotion was increasingly tied to UN peacemaking and peacebuilding 
operations despite the difficulty of connecting ideals and practice (Newman & Rich, 
2004). On the ground, democracy was now even part of the tools to solve conflict
30 For example, a paper presented at the ISA Annual Convention in San Diego (2007) established 
that war and dictatorship were worse for a country’s economy than peace and democracy after a 
complicated (7 variables), large-N model.
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and not only part of post-conflict resolution, as this thesis analyzes regarding the 
DR Congo.
In sum, though promoting democracy internationally seemed to serve the 
cause of international peace, the links were not systematic. Importantly for this 
research, they also played different roles in the US and in Europe. The Democratic 
Peace theory found unrelenting support from American policy makers and leaders 
in the 1990s who justified democracy promotion for security purposes. All National 
Security Strategy documents mentioned this; for instance Strobe Talbott (Clinton’s 
Deputy Secretary of State) claimed “that proposition is the essence of the national 
security rationale for vigorously supporting, promoting, and when necessary, 
defending democracy in other countries” (Talbott, 1996/1997). By contrast, 
democracy promotion was absent in European Union security documents, the 
rhetoric was much scaled down and cases were always specified: the Balkans, the 
Middle East and North Africa, ACP countries. Though CFSP and European 
Defence Policy only made limited progress, I found this absence important because 
the EU basically embodies the Democratic Peace theory -Eastern enlargement 
proved this dynamic again (W. Wallace, 2003). Overall, there was less 
securitization of democracy promotion in the European rhetoric compared to the US 
(Barrios, 2006)31. This was the case during the war in Iraq, when Europe called for 
the West to defend pacific understandings and policies of democracy promotion, in 
clear reference to the American rhetoric. Patten’s (2003) article “Democracy doesn’t 
flow from the barrel of a gun” appeared in several European publications and was 
quoted extensively in this regard32.
31 The EU rhetoric appealed to human security and was closer to the theories of just war and 
international human rights. Solana’s 2003 European Security Strategy was, for instance, shy 
regarding democracy promotion (but this document mentions the “rule of law” and “human 
security”). By contrast, the American mission of democracy promotion is conflated with the 
achievement of international peace: this is an essential element of Wilsonian grand strategies.
32 The argument of promoting democracy in connection with security should not be confused with 
armed interventions or the use of violence to promote democracy. Nevertheless, this has been raised 
in some accounts of US democracy promotion (Peceny, 1999) and double standards underlined 
(Kinzer, 2006).
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4. Democracy promotion on the ground: positive links, technical 
approach, universality and “learning by doing”
Section 3 documented the conceptual and pragmatic problems to define what to 
promote and how to do it. These debates were conceptual and normative, but they 
also affected democracy promotion policies on the ground. Against this background, 
democracy promotion seemed a controversial and elusive practice. This section 
takes these observations closer to the ground, focusing on a middle-range level of 
policy formation and implementation. At this level, the “rival universalisms” 
emanating from the US and the EU confronted the conceptual and pragmatic 
challenges described above33.
This thesis puts forwards four observations that characterized post-Cold War 
democracy promotion and that will be tested against (and illustrated in) the case 
studies: positive links, technical approach, universality of democracy, and “learning 
by doing”. These are related to one another but highlight specific shortcomings of 
the democracy promotion policies.
4.1. Positive links and technical approach
One first aspect was the assumption of positive links between the different aspects 
and goals described in Section 3: human rights and rule of law, economic 
development, security, civil society, etc. all seemed to go hand in hand. In this way, 
the absence of a comprehensive strategy would not be necessarily harmful because 
democracy would be reinforced in the end.
Nevertheless, though they all related and contributed to democracy 
promotion, the assumption that these policies worked in a sort of “virtuous” (as 
opposed to “vicious”) circle was erroneous. Instead, they involved distinct and 
sometimes opposed targets, and they usually implied trade-offs.
For example, policies to foster the rule of law involve strengthening 
institutions and the state at different levels to create a system that is independent of 
government. By contrast, policies to foster civil society target people’s civic 
participation, counterpart and check against the institutions. In a case like the
331 am thankful to professors M. Smith and M. Kaldor for helping me refine these points and 
strengthen the thesis conceptual framework, notably regarding my arguments on this middle-range 
level of democracy promotion policies.
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Eastern Congolese provinces, justice is malfunctioning and needs to be promoted as 
an essential element in a democracy. Here the question is, what to promote? Should 
the institutions and the rule of law be strengthened, giving more independent power 
to the judicial branch and fighting corruption in the system? Or should democracy 
promoters strengthen civil society associations defending human rights and 
denouncing violations? While these are obviously not opposed goals, there are 
choices to be made and the potential result would be a stronger state or a stronger 
civil society. Democracy promotion policy-making assumed that all will work in the 
same (good) direction, but these links were not always easy and positive. On the 
contrary, there were cases of trade-off. In these Congolese provinces, democracy 
promotion has prioritized the target of civil society, and thus lawyers work with 
associations that usefully denounce injustice. However, the institution remains 
corrupted and malfunctioning, and there is no rule of law. My observation here is 
not that civil society policies were “wrong”, but that democracy promotion assumed 
positive links, and that there was no strategic plan.
The second aspect refers to democracy promotion policies being 
introduced as if they were neutral and “technical” instead of a clear form of political 
intervention. Investing democracy promotion with a technical approach arguably 
contributed to two effects: first, creating an image of efficiency and effectiveness 
and second, legitimizing the international intervention. The universalisms of 
democracy promotion materialized in a “technical approach”, crafted at a middle- 
range level of policy formation both in the US and the EU.
American and European policy documents were usually written in a style 
of pretended neutrality and professionalism, as if democracy promotion could be 
accomplished as a form of technical progress based on models. The USAID 
Handbook o f democracy and governance indicators (USAID, 1998b) and EU 
Commission’s Communication on Democratisation, the rule o f law, respect for  
human rights and good governance (Commission of the European Communities, 
1998) are examples of this. In addition, the institutions tasked research institutes and 
individuals to draft papers and guidelines, and they utilized documents created by 
other bodies such as Freedom House, International IDEA, the German Development 
Institute (DIE) or the South African EISA (Freedom House, 2007; International
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IDEA, 2000). The political party foundations also developed their own manuals34. 
Numerous projects were created ad hoc to work on a target region or country, and 
also to help policymakers brainstorm, for example countless consultancies and 
workshops took place under the auspices of the European Parliament’s DG External 
Policies.
Because these actors were non-governmental, they tended to address 
democracy promotion from a different perspective, often focusing on the goals to be 
achieved on the ground and on the processes (elections, reform of institutions and 
laws, etc.) identified with transition. To a certain extent, this was a classic instance 
of bureaucratic politics and government where the institutions need information and 
expertise, and the non-govemmental groups interested in this subject (mostly non­
profit, but also some companies) will seek to influence policy. This kind of direct 
input and lobbying is not so frequent in American foreign policy-making (Drezner, 
2000), and democracy promotion became indeed an original network of policy- 
locations. In the EU this was maybe not so exceptional, as the Commission’s 
limited staff and development of tasks has exponentially multiplied lobbies and 
policy institutes in Brussels. Noticeably, this indicated a Europeanization of 
democracy promotion compared to Member State capitals35.
The “expertise” put forward with this non-academic literature stripped 
democracy promotion of its ideological and interventionist clout. In a Realist 
analysis, David Chandler (2006) argued that this “technicization” of democracy 
promotion was an instrumental discourse seeking to hide imperial behavior. While 
Chandler is right in that promoters sought to depoliticize their action, it is not 
convincing that this was explained by the American and European interested quests 
only, and two additional factors existed. On the one hand, “neutral” or “a-political” 
democracy promotion was based in an international morality (Carr, 2001, 1981) that 
was favored by the context of post-Cold War democratic triumphalism. On the 
other hand, many policy-makers in Europe and the US were genuinely impressed 
with the experts’ knowledge about specific areas and countries and, more 
importantly, with the technicalities (concepts, processes, models) that sought to
34 These documents are available on the institutions’ websites and printed copies can be requested.
35 It is a claim in this thesis that the way MS ministerial or development agency personnel 
developed networks on democracy promotion constructed a European approach de facto, though 
these connections were loose
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replicate social sciences behavioral methods in policy-making . This substantiated 
that international democracy promotion should, and could, work.
Yet democracy promotion is unavoidably a political, ideology-laden 
phenomenon in International Relations. This kind of neutral, technical policy­
making met important challenges in the political realities of competing interests, 
trade-offs and power distribution. These regarded both the promoters’ side (leaders, 
institutional dynamics e.g. between MS and EU, bureaucracies, evolving budgets 
and programs) and the “target” countries and regions.
4.2. Building universal consensus: worldwide democracy promotion
The third element observed at this middle-range level of policy formation was the
universal validity of democracy promotion. Indeed, this universality had to be 
substantiated to justify and give ground to the policies. This aspect did not help 
emphasize distinct European or American approaches, rather the opposite, because 
it raised questions about the West and about potential differences between them and 
between the theory and practice of democracy.
More specifically, a compromise had to be found among three aspects of 
democracy: its universality, its Western origin (and the domination of the Western 
liberal model), and its adaptation to the cultural specificities on the ground37. Once 
they could be reconciled, democracy promotion would have increased legitimacy 
and feasibility. Yet the specificities of an “American” and a “European” 
universalism would be underplayed.
First, the universal validity of democracy was demonstrated with the post- 
Cold War era of triumphalism. Theoretical claims along these lines included 
Fukuyama’s Hegelian “end of history” thesis (Fukuyama, 1989) and new 
interpretations of international law whereby a state’s recognition in the international 
community would depend on its democratic regime (Franck, 1992). In more 
practical terms, this claim was supported by the influential writings of Amartya Sen
36 I agree with Fred Halliday’s analysis of the methodological limits o f behavioralism as a 
“scientific” detour to understand International Relations, (Halliday, 1994, pp. 27-31) However, an 
important aspect of behavioralism was its intense relationship with the policy-making world: these 
quantitative-based, variable-oriented methods continue to convey a “scientific” approach to policy­
making and help ground policies, much like in the realm of Economics.
37 This argument is set out here as an analysis of the challenges in the field, and will be used as an 
entry-point to the case studies in the second part of the thesis. I will thus assess the challenge of a 
“consensual definition” in the Congo, the MENA region, and the global Community of Democracies.
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and the new leadership (Kofi Annan and Boutros Boutros-Ghali) and policy 
impulses at the United Nations.
Amartya Sen’s “Development as Freedom” and “Democracy as a universal 
value” (Sen, 1999) powerfully established the link between democracy and 
economic development, which was used to support the adoption or confirmation of 
good governance and democracy promotion policies worldwide. Sen’s writings 
(based on the Indian experience) introduced a sensitivity to culture that portrayed 
democracy as a universal value, defending the policies’ link with economics from 
an “insider” perspective: India’s regional and municipal distribution, in his case. 
The United Nations, endowed with multilateral legitimacy and supporting 
democracy in the post-Cold War period, also emphasized the universality of 
democracy. UNDP and the Millennium Goals followed the principles linking 
economy and democracy; the institution increasingly endorsed a discourse of the 
state’s “responsibility to protect” and included democracy promotion as part of 
security operations (Newman & Rich, 2004). Declarations from the General 
Assembly and speeches from Kofi Annan (2002) explicitly reintroduced democracy 
as an element of the United Nations action, establishing a base for promoters and 
their policies around the world. Yet this universalization respected state-sovereignty 
principles and opened the door to interpretations of democracy. For example, in 
Resolution 55/96 of the General Assembly (2001) a preamble clause “recogniz[es] 
that though all democracies share common features, there is no universal model of 
democracy”. While the trend was to substantiate the universality of democracy, the 
UN state-centric dynamics allowed resisting states to safeguard their potential 
interpretation of “democracy”.
Secondly, a consensual definition was needed to tame the argument that 
democracy promotion was just an instance of Western domination. In a world where 
the West had “won the Cold War”, the United States was hegemonic, and Europe 
inherited a past of colonialism, both the US and the EU had to lower their profile as 
promoters. Indeed, some research on democracy promotion criticized the imperial 
tones of the American and European missions. Hazel Smith (2000a, p. 24) argued 
that theories as the Democratic Peace were charged with Western ideology, and that 
implicit or explicit claims of superiority led to export a Western version of 
democracy (state-centric, liberal). For some, international democracy promotion
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was an instance of Western liberalism not only in theory but also in practice (W. I. 
Robinson, 1996a).
Other authors had a more conciliatory position, conceding that democracy 
promotion had a Western origin but arguing that the periphery accepted these norms 
coming from the Western liberal core . For example, Roland Paris explained there 
was a widespread international sanctioning of peacebuilding in what was, in 
addition, a benign mission civilisatrice (Paris, 2002). This meant that Western 
ethical grounds and morality became embedded in democracy promotion, as they 
were in the cause of universal human rights. Chris Brown explained how the 
Western origin and liberal attributes in these causes could not be denied, even if 
activists were sometimes unwilling to admit that “universal grounding is a fiction” 
(Brown, 1997, p. 42). Moreover, ideologies and in general “social morality” in IR 
are the product of dominant nations or groups of nations (Carr, 2001, 1981, p. 75). 
Thus, as far as there was a hegemonic “triumphant West” during the post-Cold War 
period, the surge for democracy promotion was Western, too39. In this sense, there 
was an unsolvable tension between the Western attributes and the universalism of 
democracy promotion, and this tension was visible in the academic debates and in 
the way practitioners underlined neutrality and consensus.
Thirdly, the idea of a universal consensus was challenged by potential cultural 
specificities of democracy, i.e. the extent to which democracy could (and should) be 
adapted to the place where it was promoted. This challenge consisted in finding a 
compromise between procedural notions of democracy, and the relativist notions 
that could make some authoritarian Asian, Arab or African regimes claim they were 
democracies “their own way”. In the 1970s and 1980s, Transition studies had 
anchored definitions of democracy that were mostly procedural and thus culturally 
“neutral”. For example, the only cultural reference that Robert Dahl made on the 
requisites for polyarchy involved procedure and not substance, i.e. that 
consociational democracy should exist in case of subcultural units in one country 
(Dahl, 1989, pp. 254-264)40. In this tradition, scholars such as Schmitter and Karl 
(1991) and comparativists such as Munck and Verkuilen (2002) perpetuated
38 This was also Franck’s (1992) claim of international norms changing towards acceptance of 
democratic regimes.
39 This argument is best explained from a constructivist point of view (Hopf, 1998).
40 Consociational democracy would be a means to manage the different cultural subgroups allowing 
for compensated representation and power distribution (e.g. quotas for minorities).
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definitions of democracy that could be applied regardless of culture. However, this 
literature tended to ignore the contention that Huntington famously put on the 
academic table of this post-Cold War period, and that practitioners confronted: the 
rising role of culture in globalized International Relations, the potential for 
civilizations to clash, and the dynamics of “the West against the rest” (Huntington, 
1997b).
Regardless of Huntington’s position, the role of culture and of 
geographical/traditional specificities in democratic rule was a key element in the 
practical definition of democracy for promoters. Practitioners working on non- 
Westem cases were rather sensitive to the claims of the cultural particularities of 
democracy, respecting Bhikhu Parekh’s (1993) view that religion could be 
important in public affairs (unlike in Western secular democracies). However, this 
could eventually lead to definitions of democracy for each culture, which was 
problematic. Moreover, the community-focus and religion-inclusive policies posed 
theoretical problems for the liberal traditions of individual rights and freedoms and 
of secularism in the state (Blaug & Schwarzmantel, 2001, p. 419). For these 
reasons, despite their increased sensitivity, policy-makers of American and 
European democracy promotion safeguarded liberal principles on most occasions41.
These questions were especially relevant (also in the scope of this thesis) for 
the cases of democracy in Africa and in the Arab-Muslim world, but there were no 
unanimous answers. For example, some analyses of African particularities included 
a role for the community (prioritizing collective instead of individual decision­
making), and active participation instead of representation (Ake, 1993). 
Nevertheless, others argued that institutional and state-fragility and not cultural 
conditions were at the heart of the African democratic challenges (Badie, 2000). 
The Arab-Muslim world, which had been highlighted by Huntington and became 
central in post 9/11 IR, led to numerous studies and some contradictory findings on 
the compatibility between Islam and democracy (Ehteshami, 2004; Sartori, 2007).
There was a struggle to reconcile the cultural peculiarities, democracy’s 
universality and the Western liberal model in both the concept and policies of 
democracy promotion. The policies needed the cultural arguments to counterbalance
41 Overall my findings were that liberal democratic values pervaded the US and EU policies, though 
actors closer to the ground showed more sensitivity to cultural particularities. These findings and 
some examples will be discussed in Chapter 3 regarding the policy-locations, and this “compromise” 
definition of democracy will be discussed further in the case studies, notably in Chapters 5.
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the perception of Western hegemony and imposition. However, Laurence 
Whitehead found this counterproductive: maintaining the validity of different 
“cultural blocs” meant that each bloc would legitimize its own particular definition 
of democracy in a potentially relativist way. As an alternative, he suggested an 
“adjudication at international level” of a definition that would make sense in view 
of the globalizing democratic trends in the post-Cold War period (Whitehead, 2002, 
pp. 23-24). Yet this led to two almost inevitable problems: the fact that the 
“international epistemic communities” he mentions are closely related to (or even 
embedded in) the West42, and that the definition of democracy finally adjudicated 
would probably avoid cultural peculiarities i.e. validating procedural notions, as 
Transition studies did.
4.3. “Learning by doing”
The fourth observation was that policy-makers and practitioners dealt with the 
design and implementation of policies in a relatively improvised way; when 
American and European democracy promotion came to be implemented there was a 
dynamic of “learning by doing”. In view of the surge of democracy promotion 
budgets and programs43 and of the limited applicability of former experiences of 
transition from different world regions, most policies were flexible and did not 
conform to preconceived approaches.
This translated into broad approaches where concepts were conflated and were 
used inconsistently; the guidelines were flexible, sometimes patchy. The three 
arguments described above were reflected in this “learning by doing”. For example, 
the universality of democracy promotion confronted the need for cultural 
specificities in some countries, so practitioners tried to adapt policies on the ground. 
However, this could be done to a certain extent only, because policy-makers in the 
US and Europe controlled and introduced safeguards regarding implementation. If 
“learning by doing” could lead to pragmatically getting new leaders or group 
involved on the ground, bureaucracies and guidelines at the earlier stages tried to
42 His epistemic community would be an “emerging collective, international network of specialists, 
lobbyists, activists and practitioners”, p. 23.
43 As an example, USAID democracy programs totaled USD 165 million in 1991 and 635 million in 
1999, and rising to USD 1.2 billion in 2004. Sources: Carothers (1999) table p. 49 for 1991-99, and 
USAID (2004) p. 7.
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verify the convenience of such new measures, or funds were re-assigned. Thus, 
there was “learning by doing”, but it was limited by the conditions in the US and 
EU processes [see Chapter 3].
Similarly, the assumption of positive links and the emphasis on a technical 
approach were reflected in aspects of “learning by doing”. This led, for instance, to 
the use of categories as “top-down” and “bottom-up” democracy promotion. The 
former supposedly referred to supporting the state and institutions “top-down” (this 
included electoral processes) and the latter anti-to supporting authoritarian 
movements and civil society “bottom-up” (Carothers, 1999; Gillespie & Whitehead, 
2002; Haynes, 2007; USAID, 2000; Youngs, 2001a). These categories seemed to be 
based on a technical definition with a corresponding strategy, but this was rather 
artificial. Indeed, these concepts and directionality of democratization led to weak 
and blurred explanations, and the categories of “top-down” and “bottom-up” were 
used to mean different things in different guidelines and assessments44. Hence, they 
have not been used in this thesis.
The dynamic of “learning by doing” allowed for some flexibility when 
implementing democracy promotion in different regions or countries. This way, in 
Eastern and Central Europe the focus on civil society was complemented with 
policies to strengthen the rule of law (for example, reform of legal codes and 
training of civil servants).
In sum, both American and European democracy promoters faced challenges 
when defining their policies, facing important problems as the policies had to be 
more specific on the ground: the challenges of implementation. “Learning by doing” 
was the way to deal with these challenges, but this did not mean the strategies were 
straightforward (difficulties arose in the bureaucratic processes and in specific 
cases) or coherent.
These points are developed later in the thesis: Chapter 3 will analyze the 
complexity of the US and EU democracy promotion policy-locations, and the case 
studies will pick up on these themes. This will further document the tension
44 The information available in Commission Communications, European Initiative for Democracy 
and Human Rights (EIDHR) reports, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
summaries, etc. confirms the volatility of this conceptual and empirical research. Concepts are used 
for some reports but are not kept through the years, or analysis of good governance are based on 
changing indicators.
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between, on the one hand, the promoters’ preferences and abilities and, on the other, 
the trade-offs and controversies on the ground.
Conclusion
As with other subjects in foreign policy, democracy promotion can only be 
understood in the larger context of domestic politics and of competing (and not 
always complementary) objectives and limited means. At the same time, democracy 
promotion is also a policy to be undertaken “on the ground”, and promoters 
prioritize some aspects and can have assumptions on what to promote and how to do 
it. The diplomatic discussions and the documents issued in the US-EU summits that 
were mentioned at the beginning of this chapter are better understood in this light. 
This chapter has established the conceptual framework for this thesis, introducing a 
working definition of democracy promotion that allows studying both the political 
understandings and the empirical manifestations of American and European 
approaches.
This chapter has presented the main questions in the academic study of 
democracy promotion as a necessary background for this thesis: goals and policy 
instruments (methods, strategies) matter, and so does the context. Four important 
claims were made to support and frame this study of US and EU democracy 
promotion in the different sections. First, I suggested a definition of democracy 
promotion as an element of foreign policy, but argued that this research will remain 
sensitive to how this translates on the ground -Transitions studies set the 
background for relevant questions. Secondly, I underlined the role of history and 
case study for this subject. More specifically, I argued that the triumphalism and 
“surge” of democracy in the post-Cold War (notably regarding Eastern and Central 
Europe) influenced the phenomenon of democracy promotion itself.
Thirdly, I summarized the main academic debates on defining democracy and 
assessed the links and preconditions with human rights, the rule of law, economic 
development (Modernization), security, and civil society. I claimed there were 
conceptual tensions and also pragmatic trade-offs when seeking to promote 
democracy not only as a procedure, and then assuming a sort of “virtuous” circle 
where all elements complement one another. Here, I also showed American and
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European approaches reflected these debates but there was no outright, convincing 
definition of a US approach “versus” a EU one. Fourthly, I notice some relevant 
challenges that emanate from democracy promotion as a practice on the ground and 
that continue to affect the study of this subject. Among them, I highlighted the 
assumption of positive links among policies in a “virtuous circle”, the emphasis on 
democracy promotion as a technical expertise (depoliticizing the subject), the 
promoter’s need to build a universal consensus around democracy promotion and 
the challenges that arise as policy-makers and practitioners work with limited and 
changing knowledge and capacity, “learning by doing”.
This chapter has introduced the complexity of studying the normative subject 
of democracy promotion, giving evidence of a potential gap between academic 
knowledge and the challenges that promoters face on the ground. Importantly for 
this thesis, it has reconciled two analytical entry-points of democracy promotion: as 
an element of foreign policy, and as a factor to trigger and foster democratization on 
the ground. The chapter has also offered the first hints on what may unite or 
differentiate American and European democracy promotion, both as policy- 
processes that emanate on each side of the Atlantic and as evolving, case-dependent 
challenges that arise when the policies are implemented. This framework will allow 
the thesis to connect the argument on American and European “rival universalisms” 
with the arguments on pragmatic policy-formation and implementation difficulties, 
and then test this in the case studies.
It is to the central argument of “rival universalisms” that Chapter 2 now turns, 
as I discuss the changing transatlantic relations of the post-Cold War period and the 
role that democracy promotion played in them.
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Chapter 2. Post-Cold War transatlantic relations: rival 
universalisms
Observers of American and European politics have always underlined that 
democracy is a distinct aspect of European and American identity: it may be 
something they have in common, but it is above all an essential idea that defines 
each of them. In this regard, historian Alan Brinkley (2006) evoked the Freedom 
Train that in the late 1940s traveled all over the United States to emphasize 
America’s identity1. Anne Marie Slaughter (2007, pp. 64-65) spoke of “democracy 
and liberty [being] deeply intertwined in our history and our national identity as 
Americans”; of their promotion she said “we should: we must”. Similarly, on the 
European side, political scientist Norberto Bobbio (1987) reminded:
“the concepts of Europe and democracy are impossible to break apart: 
such is the recurrent European ideology. I understand this as an idea a bit 
less rational than a myth, a bit less defined than a theory, a bit less 
pretentious than an ideal”2.
These distinct identities have nevertheless a common ground, and the history 
of liberal democracy unites both sides of the Atlantic in a Western tradition and 
quest. When Eastern and Central Europe was under Communism, some spoke of 
“the kidnapped West” (Kundera, 1983). For these reasons, with the end of the Cold 
War and the Zeitgeist of “triumph of democracy” and “end of history”, we could 
have expected a stronger West, with democracy promotion as a ground for common 
transatlantic action.
1 This train was an exhibit to remind the principles of US peculiarities and citizenship on a tour of 
48 states and got direct approval from president Truman; another American Freedom Train toured 
the country in 1976 to celebrate the nation’s 200th birthday.
2 In this definition, Bobbio possibly contrasted this view of democracy with the United States more 
utopian conceptions: myth, theory, ideal.
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Yet the end of the Cold War did not create such a scenario of unified 
transatlantic action and power. Indeed, the fall of the Berlin wall took off the unity- 
mantle of security and ideological arguments that had disguised existing tensions 
and downplayed European initiatives and schemes (Cox, 2007). The transatlantic 
relationship was shaken, and academic and diplomatic discussions had to consider 
whether this meant demolition, minimal maintenance, refurbishment or rebirth3.
Against this background, this chapter analyzes democracy promotion as an 
issue-area of American and European foreign policy, and how this affected 
transatlantic relations. It argues that democracy was a common ground and its 
promotion a common objective, yet this did not translate in a converging approach. 
The focus here is on the promoters rather than the target.
For my theoretical approach, I have drawn on the proposition made by 
Elgstrom and Smith to link role and identity politics in the analysis of EU external 
action (Elgstrom & Smith, 2006, pp. 5-6). Indeed, such a link allows observing not 
only US and EU identity leading to democracy promotion, but also democracy 
promotion itself constructing the US and EU international roles. The chapter 
contends that democracy promotion was increasingly portrayed as a distinct basis 
for separate US and EU action. In this regard, I advance the argument that two 
“universalisms” of sorts developed, and that they became a source of transatlantic 
rivalry rather than cooperation. In these two distinct narratives, democracy 
promotion was no longer emphasized as common value, it became instead a 
compatible interest. As established in Chapter 1, this broader analytical framework 
allows investigating democracy promotion as both resulting from the “rival 
universalisms” and contributing to them.
Democracy promotion thus illustrates the evolution of post-Cold War 
transatlantic relations that swung from drift to rift: in the rhetoric the allies drifted 
along, but the strengthening of universalisms and differentiated policies of 
democracy promotion confirmed a rift. While this rift was manifest after the 
American-led intervention in Iraq during the Bush administration, the chapter 
contends that it was not only contingent. The chapter presents American post-Cold 
War democracy promotion as one aspect of the “new” hegemony. It also suggests
3 1 am thankful to Lisa Aronsson for the discussions we have had on the fashioning of “new” 
transatlantic narratives (academic and policy-oriented interpretations) during the post-Cold War 
period (Aronsson, 2009).
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that a main factor of change in the transatlantic relationship was the “rise” and 
confirmation of international roles for the European Union. For this, the chapter 
elaborates on how democracy promotion played an important yet controversial role 
in the portrait of the EU as a civilian (super)power, analyzing the EU discourse and 
some of the norm entrepreneurs.
Section 1 will discuss the context and evolutiom of American and European 
democracy promotion and the rhetoric of coopeiration. Section 2 discusses 
democracy promotion within the US and EU post-Cold War “universalisms”. These 
“universalisms” were grounded on special, unique characteristics; they asserted 
distinct international projects, and prescribed some action/methods in international 
action. Section 3 then focuses on the United States, and analyzes the post-Cold War 
context of American hegemony, some nuances between administrations and the 
changes triggered by the September 11, 2001 attacks. Section 4 assesses the 
evolution of the European Union since the 1990s and the way in which democracy 
promotion was affected by the debates on the EU potential as an international 
“civilian power” that partly conceived itself vis-a-vis (when not in opposition to) 
the United States. This section finishes with the case in point of a European 
foundation that sought to define and strengthen an EU approach.
1. Historical context and evolution of Ameriican and European 
approaches
Despite the distinct histories, the arguments for different American and European 
models in democracy promotion should not be overstretched because of the 
common Western roots of democratic ideologies -even if this did not mean an 
univocal understanding of the concept. European valuies were identified in ancient 
Greece in comparison with the non-democratic barbarians, Montesquieu spoke of 
Europe’s predisposition to democracy compared t<o Asia, and all through the 
centuries the idea of Europe has often included democracy (Hersant & Durant- 
Bogaert, 2000); yet the history of Europe has been one of dichotomies and 
synthesis between democratic and authoritarian rule.
In relatively similar ways, the United States national discourses and political 
historiography clearly cemented an ideal identity of America as a democracy since
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its foundation, and politicians from all fronts endlessly resorted to it and endorsed 
the mission of “democracy promotion” as if it were limitary, transparent and self- 
evident (T. Smith, 1994). This was definitely not the (case in history, as shown by 
the Civil War, by the connotations that confronted Republicans and Democrats in 
the 19th century (Dupuis-Deri, 2004)4, and by the way the national discourse 
depended on ideological traits (Ninkovich, 1999). In tlhe 20th century, “democracy” 
increasingly came to be identified with liberalism, as? in Louis Hartz’s influential 
1955 book The liberal tradition in America (Kloppenlberg, 2003), clearly opposed 
to communism (Doyle, 1996).
1.1. America and democracy promotion since World War II
Before World War n, democracy was doomed im the Spanish Republic and 
Czechoslovakia (and in Italy and Germany), so it became clear that democracy 
would be central to peace. The Allies utilized a democratic rhetoric during the war, 
visible in speeches by US Chief of Staff G. Marshalll and UK Prime Minister W. 
Churchill. An interesting document of the period was the series of films 
commissioned to Frank Capra (1942) to explain the War to the American troops 
and the general public, which he entitled Why we fightt. In these films, the theme of 
“free world vs. slave world” is recurrent; the rise on defense expenses is justified to 
build “the arsenal of democracy”5. Then, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union 
would become a new non-free “other” in the Western lrhetoric.
This way, democracy promotion was clearly identified with the Western fight 
against communism during the Cold War. Westad (2005, pp. 9-10) has shown how 
this ideology, constitutive of the American state and identity, has a long history and 
clear teleological functions: “what America is today, ithe world will be tomorrow”. 
Indeed, the Cold War’s democracy promotion was amother reinterpretation of this 
universalism. In this period, the securitization of American policies and rhetoric 
was underlined: “making democracy safe for the world” should also serve US 
interests (Lowi, 1979). This securitization is key to understand US foreign policy im
4 In the 19th century, Republicans were “against democracy” because they associated this word with 
chaos; Dupuis-Deri’s argument is that the widespread acceptance of “democracy” as positive 
political reference took time both in France and in the United States.
The rhetoric of the Allies against the Axis was clearly based on the theme of democracy vs.. 
totalitarianism, and this film illustrates the role that democracy promotion played in justifying 
America’s international role. The US government commissioned! the film, which was then shown to  
soldiers, the public, etc.
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general (Beeson & Higgott, 2005), and the context of post-World War II liberal 
institutionalism6. The plans for an order that combined peace and democracy were 
constitutive of the mounting American hegemony, and would only be emphasized 
with “the triumph” of the 1990s.
Nevertheless, it is important to notice that during the Cold War, as before and 
after, the practice of democracy promotion was never consensual and led to diverse 
discourses and programs, which makes it difficult to speak of “American” 
democracy promotion. For example, the links with Modernization and the 
development of aid programs (including the Marshall plan) and of the USAID 
bureaucracy were highlighted during Democratic administrations, while Ronald 
Reagan’s Westminster speech of 1982 is considered a benchmark in conservative 
ideology (he underlined here the role of Western civilization and Europe, too).
Some analyses have even disregarded that democracy promotion existed at all 
because of the cases of “double standards”, where this policy was supposedly a 
smoke screen for other American interests (Kinzer, 2006; Lieven, 2006; W. I. 
Robinson, 1996b). Indeed, inconsistencies took place under Democratic and 
Republican administrations. For example the program Alliance for Progress arrived 
in Chile in 1961 but there was support for the coup against Allende in 1973 
(Johnston, 1999), and the interventions in El Salvador and Guatemala were not pro­
democracy, despite the rhetoric (Carothers, 1991). Yet the occasional calls in the 
policy-making world to be rid of this ethical, value-based enterprise because of the 
“double standards” never succeeded; this was famously the case of Reagan’s 
ambassador J. Kirkpatrick (1982). Her advice for isolationist and interest-led 
foreign policy still persists in some ideological branches in American politics, 
however some remarks she dared at the time could no longer fit the post-Cold War 
period, i.e. “traditional leaders do not disturb” and “authoritarian governments are 
less repressive than revolutionary autocracies [...] more susceptible of 
liberalization, and more compatible with US interests” (Kirkpatrick, 1982, pp. 48- 
49). This Republican discourse faded in the 1990s and 2000s, and was substituted 
by neo-conservatism.
Still, this did not mean that “double standards” would end with the Cold War, 
though this was certainly envisaged in some policy circles (Carothers, 1999, p. 5).
6 As discussed in section 2, American universalism is grounded both on the expansion of values and 
on the preservation (safety) of America.
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Regarding this question, this thesis contends that the problem of effective 
democracy promotion has not necessarily (or only) been one of hypocrisy, but one 
of balancing out rather complex interests and intricate networks and politics at the 
promoters’ and the target countries; interests sometimes competed, sometimes 
complemented each other. Controversies about democracy promotion led to choices 
that were hardly ever perfectly rational, and to outcomes that portrayed such 
imperfect working solutions. That was so in the past and remains the case in 
contemporary cases.
1.2. European experience; the role of the Conference for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe
The European perspectives and practices of democracy promotion during the Cold 
War were affected by the same ideological battle (the West vs. communism), the 
same potential for different policies depending on governments and countries, and 
the same complexity to balance out interests that amounted to pictures of “double 
standards” described above7. It is worth stressing, however, that webs of new 
Western institutions were created, and these included democracy as a defining 
element: the Council of Europe (created in 1949), NATO, and the European 
Community itself (Bitsch, 1996)8. The links between economy and security were 
also evident in the aid from the Marshall Plan and the logic underlying the 
European Communities themselves. Significantly, the first meetings on European 
Political Cooperation already referred to democracy, as in the Luxembourg report'.
1 It is beyond the scope of this research to discuss how the different countries in Western Europe
evolved after World War II, and the role of democracy promotion in this evolution. It is worth
mentioning some national peculiarities to illustrate these points, even if  in a simplified way: Nordic
countries reinterpreted their neutrality in policies of human rights independent from the
governments, France struggled with the ideological and pragmatic problems posed by its colonies
and by the American control of Western security, West Germany lacked a proper foreign policy 
(which was partly “replaced” by development aid and initiatives around the party Stiftungen since 
1957). In addition, it is worth stressing that Turkey was admitted to the Council of Europe and to 
NATO but the argument of “insufficient democratic standards” still keeps it out of the European
Union in 2009.
8 Democracy was one of the prerequisites to join the EC, but in a rough division of tasks another 
institution, the Council of Europe, was to undertake the promotion of human rights and democracy 
in the continent. To this day, there is a corridor (not always open, and entry of non-EU individuals is 
controlled strictly) joining the buildings of the EU and the Council of Europe in Strasbourg. The 
Council of Europe had a relative renaissance in the post-Cold War period as it scrutinized the 
democratic transitions of post-communist states, but its policy of “easy membership” has also 
damaged its credibility (it co-opted states early in the reform process so that democratization 
continues “from inside”, including all o f Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space i.e. 47 states in 
2009).
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“A united Europe must be founded upon the common heritage of respect 
for the liberty and the rights of men, and must assemble democratic States 
having freely elected parliaments. This united Europe remains the 
fundamental aim [...]’’(Council of Foreign Ministers, 1970)9.
Here, Europe itself is portrayed as a project of democracy promotion, in an 
interesting case of domestic-external linkages: the aim is European (“domestic”), 
even if the meeting was to coordinate foreign policy. The role for Europe as an 
actor with external relations emerged as interdependence and integration were 
furthered, amidst trends of both Europeanization and state-sovereignty, but also 
thanks to the key, active role of the American “partner and patron” (W. Wallace, 
1990, 1994; White, 2001, pp. 71-93). In this regard, it is interesting (and for some, 
paradoxical) that the European Union may seek to gain international leverage vis-a- 
vis the United States, which had been an active sponsor of its creation.
The case of the Conference, later Organization, for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (CSCE, OSCE) and Helsinki Accords (1975) deserves special mention as 
a forum with particular European input. One aspect was the emphasis on human 
rights, which would prove to trigger political change. Two others were the role of 
multilateralism and of socialization through co-optation, as this was a diplomatic 
forum with the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. While the Nixon 
administration was skeptical, European Community countries (with a relatively 
unified position) included the human rights/political basket and insisted on broad 
inclusion (Lundestad, 2003, pp. 174-175). The CSCE also set interesting precedents 
for contemporary dynamics of democracy promotion, bringing in activists from 
civil society. Some documents of the time illustrate CSCE support for dissidents 
that could play a role in democratization, as well as the creation of transnational, 
non-governmental groups to monitor the implementation of the Helsinki Accords 
(Hanhimaki & Westad, 2004, pp. 531-532)10.
The CSCE also illustrated some of the transatlantic tensions that would seem 
clearer in the post-Cold War period. In Europe, multilateralism was embedded and 
there was positive consideration of this kind of inclusive forum and of medium to 
long-term socialization (Bitsch, Loth, & Poidevin, 1998). In America, much like
9 The reference to “having elected parliaments” set the contrast with the communist regimes that 
called themselves democratic.
10 Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia also resulted from this context.
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Kissinger during the Cold War, many contemporary policy-makers and analysts 
(especially conservatives) were frustrated with forums that seemed “toothless” and 
diplomatic negotiations (Kupchan, 1996). Such reluctance has always accompanied 
the many initiatives of American multilateralism, and this is partly explained by the 
unilateralism and even isolationism of part of the political establishment (Hassner 
& Vaisse, 2003, p. 45). Indeed, the US outspokenly favored international 
institutionalism during the Cold War with the Organization of American States and 
the United Nations (Halperin, 1993; Ikenberry, 2001), yet these conceptions of 
multilateralism also involved American hegemony and selective participation 
(Patrick, 2002; W. Wallace, 2002)11.
1.3. General features: European long-term, indirect approach;
American result- and security-oriented approach
This way, different experiences with democracy and autocracy [cf. Chapter 1] and 
in international relations (World War n, the Cold War) shaped American and 
European approaches of democracy promotion in direct or indirect ways. In this 
regard, the EU arguably inherited a more long-term view and indirect approach: 
programs were not controlled by government, but established in the bureaucracies 
of Development and Foreign Ministries. These policies did not directly push for 
reform, they sought reform in the long run; they also avoided excessive visibility 
and could adapt to the context. In addition, EU conditionality (for membership) was 
stricter, but other multilateral forums were maintained in parallel (as with the 
Council of Europe) and fostered socialization and some opportunities for reform 
even if they were limited12. In this, the EU conforms to an international identity of 
milieu-shaping i.e. democratizing the European continent (K. E. Smith, 2003a, pp. 
200-201).
In accordance with these features, international political aid had an important 
precedent in the German Stiftungen (party foundations). Initially conceived to work 
with “sister-parties” in third countries, the foundations increasingly developed
11 Chapter 4 (intervention in the DR Congo) will illustrate this selective engagement and US 
multilateralism in Africa, while Chapter 6 will discuss how the Community of Democracies again 
featured an American-led multilateralism. Chapter 5 will discuss the EU approach to the Middle 
East and North Africa and how this replicated the CSCE structure.
12 For example, the non-democratic governments of Greece, Spain and Portugal also participated in 
the CSCE from 1973.
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broader activities, working with all political parties, on electoral processes, and 
sometimes on more general socio-economic preconditions13. Other national 
political party foundations were created in Europe in the post-Cold War period: the 
UK Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) (in 1992), the Swedish support 
for party association (pilot projects since 1995, establishment in 2001), and the 
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (2001) (Ohman, Oberg, 
Holmstrom, Wockelberg, & Aberg, 2004). Assistance to sister-parties had been 
common in the Cold War, but the 1990s and 2000s saw a diversification and 
widening of projects, as if the specific ideology mattered less and the objective was 
the broader democratization of the system; for example, many Westminster 
Foundation projects aim to promote multipartism at large, and not just aid the 
sister-party14. The Stiftungen had also inspired the American party institutes and 
the National Endowment for Democracy in 1983-4, and both the German and 
American cases remain quite exceptional in their significant budget and their 
independent action -yet they are tied to ministry and congressional funding and 
above all, and their programs should not be understood as “neutral” [especially in 
the case of NED, cf. Chapter 3].
By contrast, the national principle of democracy promotion became 
embedded in American high-flying rhetoric, while the US arguably focused on 
rather short-term, result-oriented policies (Ottaway & Hamzawy, 2004; Youngs, 
2001a). This translated in a focus on elections, leaders, and regime change; this led 
to potential direct action, often taking advantage of critical junctures in specific 
countries, and exceptionally creating them. The logic of Domino Theory (one 
movement triggers wide change) subscribed to this principle; it first appeared in 
1952 in a National Security Council document when the intention was to keep 
South-East Asia from going communist (Kissinger, 1994, p. 626). But in none of 
the cases of direct intervention was democracy promotion the only or even the main 
justification -it was rather a means, and a positive “collateral goal” especially in 
Latin America (Lowenthal, 1990; W. I. Robinson, 1996b).
13 This depended very much on the budget and on the national histories, and the German foundations 
remained extremely well funded, mainly will appropriations from the Development Ministry (i.e. 
there was a link with socioeconomic development).
14 The national parties also receive part of the funds, which they can then spend on their own 
international projects.
72
This was also explained by the securitization of democracy promotion as an 
element of US foreign policy. However, the link with security was also broadly 
conceived and embedded in US policies in the form of the Democratic Peace 
argument; democracy promotion has its place as part of a widely accepted grand 
strategy and of national interests (Art, 2003). This usually does not imply direct 
military intervention, and acknowledges that socio-economic welfare accompanies 
the global spread of democracy (Art, 2003, pp. 27-31). Nevertheless, this does not 
preclude the so-called “double standards” either, as democracy and its prioritization 
are interpreted according to strategic goals. Because in Europe there was absence of 
unified security strategy or action, this feature was clearer in American democracy 
promotion, but this did not mean that European foreign policies were led differently 
-simply that democracy promotion was not framed in the same way15.
2. The rise of rival universalisms
In the context of the post-Cold War democratic triumph, it could have been 
expected that the transatlantic partners would become joint, active sponsors of 
international democracy promotion. However this was not the case, a rhetoric of 
cooperation continued but two additional trends unraveled. First, democracy 
promotion became increasingly transnational, and networks of activism and 
knowledge developed, similar to other issues related to humanitarian concerns and 
intervention (Haynes, 2007; Kaldor, 2003b; Schraeder, 2003)16. Second, and more 
central to this chapter, the transatlantic relationship seemed to lose weight in 
American politics, and European Union integration advanced. More specifically, 
supranational decision-making was enhanced in a number of areas, and changes 
arose from the Treaty of Maastricht’s creation of the single market and the Treaties 
of Amsterdam and Nice17.
A key question was whether the transatlantic relationship should be 
maintained, and on which areas, once the security-imperative of the Soviet Union
15 The case studies will allow us to nuance the EU positions, nevertheless.
16 Since the thesis focuses on American and European Union democracy promotion, the nature and 
role of the transnational networks are not discussed in detail; nevertheless Chapter 3 discusses this 
aspect and the extent to which it lead to a kind of “global” democracy promotion.
171 would underline that the “European Union” was granted international actorness (legal 
personality) and that EU citizenship was strengthened as EU rights derived from the single market 
provisions.
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disappeared. The United States arguably needed Western Europe much less, though 
the partnership could still provide a “mantle of legitimacy” through multilateralism 
(Mead, 2005, pp. 165, 179). According to Mead (2005, p. 168) the decline of 
European power “is one of the oldest and best established trends in world politics”, 
but he also acknowledges that for many, a recovery or resurgence may have begun 
with the European Union. Indeed, on the European side, new political will and 
interests could lead to emancipation from transatlantic relations. Yet at the same 
time Europe seemed to follow American leadership in the Western “triumph” and, 
importantly, a new wave of enthusiastic atlanticists came in with Eastern and 
Central European countries (Oswald, 2006, pp. 21-25).
Democracy promotion must be understood in these dynamics of 
transatlantic “drift and rift”. Against this background, two “rival universalisms” 
emerged. On the one hand, democracy promotion contributed to the ongoing 
rhetoric of transatlantic cooperation, and was portrayed as the common basic value 
in times of transatlantic crisis, notably after the US-led intervention in Iraq. On the 
other, nevertheless, it was actually at the heart of two distinct trends of 
“universalisms” visible in American and European Union politics during this 
period. These universalisms were used as an ideal, teleological basis for action, 
both in the US “mission” and as part of the new role and identity unraveling in 
Europe.
2.1. Cooperation to promote democracy: a transatlantic rhetoric and a 
nuanced European approach
In the post-Cold War era, the principles of US-EU cooperation were set out in 
declarations such as the Transatlantic Declaration of 1990 and the “New 
Transatlantic Agenda” launched in Madrid in 1995. At the most important 
diplomatic level, there were regular bilateral Summits (US, European Commission, 
Presidency of the European Council) and other gatherings with EU Member States’ 
heads of state and government, and official visits (M. Smith & Steffenson, 2005, 
pp. 351-353). At all such meetings, and in countless other occasions, American and 
European officials made declarations on the common values and strategic
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partnership that sustained transatlantic relations. Democracy promotion occupied a
key role throughout, as the primary documents issued at these meetings illustrate.
The 1990 Declaration included a section on Common Goals that begun:
“The United States of America and the European Community and its 
Member States solemnly reaffirm their determination further to 
strengthen their partnership in order to support democracy, the rule of 
law and respect for human rights and individual liberty, and promote 
prosperity and social progress worldwide [...]” (US & EC and Member 
States, 1990)
And a Declaration from the bilateral Summit in June 2008 pledged:
“The strategic partnership between the EU and the U.S. is firmly anchored 
in our common values and increasingly serves as a platform from which 
we can act in partnership to meet the most serious global challenges and to 
advance our shared values, freedom and prosperity around the globe. [...] 
The bond between the EU and the U.S. has proven its resilience through 
times of difficulty, and we continue to demonstrate global leadership and 
effective transatlantic co-operation in the face of the most pressing 
challenges of our day: Promoting international peace, stability, democracy, 
human rights, international criminal justice, the rule of law and good 
governance [...]” (EU-US, 2008)
As these declarations illustrate, the US and the EU considered democracy 
promotion a common goal, “firmly anchored” and “reaffirmed” again and again. 
The 2008 document insisted on “most pressing challenges of our day” that were 
similar to those of 1990, and indeed, to those of the Atlantic Charter signed long 
ago by Roosevelt and Churchill (1941).
Nevertheless, two specific references hinted at what was new in the post-Cold 
War period. First, the idea of “a platform from which we can act” suggests that 
transatlantic relations become a practical option for potential action in partnership. 
This evokes the shift away from common interests and shared identity and 
principles for more pragmatic, sporadic cooperation (Kupchan, 2008, p. 112). 
Second, the reference to the bond of “resilience through times of difficulty” was an 
open acknowledgement of past and potential differences (an even clash) between 
the transatlantic partners. Crises had existed during the Cold War (Hitchcock, 2008) 
but the transatlantic rhetoric and historiography had tended to downplay or ignore 
them. This changed in the post-Cold War period, as the tensions within NATO 
were more visible; relations deteriorated during the first term of George W. Bush’s
75
presidency, as it clearly tended towards unilateralism despite the worldwide 
diplomatic support that the US gathered in the aftermath of 9/11. The “crisis” 
arrived when some Western European countries opposed the US-led intervention in 
Iraq. Academics were arguing the US and the EU seemed “quite distinct places, 
very possibly moving in divergent directions” (Judt, 2005), so the rhetoric of 
cooperation was escalated to redress this situation.
This escalation of Atlanticist rhetoric in 2004-05 could be considered as an 
American operation to restore transatlantic charm, where Europe also participated 
actively (AFP, 2005; Beale, 2005; Wright, 2005). The US may have realized the 
transatlantic relationship could still be useful, but Europeans also appreciated 
getting back on the radar of US priorities. The tone was especially reconciliatory 
for transatlantic relations during the G8 summits in the US (2004) and the United 
Kingdom (2005)18. When Gaddis envisaged Bush’s grand strategy for the second 
term, he suggested to work on “manners”, “language” and “vision” (Gaddis, 2005). 
He did not mention transatlantic relations, but Bush’s critics had increasingly 
pointed at the damage that unilateralism and preemption were doing to the security 
partnership (Ikenberry, 2006, pp. 214-228). As in the declarations above, the 
reconciliatory rhetoric underlined democracy promotion as a common value and 
joint enterprise.
Newly appointed Secretary of State Rice disembarked (symbolically) in Paris 
“to talk about how America and Europe can use the power of our partnership to 
advance our ideals worldwide”. She insisted: “Our charge is clear: we on the right 
side of freedom’s divide have an obligation to help those unlucky enough to have 
been bom on the wrong side of that divide” (Rice, 2005b).
Yet this kind of rhetoric was ill-conceived for at least two reasons. First, by 
“uniting” the US and the EU over democracy promotion, this rhetoric emphasized 
the role of the West, reinforcing the idea that universal democracy was due to the 
fact that “breathtaking preponderance of power is held by a liberal democracy” i.e. 
the US, and that “the next most powerful global actor is a loose union of countries 
that are also all liberal democracies” i.e. the EU (L. Diamond, 2003). This was in 
contrast with international democracy promotion efforts to foster consensual, 
worldwide-owned policies [cf. Chapter 1]. Second, and more specifically, this
18 A series of speeches from the White House and the Department of State during this period 
emphasized transatlantic relations.
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discourse reinforced Huntington’s picture of “the West against the rest”, and 
stigmatized those who were now “on the wrong side of the divide”: no longer the 
Communists but arguably the Arab-Muslim world and in any case a non- 
democratic “Other”.
Nuances in the European approach. Europeans were interested in maintaining the 
transatlantic rhetoric and also made sure that the common principles and 
partnership were maintained. But even if Joint Declarations were signed as usual, 
Europeans insisted on the peculiarities of their approach [cf. Chapter 1], and 
claimed credit for their own record. In his last speech before the European 
Parliament, when he summed up his term’s accomplishments, Commission 
President Romano Prodi avoided laudatory references to transatlantic relations, and 
instead insisted:
“I have said, and I will say it again: in this complex and often tragic world 
of ours, Europe has been capable -indeed has been the only player 
capable—of exporting democracy” (Prodi, 2004)19.
More generally, EU officials insisted on general differences vis-a-vis the US, but 
they also warned of defining Europe from an empty anti-americanism (Chris Patten, 
2005). With the new Commission President, Jose Barroso, and the 2005 European 
Council presidencies of Luxembourg and (especially) the United Kingdom, the EU 
clearly sought to reduce the transatlantic distance too20.
The nuanced European position vis-a-vis democracy promotion and the 
United States is best summarized in Javier Solana’s words in the spring of 2005:
“Both the EU and the US want to increase the number of democracies 
around the world. We may bring somewhat different approaches to the 
table and use different language than our American friends. But human 
rights, good governance and the mle of law go hand-in-hand with 
democracy and freedom. As long as our respective strategies reinforce 
each other -and they do—this pluralism in promoting democracy is a 
source of strength” (Solana, 2005).
19 My emphasis: the reference is clear to the U S’s failure in Iraq.
20 This period also saw important changes in Europe in the context of enlargement and of changing 
governments in some Member States (notably Spain in 2004, and Italy in 2006 retreated their 
support for the war in Iraq).
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Solana struck here the right note of transatlantic friendship “reinforcing each 
other”; at the same time he admitted to an important European distinctiveness, both 
regarding style (“different language”) and content of the policies (human rights, 
good governance and the rule of law, which the EU traditionally emphasized). This 
illustrated the redefinition of the relationship: the emplhasis is on pluralism and not 
on unified Western action. There was de facto an increasing gap in the partnership 
as the post-Cold War American hegemony developed a resistance to Europe’s 
leadership and independent agenda (W. Wallace, 2001) and as the rise of 
conservatism confirmed an American unilateralism and sense of mission that did 
not resonate with Europeans. In this context, US-EU cooperation to promote 
democracy was a common goal, but could not amount tto more than rhetoric.
As the bond’s resilience was in doubt, the transatlantic rhetoric was supposed 
to improve a picture of cooperation that was rather weak. As Danchev (2005, p. 
429) pointed out, the common values were supposed to live up to a past that was 
often monumentalized, while the rhetoric actually had to appeal to a transatlantic 
future. Nevertheless, even considering rhetoric, a-temporality (past and future, but 
an uncertain present), and monumentalization, American and European democracy 
promotion were increasingly less suitable to sustain the transatlantic common 
identity and role, as these features were found in tlhe development of separate, 
distinct universalisms.
2.2. Democracy promotion and US and EU universalisms: emphasizing 
uniqueness, hinting at rivalry
The academic analysis of transatlantic relations emphasized that in the post-Cold 
War era, cooperation continued in general and that interdependence on the 
economic sphere was accompanied by ongoing benefits in the security alliance 
(Peterson, 1996; Serfaty, 2008). However, part of the literature considered that 
transatlantic cooperation may have reached its limits (Duffield, 2001). One 
important argument emphasized that despite the common values and goals, 
positions and policies on one side and the other of the Atlantic were strengthening 
different outcomes (Levin & Shapiro, 2004).
Indeed, domestic institutions and policy-making, but also the international 
arena, were shaping the relationship in new ways.. This corresponded to new,
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purposeful depictions of US and EU roles and identities for the post-Cold War era. 
This thesis uses the term “universalisms” to refer to democracy promotion in 
relationship to identity and to role-construction, considering its importance in the 
conception but also in the materialization of policy. The universalisms were
encapsulated in two distinct narratives of the US and the EU as international
0 1actors . The universalisms are narratives that refer not only to a story, but also to 
the telling of the story (Hobsbawm, 1998). This is especially useful to grasp the 
relevance and meaning of US and EU democracy promotion.
In general, universalisms emerge as an ideological assertion to validate, 
explain and eventually justify international action. In constructing the narratives, 
universalisms need to present their uniqueness, even though in principle any system 
of values is subjective and could be considered universal (Wallerstein, 2006, p. 46). 
Here is where linking the study of role and identity (Elgstrom & Smith, 2006, p. 5) 
can explain the rise of distinctions, and even rivalry, regarding American and 
European democracy promotion. On the one hand, it is an element of common 
Western identity and origin, and the rhetoric of cooperation sustains a transatlantic 
element. On the other, American and European positions and projects of democracy 
promotion needed uniqueness. Identity and role-construction reinforce one another, 
as democracy promotion becomes an expression of what the polity is and of what it 
purposely does in the international arena. On the basis of a shared Western identity, 
I argue, rival US and EU universalisms arose.
The definition of democracy promotion as an element of foreign policy 
(Chapter 1) allows deploying here the argument of US and EU universalisms. Table 
3 below draws on the historical discussion in section 1; these observations will then 
be developed in section 3 (on the United States) and section 4 (on the European 
Union). Later in the thesis, Chapter 3 will establish how these aspects were 
appropriated in the policy-making processes, emphasizing the specificities, and the 
general argument will be tested in the case-studies, analyzing the rival 
universalisms against the pragmatic challenges of democracy promotion arising on 
the ground.
21 In Constructivist terms, this universalism is a “social kind” or reality: space-time specific (though 
generalization is possible as far as the essential characteristics remain), depending on the 
interlocking of beliefs held by actors and on their practices, affected by ideas and by internal and 
external structures (Wendt, 1999, pp. 68-71).
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My goal here is to pin down the US and EU universalisms regarding 
democracy promotion, focusing on the characteristics that emphasized uniqueness 
and US-EU rivalry. In order to unravel these distinctions, I compare the 
universalisms along three aspects: fundamental characteristics that asserted 
differences, autonomous international projects, and distinct prescriptions for 
international action. The American and the European universalisms were not 
incompatible in principle, but it was difficult for these trends to simultaneously 
reconcile a transatlantic common view, and to substantiate independent US and EU 
action.
Table 3. Democracy promotion and American and European universalisms
Universalisms American European
Fundamental
characteristics
“Power”: hard + soft 
Exceptionalism
“Civilian power” (non-military)
Normative
Utopia
International project 
(content)
Example 
Civil society 
Mission
Example
Institution-building, law 
Reflexivity: Regionalism
Prescription (action) Liberal order based on US 
hegemony 
Intervention
Multilateral order 
Socialization
Legal/rational basis (Kant), 
conditionality
This table schematizes American and European universalisms using the concepts 
and arguments in the literature on changing roles of the US and the EU in 
International Relations. The three aspects are intrinsically interconnected; they are 
used as analytical entry-points to understand US and EU democracy promotion in 
the light of the universalisms. First, “Fundamental characteristics” refer to the 
concepts and principles that ground and motivate democracy promotion; they 
pertain to identity but also US and EU to role-construction. Secondly 
“International project” refers to the goals envisaged in the enterprise: how 
democracy promotion is understood and conceived (the “content” that constitutes 
the US and EU approaches). Finally, “Prescription” refers to specific plans of mise 
en oeuvre, how the universalisms are undertaken.
The US and EU distinct narratives forge a picture where democracy 
promotion is no longer a common value but (at best) a compatible interest. I
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discuss here the “Fundamental characteristics” in greater length, and introduce the 
main arguments regarding “International Project” and “Prescription”; these will be 
raised and developed in the relevant case-studies.
Fundamental characteristics. The universalisms’ fundamental characteristics bring 
up the debates on what defines international actors and what makes them 
“powerful”. In this regard, Robert Kagan’s wording of “paradise and power” 
summarized (though for many, oversimplified) the contention that America and 
Europe were fundamentally different (Kagan, 2003). The US was characterized by 
military “hard” power that Europe lacked not only passively but on principle, 
purposely. This way, some European commentators sympathized with Kagan’s 
picture of EU paradisiacal “soft power”(Lindberg, 2005). Yet it shouldn’t be 
ignored that, according to Joseph Nye (1990, 2004) the US also had resources of 
“soft power”, even though he thought this was being undermined by the policies of 
the Bush administration.
In contrast with hard power, Duchene first coined the term “civilian” (1973) 
to refer to Europe’s non-military power. Civilian power was, for Mario Telo 
(2006), an alternative form of power that singled out Europe as an original polity, 
both its nature and its actions. Telo drew a portrait of the specificities of civilian 
Europe that could only be understood in comparison with American military power 
and worldview. The related notion of “normative power Europe” (Manners, 2002) 
referred more specifically to the EU’s ability to export norms and shape its 
environment, and again the emphasis was on issues that distinguished the EU from 
American approaches, such as the abolition of the death penalty and the protection 
of the environment. Arguably, the normativity of this analysis itself, and the 
incoherence in EU discourse and policy-making posed problems (Lerch & 
Schwellnus, 2006; Scheipers & Sicurelli, 2007), but this did not undermine the fact 
that “a clear conception of exceptionalism [was] at play” in the EU (Jorgensen, 
1998, p. 95).
This picture translated into some analyses of democracy promotion where 
American hard power could take care of the serious combat tasks, while Europe 
could deal with issues of “soft security” as nation building. Hopkinson (2003) 
suggested this cooperation, but he observed that there seemed to be divergences in 
the conceptions of security and international intervention. However, democracy
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promotion partly counters this argument because it is an instance of American 
norm-export. Seemingly, the difference could be over the instruments and means 
(civilian vs. military). Overall, the literature supported the argument that American 
democracy promotion could include military action (Peceny, 1999; von Hippel, 
2000), while European means would be “civilian” and “normative” almost by 
definition (Borzel & Risse, 2007). Again, there is a link between roles- and 
identity-building in the universalisms. Yet these fundamental characteristics did not 
necessarily correspond with US and EU democracy promotion in action (this will 
be tested in the case studies): the universalisms seemingly corresponded to 
ideological rather than pragmatic positions.
American universalism, in its narrative of uniqueness, has usually taken the 
form of Exceptionalism, and argument illustrated at length and recurrent in 
American historiography. Exceptionalism would define the US itself (Shafer, 1999) 
and, importantly, create links between the domestic and an international “American 
dream” (Slater & Taylor, 1999, p. 344). According to Lieber (2006), 
exceptionalism is a key difference (and a factor of discord) between the US and the 
EU. Democracy and freedom would be at the heart of the national exceptionalism 
that is in turn embedded in American universalism.
The conception of uniqueness and the European narrative is an interesting 
alternative to the American materialization as a shining city upon a hill (Winthrop’s 
famous image). Indeed, Europe is instead a project [Section 1 above], almost a 
utopia i.e. an unachievable ideal. Along these lines, Nicolaidis and Howse (2002) 
argued that the European Union has been constructing a narrative of “utopia” based 
on the notions of civilian and normative power.
More specifically, Nicolaidis (2006) criticized that many aspects of EU 
narratives were basically based on an essentialist, over-generalizing self-definition 
of the EU vis-a-vis America. Interestingly, she contended that “democracy 
promotion” was one example where some Europeans saw themselves as different 
from the Americans in simplistic, over-generalized ways. Instead, she invited to 
think of an alternative utopia where the EU conceives its universalism and its 
identity vis-a-vis its own past. Along these lines, the new way of democracy
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promotion in this “EUtopia” would need to be different from the universalism that 
existed then Europe was a colonial power22.
International projects and Prescription. The fundamental characteristics of the 
American and European universalisms set distinct contexts for democracy 
promotion, visible in turn in their international projects and prescription. 
Democracy promotion not only fitted into such universalisms, it actively 
contributed to construct such distinct projects of the US and the EU as international 
actors.
On the one hand, exceptionalism led to an American Mission to promote 
democracy (T. Smith, 1994), projecting Wilsonian values and enhancing security 
with a liberal strategy (Ikenberry, 1999). American identity and interests were 
invoked as one with democracy promotion: US leadership was maintained and used 
to shape the international order (Cox et al., 2000). Sometimes the project would be 
passively exemplarist, sometimes it would be pro-active i.e. “vindicationist” -both 
approaches rooted in American traditions (Monten, 2005). For example, under 
George W. Bush, vindicationism could lead to intervention, and in his 
neoconservative policies “soft power” had to be complemented with hard power.
On the other hand, European democracy promotion saw itself as an 
example, and thus sought to recreate its regional institutional settings through 
reflexivity (Bicchi, 2006), and to export its model of governance (M. Farrell, 2005). 
Reflecting its own cooperative functioning for policy-making, the EU defended 
multilateralism as “a specific aspect of European democracy promotion” (Council 
of the European Union, 2006b, p. 5), revealing connections both with identity and 
with role-construction as an international actor. Along these lines, the document 
The European Union and the United Nations: the choice o f multilateralism was 
designed to shape EU policy-making in general (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2003). Similarly, the EU’s universalism put forward socialization 
(key in the European history of democratization) as an instrument to promote 
democracy (Youngs, 2001a). Additional elements in the universalisms’ prescription 
would be the legal-rational basis for international relations (in the Kantian tradition) 
that leads to agreements among parties (Petiteville, 2003), together with a dynamic
221 infer from her view that contemporary EU democracy promotion should instead be designed
distinguishing itself from the colonial projects -this is an interesting contention.
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of conditionality -both have existed in the dynamics of EU membership and would 
be replicated, with elements of democracy promotion, in EU relations with third 
countries. While all these aspects featured in the universalisms, this thesis suggests 
it is necessary to check these narratives against the policies on the ground to have 
more nuance. This nuanced approach differs from other studies of democracy 
promotion that establish a relatively easy, pragmatic division of tasks in the 
transatlantic partnership (Sarotte, 2005). For instance, it could be argued that the 
US approach prioritized civil society while the EU promoted institution-building, 
replicating traits in their own identities (Kopstein, 2006). However, these 
assumptions proved to need much more nuance: Chapter 3 and the case studies 
depict how both the US and the EU were involved in both, they did not divide tasks 
along those lines, and even confronted similar challenges on the ground.
The main premise that derives from this analysis is that, in all these features, the 
EU approach was defined not only ex ante, but also in clear distinction from the 
United States. The universalisms did not prevent eventual complementarity, but 
they contributed to (and explained) the rift both in discourse and action. The 
literature on transatlantic relations not only pointed to features and policies 
distinguishing the US and the EU but also, more broadly, at world perceptions and 
default-behavior (Jones, 2004; M. Smith, 2004). Along these lines, democracy 
promotion evolved in the internal and international contexts, while it also shaped 
them during the post-Cold War era. The next sections are precisely devoted to the 
specificities of US and EU democracy promotion and these internal and 
international linkages.
3. Democracy promotion and the United States: a “new” mission 
for the superpower?
This section argues that democracy promotion fitted into the international picture of 
post-Cold War American hegemony, while this nevertheless allowed for differences 
between the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations. The impact of 9/11 was 
crucial in the redefinition of the American “mission”.
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The end of the Cold War confirmed the picture of unmatched American 
power and hegemony in IR, but the demise of Communism arguably left the 
“superpower without a mission” (Cox, 1995). The question was whether democracy 
promotion could function as a new mission (T. Farrell, 2000; T. Smith, 1994), and 
what this would imply regarding rhetoric and practice. Even though the goal of 
expanding capitalism and democracy had always existed in American foreign 
policy, the presidential rhetoric captured this momentum and emphasized the 
“turning point” and “new era”, as the following quotes show23:
“This is a plain truth: the day of the dictator is over. The people’s right to 
democracy must not be denied” (George H. W. Bush, 1989)
“...Today, a generation raised in the shadows of the Cold War assumes new 
responsibilities in a world warmed by the sunshine of freedom” (Bill 
Clinton, 1993)
“The advance of freedom is the calling of our time; it is the calling of our 
country [...]. This is above all the age of liberty” (George W. Bush, 2003)
After a long history of divisions on whether to promote democracy or not, a 
common line was seemingly emerging. The consensus seemed unprecedented as 
hardcore realists as Henry Kissinger (2005) gave in to the inevitable democracy 
promotion; yet the practice would depend on context and contingency, and the 
difficulty to conciliate this with other objectives did not change.
The following table indicates some important initiatives in democracy 
promotion: democracy assistance by USAID, the funds devoted to human rights 
and democracy within the Department of State, and the Millennium Challenge 
development aid that was conditioned to democracy [developed in Chapter 3]. This 
information is extracted from policy-papers and assessments from USAID’s Center 
for Development Information and Evaluation and reports available online; it should 
be taken as orientation only, because the categories and the methodology vary 
across years and sources24.
23 George H. W. Bush’s quote comes from Department of State Bulletin, June 1989. Clinton’s quote 
is extracted from his First Inaugural Address, 21 January 1993, the third quote comes from Bush’s 
Second Inaugural Address.
24 In addition, as an official from USAID admitted in interview “there is just so much of some things 
you need to have available online”. I have also used alternative sources and (Finkel, Perez-Linan, & 
Seligson, 2006) independent audits (Blair & Hansen, 1994).
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Table 4. Main initiatives o f democracy promotion in the United States
Democracy
assistance
(USD 600-800 m/year25)
Human rights and 
democracy fund
(USD 94 m, example 2004)
Millennium 
Challenge Account
(USD 4-6 bi /year26)
Period 1990- 2004- 2006-
Agent27 USAID Dept. of State, Bureau 
democracy, human rights 
& labor
Millennium Challenge 
Corporation
Themes Civil society, 
governance, rule of law28, 
elections
To be decided by
beneficiaries/
implementers
Development aid (no 
theme) is granted if 
conditions satisfied 
incentives/conditionality: 
Modernization
Beneficiaries Project-funding for 
NGOs, channeled on the 
target country
$ 15 m NED 
$ 6.5 m Syria/Iran
Eligible countries 
(approx. 40 eligible, 
10 funded in total)
3.1. American hegemony
The confirmation of American hegemony at the end of the Cold War can be 
understood in the interplay of ideas, institutions and geopolitical contingency 
(Beeson & Higgott, 2005), and democracy promotion played a role in all three 
aspects. As discussed in Chapter 1, democracy was confirmed as a triumphant idea, 
and both the victory over the Soviet bloc and the ideology were clearly connected 
to America. The international institutions and the system conferred power and 
global leadership upon the United States, ratifying the expansion of capitalism and 
its political component. The United Nations (mainly the General Assembly) 
corroborated these principles in the resolutions it adopted29; this enhanced a post- 
Cold War homogenization of the international society in which democracy was 
central. Finally the geopolitical context was one of a “unipolar moment”
25 Democracy programs constitute a small percentage of the total USAID budget, e.g. 9% for 2003.
26 These were the plans approved by the administration but in reality the MCA has been working 
with around USD 2 billion/year.
271 am using “agent” in the sense attributed in Functional theories to the institutions in charge of 
fulfilling a certain task (Pollack, 1997). The roles of these agents is explored further in Chapter 3.
28 Almost half of US aid to the rule of law for 1990-2003 went to Latin America, where the US 
works with partner-governmental authorities.
29 A series of General Assembly resolutions concerned democracy: 49/30 of 7 December 1994,
50/13 of 20 December 1995, 51/31 of 6 December 1996, 52/18 of 21 November 1997, 53/31 of 23 
November 1998, 54/36 of 29 November 1999, 55/43 of 27 November 2000, 56/96 of 14 December 
2001, 56/269 of 27 March 2002, 58/13 of 17 November 2003, 58/281 of 9 February 2004, 60/253 of 
2 May 2006, 61/226 of 22 December 2006 and 62/13 of 13 December 2007.
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(Huntington, 1999) that gave leverage to the US and featured unprecedented 
American “hyperpower” to project its preferences (Vedrine, 2003).
American primacy was not only based on “hard” power but on “soft power” 
too; and here democracy and its non-military promotion were central (Nye, 1990). 
Cumings (1999) posited that American liberal hegemony was “less as a form of 
domination than a form of legitimate global leadership”, presenting hegemony as 
the international system’s voluntary concession of power to the hegemon30. In 
addition, the hegemon promoted democracy because of its interest in the expansion 
of the liberal economic regime, which needed a favorable global order and worked 
through cooptation better than through imperial coercion. Post-Cold War American 
hegemony would thus peak this “American century” (Slater & Taylor, 1999, pp. 3- 
4) and fulfill the post-World War II order (Ikenberry, 1989; Johnston, 1999). While 
this is also Cumings’ (1999, p. 298) view, he questions its fulfillment as he claims 
that modern liberalism is also “a heterogeneous, contested and deeply unfinished 
business”. This critique applies to democracy promotion as well: the liberal mission 
is part of American hegemony, but the superpower and the international regime are 
challenged because of the heterogeneity and contestability inherent to promoting 
democracy.
3.2.Democracy promotion and the Clinton and Bush administrations
Though this thesis makes the case for cross-administration continuity in American 
democracy promotion, it does not disregard the specificities that each
^  -I
administration brought into the policy . These specificities derived from the 
ideological background of the party and people at the time and as any foreign 
policy, from the contingency imposed by world events and by domestic electoral 
politics (Hill, 2003, pp. 159-170, 219-249). The American mission thus took 
different shapes under Clinton and Bush.
Bill Clinton’s democracy promotion was set out in the rhetoric of the 
“democratic enlargement” (Christopher, 1993; Clinton, 1996; Lake, 1993) where
30 By contrast, Fred Halliday (1994) also admitted inclusion in the international society happened 
through hegemony, but he is open to the Gramscian ambiguity of the acceptance and/or subjugation 
of the states co-opted. Pp. 100-103.
31 Here I leave aside the George H. W. Bush administration as the “turning point” and consider only 
the completely post-Cold War administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush.
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the Democratic Peace theory was used as justification to actively support 
democracy worldwide. This way, even in the early “peaceful” times after the Cold 
War, the discourse of democracy promotion was securitized. This discourse was 
framed in the liberal internationalist tradition, but iit translated into only limited 
multilateralism in practice, as Clinton sought to safeguard rather than constrain the 
US position as the sole post-Cold War superpower (KLupchan, 2002). Scholars agree 
on the fact that Clinton’s presidency was dominated by economic matters, and this 
applied to democracy promotion as well. The emiphasis was on the model of 
market-democracy and on how free trade and demociracy could be fostered together 
(D. Brinkley, 1997; Cox, 2000). Clinton’s democracy promotion rhetoric also 
embraced the American tradition of exceptionalism [and universalism, as Secretary 
Albright’s references to the “indispensable nation’” and her remarks before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1997 show:
“...the U.S. government works to encounage democracy in developing 
nations throughout the world on the basis olf the ideals of liberty, personal 
and civic freedom and government of, for and by the people -values on 
which the US was founded and which girdl the social and political life of 
our nation”.
On the other hand, Clinton’s democracy promotion im practice was inconsistent and 
restricted mainly to USAID development policies, 'which he failed to reform and 
bring closer under the administration [cf. Chapter 3]. The reluctance of Congress 
(Democrats lost the majority in the House of Representatives in 1994), bureaucracy 
and public opinion arguably prevented more assertiwe policies (Haas, 1997; Ripley 
& Lindsey, 1997), but there was a connection between the main US military 
interventions under his presidency and democraicy promotion, namely Haiti, 
Somalia and Bosnia. These cases gave evidence off the difficulties in connecting 
state-building and democratization policy-making iin stages. In addition, as they 
were framed as humanitarian intervention, they alsco illustrated the paradoxes and 
challenges of just war and effective peace-support operations as new paradigms for 
international intervention, and the limits of US multilateral engagement (Berdal & 
Economides, 2007; von Hippel, 2000).
Some Realists critiques establish that Bush’s  democracy promotion is only 
interested rhetoric without matching practice. However, this misses the well-
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documented point that neoconservatism and other specific aspects, e.g. Sharansky’s 
writings, influenced this president’s foreign policy dramatically. Thus, though 9/11 
and the War on Terror impacted the US, democracy promotion had a place of its 
own in the response that the Bush administration orchestrated and more generally in 
foreign policy. Here, the rising influence of neoconservative ideology was key, 
shifting American universalism toward enlightened intervention (Halper & Clarke, 
2004; Project for the New American Century, 1997; Williams, 2004). 
Neoconservative ideology had an extremely patriotic understanding of American 
exceptionalism, and nuanced the dovish principle of democracy promotion by 
example. Under the lead of hawkish Republican advisors and policy-makers, this 
materialized in a strategy that featured unilateralism, preemption and the supremacy 
of military power (see for instance the 2002 National Security Strategy).
In addition, there was at times a personal justification for Bush’s stand on 
democracy promotion. Notably, he acknowledged the influence of Nathan 
Sharansky’s book (Sharansky & Dermer, 2004), which used a rhetoric that became 
familiar in Bush’s speeches. For example, Sharansky (a Soviet dissident) referred to 
his Cold War “long journey through the world of evil” (p. xi); such manichean 
views were adopted by Bush but were not present in European rhetoric. Sharansky 
defended Western “moral clarity” to “once again secure a better future for hundreds 
of millions of people around the world” (pp. xiii, xxv), but also underlined the 
primacy of security and of war against terror. Bush’s position may not have reached 
all sectors and personnel in his administration (Amaral & Patterson, 2009) but his 
personal will to put democracy promotion at its center was unambiguous.
That democracy promotion was not successful does not take away from the 
fact that the Bush administration elevated this mission under a particular 
ideological brand. In his second inaugural speech (2005) he insisted:
“so it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of 
democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the 
ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world”.
According to his speechwriter Michael Gerson (2006), Bush wanted this 
“Democracy Speech” to be the one he would be remembered for. This speech was 
an attempt to cement his legacy as president by substituting the obsolete Cold War 
theme of “anti-communism” with democracy promotion, and feature as overarching
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principle and goal. In addition to the personalized rhetoric, Bush also undertook 
significant changes in the bureaucracy, including Secretary of State Rice’s 
“transformational diplomacy”, and the Millennium Challenge Account [cf. Chapter
3].
In sum, democracy promotion became the new superpower’s mission in the 
post-Cold War period, but such a claim must be nuanced. Overall, democracy 
promotion was not really new and the reasons why it featured in American foreign 
policy are best understood in the light of long-term history and continuity (Barrios, 
2008). Presidential speeches have very often made reference to new world orders 
and the US “crusade” for democracy; Olson (2004) demonstrated how Clinton’s 
democracy promotion policies used the rhetoric of past presidents. It is however the 
case that the American political stand became increasingly conservative; first in the 
House of Representatives during Clinton’s presidency, and then under the Bush 
administration. Such a polarization accounted for part of the rift in transatlantic 
relations (Kahler, 2005) and September 11 led to a reinforcement in this doctrine of 
“new American exceptionalism” (Hoffman, 2005).
3.3.Democracy promotion, 9/11 and the War on Terror
The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 changed American international politics, 
but probably no more than the end of the Cold War (Kennedy-Pipe, 2008). 
Nevertheless, this thesis would miss “an elephant in the room” if it neglected this 
factor, so a brief account of how this affected US democracy promotion is in 
order32. The attacks constituted a physical, inland aggression by a stateless, 
transnational enemy, and this had no precedent in America. The event drew a swift 
governmental response; the US sought to fight back with military might, and linked 
the War on Terror with democracy promotion. In this war, Islamist terrorism was 
increasingly framed as the enemy and a new “other”, maybe substituting the Soviet 
Union as the international bogeyman and triggering a reinterpretation of the 
American hegemony and power (Booth & Dunne, 2002). Since the correlation 
between Arab-Muslim countries and autocracy was high (according to the
32 Some arguments related to the War on Terror will be developed in detail in the case study of the
MENA region (Chapter 5).
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qualitative observations in Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations but also to the 
quantitative reports of Freedom House), the rhetoric of democracy promotion found 
a practical target in these countries.
First, the War on Terror increased securitization of foreign policy in general 
and of democracy promotion in particular. Bush’s National Security Strategy 
(2002) focused on terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, the transformation of 
security institutions, etc. and economic growth and free trade lost relevance. Still, 
promoting democracy was maintained in speeches about the War on Terror, and it 
was considered a tool in the war:
“America has a clear strategy for victory in the War on Terror. [...] 
Through the spread of democracy, the United States can help deny 
terrorists the ideological victories they seek. Free nations do not support 
terrorists or invade their neighbors. By advancing the cause of liberty 
across the world, we will make the world more peaceful and America 
more secure .
Nevertheless, the tensions and practical problems of promoting democracy 
as part of security interests, and against terrorism, were significant. Along these 
lines, Carothers (2003b) criticized the instrumentalization of the democracy 
promotion discourse, and the potential to overestimate the US actual ability to 
“export” democracy. This scholar and an official from the administration 
exchanged some arguments (Dobriansky & Carothers, 2003), but the uncertainties 
in Iraq, the US policy of double standards with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia (among 
others) and the challenge of election results (Hamas in Palestine, January 2006) 
kept introducing difficulties on the compatibility of democracy promotion and the 
War on Terror.
Significantly, research on the links between fighting terror and promoting 
democracy boomed, but it was not consensual. An example that made the case for  
promotion was Windsor’s (2003) argument that democracy could help prevent 
(Islamist) extremism. Such publications illustrated the links between the knowledge 
networks and policy-making, since Windsor was Executive Director of Freedom 
House. Despite the ideas of a “virtuous circle” of policies, this research neglected
33 George W. Bush, “Fighting a Global War on Terror” Discourse at FBI Academy, Quantico, 
Virginia, 11 July, 2005. The reference to the Democratic Peace is clear here.
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the fact that extremism could perform well and win elections34. In addition, it 
misunderstood the transnational nature of the threat: that terrorism poses distinct 
problems as non-state actor and can exist in democratic states (this was the 
experience in several European countries).
Finally, these arguments and the policies that followed underestimated the 
key links between the state and democracy, i.e. that democracy needs the basis of a 
state structure. In fact, enhancing democratic-state capacity remained a conundrum 
in American democracy promotion, because documents and institutions fostered a 
model of democracy focused on the role of elites and on civil society, not on the 
state. For example, in a USAID (2002a) report on Foreign Aid in the National 
Interest renown scholar Larry Diamond made the case for supporting democratic 
trends in civil society, and argued:
“State capacity must be enhanced, but it makes no sense to strengthen the 
capacity of state structures that lack the political will to govern 
responsibly. Building effective state structures must be a major goal of 
assistance for democracy and governance, but not until state leaders are 
serious about governance. Large investments in the infrastructure and 
technical capacity of judiciaries and legislatures will be largely wasted if 
there is no political will to use the enhanced capabilities for more honest, 
responsive, and accountable governance” (p. 60) 5.
Yet the War on Terror and more specifically the interventions in Afghanistan and 
Iraq needed a ‘nation-building’ phase of democracy promotion. There was an 
imperative for practical, immediate contributions, while transitologists had been 
studying cases but no overall consensus was established. State-building was 
identified as a precondition in the cases of weak or failed states in the late 1990s 
and into the 2000s, as democracy promotion policies targeted Africa and post­
conflict societies (Linz & Stepan, 1996). Importantly, the contributions to 
American know-how came from the Department of Defense and think tanks such as 
the RAND Corporation and the American Enterprise Institute; these publications 
intended to give practical if somewhat simplistic policy-advice with titles as The
34 Possibly, the experience of this “failure of democracy” in Europe -notably regarding Nazi 
Germany and other totalitarianisms in the 20th century- made for a more careful European rhetoric in 
this regard, in contrast with American perspectives.
35 This example also illustrates the input from the academic community in democracy promotion 
policy documents. Diamond also played a key role in the design of the post-invasion strategy for 
Iraq.
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beginners’ guide to nation-building (Dobbins, Jones, Crane, & Cole DeGrasse, 
2007; Dobbins, McGinn, Crane, & Jones, 2003) or Nation-building 101 
(Fukuyama, 2004). The real problematique was the extent to which states should 
organize and guarantee services to the citizens, because liberal policies requested 
“less state” but war-torn societies needed basic infrastructures (Chesterman, 
Ignatieff, & Thakur, 2005).
Robert Jervis (2006) found somewhat ironic that Bush seemed to want to “change” 
an international order where America was the hegemon, and he explained this by 
the way democracy promotion is anchored in US political culture and by the 
president’s own “missionary zeal”. Bush’s new order consisted in overcoming an 
“ideological frontier”, but Jervis worried about how this quest could be balanced 
with the “constraints of an intractable world”. Indeed, the international context 
shaped the US “new mission” and vice-versa, and among the complexities and 
evolving features, the changing role of the European Union in International 
Relations was also key, as it increasingly turned Europe from subordinate to 
challenger in transatlantic relations.
4. European democracy promotion: a normative and civilian 
“superpower in the making”?
This section sets the previous discussion of European democracy promotion and 
“universalism” in the post-Cold War context. This universalism presented a series 
of EU factors (multilateralism, civilian and normative power) as willful ideology, 
but this section contends that EU democracy promotion is also explained by the 
domestic and international context regarding EU capabilities and an alternative 
definition of power. This discussion can be usefully framed with the question: is the 
EU a “superpower in the making”? (Galtung, 1973; Hill, 2002; McCormick, 2006). 
Democracy promotion must be understood within three key debates on the role of 
Europe in International Relations: the “rise” of this “superpower”, the question of 
capabilities and effectiveness, and the dynamics of Europeanization.
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European Political Cooperation and post-Maaistricht Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) set the ground for a vast: literature on the EU as an 
international actor regarding matters other than economic (Ben Tonra, 2000; White,
2001). Indeed, during the post-Cold War period, ai stronger (legal) basis, more 
tools, and political will established the EU as a poliity with foreign policy (K. E. 
Smith, 2003a), and the development of European positions and initiatives became 
stronger vis-a-vis the United States (Carlsnaes et al., 2004; Hill & Smith, 2005; W. 
Wallace, 1999).
The nature of the EU draws the analysts’ attentiion to the role of supranational 
or intergovernmental institutions and to the developnnent of specific policy areas or 
“competencies” (Hix, 2005; McCormick, 2002). In this regard, democracy 
promotion was exceptionally cross-pillar, cross-themes: instances of CFSP 
(intergovernmental) went hand in hand with instruments where the treaties allowed 
for more supranational dynamics as Development Cooperation (democracy was 
linked to socioeconomic development); human rightts had been at the heart of the 
European Parliament’s tasks since its creation. In this regard, two dynamics were at 
stake: integration vs. member state-sovereignty regarding the kind of polity, and 
supranationalism vs. intergovemmentalism regarding; the kind of power/policy.
Part of this literature sought to describe andl assess the achievements and 
shortcomings of the EU promotion of democracy and human rights (Crawford, 
2001; Ethier, 2003; Holden, 2003; Pi, 2000; K. E. ISmith, 2004; Youngs, 2001b). 
Here, the case of EU policies on enlargement betcame key. The experience of 
European policies towards Greece, Portugal and Spain, though part of a previous 
“wave”, influenced the enlargement process to post-ccommunist Eastern and Central 
Europe (ECE) during the post-Cold War period. EU democracy promotion was 
driven by this evidence, which seemed complex ((each of the cases brought in 
specific challenges) and based on material and on “soft power”.
Studies about explicit programs of democracy .assistance often focused on the 
EU-budget lines (around euro 100 million/year) thaat were grouped in 2008 under 
the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), an 
“integrated policy” managed at the EU. The following table indicates how EIDHR 
implied EC agents, and set out some guidelines (regional, thematic, distribution, 
non-governmental recipients) that provide some firstt conceptions of what European 
democracy promotion implied.
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Table 5. European explicit policy (budgetary allocation) to promote democracy and 
human rights
9 budget lines 
(B7-7)
European Initiative 
DHR
European
Instrument
DHR
Period 1994-99 2000-2007 2007-2013
Agent Directorates General EuropeAid (AidCo)) EuropeAid (AidCo)
Content Regional focus Thematic focus 
+
Region/country
Thematic focus
Beneficiaries Includes NGOs Mostly large NGOs; 
(80%)
NGOs, including smaller 
Also political agents (e.g. 
local parliaments)
Primary documents explain EU objectives and functioning (EuropeAid, 2004, 
2006, 2007; European Commission, 2006) and there are also counted instances of 
internal auditing (Court of Auditors of the European Communities, 2000)37. 
General comparisons between the US and the EU (for instance by the OECD) 
picture the EU as main provider of aid in the world, often assuming this is also 
valid as measure for democracy promotion. In these, the “EU side” includes this 
EIDHR but also the European Development Funds; (around USD 5 billion/year, or a 
total of euro 13.5 billion for the period 200Q-2007)38 plus, importantly, the 
individual policies of Member States. Sometimes, EU documents and officials 
highlight themes such as the protection of minorities’ rights and the abolition of the 
death penalty as “European model” (EuropeAid, 2004; European Parliament, 2005; 
Kionka, 2007). Yet this overemphasized the EU as if it were the only exclusive 
defender of these causes, and mixed up the definition of democracy promotion. 
With the abolition of the death penalty, an aspect of “European universalism”
36 Again, quantitative analysis involved some methodological difficulties as the budgets were multi­
annual and broke down in unequal categories (sometimes only marginally related to democracy); 
additional budget lines were conceded to themes/regions/couintries outside EUDHR, and there was a 
gap between allocation and actual disbursement. For the most informative survey for the period 
2000-6, see (Youngs, 2006).
37 Interestingly, and an illustration of the inter-agency competition, the Commission raised an 
objection to the Court’s audit of the policies’ success -arguing the Court could only audit the funds’ 
allocation, but not their use.
38 These funds are managed by the Commission DG Development and Cooperation, and are usually 
allocated to governmental programs/targets, not NGOs.
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seemed to be constructed vis-a-vis the US39, but in any case this could hardly be 
equated with a definition of democracy.
4.1. The EU as normative, civilian “superpower”
The European Community proved to be exceptional as economic cooperation and 
integration led to an ever more prosperous Western Europe, while the political ties 
(notably between Germany and France) seemed to guarantee security. In the 1970s 
and 1980s, debates on the external leverage of Europe grew more common, and 
Johan Galtung (1973) asserted that Europe could evolve to become a “superpower”. 
In the post-Cold War period, more scholars started to consider this “superpower in 
the making” (Hill, 2002). Yet while only few questioned American hegemony 
(Todd, 2002), the potential and reality of EU power in IR was not consensual in 
academia. More importantly, this reflected the political debates and dynamics of 
(limited) integration that took place in the continent. Security debates were tied to 
the evolution of NATO (notably its enlargement to the East). NATO was identified 
with a continuation of American leadership and with ongoing tensions, as the US 
demanded more contribution from Europeans, but it also discouraged EU 
independence and “emancipation” (Niblett & Wallace, 2001; Nuland, 2008; 
Thornton, 2008).
These debates brought in a series of paradoxes regarding the nature of the 
European polity (Zielonka, 1998) and of the EU “original power”, i.e. normative or 
civilian rather than military (Bull, 1982; Duchene, 1973). This has been used to 
characterize European power; EU democracy promotion has often been assumed to 
fit these categories and thus reinforce Europe as this kind of “superpower”. This 
thesis challenges this picture of democracy promotion as a policy that fits the 
civilian and normative EU image; it argues that this played a rhetorical role in the 
construction of an EU universalism but did not completely correspond to the 
empirical reality.
The reality was one where the definition of the EU as “superpower” under 
those features could not be taken for granted, because this assumed a definition of
39 Indeed, it has been disputed that this should be considered a structural US-EU difference -only the 
contemporary practice is different (Moravcsik, 2001).
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what was considered “power” that was not evident within Europe nor in the 
international system. Within Europe, the prospects to develop power involved 
traditional conceptions and notably security and military affairs. The EU was said 
to gather strength as it developed CFSP and a European Defense Policy, with 
events and trends as the St. Malo Franco-British summit of 1998 and the St. 
Petersberg tasks defining EU intervention. The EU seemed attached to Westphalian 
features i.e. diplomacy, army, police, intelligence, hard external borders (Zielonka, 
2007, p. 140); these are key in European discourses to build power as an external 
actor. Here there was a difference with the US in that the EU did not “securitize” 
democracy promotion, i.e. this element remained outside the realm of traditional, 
hard power considerations. For example, in documents such as the 2003 European 
Security Strategy, there is no explicit mention of democracy promotion other than 
to potential member states, no reference to a world of Kantian Democratic Peace. 
Democracy promotion was in principle not to be associated to EU external security.
This brings nuance to the picture of EU as civilian and normative power 
developed above: this picture existed, but there was a real tension over whether to 
bet on “traditional” (Realist, military, hard) power or these “new” conceptions of 
power. There were key political debates on what kind of superpower the EU could 
and should be. The EU was constructing this universalism, and it seemed 
appropriate to consider that studies on civilian power influenced policy- 
development further; yet there was also evidence that this was only one facet of the 
EU as “superpower in the making” (K. E. Smith, 2005). For detractors, it was 
plausible that the EU was actually not civilian and normative by choice, but 
because it could not aspire to hard power (Laidi, 2005). The EU illustrated this way 
the debates about power ongoing in International Relations (Baldwin, 2002), while 
at the same time it seemed to tilt the balance over the “new” interpretations of 
power to solve conflicts in globalization (civilian power, cosmopolitan rights, 
human security). These debates existed within Europe: Member States defended 
traditional notions of power and security (France clearly, while this is not obvious 
for other MS), while europeanized circles conceived and betted on the EU as
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civilian superpower, a dynamic emphasized by the transnational, civilian, 
democratic nature of the EU itself40.
Another important aspect regarding the “superpower in the making” was that 
this self-definition counted, but only as long as others considered civilian and 
normative attributes (and hence the EU) as powerful. As Jolyon Howorth (2008) 
argues, this may have allowed Europe to become a “power in the world” but not a 
“world power”, for which military might still seemed to count. For this reason, 
building up the EU as democracy promoter might not have been a way to 
strengthen the EU as a superpower either. This view was emphasized with the 
unilateralism and militarization of American foreign policy during the Bush 
administration, during which “American hegemony” underlined hard power instead 
of an international system were countries joined in. Yet there were doubts about the 
extent of such hegemony if “soft power” was lacking and, as Kaldor argued, the 
reality was that the US had been losing power and that “only multilateral 
framework and humanitarian norms [could] restore America’s ability for 
compellance” (Kaldor, 2003a).
In sum, “superpower in the making” seems an adequate phrase to characterize 
the EU in post-Cold War IR, though it raises questions about the kind of polity and 
the kind of power the EU is. There has been no consistent answer to those 
questions. On the one hand, the political debates and tensions in the EU (rhetoric 
and practice) were ongoing. On the other, interpretations of contemporary 
international relations and power depended on geopolitical or cosmopolitan points 
of view -these debates existed in the academic world, but also permeated US and 
EU diverging positions. In the EU, democracy promotion would traditionally fit the 
arguments of civilian and normative power, and of cosmopolitan IR (globalization), 
yet this categorization was not obvious. This meant that the pictures of the US and 
the EU and also of democracy promotion (securitized or not, source of power or 
not) needed more nuance; this underlined in turn the political understandings of 
democracy promotion.
40 It is beyond the scope of this research to elaborate on the national positions and on how these 
translated in the EU discourse and policies, but this opens an important question for further research. 
Importantly, CFSP was mainly intergovernmental and the transnational debates on the EU’s 
international role may have constructed the discourse yet had limited influence on the policies.
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4.2. EU democracy promotion: successful enlargement but limited 
capabilities
Another important argument in the literature on the EU as an international actor 
was Christopher Hill’s (1993) identification of a gap between the EU capabilities 
and the expectations abroad; this framework was used to analyze EU policies and 
their shortcomings empirically. This hints at the difficulties and controversies of 
democracy promotion itself, and at a gap that not only depended on the promoter’s 
ability but also on the possibilities on the ground, and where the evaluation depends 
on the views and expectations projected. This approach is key to explore whether 
the gap between expectations and capabilities to promote democracy was only 
European or American or, as explored in this thesis, related to the more general 
limitations of external actors in democratization processes.
Here the focus is on Chris Hill’s critique that “superpower” Europe remained 
on the side of expectations that were not matched by EU capabilities. This 
argument has been explored regarding foreign policy in general and defense in 
particular, where some EU officials insisted on the need to develop capabilities 
(Chris Patten, 2005). Democracy promotion has perhaps epitomized the gap 
between the ambitions and the limits of the EU, and in order to measure its power, 
it was important to interrogate what the EU achieved, i.e. whether it actually could 
promote democracy as it was expected it would41.
One important question was whether the EU could be successful only in its 
neighborhood, as the cases of candidates had shown. EU authorities and scholars 
have indeed granted that enlargement has been the successful EU foreign policy; 
consequently, EU capabilities in the near-abroad have been proven (Timothy 
Garton Ash, 2006; Solana, 2003b; W. Wallace, 2003). The Eastern and Central 
European case has nourished the literature on EU democracy promotion for the past 
15 years, and established that the main EU capabilities were potential membership 
and conditionality. Defense issues were left aside and approached from a NATO 
perspective (Seidelmann, 2001), so this was a case were security issues were
41 Nevertheless, as with the conception of “power”, Jorgersen (1998) warned that the evaluation of 
EU success could actually depend on the yardstick used by the observer, who often projected its 
own views and expectations.
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considered separately from democratization42. The ECE contributed to establish 
that EU-membership could trigger and succeed in democracy promotion for two 
main, related reasons: incentives were high (Pridham, 2007; Schimmelfennig & 
Scholtz, 2007) and conditionality was high (Ethier, 2003; Sorensen, 1993; 
Vachudova, 2001). However, this literature emphasizes that EU democracy 
promotion was not only a matter of “soft” power, as sanctions and potential 
sanctions had much leverage, and the EU often acted unilaterally. Again, the 
picture was nuanced regarding the universalism and the EU experience.
By contrast, the capabilities of the EU to promote democracy elsewhere or 
otherwise have been questioned altogether. This thesis is sympathetic to the 
exceptional character of democracy promotion in the case of candidate countries, 
which is, in a way, “anticipated domestic policy”. As a result this research does not 
analyze these cases, and it does not consider the hypothesis picturing the EU as 
magnet (Pevehouse, 2005). This also derives from this research’s conceptualization 
of the EU as international actor that is comparable to the United States, and from its 
subject of interest being their roles as democracy promoters in International 
Relations rather than their internal/expanding synergy.
Hill’s observations about the European Union’s capabilities-expectations gap 
lead us to consider another interesting aspect, namely the role that non-EU citizens 
and EU citizens expected the EU to play. Overall, there were high expectations for 
the EU to play a significant role in IR throughout this period both in Europe and in 
the world. This was the case in Iran and the Arab world (Hollis, 1997), and what 
transnational surveys reported, e.g. Pew, German Marshall Fund, and Bertelmanns 
Institute reports. Eurobarometer reports have been interpreted this way on the basis 
that for instance in 2007, 62% of EU citizens would like Member States and the EU 
to take decisions on foreign policy jointly (European Commission, 2007). In 
European political circles, the quest for a more assertive role for the EU was active 
(Ahtisaari & Fischer, 2007), though for observers such as Timothy Garton Ash
42 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss NATO’s leverage in democracy promotion, but it is 
important to notice that it has arguably been ambiguous too: it often served as basis, precondition 
and development of democracy, but these aspects could be secondary to security. Previously this had 
been illustrated by the early accession of Turkey and Portugal to NATO but stricter democratic 
conditionality in the European Communities. In any case, NATO is core to the American-European 
partnership and illustrates the importance of democracy promotion for both sides and a number of 
additional tools (democratization of military forces, involvement of parliamentarians, etc.).
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(2005) this did not necessarily mean that EU action would, or should, challenge the 
Western partnership.
Finally, the academic literature on Transatlantic relations was not consensual 
about a strong EU, either present or future. Some schcolars disregarded EU action as 
limited re-action, for instance Lieber (2006, p. 262) aargued the EU was “not about 
to emerge as a superpower, let alone a balancer: against the United States”. 
However, many more authors started to picture the EIU as “challenger”, and argued 
that the EU capability to act abroad in developmeint cooperation and trade had 
increased its clout. For these authors, the confrontatiion vis-a-vis the United States 
was an integral part of what could make Europe a “suiper-state” (Haseler, 2004) and 
even “the next superpower” in economic, geopolitical and cultural dimensions 
(Schnabel & Rocca, 2005). In his analysis of the rises of Europe, Kupchan actually 
identified that Europe could challenge the Americaan plans of global democracy 
promotion, turning the Atlantic into “a new axiss of competition” (Kupchan,
2002)43. This view was also part of Cox’s (20)05) portrayal of “terrors in 
Transatlantic’, emphasizing the rift rather than the driift.
4.3 EU democracy promotion: in the making? Europeanization plans
In this nuanced picture of the international “rise” of tlhe EU, there was potential and 
also clear attempts to “Europeanize” democracy promotion. In principle it was an 
area where policy could be coordinated (it was nott controversial), and important 
instruments already existed, such as the EIDHIR and Development Funds. 
Nevertheless, in practice, it was difficult to overcoime the fragmentation between 
institutions and to conciliate the different interests of actors, including the 
transnational or national bodies in charge of chanmeling funds or implementing 
projects on the ground. This potential and the shortcomings were illustrated by an 
important initiative to create a “Foundation for Eurcopean Democracy Promotion”, 
which can be interpreted as a conscious and willlful effort to construct a EU 
approach in practice, centralizing funds and decision-making and somewhat 
branding European democracy promotion. These eefforts have actually not bom
43 In his chapter on “the false promise of globalization and demiocracy”, Kupchan claims “the EU 
may well find it convenient, if  not necessary, to propagate a nevw and ambitious brand of pan- 
european nationalism” p. 117.
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fruit and such a foundation does not exist as of 20099. Yet the initiative illustrated 
important aspects of EU democracy promotion: tthe potential and interest in 
building a joint, European effort, but also the liimits and fragmentation within 
Europe and the role of the diverse agents’ interests anid of power politics.
Historically, the relevance of foundations in thee promotion of democracy and 
human rights dates back to the German political pairty Stiftungzn during the Cold 
War, which influenced the creation of the Aimerican counterparts. These 
foundations diverge from the traditional, mainly Aimerican private organizations 
based (often exclusively) on private funds and witth no formal connection with 
public political institutions [cf. Chapter 1, Chapter 3]u . In the US, the party 
institutes NDI and IRI associated with other public aactors (including labor unions) 
under the National Endowment for Democracy. Im principle, this unified front 
makes sense because they pursue non-partisan goalss in democracy promotion and 
agents can in this way maximize their domestic clouit: according to rational choice 
institutionalism, they will also increase their funding and range of action (Pollack, 
1997, p. 100). The idea of creating a European foumdation that brings together the 
Stiftungen and other actors would similarly secek to increase the national 
foundations’ clout while also endowing democraccy promotion with a distinct 
“European approach”.
The project was developed mainly by the Nethcerlands Institute of Multi-party 
Democracy (NIMD), with support of the Britisht Westminster Foundation for 
Democracy (WFD). It was pushed forward as off 2003 and gained additional 
importance under the Dutch presidency of the Eurcopean Council in 2004, during 
which democracy promotion was high on the agenda. A key conference on 
“Enhancing the European profile in democracy assiistance” was organized in July 
2004 to brainstorm on what that European projfile could be. Significantly, it 
brought together academics, think tanks, NGOs arnd national and EU officials, 
allowing for a very important transnational, non-govfemmental input at this stage of 
policy-definition45. The main presentations weree gathered in a publication
441 consider these foundations, as Rockefeller, Open Society, ettc. as non-state, often transnational, 
actors in democracy promotion. They are however not central im this analysis of US and EU policies 
[cf. Chapter 3].
45 Indeed, a number of think tanks and individual identified thatt democracy promotion could play a 
key role in defining European external action (also vis-a-vis the3 US). Among them there were the 
Centre for European Reform (researcher Steven Everts would 1 eater work as Special Counselor for 
Javier Solana at the General Secretariat of the Council) and the 1 Open Society Institute (fellow Mark
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symbolically entitled “Democracy: Europe’s core value” and included both 
academic and policy-oriented pieces (von Meijenfeld & van Doom, 2007). In 
addition, a final Statement was presented to the EU presidency to pursue this goal 
further (NIMD Europe Conference, 2004).
Within this context, there were numerous exchanges among EU institutions, 
think tanks (including FRIDE in Madrid), and the foundations in different 
countries, and several drafts for a European Foundation for Democracy through 
Partnership were presented in 2006 and 2007. This proposal was submitted by D. 
French, Chief Executive of the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, and R. von 
Meijenfled, Executive Director of the NIMD. The comparison with American 
democracy promotion was explicit, as if the Europeans were copying the model 
back from the other side of the Atlantic. Seemingly, they were also measuring the 
EU initiative with the levels of the NED. The 2006 draft acknowledged:
“The Foundation should be provided (after its start-up phase) with sufficient 
funding to enable it to fulfill its remit, with commitments to it made on a 
rolling basis. (The total budget for the foundation should resemble that of 
the US National Endowment for Democracy, euro 50 million in 2005 and 
euro 62 million in 2006.) The Foundation would be primarily funded from 
the EU, the EU Member States and the private sector.”46
In the draft, the Foundation was presented as an ideal link between civil and 
political society and underlined that it would provide expertise and knowledge as 
well as flexible, easier access to the target (compared to heavier bureaucratic 
procedures in the EU and MS). Yet it also emphasized how democracy promotion 
would be used to raise the EU’s profile in international relations and “to strengthen 
Europe’s strategic contribution [...] and the achievement of wider international 
objectives for development and security” (p. 8). Pragmatically, the proposal 
suggested joining all European public funding (Member States and EU), where its 
role would be to coordinate and monitor EU activities, both non-governmental and 
governmental.
The initiative was met with enthusiasm by some individuals in the European 
Parliament, where the main attractive seemed to be the increased EU visibility that
Leonard ran some workshops on democracy promotion in 2007, before the foundation of the 
European Council on Foreign Relations).
46 ("European Foundation for democracy through partnership: a proposal for a new initiative in EU 
democracy assistance world-wide," 2006, p. 10)
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democracy promotion could earn on the ground and internationally47. However, 
there were also other, internal, political considerations at play, such as the 
possibility to create a new EP Committee on democracy, separate from the one on 
human rights; this meant an additional Chairmanship would have to be allocated to 
a political party (a very important issue in EP politics)48. Similarly, though some 
foundations and think tanks supported the proposal of one Foundation, there was 
resistance to centralize decision-making and financial processes on the part of most 
non-governmental actors and of many EU officials. Indeed, the main opposition to 
the Foundation actually arose from the German party foundations, both the 
conservative Konrad Adenauer stiftung and the socialist Friedrich Ebert stiftung. 
Arguably, the foundations feared that the very generous (German, public) funds 
they are allocated yearly would be dispersed, as the budget would be redirected to 
this EU central pool. Some individuals also resented that the Foundation would 
empower some individuals and boards, while other NGOs and activists would be 
left out. Finally, officials in the Commission (AidCo) and some EP officials were 
also suspicious of such a “new kid” on the block of democracy promotion, and 
preferred to keep more direct control/monitoring of the projects and funding49. This 
attempt to centralize European democracy promotion thus did not succeed for 
practical reasons but also political differences, which illustrates the fragmentation 
as well as the politicization on the promoters’ side of policy making.
I will refer to one last example to bring this discussion back to the general 
context of democracy promotion in the EU. During an event related to the 
Foundation plans, the President of the European Commission Barroso stood for 
Europeanized democracy promotion in a speech where he mentioned “universal 
values that must be promoted worldwide” but also Europe’s “own version of 
democratization”. In a clever turn, he argued that the contemporary international 
context is one where the EU is “a world power whose soft power is a hard reality”. 
He then sought to co-opt all EU parties internally, asserting that “democracy 
promotion is an area where everybody can play a role: Member States, European
47 The Democracy Caucus of the EP adopted the concept of a European Democracy Foundation 
[source: http://www.democracycaucus.org/42904.html]. An active proponent of the project was 
Markus Meckel MEP, former foreign minister of East Germany (Meckel, 2006), and also the British 
MEP Scott-McMillan.
48 Source: interview with Official, DG External Policies, EP, Brussels, 22 June 2005.
49 Source: interviews with Policy Officer, NIMD and with Research associate, Konrad Adenauer 
Stiftung, Brussels, 8 January 2007.
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institutions, etc.”. Barroso also praised the achievements of the Commission, which 
“fosters and restates democracy in Political Dialogue as part of bilateral relations” 
(Barroso, 2008). The general tone and such specific mentions to bilateral relations 
between the EU and non-democratic countries seek to emphasize the EU own, 
independent capabilities in IR, separate from MS, yet in cooperation. There was no 
mention of the transatlantic partnership.
This section has given evidence of how democracy promotion was embedded 
in the European universalism and gained an increasing role in the rise of the EU, 
while it was also trapped in the nuances and paradoxes of the EU as “superpower”: 
it seemed an instance of civilian and normative power, but it was not certain that 
this would actually yield international power to the EU.
Conclusion
Chapter 1 discussed the literature on democracy promotion and how this research 
contributed to it. This chapter has complemented this thesis’ research framework 
with the discussion of the US and the EU as international actors in the context of 
transatlantic relations. This chapter framed US and EU democracy promotion in the 
longer history, identifying how specific experiences and ideas corresponded to (and 
in turn generated) different approaches.
Importantly, it has substantiated that democracy promotion contributed to the 
development of two “universalisms” of sorts during the post-Cold War period. 
Despite the continuing rhetoric of cooperation, two independent narratives 
portrayed the US and the EU as distinct democracy promoters. These universalisms 
displayed elements that not only distinguished American and European approaches, 
but also made explicit the rivalry between them. Democracy promotion and the US 
and EU universalisms were better understood linking the study of identity and of 
role-construction in international relations. In designing its own action and role, the 
European Union notably defined itself vis-a-vis the United States, hence using the 
concepts of “civilian” and “normative” power.
The distinction and divergence was understood, and explained, in the context 
of post-Cold War International Relations that saw the United States confirm 
democracy promotion as a new mission and the European Union develop new and
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stronger capabilities as an international actor. Regarding US democracy promotion, 
the chapter discussed some specificities of the Clinton and Bush administrations 
while making the case for continuity and structural features of “American” 
democracy promotion; it also presented the turning point of 9/11 and the challenges 
to reconcile policies and to include state-building in the War on Terror.
In the EU, democracy promotion was partly made to fit the corresponding 
universalism, but this chapter has argued that this narrative also presented important 
shortcomings: civilian power was (maybe) not so powerful, and the EU did not 
seem to be limited to civilian, normative roles. The chapter explored the complex 
evidence that exists in this regard, establishing the extent to which democracy 
promotion contributes to a European “superpower in the making” with independent 
foreign policy, and to the picture of an emancipation of sorts from the United 
States. Beyond the narrative, the chapter discussed one pragmatic initiative, the 
European foundation for democracy. This illustrated the rise and Europeanization 
of democracy promotion, how its content and shape were designed vis-a-vis 
American democracy promotion and, importantly, how internal interests and 
politics had led to such an initiative but also dragged it down.
Chapters 1 and 2 have focused on the content of European and American 
democracy promotion. They will now be completed with a study of the actors in the 
policy-making process in Chapter 3. This will finalize the thesis’ depiction of US 
and EU democracy promotion before moving on to the case studies.
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Chapter 3. Democracy promotion in American and 
European policy-making: dispersed agency, fragmented 
processes
Who are the “democracy promoters” that develop or even embody the American and 
the European approaches? Do they inform, draft, assign and implement the policies 
like “intellectuals” or like “bureaucrats”? E. H. Carr thought there was a sort of 
antithesis of theory and practice in politics in the roles of “the intellectual and the 
bureaucrat, the former trained to think mainly on a priori lines, the latter empirically” 
(Carr, 2001, 1981, p. 14). Democracy promotion makes its way from the utopian 
views and principled goals of the top decision-makers in the United States and 
Europe and through the policy-making processes -styles and bureaucratic cultures 
will shape the policy outcome. Eventually, it translates into wide-ranging programs 
implemented in non-democratic countries. The policy entrepreneurs both sides of the 
Atlantic are thus influenced by epistemic communities, bureaucratic processes, and 
the practitioners’ choices when implementing the policies. The goal of this chapter is 
to throw light on the politics of this phenomenon where theory and practice 
intertwine.
This chapter addresses the agency question “what is done where, and by 
whom” in American and European democracy promotion. It focuses on the public/ 
governmental action in the policy-process, keeping in mind that the process also 
involves private actors. Indeed, depending on the definitions and the estimations, the 
“democracy promotion community” amounted to several thousand officials and 
professionals (Melia, 2005), several dozen independent bodies (Carothers, 1999) or
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broadly “many advocates for a new doctrine” (Mayall, 2000) *. The state and non­
state members of this loose, open “community” undertook international action as a 
joint venture where the views of intellectuals and bureaucrats co-existed, and where 
it was often difficult to consider some actors, or their approach, strictly “American” 
or “European”.
Nevertheless, this chapter gives evidence of how democracy promotion was 
shaped in two distinct foreign policy processes, and how this accounted for some 
important differences in the American and European approaches. As it discusses the 
constraints and domestic pressures that shaped the policy-making processes 
(Peterson, 1996), its goal is to nuance this thesis’ picture of transatlantic relations.
This chapter takes into consideration the definition of democracy adopted in 
Chapter 1, adopting a pragmatic and relatively classical FPA approach. The 
differences in the political structures and cultures in the US and the EU were 
manifest in specific policy-dynamics, illustrated by the actors’ potential and actual 
undertakings regarding democracy promotion. This chapter’s focus on the policy- 
dynamics one side and the other of the Atlantic allows exploring the elements of the 
“rival universalisms” mentioned in Chapter 2 (International Project and 
Prescription). More specifically, this approach allows identifying the locus of policy- 
initiatives, policy-development, decision-making and implementation (Webber & 
Smith, 2002). At the same time, the goal is to capture the politics in this process 
(Hill, 2003). The discussion of each approach follows four broadly-conceived 
“stages” in the policy-making process from guidelines to implementation, and 
focuses on the actors’ roles and power.
Section 1) discusses some generalities and the shortcomings of cataloguing 
policy-makers as “American” or “European”; it introduces three main characteristics 
of the policy-process: transnational, fragmented, interest competition. Sections 2 and 
3 draw the picture of the American and European approaches focusing on the 
structures and the most important actors, i.e. the location of policy-making. Each 
section is divided internally in the four stages of the process: general guidelines, 
policy design, policy implementation-phase A (selection, allocation) and policy 
implementation-phase B (execution in the field).
1 It is interesting to notice that some actors, on the contrary, specifically and explicitly exclude 
themselves from the “democracy promotion community”. This was the case of several Human Rights 
associations and Amnesty International [interview with senior policy official, Open Society Institute, 
Brussels 8 January 2007].
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1. Complex and transnational relations; a comparative framework
1.1. “American” and “European” democracy promoters?
While it was easier to identify and classify promoters at the beginning of the official
policy-process, as one moves along, actors include NGOs (international or local) and 
knowledge-hubs (research centers, experts, projects) that can difficultly be classified 
as “American” or “European”. This input came from actors that were independent 
but at the same time embedded in the American or European context, or actors that 
were concerned about the target-country yet remained dependant on US and EU 
funds.
Some of this input was of intellectual nature or, as far as that could be 
established, “expert advice”. For example, many publications from the Stanford 
Center for Democracy, Development and Rule of Law included policy advice, the 
Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars (Washington, D.C.) played a role 
in shaping policies in the Congo, and the World Movement for Democracy (loosely 
connected to Freedom House and the NED) served as framework in the Community 
of Democracies non-governmental process. Yet we could not swiftly conclude that 
this was “American” democracy promotion. Similarly, the think tank European 
Center for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), working with governmental 
funds of eight European countries2, played a key role in the assessment and 
elaboration of European Union policies towards ACP countries. Yet they may use 
worldwide consultants and were not answerable to any institution, so one cannot 
easily conclude this was “European” democracy promotion either. These democracy 
promoters enjoyed clear freedom of mind and critical, independent action.
The input could also be more practical, as it was impossible and probably 
undesirable that US or EU officials perform these tasks on the ground. Within this 
category there were large NGOs: for instance the Electoral Institute of South Africa 
(EISA), which has played a key role in organizing and monitoring many African 
electoral processes. Among EISA’s donors were European development agencies or 
embassies (Norway, Sweden, UK, Germany, Belgium, Ireland, Denmark) and the
2 The Development Ministries of Belgium, the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden, Portugal, Ireland, 
Luxembourg and [the non-EU member state] Switzerland.
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EU, as well as USAID and the Open Society Initiative3. There were also small NGOs 
or contractors that responded, for example, to calls for offers on “women 
empowerment in the Middle East” in the framework of both the MEPI (American) or 
EIDHR (EU) programs. When they received financial support, these private actors 
“became” field-agents of the American or European authorities. Yet, they perceived 
themselves as independent actors with their own project or, at most, as partners with 
the donor. It is true that one single NGO may receive grants from both the US and 
the EU for one project, and that while some NGOs targeted single donors, many 
were increasingly diversifying their sources. The applications were made on 
pragmatic grounds, i.e. NGOs mostly applied for funds they thought they could get, 
not selecting US or European donors on principle. In addition, it was possible that 
the programs were not exactly implemented the way they were accepted in the call. 
Practitioners also had a relatively ample margin for freedom, and were pragmatic and 
flexible4. They could not be classified as “European” or “American” easily; and there 
were also many connections between local and international actors 5.
This community was transnational in the sense that it brought together an open 
network of political actors, and private and public institutions and individuals 
(Josselin & Wallace, 2001, pp. 2-3)6. Along these lines, democracy promotion 
illustrated globalization and some of its features: global networks, flows and 
relations (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, & Perraton, 2003). First, actors and policies 
were interconnected (and increasingly so). Secondly, this transnationality and 
networks constructed and defined democracy promotion structurally (as an 
international phenomenon). Thirdly, this phenomenon conditioned patterns of 
domestic, social, economic and political organization worldwide (in any case, 
beyond state borders). It is uncertain, nevertheless, that these features were becoming 
institutionalized in the international system, how and why.
3 Information available at EISA website (http://www.eisa.org.za/EISA/donors.htm).
4 Practitioners often complained about the abstract, sidetracked nature of some of the calls, drafted by 
“people sitting behind a desk” and considered their own decisions legitimate [interviews with 
personnel from NGOs in Kinshasa 29 October 2006, Bamako 15 November 2007, London 3 January 
2008].
5 My use of “community” here mirrors the self-denomination that many practitioners used, and I use it 
to emphasize the aspects of collectivity and common interest, though the structure was loose and 
open.
6 The authors also quote a definition of Thomas Risse-Kappen (1995).
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1.2. Fragmentation and competing interests
Two other characteristics are key to understanding tlhis democracy promotion 
community of private and private actors, namely fragmentation and competing 
interests. The sections on the American and the European approaches will give 
evidence of this and also explain the politics within these processes.
The first characteristic was the fragmentation within this community. There 
was a very wide diversity of goals, tasks and competencies in the US and the EU 
settings. For example, DG Development and Cooperation and USAID were supposed 
to focus on development, while DG External Relations and the Department of State 
dealt with external relations more broadly. Within the case of DG Development and 
Cooperation, the competence is actually geographic instead of thematic -its action is 
traditionally addressed to ACP countries (not the Middle East, not future Member 
States). There was also fragmentation regarding institutional competences, such as 
the Commission’s vis-a-vis the European Parliament’s and those of Congress vis-a- 
vis the administration’s. These were key in the processes of legislation and budget 
approval, and driven by separate agendas and political interests7. This fragmentation 
derived from the legal provisions (Treaties or US Constitution, and the rest of the 
body of laws), but only to a certain extent. Individuals could clearly have a distinct 
impact and develop some agendas, and institutions often adopted network- 
govemance methods. Indeed, democracy promotion provides an interesting example 
of what Slaughter (2003, p. 190) called “governing through networks”, where 
officials from governments developed policy in decentralized and informal 
international networks. For example, there were meetings and correspondence to 
prepare documents (summits, conferences) and circulation of policy guidelines. 
Hence there was fragmentation but also potential for cooperative synergies. There 
were also usual “revolving doors” in which civil servants, officials and politicians 
became “non-governmental” academic experts, managers or consultants at research 
institutes and NGOs, and vice-versa.
Fragmentation also took place at the level of expertise, especially among non­
state actors. Consultants and policy-advisers and NGOs; on the ground worked on 
specific topics, e.g. rule of law, the abolition of the death penalty, electoral
7 In the case of the EIDHR, the EP played a very important role as it had a co-decision power for this 
non-compulsory budget. In the case of the US, Bush (the executive) regularly demanded higher 
allocations for democracy promotion (e.g. for the NED) than he eventually got approved by Congress.
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assistance. This sometimes led to gaps between topic expertise and background 
reality, or to incoherent or unbalanced strategies. Finally, there was also 
fragmentation in that the instruments devoted to promote democracy were very 
diverse: agreements that implied conditionality, direct financing of projects, 
cooperation with incumbent governments, funds for civil society. This multiplicity of 
actors and fragmentation in the American and European approaches amounted to a 
puzzle-picture of democracy promotion. Despite the complications, for many this 
was also a positive aspect: pooling wide-ranging and rich resources, maximizing 
expertise (at least in theory), and avoiding monopoly of decision-making and action8.
The second characteristic concerned the many interests /competing claims that 
converged in democracy promotion policies. The US and the EU did not only 
promote democracy because it was their value, this served other interests notably in 
the realms of security and economics [cf. Chapter 1]. The priorities and objectives 
varied for the different actors feeding into the policy process. For example, many 
argued that USAID needed its independence from the Departments of Defense/State 
in order to safeguard the Modernization (development and democracy) paradigm and 
not only the nation’s interests in the short-term. Yet US governments usually used 
this agency as much as possible for their own purposes. In another example, the 
advice on democracy promotion in the Middle East issued from RAND clearly 
diverged from that from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Similarly, 
as a research institute linked to the Barcelona Process, EuroMeSCo reports obviously 
emphasized the importance of the Euro-Mediterranean area and sought to raise the 
policies’ profile; by contrast the Open Society Institute (headed by the philanthropist 
George Soros) focused on Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space and thus 
directed funds to project and NGOs working in those countries.
1.3. A descriptive, comparative framework: locations in American and
European policy-making, and four stages in the process
Transnationality, fragmentation and competing interests within and across promoters
makes it difficult to establish straightforward American “vs.” European democracy 
promotion. Nevertheless it is possible to specify a bit further their dynamics, and 
address the “what is done where, and by whom” for each of the approaches. The
8 This visibly epitomized the liberal premises of international democracy promotion.
112
following table identifies the most relevant institutions and their main role in the US 
and the EU. For a more useful comparison between them, this analysis distinguished 
four stages in the policy-process9:
1) General guidelines: these actors proposed and conceived democracy promotion
at large, interpreted the context that led to policy making and sought to imbue 
these policies with some principles. They influenced the provision of funds and 
were the last responsible decision-makers. In practice, there were no linear 
phases of proposition and decision, as there is some institutional bargaining in 
the process. Actors had power in both proposition and decision, which led to 
drawing the policy’s general guidelines.
2) Policy design and definition: these actors10, mostly within a bureaucratic
structure but also including semi-private actors, were in charge of defining 
areas of focus and designed democracy promotion policies at large. They also 
created (and constitute) the institutional memory of approaches, concepts, 
priorities... Their direct contact with the ground (target countries, project 
implementation) was scarce.
3) Policy implementation phase A: these actors included lower ranks of the
bureaucratic structure (with geographic/thematic specialization) and some 
semi-private actors; they were in charge of operationalizing the policies by 
area. They were responsible for pragmatic decision-making: terms of contracts, 
allocation of grants, assessment (introduced accountability). They had direct 
knowledge and implication in the democracy promotion policies 
implementation.
4) Policy implementation phase B : these actors only exceptionally included officials
and were mostly private organizations and individuals, including the large and 
dense network of transnational, non-governmental democracy activists 
(researchers, practitioners). Officials were occasionally deployed in the target- 
country, and were often tasked with supervision, organization, reporting (e.g.
9 1 contemplated a stricter institutional approach, i.e. a list of American and European actors/agents 
and their tasks, but I decided to maintain the focus on democracy promotion at large. This way, I 
discuss the stages in the policy-process, indicating which institutions have an input, o f which kind, 
and what this implies. This allows to analyze the politics behind this process, and to account for 
contextual and historical contingency when these institutional structures/roles evolved.
10 At times it is useful to differentiate among actors and agents (in charge of channeling/ implementing 
democracy promotion) as functionalist theories [cf. Chapter 2] but I am using “actor” broadly here not 
to presume that they behave only as agents. This view ins inspired from Hix’s review of the 
functionalist literature (Hix, 2005, pp. 12-18).
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when incumbent governments were associated in the implementation). They 
were in charge of the execution of policies in the field (field teams, contractors, 
grantees). Importantly, in the case of the research community, they provided 
knowledge and advice that eventually influenced stages 2 and 3 too.
Though this chapter uses the term “stages”, in practice there is not a simple linearity 
in this scheme, especially considering democracy promotion at large and not 
instances of policy (e.g. a specific NGO program, or a budget line), as this thesis 
does. Indeed, at any given time, the policies implemented would influence decisions 
for other policies at earlier stages, or eventually lead to new guidelines. Nevertheless, 
these four categories conform broadly to separate aspects of the policy-process that 
were observed during fieldwork, and they offer a good entry-point to the empirical 
analysis. The question addressed is Robert Dahl’s “who governs?” in democracy 
promotion, and these stages let us discuss the “locations of policy-making” (H. 
Wallace & Wallace, 2000, p. 73).
This chapter’s core sections discuss the American (Section 2) and the European 
(Section 3) specificities in their contexts of domestic processes and politics. The 
analysis privileged the focus on actors rather than on the instruments of democracy 
promotion. In each of the stages, the diverse actors’ contributions or instruments are 
discussed: rhetoric of democracy promotion, decisions on intervention or budget 
allocations, as well as more specific elements of conditionality or earmarked aid in 
programs of democracy assistance. This discussion of each actor’s capacities (legal, 
bureaucratic, political) and of the tasks and policies undertaken throws light on how 
the “universalisms” manifested in the US and EU democracy promotion. This 
illustrates the pragmatic differences between the approaches and the political 
implications of these policy-dynamics.
Keeping in mind the element of transnationality in democracy promotion, a 
strict division between “American” and “European” for stage 4 was avoided. This 
framework also allowed exploring the complex input of public and private actors, 
and illustrating the fragmentation and competing claims in democracy promotion. In 
all four stages, actors and agents enjoyed a relatively wide discretion, depending on 
the institution and on the policy (tool) in question. The resulting policy did not imply 
that all competing claims had been reconciled; the outcome was often a result of 
compromises but owed a greater influence to the more powerful agent. Necessarily, 
bureaucratic politics, personalities, etc. affected the process, and the evolution of the
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European Union and American political cycles created contexts/contingencies. This 
analytical framework (the stages) is used to give an account of the historical realities 
of the post-Cold War period, discussing first the American approach and second the 
European one.
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Table 6. General framework for the analysis o f American and European democracy 
promotion as an element o f foreign policy, with focus on agents (location)
Policy-process Location of policy-making
(stages) United States European Union
1 General guidelines
Responsible
decision­
makers
•  Administration (executive): 
Presidency
• Congress (legislative)
•  Member States 
Council Presidency 
Council of the EU
• European Parliament [limited
influence]
2 Policy definition
Bureaucracy and 
semi-public 
actors
• Department of State
B. Democracy, Human Rights and Labor 
Deputy-National Security Advisor
• USAID
• Millennium Challenge
Corporation
• NED
• Commission
• CFSP:
High Representative 
Comitology
Policy unit; research institute ISS
3 Policy design/ 
implementation 
phase A
Bureaucracy
(theme/geogr
aphic)
• USAID
Field decision-making 
Office for Democracy and Governance 
Office for Transition Development
• Department of State 
Centralized decision-making
• NED 
Core grantees:
Party foundations (IRI, NDI)
American Center for Int. Labor Solidarity 
Center for Int. Private Enterprise
• Commission 
DG Relex
DG Dev 
EuropeAid 
Delegations (field)
• European Parliament 
Parliamentary assemblies
4 Policy
implementati 
on Phase B
Actors in the field, 
“execution”
• NED grants to NGOs
• Policy-implementing
institutes 
IFES (elections)
The Carter Center 
US Institute for Peace 
Freedom House
• Research community: CEIP,
Woodrow Wilson,
Hoover, RAND...
• Networks (WMD)
• Philanthropists (Soros’ Open
Society) and Foundations
• Private companies
(contractors)
• NGOs (not for profit)
•  EU Electoral Observation
• Recipient-government
• NGOs 
Party Foundations
•  Research community: 
International Idea 
EuroMesCo
German Marshall Fund 
(transatlantic)
etc....
•  Private companies
(contractors)
• NGOs (not for profit)
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2. Democracy promotion in the United States
2.1. Inspiring policy: the role of Congress and the presidential office
At Stage 1, the ultimate responsible “decision-makers” in the American approach
were on the side of the executive the presidential office, and on the side of the 
legislative, Congress, with power to appropriate funds, authorize programs and 
oversee action in general (Folay, 2008, pp. 116-119).
In the 1960s, Congress had shaped the Foreign Assistance Act, the programs 
and the funds allocated11. This way, it preferred to secure dispositions that it could 
control and halted other programs that were to be run exclusively by the executive 
branch (Carothers, 1999, p. 23). The activity of Congress regarding democracy 
promotion intensified in the post-Cold War period12. Many more pieces of legislation 
were introduced and increasingly important sums were allocated in the yearly State 
Department and Foreign Operations Appropriations. Bills regarding specific target 
countries were often discussed, and the prestigious Foreign Relations Committee 
(Senate) shaped decisions. More specifically, Congress approved several programs to 
advice legislatures in (mainly European) democratizing countries through the 1990s, 
and even created a House Democracy Assistance Commission for this purpose in 
2005 (Epstein, Serafmo, & Miko, 2007)13. Congress has been key in emphasizing 
bipartisan cooperation over democracy promotion. It was also endowed with quite 
some ground for programmatic detail, which would otherwise be taken over by the 
Department of State14. The role of Congress was often overshadowed by the 
executive branch, and scholars have tended to evaluate democracy promotion under 
presidential administrations. However, the timing of elections, the partisan
11 There was also a debate on content of democracy promotion, i.e. on whether aid should be for “the 
encouragement of democratic private and local government institutions” instead of the governments 
(Title IX).
12 Congress also had an important role in the Helsinki Accords of the CSCE, and promoted the first 
programs to end Communist rule i.e. the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989 
(P.L.101-179) and the Freedom Support Act (FSA) of 1991 (P.L. 102-511).
13 It seems there was a blank period between assisting the Eastern European legislatures and re­
starting this activity again, formalizing it with this Commission, in 2005, clearly within the context of 
Bush’s policies of democracy promotion. This Commission has been maintained after Democrats won 
a majority in Congress in 2006, which illustrates bipartisan cooperation in democracy promotion. As 
mode of example, in 2008 the Commission was working with the legislatures of Afghanistan, 
Colombia, East Timor, Georgia, Haiti, Indonesia, Kenya, Lebanon, Liberia, Macedonia, Mongolia, 
and Ukraine.
14 Another recent example of bipartisan cooperation for democracy promotion safeguarding these 
distinct executive-legislative roles was the Advance Democracy Act of 2005, later incorporated in 
other pieces of legislation.
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composition of Congress, and the evolution of power in the hands of the House and 
the Senate vis-a-vis the executive also explained many of the policies undertaken (or 
not).
At the time of the end of the Cold War, President George Bush (father) (G. H. 
W. Bush, 1990) made an important speech at Congress where he mentioned a “new 
world order” of freedom and the rule of law. As overviewed in Chapter 2, when Bill 
Clinton took power he soon made the “Democratic enlargement” part of his strategy, 
connecting democracy promotion with security but also especially with economic 
interests. As of 1994, when Clinton faced a Republican majority in Congress, his 
range of action became increasingly limited and he had to give in to demands to 
reduce intervention abroad15. For instance, he signed a presidential directive limiting 
the potential for future deployment under United Nations operations (Clinton, 1994), 
which would affect democracy promotion as it had been understood for Haiti and 
Somalia because it made US troops deployment more difficult. This way, US politics 
partly explain the gap that some observers (Carothers, 1995) found between the 
democracy rhetoric and his actual policies.
There were many signs of continuity between the Clinton and the George W. 
Bush administrations regarding democracy promotion, but the latter seemed to 
introduce a neo-imperialist rhetoric in this regard (T. Smith, 2007). It was clear that 
Bush raised the profile of democracy promotion in foreign policy and it was higher 
on the agenda. Nevertheless, the most important initiatives and allocations were 
clearly security-oriented, e.g. MEPI (MENA region) and programs to complement 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. His speeches included countless references to 
democracy promotion as a goal of its own, but also as a means in the War on Terror. 
During his time in the presidency Bush worked with a Republican-majority 
Congress, and when at the end of his second term there was a shift towards 
Democratic-majority his allocations were mostly renewed -this shows the broad 
bipartisan agreement on this subject. President Bush clearly illustrated how the 
executive branch can influence democracy policies (tone and target), but also how it 
distinguishes features of an overall “American” approach16.
15 These interventions had a component of democracy promotion and humanitarian aspects though the 
conceptualization was not authoritative (von Hippel, 2000).
16 It is likely that the limited success of Bush’s controversial policies leads the new president (Barack 
Obama) to set a differentiated tone for democracy promotion, but this goal will not be put in question
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2.2. Informing policy: the turf wars between State and USAID, and the 
originality of the National Endowment for Democracy and the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation
At Stage 2 of democracy promotion, the bureaucratic structure at large and the higher
hierarchies influenced the approach. At this level, the following actors shaped the 
American approach: Department of State, USAID and the National Endowment for 
Democracy (NED). The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) can also be 
included in this category. The Department of State was clearly linked to the 
administration in power, USAID and MCC were independent government agencies, 
and the NED was a semi-public agency -they all play a key role in defining the areas 
of focus (themes and geography-wise) and designing the guidelines for policies. Two 
aspects of domestic politics affected these institutions: first, plans from the executive 
to do away with USAID bureaucratic independence and to bring it within the 
administration and second, to maintain the Congress-funded bipartisan NED.
In the Department of State, democracy promotion occupied an ever-greater role 
since the end of the Cold War17. However, according to some analysts State officials 
had a tendency to remain “pragmatic Realists” and not easily give into the 
democracy promotion rhetoric, even during Bush’s administration (Amaral & 
Patterson, 2009). State’s main financial instrument was the Human Rights and 
Democracy fund at the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. This fund 
grew from USD 7.82 million in 1998 to over USD 126.55 million in 200618. This 
meant that Department of State was pursuing policies that resembled those of 
USAID, which is the traditional branch and main source of American democracy 
assistance. This posed a problem of structure and also one of content.
Regarding structure, debates on the duplication and alleged inefficiency of an 
independent USAID are recurrent in Congress, and took place during both the 
Clinton and Bush administration19. Clinton even tried to unify a diversity of
[indeed, this was one of the issues where the Republican and Democratic candidates did not disagree 
upon during the campaign].
17 In a symbolic change, the Bureau of Human rights and humanitarian affairs became the Bureau of 
Democracy, Human rights and Labor in 1998.
18 Data from the Department of State, accessed online on 12 June 2007 [http://www.state.gOv/g/drl/p].
19 Governments have systematically tried to get more control of foreign aid and argue USAID 
bureaucracy is too problematic. Conservative positions identify them with missionaries ready to put 
the foreigners’ good before national interests [correspondence with USAID official, 25 November 
2006].
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development programs and substitute Kennedy’s Foreign Assistance Act (1961)20. In 
the end, coordination and policy-coherence was enhanced with the creation of a 
Deputy-National Security advisor within State who was a “Director of Foreign 
Assistance” (an assistant-Secretary position first and an under-Secretary in the Bush 
administration). USAID was still independent and this Director only had 
administrative tasks, but the move to get it closer to State was clear (Schalatek, 
2006)21. This implied increased control by the government, as this Director was not a 
Senate-confirmed position, in comparison to the USAID Administrator22.
Regarding content, the evolution of USAID (and State) was indicative of the 
emphasis on democracy instead of development, and of the securitization of 
democracy promotion by moving it closer to State and even to the Department of 
Defense. Indeed, as of the early 1990s the guidelines and policy-papers emanating 
from USAID’s Center for Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE) 
emphasized the role of democracy (USAID, 1998a). Modernization had always been 
at the heart of USAID but conditionality was now preferred to incentives, and 
securitization was always a shadow. This meant that aid had to be channeled 
exclusively to some beneficiaries (e.g. Egypt) while others underwent good 
governance conditionality. Many USAID officials closer to the implementation 
stages felt very uncomfortable with this approach because of the “double standards” 
(Harbeson, 1998) and the feeling that conditionality hindered development 
(International Herald Tribune, 2006).
Democracy promotion was further highlighted in the Department of State 
policies when Secretary Rice unraveled her “transformational diplomacy”, and asked 
ambassadors to be more active on this ground. She suggested that a number of 
American “presences” or alternative posts were going to be created to further 
mainstream support for pro-democracy trends and factions in the world (Rice, 2006).
20 There was a Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act in 1998 (Public Law 105-277) that 
established USAID as an executive agency, but it was kept independent (not under State, not under the 
president as for example the Millennium Challenge Corporation).
1 This reminds of the controversies between the Department of State and the USIA (US Information 
Agency) and is an original feature of the American approach. Nevertheless, whereas in most European 
countries Development policies are included in a ministry that is part of the executive, the agencies 
(DFID in the UK, AECI in Spain) still maintain quite some independence, and in the Nordic states the 
Development institutes (in charge of policy and research) have a status somewhere in between USAID 
and the Foundations.
22 The Administrator also reports to the Secretary of State, nevertheless. In turn, both sit on the Board 
of Directors of the Millennium Challenge Corporation. These positions are highly politicized in 
Washington DC in view of these blurred tasks and lines of command.
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Though USAID has offices in many countries, it has also depended on the assistance 
of ambassadors to channel implementation, so potentially this created new political 
difficulties, i.e. tensions between officials, disagreement over specific projects and 
conflicting interests in specific countries.
The securitization of democracy promotion, linking USAID action to 
defending the national interest also became increasingly explicit in CDIE policy 
guidelines (Department of State & USAID, 2003; USAID, 2002a, 2005). Especially 
in the light of the War on Terror, USAID was framed as a “democracy-security card” 
in order to raise its profile or at least maintain its budget. The Director of Foreign 
Assistance (the State-official in charge of policy-coherence, as explained above) 
often referred to Bush’s speeches, to “the post-9/11 world”. At a Congress 
Subcommittee hearing, he claimed:
“The locus of national security threats has shifted to the developing 
world, where poverty, oppression, injustice and indifference are exploited 
by our foes to provide haven for criminals and the planning of criminal 
acts. Foreign assistance is an effective tool for countering these new 
threats, and thus has become a foundational pillar of our new national 
security architecture.”(Tobias, 2006)
As an “agency with a mission”, USAID recovered in this way a political goal that 
was strong when it was created in the 1960s but that had died off to a more 
development-oriented culture, especially for Africa. In his study of bureaucracy, 
Drezner (2000) argued that “a missionary institution thrives if the agency’s espoused 
norms and principles closely correlate with the state’s observed policy outcomes”. In 
this sense, the democracy-security turn of the Department of State and USAID 
strengthened this premise as national strategy, but USAID bureaucratic and field 
independence were likely to maintain the principles of Modernization and focus on 
civil society.
Debates about the USAID bureaucracy and democracy promotion continue: 
many criticize USAID, but they do it for different reasons. Some would like aid to 
fall more directly under the administration, some would like to create a new 
Department-level ministry for aid (independent from State and from Defense, but 
empowered at similar levels), some would like USAID to become strictly non­
governmental (a foundation) so that it is not trapped in foreign policy “double 
standards”.
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The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) was created in 1983 by 
Ronald Reagan, and since then it has been a sign of continuity in American 
democracy promotion. Its main characteristics are the fact that it is independent in its 
functioning (it works as a private association though it is a governmental agency) but 
has a clear official, public stand in that it depends directly from Congress and is led 
by a bipartisan board . The NED is one of the best-researched instruments of 
American democracy promotion (Cavell, 2002). Though sometimes described as 
relatively isolated from US foreign policy (Lowe, 2002), it has actually been a 
“brand” of American action abroad and plays a role both in informing and actually 
designing democracy promotion (see below). Its programs and guidelines often 
present broad strategies and some “technical” aspects to promote democracy which, 
above all, introduce a distance from the American executive or the US official 
policy: the focus is shifted to the target and away from the benefit/interest they imply 
for the US. This way, for instance, the NED had a massive program in China 
(including support for Tibetan communities) since 2002, but it was not connected to 
the US government (Lum, 2007). This example illustrates the “pros” defended by 
NED-supporters i.e. that they act where the government may not act (lack of will or 
of means, political concerns), but also the critiques: that the NED is an official 
American actor abroad with limited accountability and this can sometimes 
undermine or contradict governmental preferences and agendas. It is clear that the 
NED is an independent actor at this level of democracy promotion, with its own 
goals and methods, and with a broader and more powerful scope of action than the 
European party foundations that had inspired it. Institutionally, it belongs to that 
realm of bodies created at one point under presidential prerogatives. It is 
controversial at times, but its existence is not at stake (rather the opposite) because 
the political parties and Congress have in the NED a tool for direct international 
action, and the distance from the presidential office is much appreciated.
Finally, it is pertinent to include here a more recent initiative, the Millennium 
Challenge Account (MCA). The MCA is run by a governmental agency, the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), that works as a private company and has
23 In its website, the NED defines itself as a “private, nonprofit organization” [http://www.ned.org/]. 
Its independent Board of directors decides on how the appropriation is spent.
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a CEO with a position of Ambassador24. Bush spoke of a Millennium Fund since 
2002, and the MCA and MCC were officially launched in 2004. This program 
became a landmark in foreign aid, with funds appropriated by Congress every year 
that were significantly large (USD 4-6 billion) and directed to a small number of 
countries only25. The MCA sought to reorganize American development aid, 
committing more substantial funds but turning away from the traditional broad 
paradigm of Modernization to more direct conditionality. It was considered a 
democracy-promotion program because it conditioned aid to achieving a certain 
status of democracy, which was measured by “objective” indicators (mainly 
originated by Freedom House and the World Bank). The MCC also brought in 
numerous private contractors after competition to implement the MCA programs, 
which also supposedly kept out the political hand of the executive. Indeed, the MCC 
influenced the American approach at this Stage 2 as an independent actor: it had its 
own guidelines and programs designed for each of the countries accepted, including 
the selection methodology, and it was not under the Director of Foreign Assistance.
Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that the MCA was very close to 
political decisions that were convenient to the Bush Administration, and democracy 
promotion was based on “selected” conditionality. For instance, Morocco was 
granted eligibility for a Compact in 2005, which seemed a compensation for the 
cooperation in the War on Terror and a bilateral free-trade agreement (Crombois,
2005)26. Secretary of State Powell congratulated the country for the “move to 
democracy” that allowed Morocco to get on the MCA list (Powell, 2004), but the 
country had arguably made very limited progress in democratization during these 
years27. Similarly, negative conditionality about the MCA was envisaged against 
Angola in 2003, when Bush suggested this country would be no longer considered if 
it did not support a Security Council resolution to justify the intervention in Iraq, 
according to a conversation between Bush and Jose Marfa Aznar leaked to a 
newspaper (El Pais, 2007). Finally, it can be argued that the creation of a Threshold
24 The MCC depends on the president, while the Administrator of USAID has to be confirmed by the 
Senate (see above).
25 In 2008, 10 countries had “Compact” full grants, while some 30 other had “threshold” access to 
some funds.
26 For instance, such agreement could potentially endanger the Moroccan pharmaceutical sector.
27 An interviewee (USAID official in Morocco, Brussels 22 June 2006) even suggested that the US 
government may have instigated Freedom House to change its evaluation of Moroccan performance 
so that, in view of their indicators, it could be considered for the MCA.
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category for countries that did not meet the conditionally benchmarks has been used 
to allow some strategic countries to have access to fundls. Similarly, a number of US 
companies with political connections have been winning the contracts in the target 
country (Daviron & Giordano, 2006). The MCC thus illlustrated the intention to base 
democracy promotion on technical assessments and political neutrality (indicators on 
a “democratic scorecard”, private/enterprise focus).. Yet political actors and 
dynamics were underlying the policy: the president hadl a major influence, the MCC 
final decision-making was rather opaque, and with the Threshold there was a 
potential to interpret or “adjust” development conditionality in selected cases.
2.3. Designing policy: bureaucracies and core grantees
The first phase of policy implementation or Stage 3 involved those responsible for 
designing programs and the calls for offers (grants, contracts) and making decisions 
in this regard. At this level, agents within the bureaucracy were specialized by theme 
or geographically. The input of the American bodies stndied above was also different 
here.
By far, the main “implementer” was USAID, for it had the staff and capacities 
to design the policies in detail. In this way, it was often the case that USAID 
developed part of the programs of the Millennium Challenge Account at this stage. 
USAID was then a “contractor” of the MCC, sometimes introducing new partners in 
the realm of implementation [stages 3 and 4]. Regarding its own programs, USAID 
was decentralized and its 80-90 field offices had quite some range for action and 
made decisions, especially since the restructuring done under Clinton (Melia, 2005). 
Two USAID bodies organized work at this stage: the Office for Democracy and 
Governance and the Office for Transition Initiatives. These offices were part of the 
very large Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) 
(USAID, 2007)28.
The work done in these offices illustrated the American approach at this level. 
For instance, the Office for Democracy and Governance had four divisions that 
indicated the focus of democracy promotion policies: civil society, elections and
28 As specified above, the 1998 Act had triggered USAID restructuring, giving an ever more important 
role to democracy. Under Secretary Rice, internal restructuring was not so dramatic, the main change 
implied further connections of the higher USAID bureaucracy with the Department of State. All this 
information was also valid as of 2008.
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political process, governance, and rule of law. Here the absence of a division on 
“human rights” was noticeable; this theme was by contrast a priority in European 
policies. Another example illustrated the methods that USAID sought to instill: the 
Office for Transition Initiatives worked with partners on the ground, and was within 
direct reach of American ambassadors or USAID Missions in the country. This 
targeted “critical windows of opportunity to provide on-the-ground, fast, flexible, 
catalytic short-term assistance” (USAID, 2007, p. 94). This approach was different 
from the European procedures that were often criticized as strict, long and overly 
bureaucratic (a complaint/observation recorded many times during my fieldwork).
The Department of State worked differently from USAID. It made decisions 
from Washington for the programs it ran (not all, some were also sub-contracted to 
USAID). For example, the Bureau of Middle Eastern Affairs was in charge of 
developing policy for the MEPI (Middle East Partnership Initiative) and this was 
done from the US. This example illustrated that “strategic” American democracy 
promotion would be understood within broader foreign policy-making and at the 
Department of State, and this was not fortuitous. Thus there was fragmentation as 
other USAID projects were pursued in the MENA region, and this led to several 
incoherent positions.
Finally the NED also played an original role at this Stage 3 as a grant-making 
institution. The NED has four “core grantees” that present their programs to the 
Board but have a wide discretion in their specific content and later implementation: 
the party foundations International Republican Institute (IRI) and National 
Democratic Institute (NDI) the American Center for International Labor Solidarity 
(focused on trade unions) and the Center for International Private Enterprise. The 
foundations (the most visible bodies) work mainly on electoral assistance and 
political party development, but they have diversified their activities in the past 10 
years.
Since the end of the Cold War, the NED has issued 5-yearly “Strategy- 
documents” in 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007. These documents corroborated important 
trends of American democracy promotion in this period: post-1989 euphoria in the 
post-Communist world, restructuring and budget restriction in the late 1990s, and 
post-9/11 securitization of democracy with focus on the Arab-Muslim world. 
Importantly, despite the pretended neutrality and “isolation” of the NED from 
American official policies, it is always in accordance with the “national interest”.
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Moreover, to the extent that democracy promotion is intrinsic to American identity, it 
arguably incarnates (one aspect of) the national interest. With 9/11, the NED clearly 
aligned itself with security imperatives, and it developed a new doctrine to fight 
“non-democratic Islam” much as it had first embodied the fight against Communism.
Box 3. The NED new doctrine to fight “non-democratic Islam ” according to the 5- 
yearly Strategy Documents (National Endowment fo r  Democracy, 2002, 2007)
“The crisis precipitated by the attacks of September 11 and the new war on terrorism have 
placed the issue of democracy in the Middle East and in other non-democratic parts of 
the Muslim world on the agenda of the international community. Before the present 
crisis, democracy was often viewed as a Western system incompatible with Islamic 
culture and doctrine [...]”.
“[...] It is especially important that NED and its core institutes try to involve in their 
programs liberal Muslims individuals who work within the Islamic tradition and who 
are also in favor of liberal democracy as a way of strengthening these elements and 
countering the political abuse of religion”.
The NED influenced the American approach by implementing some programs and 
orientating funds to specific areas. For instance, in addition to groups, the NED 
neatly supported individuals engaged in democracy promotion, creating important 
networks of dissidents or activists, especially in Eastern and Central Europe and the
90post-Soviet space (National Endowment for Democracy, 1997) . Though the 
European Parliament also recognized individual commitment with the Sakharov 
Prize, the American policy actively maintained these “heroes” engaged in networks 
that in turn developed democracy promotion activities at Stage 4.
The role of these main public actors (or semi-public, as the NED) in this 
“phase A” of American democracy promotion implementation must be nuanced, 
because a number of non-state actors exerted an important influence on them: 
consultants, experts and some academics (individuals or groups). These shaped the 
policies with their work on methodology, democracy and democratization practices, 
and geographic or thematic expertise. They often helped policy-makers gain 
knowledge and create an opinion, or contributed more directly with “strategic 
planning”. This way, USAID outsourced part of its assessment programs, either for
29 The NED clearly contributed to the US democracy front in the last stage o f the Cold War and this 
heritage has been maintained in the post-Cold War period, though there has been an important rise of 
other actors in this area, most notably the philanthropist Soros and his Open Society Institute.
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more transparent auditing or to gain new insights (Finkel et al., 2006; Hansen, 1996). 
This ad hoc (but frequent) external support was combined with internal policy- 
development. For example, USAID had a Division (within the Office for Democracy 
and Governance) devoted to strategies and research, and there was an effort to 
develop institutional handbooks and cross-country knowledge (by theme). Similar 
dynamics existed within the European Parliament and European Commission and its 
diverse DGs, such work resulted in the Communications and other working 
documents that intended to shape EU policies.
2.4. Implementing policy: a myriad actors in the field and the leverage of 
think tanks
Stage 4 involved the actors in democracy promotion that were in direct contact with 
programs on the ground. Yet they were not necessarily local; indeed, this group of 
policy-implementers was largely composed of Westerners in many instances 
(Youngs, 2005)30. Though the official bodies mentioned above (USAID, NED) 
undertook fieldwork, their reach was limited and many more non-state actors were 
co-opted with grants or contracts to implement the programs, diversifying and 
multiplying influences and input in democracy-promotion policies.
At this level, there were hundreds or even thousands (Melia, 2005) of groups 
that either used American funds to implement their own programs (with grants) or 
won competitive offers to provide a service that the donor wanted to implement 
(contracts). Some were private companies, but most had NGO (nonprofit) status. A 
credible estimate is that NGOs depend on public funds at an average of 40%, though 
of course this varies widely with each case and through time (Youngs, 2005, p. 144). 
Youngs (2005, p. 159) gathered that NGOs had only limited access to the policy­
making process, and that American funding usually targeted short-term institutional 
change. With such a multiplicity of actors, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to 
offer a comprehensive study of their policy-contents, but this section outlines the 
main types of non-state actors and discusses some important ones. It also draws
30 Many of these organizations simply employ Westerners, though not exclusively and possibly not in 
purpose, i.e. they tend to be based in the United States and Europe and often require skills, work 
permits, etc. that involve Westerners more easily. The will to co-opt workers from democratizing 
countries is often evident.
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some characteristics of the “American” approach at this stage, though the lines 
blurred and it was difficult to claim that the policy was “American” or “European”.
First, there was a series of “policy-implementing” institutions that performed 
specialized work. For instance, regarding electoral assistance observation, IFES 
(often funded by USAID, but also by the United Nations) and The Carter Center 
(often funded by USAID or by the NED through NDI) were formally private. This 
meant there were never “American observers” in the field, compared to “European 
Union observers”, there were IFES or The Carter Center observers (and their 
employees weren’t necessarily American) and their assessments/ reports did not have 
any official value nor represented the “American” stand.
Another of the most important American organizations of democracy 
promotion is Freedom House, which has existed since 1941 (it supported US 
involvement in World War II) and has historical connections to leaders from the 
Democratic and the Republican parties. Since 1973, it has published surveys of the 
state of democracy in the world and influences practitioners and policy-makers 
worldwide. NED grants fund many of its programs31. For instance, the NED planned 
a “network of democracy promoters”, the World Movement for Democracy (WMD) 
since 1999, and Freedom House helped establish the network. Similarly, the 
conference “Democracy and Security” brought together many former and current 
dissidents in Prague in 2007 (Donovan, 2007; Moore, 2007). This policy of actively 
maintaining these democracy-heroes engaged in networks as the WMD, that in turn 
develop democracy promotion activities broadly in this Stage 4, arguably had 
“something American to it”. This does not mean that there was not a similar goal in 
the European approach; rather, it was difference of methods, and a result of the 
political and bureaucratic cultures.
Second, there was a myriad of NGOs and programs in the field that got funds 
from USAID programs, Department of State Programs and exceptionally direct funds 
from Congress (this was not often the case, though NED appropriations could be 
quite specific and this way Congress influenced some programs directly). NED gave 
around 300 grants per year to non-govemmental organizations of an average of USD 
50,000. When they funded these “indigenous organizations”, the NED claimed:
31 At the same time, the European Union has also funded some Freedom House programs. It should 
not be assumed that NED and Freedom House work as a team, nevertheless; indeed their relationship 
is not always friendly and depends on the leaders and positions for specific themes.
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“...[our] overall funding strategy is not to create our own programs but rather 
to support the work of grassroots democratic activists. We studiously avoid a 
“made in Washington ” approach”32.
The policies developed in stages 2 and 3 may favor specific policies over others, e.g. 
women’s rights, civic education, rule of law, conflict resolution mediation, youth 
groups, political parties, etc33. The case studies will illustrate some US-EU 
differences along these lines. Nevertheless, NGOs and programs at this stage were 
often quite free and enjoyed a good dose of discretion in their implementation, 
especially with grants.
Practitioners usually argued that American funding allows for more flexibility. 
Overall, there was a sentiment that the American approach allows for more 
pragmatism than European policies -and even European donors agreed on this 
(Timans, 2007). Among the examples I found on the ground, one particularly 
illustrated this flexibility and also the degree of cooperation among agencies that 
preserved an “American” policy beyond turf wars. In the early 2000s USAID had 
started a program of women’s empowerment, funding a handicraft workshop in a 
village north of Bamako (Mali), in which the women recovered some traditional 
patterns and coloring methods from different artisans to craft tissues, produced some 
with the sponsored machinery and then sold the goods. As a result of the budget 
restrictions suffered at USAID in the late 1990s (especially for Africa), the project 
was suspended and the craft-shop closed down. However, soon after, the NED- 
funded International Republican Institute used one of its grants to take over the 
project and continue the activity, with relatively little changes in Mali34.
By contrast, this kind of cooperation and flexibility does not exist in the 
European approach, illustrated by this other example. In the Congo (Kasai region), 
the EU allocated funds a project on the rule of law (administrative training and 
material), but when the NGO was notified of the grant the court no longer existed: 
the building had been pillaged and tom down, and the judge had left the town (the
32 Source NED website: http://www.ned.org/ [accessed 4 September 2008]. My emphasis
33 Actually donors do not often find what they want to fund or have subjective guidelines. An example 
is NED’s explicit effort “to involve liberal Muslims” in their policies “to provide a modernist 
treatment of the role of Islam in public life” (NED Strategy Document, 2007).
34 This shows that even if  IRI/NED and USAID actually compete for funds in the American system, 
once on the ground the projects can sometimes take priority and contribute to a more flexible 
approach of democracy promotion. Interview with IRI, Bamako 17 November 2007.
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application and grant-making process had been 14 months). It was not possible for 
the NGO to shift the funding to a related project or another town; the EU cancelled 
the allocation35. These examples also illustrate the scope of policies: from 
Modernization (originally USAID but also endorsed by the IRI) to institutions for the 
rule of law.
Finally, it is necessary to take into consideration that some NGOs/foundations 
were large and self-sufficient enough to have their own programming and field- 
implementation. This tied in well with the “American” tradition and initiatives by 
philanthropists. George Soros’ Open Society Institute, a private-operating and grant- 
making foundation has been a key actor in all the post-Communist space during the 
post-Cold War period, but the Rockefeller foundation, the Ford foundation, etc. also 
funded numerous good governance programs. Many of these institutions arguably 
formed part of a socially-constructed “American” democracy promotion. 
Nevertheless, this research only took into consideration that at this Stage 4 of 
democracy promotion, what matters is that many diverse agents can eventually be 
funded with these private or public funds . In this, the institutions were likely to 
imbue this aid with their own principles and insisted on their contribution as 
“bottom-up” democracy promotion.
Another type of private, external actors that influenced American democracy 
promotion was the research community working on these topics, made up of think 
tanks and of active, policy-oriented academic centers. The Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, the Brookings Institution and the Hoover Institute (Stanford) 
were only some examples of the wide-ranging, numerous centers with influential 
publications and, relatively often, a political preference if not an official affiliation 
(Hassner & Vaisse, 2003). Some with a clear ideological position as the Heritage 
Foundation could be quite influential over individuals in Congress (Hassner & 
Vaisse, 2003, pp. 14, 38). Others could reach a specific public or fulfill technical 
needs: a case in point would be the RAND Corporation (that receives federal, state 
and local funding) with publications on state-building that arguably influenced the
35 Interview with NGO responsible, Kinshasa 29 October 2006.
36 For reasons of space and not to over-stretch my framework, I am not analyzing American private 
foundations here.
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Departments of State and Defense and strongly connected democracy promotion 
with military intervention since the 2003 Iraq War (Dobbins et al., 2003)37.
3. D em ocracy prom otion in the European U nion
This section discusses the input and debates at the four stages of the democracy 
promotion policy-process on the European side. As in the case of the US, the 
outcome was very much determined by the institutions involved in the process, but 
these actors did not always have clearly separated powers and tasks. Rather, they all 
had the potential to influence democracy promotion at one or several stages, and they 
did. As in the case of the US, the institutions influenced the process: there were 
specific competencies and instruments, and an underlying system of coordination and 
competition38. This resulted in a non-homogeneous picture with some holes and 
some contradictions, and a relative “undefinition” of the European approach (not so 
different, again, from what we observed regarding the US).
Part of the literature on EU foreign policy focuses on the EU system of 
governance i.e. “what the institutions do” (H. Smith, 2002) and on the modes of 
policy-making summarized in Wallace and Wallace (2000, pp. 28-34) as 
intergovernmental, community and cooperation modes. These angles were not 
satisfactory for this research because they assumed a distinction between CFSP 
(intergovernmental) and external relations (Community or “supranational”) that did 
not correspond to the practice of the EU as a democracy promoter39. Democracy 
promotion fits better in Hill and Smith’s (2005, p. 6) description of EU foreign 
policy as a dynamic “web of activity” but not a stable governance system40. For
37 Again, for reasons of space and not to over-stretch my framework, I am not expanding on this topic 
here. Inderjeet Parmar has undertaken interesting research on the cross-influences among 
philanthropic foundations, think tanks, policy research institutes, university foreign affairs institutes, 
and state agencies.
38 In a way, this system is one of “checks and balances” with complex possibilities for each institution 
(MS, Council, Commission, DGs) to check and balance executive and legislative powers in this 
policy-area and allowing for “pendulum” policy-making of common EU action and MS-govemmental
framework is to remain open to consider democracy promotion in the EU’s 
international action and not exclusively as CFSP nor an instrument (EIDHR) nor an institution’s 
policy (Commission/ EP/ Council) [cf. Chapter 2].
0 During the post-Cold War period, and specially considering the landmark treaties of Maastricht, 
Amsterdam and Nice, EU institutions’ roles and functioning underwent important changes, but it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to account for these details comprehensively and in chronological 
order. As a general rule I will be referring to the situation valid as of 2008 and never earlier than 1993
prerogatives.
9 The originality of my
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these reasons, it was especially important to maintain here the more conventional 
account of policy stages and combine it with a discussion of “locations” of policy­
making41.
It would be tempting to privilege either the federalist, supranationalist 
viewpoint and argue that the Commission enjoys the right to propose legislation in 
the EU and initiates policies, or the intergovemmentalist one and argue that it is 
Member States who ultimately decide if anything at all is to be carried out, especially 
in the delicate realm of foreign policy. Both stories have some truth to them, and in 
European policies possibly more than elsewhere “the devil is in the details”. Neither 
institutional trend alone fully explained the development of the European approach 
that has actually shaped the EU as an international actor. The following discussion 
will instead provide more nuanced, accurate insights.
3.1. Inspiring policy: the responsibility of the Member States
Arguably, a diversity of responsible actors (basically all European actors except the
European Court of Justice) contributed in the conception and guidelines of 
democracy promotion, laying bricks towards one common policy. The resulting 
picture illustrated these policy-makers’ functions and instruments as defined in the 
EU legislation, and also the complex bargaining among them. In this way, the 
Commission influenced the general guidelines of democracy promotion because it 
had power to propose policies especially in the realm of Development and 
Cooperation, and it adopted Communications (often involving the EP and the 
Council) that spread widely and earned a status of “EU-voice”42. Similarly, the High 
Representative for CFSP, who also drafted influential proposals and officially 
represented the EU (for instance in trips to third countries), also played an important 
role. Nevertheless, this Stage 1 definitely privileged action by Member States (MS), 
who were the responsible decision-makers and budget-providers.
Member States played the key role in the EU flow of “collective governance” 
and set in motion European democracy promotion (W. Wallace, 2000). First, they
(date of the Treaty of Maastricht), with notes to the changes and characteristics of a particular time as 
needed. The “dynamism” underlying EU foreign policy is thus a key assumption.
41 In this I draw from Helen Wallace’s considerations, adding a necessary nuance in the policy 
implementation for democracy promotion (my stages 3-4), and intending to address this way Dahl’s 
classical question “who governs?” (H. Wallace & Wallace, 2000, pp. 70-74).
42 My view is that Communications contributed to the narrative of the EU as democracy promotion 
and informed policy-making, though not formally and automatically.
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agreed the documents that lay the foundations for the EU as a democracy promoter, 
often by unanimity. For example, in the Treaty of the European Union they set out 
democracy promotion as CFSP objective; in the Barcelona Declaration they included 
democracy and human rights as considerations in the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership. The European Council adopted the first post-Cold War documents that 
mentioned good governance, human rights and democracy promotion in relationship 
with the Europe’s role in the world (European Council, 1990a, 1990b).
The Council of the EU, gathering MS and usually working by consensus (even 
if QMV applies), agreed the Common Strategies and Common Actions that framed 
CFSP. A series of them included democracy promotion for specific regions e.g. the 
Mediterranean, and countries e.g. the DR Congo. In 1999, the Council also adopted 
two Regulations (binding and directly applicable) to “contribute to the general 
objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the mle of law and to that 
of respecting human rights and fundamental freedom” (Council of the European 
Union, 1999). These regulations framed democracy promotion in developing 
countries (975) and generally in third countries (976). They gave operational power 
to the Commission, but also set a Committee of MS representatives that would 
inform the policies43.
The Council Presidency allowed MS to be policy entrepreneurs in CFSP, and 
influenced democracy promotion. Some presidencies, namely those of the 
Netherlands (2004) or of Portugal, clearly prioritized this policy on the agenda. 
Notably, the Dutch presidency organized a conference to work on enhancing the 
European profile of democracy promotion (NIMD Europe Conference, 2004) and 
was an important turning point in building up the EU approach. Country presidencies 
also focused on regions or themes of interest; Spain and Italy focused on the 
Mediterranean while Germany focused on Eastern Europe, Italy usually underlined 
human rights. A group of MS (Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Italy, Ireland) also 
insisted on the abolition of the death penalty especially vis-a-vis the US (Leben, 
1999). The Presidencies also played an important role in the EU’s political dialogues, 
though the Commission sometimes took over their organization. Political Dialogues 
often included democracy promotion, but they emphasized partnership and
43 The Committee’s opinion had to be taken into consideration by the Commission. The Commission 
had to submit assessments and reports to the European Parliament and the Council.
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diplomatic relations; their success has been mixed (K. E. Smith, 2004; Youngs,
2006).
Finally, MS (in the Council) controlled democracy promotion with their 
“power of the purse”. The Council approved the main EU instruments (such as the 
EIDHR or MEDA or the Financial Stability Instrument) and actions (such as the 
EUFOR mission in the Congo). In addition, MS contributed to the European 
Development Funds (not included in the EU budget) that financed programs with 
ACP countries and other potential programs and interventions, sometimes related to 
democracy promotion. Though the European Parliament’s “power of the purse” 
remained rather limited, the EP could use its co-decision powers for non-mandatory 
budget to channel some allocations to democracy promotion, e.g. decisions that 
allow funding of think tanks as Notre Europe. More importantly, the EP has used its 
limited veto power (it needs to approve the EU budget) to extract concessions from 
the Commission and the Council with new budget lines (Hix, 2005, p. 281). Along 
these lines, the EP was key in bringing together the budget lines that led to the 
European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights in 1994. This initiative 
typified EU action through NGOs, who would be in charge of implementing the 
EU’s policies -in  this sense, it was the European Parliament that raised the NGOs 
profile in EU democracy promotion, which constituted an important new aspect of 
the overall EU approach44.
3.2. Informing policy: the Commission’s controlling hand and the rising 
role of CFSP
This location of policy-making included the definition and design of policies at large, 
which contributed to the constitution of a European institutional memory. Policy was 
closely deriving from the general guidelines, yet there was no direct contact with 
democracy promotion on the ground. Here, the Commission (and the Parliament and 
the Council) played a key role in addressing the questions about democracy 
promotion that framed EU action from the first pillar, i.e. what to promote and how. 
In addition, the input from the pillar of CFSP into the first was increasingly
44 Though some observes disregard the EP’s role, I found that its initiative and support for the EIDHR 
influenced European democracy promotion greatly, as this budget line increased significantly, it 
complemented other EU policies with an NGO-focus, and became symbolic of EU action.
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significant, especially in the context of post-9/11 enhanced cooperation and of some 
institutional changes.
The Commission’s central task of policy-initiation and significant 
bureaucratic capacity enabled it to shape democracy promotion at this stage. The 
Commission produced reports on the meaning of good governance, on the link with 
development, etc. Through an impressive production of Communications, it 
influenced EU legislation and potential action (Commission of the European 
Communities, 1995a, 1998, 2000b, 2001). These documents not only piled up in an 
ever-growing acquis, they also featured considerations and assertions of what the 
EU will do and how. Some of them were quite specific and determined, for instance, 
how European electoral observation will happen (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2000a). Others, more general, “foresaw” and planned the 
mainstreaming of democracy promotion in EU action and constituted the basis for 
later action45.
In this way, the Commission contributed to create and strengthen an 
institutional identity for the EU as democracy promoter. It reinforces this thesis’s 
central argument, as well as provides for an element of explanation, that the EU’s 
most integrationist institution “allowed itself’ and actually worked insistently to 
forge this emerging identity, especially at this stage of informing policy. In turn, this 
EU role was also picked up by academics and by other actors, who indirectly raised 
expectations about EU action in the world as a civilian power, counting within its 
external goals the promotion of democracy and human rights. Actors from stage 4 
thus enhanced the roles and policies that were designed in Brussels.
When democracy promotion was shaped from the first pillar, the Commission 
had the right to initiate legislation and consider the EU options, but the Council and 
the EP made the decisions and had the “executive power” . The inter-institutional 
distributions of power depended on the policy domain or the instrument considered. 
For instance, for Development and Cooperation, the Council (under QMV) and the 
EP had co-decision power. In this realm, democracy promotion broadly followed the 
Modernization paradigm, just as USAID. By contrast, for Association Agreements 
with third countries, the Council decided by unanimity and the EP only had an assent
45 In its website, the Commission always indicates a selection of documents (the Council documents 
allowing for action and relevant Communications) that set the policy background. These strategy- 
documents are the equivalent of USAID’s general guidelines.
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role. Here the EU method has been to include conditionality through 
democracy/human rights clauses, e.g. in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership or ACP 
Agreements. In theory, this restored the institutional balance in the EU, but in truth 
the Commission maintained an important role as an “indirect executive”. Following 
upon these examples, in fact there was relatively little legislation in the domain of 
Development and Cooperation, so many policies were directly administered (in Stage 
3) by Commission divisions. Regarding the Association Agreements or democracy 
clauses, the Commission was likely to have proposed to the legislators some (rather 
detailed) options on what to do (Commission of the European Communities, 1995b) 
and, in agreement with theories of principal-agent and bureaucratic discretion, it 
successfully influenced the policy outcome (Hix, 2005, pp. 28-30).
The second pillar (Common Foreign and Security Policy) was another locus of 
democracy policy-making; it existed in parallel, and to a certain extent in 
competition, with the Commission-controlled first pillar. The EU position and 
potential action was defined from the policy space around the CFSP-High 
Representative and the committees (with MS representatives) that guided action in 
this pillar46. Though democracy promotion input had been coming from the first 
pillar in the 1990s, the proposals of the Treaty of Amsterdam and of Nice47 and the 
context of post-9/11 International Relations led to a more active CFSP, tightly 
controlled by the MS. This enlarged agenda and capabilities for cooperation opened 
the door to democracy promotion in CFSP. Arguably, as this theme became so 
relevant for the Bush administration, the EU felt it had to react and take a stronger 
position in this regard, though own initiatives were cautious.
Since his appointment in October 1999, the High Representative for CFSP
A O
(Javier Solana) had an ever more important role in proposing policies . The will to 
develop expert policies in this field, but also independently from the Commission, 
led to input from the EU-fimded Institute for Security Studies (created with a Council
46 Though the Commission has the right of policy initiative according to the Treaties (TEU), it is 
regularly the Council that initiates CFSP actions.
47 The Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) created the High Representative position and a policy unit, and 
led to changes in the committees developing CFSP and overall a strengthening of MS policy-input 
vis-a-vis the Commission, which was confirmed in the Treaty of Nice (2001).
481 have not included the High Representative’s input in the Stage 1 of policy-guidelines because 
there is a lack o f decision-making, accountability, and budget-control, but Solana’s general input has 
sometimes been elevated to “grand-strategy” and has been compared to US presidential rhetoric. 
Nevertheless, the responsible decision-makers in CFSP are the Member States, and I believe his role 
fits better the category o f “informing” than “inspiring” EU external action.
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Joint Action under the second pillar in 2001 and formerly attached to the Western 
European Union). Similarly, Study Groups were created ad hoc, the most significant 
one produced Europe’s “Human Security doctrine” (Study group on Europe’s 
security capabilities, 2004), which opened new doors for EU action abroad and 
raised interesting aspects of European universalism. These moves opened the door to 
think-tanks, bringing the EU closer to the American system of policy-advice but with 
a distinct nature: the most influential think-tanks were “pre-selected” and funded by 
the policy-maker in a way that made them semi-official49.
In all these documents in the realm of CFSP, the EU avoided to securitize 
democracy promotion. This seemed to be Solana’s personal perspective, but also 
corresponded to widespread European views (cf. Chapter 1 and 2)50. The reluctance 
to pursue democracy promotion in security quests only intensified with the Iraq 2003 
war, and the contrast with the American rhetoric was increasingly evident. A certain 
EU-unified position appeared in this regard, as Chris Patten (DG External Relations 
Commissioner) and Solana spoke along the same (critical) lines51.
Finally, Solana also appointed a Personal Representative for Human Rights in 
2004, who would work actively on strengthening a unified position for the EU under 
CFSP (Matthiessen, 2006). The Americans actually considered him an interlocutor 
on democracy promotion and expressed their official welcome, even though his 
position was explicitly not for “Human rights and democracy” but only for Human 
Rights . In all this, democracy promotion played a role in CFSP, possibly more than 
the other way around (democracy promotion was not securitized). The EU also
49 A number of private think tanks, notably CEPS (active since the mid 1980s) and the London-based 
CER are also influential. This trend is well known in the EU, where the limited research and policy- 
development abilities of the Commission and even more of the other institutions translated in a rising 
demand for expertise and knowledge. The supply increased accordingly, making of Brussels an 
increasingly dynamic think-tank hub. A recent significant addition to a very long list is the European 
Council on Foreign Relations, with links to Soros’ Open Society network.
50 Democracy promotion was specifically not one of Solana’s priorities. Nevertheless he was also 
constrained to address democracy promotion because it is mentioned in the treaties as a CFSP 
objective and because it was such a key point on the international agenda during Bush’s 
administration. Source: interviews with EU officials, Brussels 6 June 2007, 16 June 2008.
51 The personal relation between these two leaders seemingly contributed to a successful period of 
“troika” work in EU external relations (Solana, Patten, and the Foreign Minister of the MS occupying 
the Council Presidency). Cooperation with Patten’s successor, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, has been more 
difficult (Vanhoonacker, 2005, p. 82). Other leaders, such as MEP Emma Bonino, also insisted on EU 
democracy promotion as a “pacific export”.
52 Author’s conversation with Michael Matthiessen, who occupied this position at the time, Paris 6 
June 2006.
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adapted to the context conditioned by the American approach, partly reacting or re- 
categorizing its discourse and seeking to create a common position.
Regarding EU bureaucratic settings for CFSP, the High Representative’s policy 
unit was very small and Member States constantly assured their position and their 
input via comitology. For example, in the Regulations on democracy promotion 
mentioned above (975/1999, 976/1999), the Council charged the Commission with 
operationalization, but at the same time it created a Committee (with MS 
representatives) that would control operations. Another example was the institutional 
structure that evolved from the Coreper/Political Committee setting to a new 
permanent, Brussels-based Political and Security Committee that integrated the 
policy-unit in the meetings of MS ambassadors. Along the same lines, the MS-led 
Committee for human rights (Cohom) officially extended its mandate to the first 
pillar. Historically, Cohom had been linked to the OSCE and started considering 
democracy promotion in 1999 (Council of the European Union, 2003b; 
Vanhoonacker, 2005).
Thus, by 2008 the Council played a much more active role in defining what to 
include as EU democracy promotion, seeking to mainstream EU policies from  the 
realm of CFSP (Council of the European Union, 2006a, 2006b). Most notably, the 
EU (re)action on democracy promotion for the EU-US summits and other diplomatic 
forums (e.g. G8) was prepared at this level. Within this CFSP team, only a handful 
worked on democracy promotion (and not exclusively on that) but they had some 
decision-making ability. In parallel, the Parliament also addressed democracy 
promotion from its Policy Unit (Committee on Foreign Affairs) and the Human 
Rights Subcommittee (European Parliament, 2005). Yet, since the EP only had a 
consultative role in CFSP, its influence was minor.
In sum, the Commission was significantly challenged as the institution in 
charge of defining potential EU action in democracy promotion, with increasingly 
aware MS clearly taking over. The fragmented approach of democracy promotion 
from the first and second pillars was evident at this location of policy-making, while 
the Commission-led first pillar view remained the reference in stages 3 and 4.
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3.3. Designing policy: Directorate Generals, Europe Aid, and a
contribution from the European Parliament
In a publication about exporting values, Petiteville (2003, p. 133) observed that the 
“European Union has hitherto found more resources of international influence in the 
politicization of economic cooperation than in the CFSP machinery”. With this, he 
meant that the EU aid (and possibly trade) policy was used to exert “soft diplomacy”. 
Indirectly, Petiteville compared the EU with the United States, where democracy 
promotion and in general value-exporting are a matter of “high politics” (not soft 
diplomacy). However, this analysis has shown thus far that the political will and 
policy-definition for democracy promotion in the European approach have involved 
the second pillar and the Member States, so it is not accurate to describe the EU 
approach as “soft” in this sense53. A more adequate interpretation arises from our 
look here at the implementation phase of democracy promotion. Indeed, CFSP actors 
were not involved, and the location of policy-making concerned mainly the 
Commission, and to some extent the European Parliament.
The main agents in the EU approach, i.e. DG External Relations (Relex), DG 
Development and Cooperation (Dev), and EuropeAid did not actually differ so much 
from their American counterparts at USAID. For both, lower ranks of the 
bureaucratic structure with some thematic and geographic specialization were in 
charge of operationalizing the policies. The politics of democracy promotion at this 
level replicated the issues discussed in the American case. Regarding policy-content, 
there was the same link between democracy and development as in the 
Modernization paradigm, a similar technical-turn of democracy promotion (as a 
long-term policy) that requested expertise and hard-data for policies “neutrally 
oriented” to the field. Regarding policy-implementation and methods, USAID tried 
to tune in with the debates (on security and American hegemony) of the actors in the 
US approach. Similarly, the Commission struggled with picking up on Council 
Presidency or MS preferences; internal turf wars existed on both sides of the 
Atlantic.
In addition, fragmentation derived from the EU institutional history. Jacques 
Delors was already trying to unify the Commission’s external action when he was
53 My argument is that the European refusal to securitize democracy promotion is not a matter of 
institutional lack of capabilities; rather, it is a choice in the position and action that the EU willfully 
planned for democracy promotion.
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President, but only in 1999-2001 did changes take place (White, 2001, pp. 159-166). 
The division between DG External Relations and DG Development and Cooperation 
was actually based on geographic and historical terms. DG Dev followed relations 
with the African, Caribbean, Pacific (ACP) countries that traditionally had colonial 
links with Europe. The Council decided on the cooperation and association 
agreements and aid packages (from the European Development Fund), which 
included the promotion of human rights, with mixed results (Pi, 2000). Overall, the 
bureaucratic culture in this DG was not always sympathetic to good governance 
conditionality and to democracy promotion, in contrast to DG Relex that seemed 
more sensitive to mainstreaming54. DG Relex was in turn responsible for the 
assistance to the non-ACP and non-Enlargement countries, i.e. the Middle East and 
North Africa, Latin America, most of Asia, and ex-Soviet Union countries. These 
DGs controlled the first part of the policy cycle. Since the end of the 1990s, 
implementation and evaluation of aid projects were controlled by yet another office, 
named EuropeAid in 2004 (Vanhoonacker, 2005).
EuropeAid then became the Commission body responsible for more pragmatic 
decision-making; it also established the contact with the field by defining the terms 
of subsidies, contracts, etc. EuropeAid was especially important because it managed 
the “landmark” EU program for democracy promotion, the EIDHR, even if EIDHR 
documents officially conceded that “the structure follows the common framework 
and procedure of the programming of thematic and horizontal budget lines 
established jointly by DGs Relex, Dev and EuropeAid”55 (EuropeAid, 2004).
At this level, Commission Delegations on the ground were supposedly able to 
shape the policies, too. Nevertheless, though the Commission has claimed devolution 
to the more than 120 delegations both in reform documents and in EuropeAid project 
implementation, this decentralization was not really effective56. These Delegations’ 
tasks were complex. On the one hand they represented the EU and intended to play
541 observed during fieldwork that DG Dev officials were often skeptical about democracy promotion, 
claiming that aid conditionality was not always positive. DG Relex only took off in December 1999 
and these officials seemed more in touch with the international trends o f democracy promotion. The 
cases o f the Congo and of the MENA region show these trends: DG Dev claimed “more patience” 
with Africa while Relex issued a Communication [(2003) 294] on the Barcelona Process where 
human rights and democracy played a key role.
55 This reiteration of shared-tasks is a clear illustration of the potential for turf wars in an institution 
(EuropeAid) whose board actually includes representatives from the diverse DGs. My emphasis.
56 This was the case as far as I could verify from the EIDHR appropriations and was confirmed in 
interview with EU official, Brussels 6 June 2007.
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“high politics” as if they were embassies. On the other* they sought to manage EU- 
funds and play a practical role in allocating aid, often with very limited resources 
(staff and budget)57. In theory, the Delegations shape the formulation and decision 
regarding contracts, but it seems that communication with EuropeAid is not efficient. 
This meant that NGOs in contact with the Delegation only often fell out of the loop; 
most contractors are European NGOs or international/regional organizations. In this 
sense, EU Delegations were not only in charge of aid and implementing democracy 
promotion, as were USAID delegations in the field58. However, it is interesting that 
EU Delegations somehow remind us of the mixed-tasks that Condoleeza Rice 
planned in her “transformational diplomacy” dispositions.
In addition to the Commission, the European Parliament undertook some 
democracy implementation tasks “hands-on”. Notably, the EP had a long tradition of 
work in the realm of Human Rights, awarding the S akharov prize and regularly 
making declarations on cases of human rights violations and problems in 
democratizing countries. Nevertheless, these declarations, addressed to the Council 
or the Presidency, were often ignored because the EP only had a consultative role59. 
More actively, EP established Parliamentary Assemblies both in a ACP-EU forum 
and in a Euro-Med forum. The ACP-EU assembly dated back to the 1960s and the 
first Yaounde Agreement, and showed the high institutionalization of relations, in 
comparison with the American-African case. Nevertheless, this parliamentary forum 
did not change the fact that EU-ACP relations maintained a “shadow of empire” 
where democracy promotion has been significantly relegated during and after the 
Cold War (Mayall, 2005b, pp. 295-302). The Euro-Med Assembly also experienced 
the difficulties of promoting democracy in a forum that is inclusive but 
simultaneously perpetuates an undemocratic situation because many parliamentarians 
may enjoy these positions undemocratically60. This way, the European Parliament 
participation gave evidence of multilateral and institutional aspects in the European 
approach. At this level, the American approach had introduced the two main parties
57 Observations based on fieldwork. Fieldwork included the Delegations in Kinshasa, Bamako and 
conversations with an official from the Delegation in Bujumbura. In Kinshasa, where different EU 
teams could be working at the same time, the Delegation struggled to coordinate action but it was not 
always successful, replicating the EU fragmentation in the field.
58 For instance, it seems that the USAID delegation in Egypt, a main recipient of US aid, is relatively 
independent from the “high politics” work of the US embassy [as long as its profile is low].
59 Hence if the EP powers were increased, it would likely imbue EU policies with further concern and 
action on human rights and democracy issues.
60 Cf. Chapter 5.
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(in the foundations and the NED) as grantees to channel funds. In contrast, the EU 
strategy was to replicate the institutional setting of parliamentary democracy, though 
ultimately with less influence on the ground than the other actors and policies 
overviewed above.
3.4. Implementing policy: EU electoral observation, state- and NGO-
recipients and an influential research community
At this level of democracy promotion implementation, policy-making was dispersed 
and, as with the American approach, it is inaccurate to separate American and 
European actors strictly, or to name many of these actors in the field “European” just 
because they utilize EU funds. Nevertheless there were some specificities in the EU 
democracy-promotion scene, illustrated here with some examples gathered during 
fieldwork.
One example of EU-direct democracy promotion were the missions of 
Electoral Observation it deployed. These missions were organized by an 
independent desk in the Commission and included observers from a EU roster but 
selected and authorized by the Member States exclusively. The European Parliament 
often participated in these missions, sending an MEP as head of the Mission and 
additional observers (depending on the case). Other regional organizations, notably 
the Organization of American States and the OSCE, also sent missions of electoral 
observation, but not the US as a country.
At a broader level, this illustrated that the evolution of the EU in International 
Relations from standard regional organization to standard polity featuring a foreign 
policy has not been neat. By “standard” it can be understood that organizations 
usually have presence, and polities have actomess in IR. Theorists have used those 
terms of presence and actomess to point at a gap in the EU role in foreign affairs 
(Ginsberg, 2001; K. E. Smith, 2003b, p. 105). This double identity gave an 
inconsistent image of the EU. As an organization with a multilateral, technical and 
neutral role, the EU could have its own Electoral Observation missions. 
Nevertheless, if one considered the EU conducted a wilful policy (as did the US) of 
democracy promotion, then the observation mission was misplaced, and problematic. 
To' earn credibility, electoral observers focus on procedures and portray themselves 
as “neutral”. The EU could play the role of presence as regional institution and
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observe, but not (legitimately) that of actors involved in the process, too. The EU 
sought to combine both identities, but this double-hat that the EU inadvertently wore 
became inevitably problematic [cf. Chapter 4].
Second, the European approach lacked the equivalent “policy-implementing 
institutes” that channelled funds or made partners, as did Freedom House in 
American democracy promotion. Instead, applicants addressed the Commission 
directly when trying to get grants under the EIDHR or any other instrument. As in 
the American approach, NGOs or other private contractors (including enterprises) 
were independent and had relative discretion for action once the funds were 
allocated. At this level, the national party foundations also entered the picture, but 
they had to apply for grants on the same footing as other NGOs (compared to the 
privileged positions of the US foundations). Even the best funded foundations, such 
as the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, applied for grants from a variety of EU sources: 
the EIDHR, the instrument on Non-State Actors and Local Authorities or (more 
recently) the Stability Instrument. The Stiftungen were accountable to the German 
Ministries that financed their projects (which they normally developed 
independently) and were audited by national offices, but differently from the 
American Congress there was no role for the national parliament or for European 
legislators in this policy-process61.
An observation on how the European approach translated in some specific 
contents or policy-cycles is pertinent here. Much of the EU-aid was allocated in 
agreement with the local governments that had some leverage on defining the 
programs, for instance the ENPI for the MENA region, or many programs of the 
EDF for the ACP countries . By contrast, USAID democracy promotion did not 
often involve governments. In the realm of non-governmental policies, the thematic 
instrument EIDHR determined some project-categories that arguably reflected the 
European approach. In the period 2000-6, the EIDHR included a preference for 
human rights projects and for the following EU-specific themes: the abolition of the 
death penalty, torture, rights of minorities or the disabled, and the International 
Criminal Court (EuropeAid, 2006, 2007). However, other themes such as
61 Source: website of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, http://www.kas.de/wfen/71.3712/ and interview 
with KAS official, Brussels 18 June 2008.
62 The EU often calls this kind of aid “geographic”, which usually means “recipient-govemment 
agreed” and is the most common under DG Dev. By contrast “thematic” aid usually refers to aid going 
to non-governmental actors (here the EIDHR is the main instrument for democracy promotion).
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governance, the rule of law and strengthening civil society (making up for an 
important share of the funds) broadly coincided with the American democracy
£<5
policies . Another characteristic of the EU (compared to the US) was the length of 
the policy-cycle, which easily lasted one to three years between the call for offers 
and the disbursement. Aware of this shortcoming, the EU proposed to set some funds 
apart for “rapid allocation” in the 2007 EIDHR, and it tried to ease the bureaucratic 
chain to shorten these cycles64.
Finally at this stage 4 an additional policy-location existed in the research 
community that influenced European democracy promotion policies. As established 
above, it was difficult to assert that this knowledge is “European” exclusively, but an 
ever-larger number of think tanks and research centers did influence policy-making 
in Brussels. Among them, the Stockholm-based International Idea was an interesting 
case; created in 1995, it illustrates post-Cold War democracy promotion65. A 
diversity of Western governments and the EU Commission, but not the US, funded 
it, giving it status of intergovernmental institution. It develops assessments of 
democracy and handbooks for electoral assistance, political parties, etc. Their 
methodology was qualitative, compared to the score-oriented Freedom in the World 
or Polity IV index (the most widely used indices, together with the World Bank’s 
index of good governance) produced by American teams66. They worked with many 
other international networks (notably ACES), but often featured as a “European” 
actor in the field.
As the examples of Notre Europe or the EUISS illustrated, the EU has been 
active in encouraging research and policy-advice centers. Another example was 
EuroMeSCo (1996), a network of think tanks created and financed by the 
Commission to drive research on issues of interest for the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership, which adopted it as an “official confidence-building measure”. It plays a 
crucial role informing the Commission and the EuroMed Parliamentarian Assembly.
63 The information on what programs were actually included in these categories is limited, and 
concepts in the assessments have also varied. With such misleading sources, it was not possible to 
arrive at clear conclusions on what was US, EU or even what was understood by these concepts at the 
implementation stage.
64 The EU is subject to stricter rules on expenditure and auditing, reflecting low trust from Member 
States (some measures were adopted after cases of corruption or misspent funds). I am thankful to 
Professor Lord Wallace for bringing this point to my attention.
65 Interview with International adviser, International IDEA Brussels 5 June 2007. Information verified 
in statutes and website http://www.idea.int/index.cfm.
66 A German team has recently produced a quantitative assessment that is also gaining widespread 
consideration, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index.
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In this way, the EU relied heavily on these actors’ input in this and in other locations 
of the policy-making process. The centers specializing in geographical areas and 
giving a management-oriented, practical advice were specially important, such as the 
European Center for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) and Eurac (Central 
Africa) for ACP countries. In a list that is definitely very long, it is worth noting that 
some think tanks /research centers featured a special interest in Transatlantic 
relations (on both sides of the Atlantic but notably in Europe), issuing influential 
publications on democracy promotion (especially around 2003-5) and often 
advocating for cooperation. The German Marshall Fund’s work has been key in this 
regard; as an American founded in 1972 through a gift from Germany, it makes 
grants to other research centers /projects mainly in Europe.
Conclusion
This chapter established “who does what” in American and European democracy 
promotion policy-making, utilizing a framework of the policy-process in four stages. 
It discussed which actors “inspired” (1), “informed” (2), “designed” (3) and 
“implemented” (4) democracy promotion, comparing the American and the 
European approaches. With a series of examples and information gathered during 
fieldwork, it threw light on the politics going on one side and another of the Atlantic. 
The chapter explored how the American and European “universalisms” manifested at 
the different stages of policy-making, driven by a diversity of actors. This made more 
explicit how democracy promotion was embedded, but also was purposely activated, 
in the US and the EU. Importantly, this chapter also suggested that, as democracy 
promotion got closer to the ground, the policy-process became increasingly 
transnational.
The policy-making structures, the political cultures, and the nature of 
incumbents underlined the specificities of American and European democracy 
promotion. The internal dynamics proved to shape US and EU policies: on the one 
hand there was the US President’s overall influence and rhetoric, and turf wars 
between agencies, on the other hand there was a complex web of EU governance and 
a tension between supranational and intergovernmental policy-dynamics. At these 
levels, democracy promotion was imbued with US and EU original and promoter- 
driven aspects. As with other elements of foreign policy, multiple agency was clear 
in the field of democracy promotion.
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The institutional fragmentation and the competing interests usefully explain the 
images of inconsistent policies and mixed content of democracy promotion, which in 
the end seemed to amount to a lack of strategy rather than a clear US and EU 
perspective. Hence, the argument that promoters simply have “double standards” 
must be nuanced: the context and the policy-dynamics open doors to specific 
policies, and the politics in the policy-making process shape many targets and 
outcomes. Similarly, the multiple inputs open doors to links with other interests or 
policies regarding content: economic development, security (national and 
international), human rights, civil society, etc. The picture that emerged was one 
where all the intentions and programs were assumed to be interconnected positively 
in a “virtuous circle”.
In the US, it was demonstrated that Congress plays an important role in 
shaping democracy promotion; the semi-private National Endowment for Democracy 
guaranteed a certain independence from government, but sought to safeguard the 
American national interest. The role of USAID was depicted notably at stages 2 and 
3; it is a governmental agency and arguably pretended to be “apolitical” on the 
ground. Since its creation, it has had some autonomy as a bureaucracy and direct 
contact with target countries, and is constantly “threatened” by the executive branch 
and notably the Department of State. USAID traditional focus on development saw a 
clear securitization under George Bush, emphasizing the premise of a “virtuous 
circle” . In recent years, with the creation of the Millennium Challenge Account and 
the new state-building tasks at the Pentagon, the role of the presidential office 
admittedly led to specific policies; overall, the Presidential rhetoric throughout the 
post-Cold War period sustained the Exceptionalism at the basis of American 
democracy promotion and “universalism”.
In the EU, Member States made the main decisions on the budget and 
established multiple measures to control policy, notably via the Council of the EU; 
also during European Councils and Presidencies. However, the Commission 
developed important powers in this field, underlining Europeanization. Development 
and Cooperation are integrated policies, and within CFSP the Commission undertook 
agenda-setting and policy-design. In addition, its EuropeAid office manages the main 
explicit democracy instrument of the EU, the EIDHR. Commission communications 
and acquis contributed to develop the narrative of EU as civilian democracy 
promoter, and to establish the links with human rights, the rule of law and good
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governance. The initiatives from the security pillar were more timid, yet they were 
increasingly present and there was potential for the Member States to “take over” 
democracy promotion (in this realm of CFSP) as it became an issue of “higher 
politics”. This discussion documented the emergence of an EU universalism along 
the lines depicted in Chapter 2. The “rivalry” or more clearly the distinction vis-a-vis 
the US were emphasized. Indeed, even at practical levels the EU sometimes sought 
to develop as an “Other”: some EU institutional initiatives (such as the democracy 
promotion Policy Unit and Special Representatives) were in part a reaction to the 
American stands. The European Parliament was traditionally the EU institution with 
more transparent and sharper interest in the promotion of human rights and 
democracy, and its influence was crucial in the inspiration and actual implementation 
of some policies (EIDHR, inter-parliamentary assemblies, electoral observation, 
Sakharov prize). Thus, though its influence seemed weak because of its limited 
institutional powers, it has arguably been a driver for EU identity in connection with 
democracy promotion.
Though the research for this thesis is not devoted to non-state, transnational 
actors in democracy promotion, this chapter acknowledged the ever more important 
role of the exchanges between the public policy-makers and the private actors who 
contribute to design and implement policies on the ground. It has been argued that 
these actors imbued democracy promotion with their own understandings, 
specialization, and interests about democracy promotion. In this way, a “democracy 
promotion community” had an ever more important clout, and many of these actors 
came to have a major, specific input in the creation and prioritization of policies (e.g. 
think tanks), and also in their financing and implementation on the ground. This 
argument leads to important nuances regarding the conceptualization of agency and 
of US or EU “universalisms” in democracy promotion: the key question becomes, 
how much and in which ways do the promoters matter, in the end?
An important implication for this research was that, at later stages of 
democracy promotion, the specificities of American-European approaches seemed 
blurred. The chapter documented how the emergence of the many new actors was 
related to US and EU political cultures (for example, the American philanthropist 
and foundation tradition) and to the policy-processes (for example, the lack of 
expertise and policy-capacity in some fields in the Commission). Nevertheless, the 
information flows and transnational networks meant that democracy promotion
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featured less and less clearly as “American” or “European”. In addition, this input 
contributed to characterize democracy promotion as a seemingly less politicized and 
more “technical” process, where expertise and neutral intervention could supersede 
US and EU approaches and interests. In general, with its analysis of these latter 
stages 3 and 4, the chapter substantiated that contemporary democracy promotion 
involves significant “learning by doing” [Chapter 1].
Democracy promotion thus became a phenomenon increasingly determined, as 
it got closer to the ground, by the dynamics of globalization. As with other themes 
and dynamics in post-Cold War international relations, networks of individuals and 
institutions (public and private), knowledge-creation and distribution, and actual 
implementation of tasks were globalized. The chapter gathered additional evidence in 
this regard, but its findings did not allow for conclusions on whether or how this 
globalization may become institutionalized.
The first half of the thesis (the previous Chapters 1 and 2 and this Chapter 3) has laid 
the basis of its contribution to the analysis of democracy promotion and American 
and European approaches in International Relations. It has in this way established the 
context and key features of this ethical and interest-led international policy as well as 
the challenges for transition in the ground. It has also discussed how democracy 
promotion contributed to the construction of distinct identities and roles within the 
evolving transatlantic relationship with two “universalisms”. Finally, it analyzed the 
locations of policy-making (dispersed agency, fragmented processes) on both sides 
of the Atlantic.
In its second half, the thesis moves on to discuss three case studies at three IR 
levels: the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Middle East and North Africa region, 
and the Community of Democracies. The case studies will allow exploring whether 
the US and the EU adapted their policies to national, regional or global context 
Though the previous chapters have not offered any hints in this regards. Democracy 
promotion projects for a country, a region and the world seemed nevertheless to 
substantiate the argument that the US and the EU established democracy promotion 
as “universalisms”, and we will investigate whether and how this was the case.
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Chapter 4. American and European democracy promotion 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo: limited
cooperation, some competition and “Kabila-state 
building”
“It is necessary to entirely underline that the process of transition, obviously, is a 
Congolese process. And this is a process which is supported by the international 
community, the greatest support since independence, and I believe that the 
international community is a faithful partner to the Congolese people.” 
-W . Swing, MONUC, Special Representative of the Secretary General, 20061
This chapter explores the Congolese transition and the international community’s 
objectives in democracy promotion. I will be using “transition process” broadly, to 
refer to the post-Cold War period that saw the demise of Mobutu’s power, years of 
complex, protracted domestic and international conflict, and the election of Joseph 
Kabila as president in November 2006. The US and the EU roles must be understood 
as part of the “international community” intervention during this period. On the 
ground, diplomats, the media, and people in the streets often used the terms “the 
internationals” and “the international community”, so despite their fuzziness this was 
empirically an accurate starting point2. In my view, “international community” did 
not refer to actors but to a series of themes and goals, instead. It seemed to include 
foreign interveners somehow acting under a UN-umbrella, but specially devoted to 
peacemaking and to democracy promotion, including the United States, the European 
Union and European countries (notably France, Belgium, Germany, the United 
Kingdom), Japan and South Africa. Importantly, this also included international non­
governmental organizations (NGOs). By contrast, other international actors were not 
considered “international community”: states as Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Uganda, 
Namibia, or Zimbabwe, and non state-actors such as trans-border armed groups 
(armies or independent militia) or miners. Hence, the term “international
1 (Radio Okapi, 2006).
2 Academics as Rene Lemarchand question that such an actor as “international community” exists and 
believe the term should be avoided in academic writing.
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community” was partly constructed in relationship with a positive intervention 
underpinned by the virtuous circle of peace, democracy and development.
The US and the EU did not openly reject cooperation, but there was no 
transatlantic front to plan and coordinate policies either; each seemed moved by their 
own interests and capabilities. At times important divergences and some elements of 
competition arose, and these will be analyzed in this chapter. Democracy promotion 
policies faced very important challenges on the ground, and though they intended to 
be neutral, the trade-offs and challenges they faced were eminently political and 
shaped by the state (nearing collapse), warring factions, leaders, and economic 
disaster. This chapter’s goals are to unravel the American and European approaches 
and put this in contrast with the challenges on the ground. Three main arguments 
emerge from this research. First, the US and the EU influenced the old dictator 
Mobutu and his fall and this clearly belonged in the context of the world post-Cold 
War “democracy triumph”. Secondly, the US and the EU were ambiguous and 
parsimonious in their involvement to solve the conflict that ravaged the Great Lakes 
region, their policies were patchy and sometimes ill-conceived (fostering Western, 
“easy”, short-term solutions). Thirdly, they accounted, to a certain extent, for the 
political process that confirmed Joseph Kabila in power, so that the transition process 
came to be identified with “Kabila-state” building.
The chapter is structured as follows. The first section discusses the American 
and European positions and actions chronologically (three stages) in the transition 
process. The chapter then moves on to thematic analysis and considers the three 
overarching objectives that democracy promoters pursued in the Congo: brokering 
democracy (Section 2), fostering preconditions i.e. security (Section 3) and enforcing 
the transition bargaining with the government and through the CLAT commission 
(Section 4). A conclusion brings the main findings together to explore how this case 
contributed to the picture of a rising Europe while it also corroborates the United 
States influential, hegemonic position in post-Cold War IR. Before the chapter sheds 
light on these issues, a brief description of the background follows in this 
introduction.
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B ackground
The end of the Cold War clearly affected democracy promotion in Zaire: after years 
of shoring up Mobutu, Western countries stopped supporting the dictator and called 
for regime-opening and democratization (G. Martin, 2005; Westad, 2005). Mobutu 
reluctantly consented to some reforms, but the economic situation worsened 
dramatically, the state as he had built it (based on the national army and the civil 
servants in the provinces) disintegrated, and uncontrollable murderous conflicts 
inflamed the Eastern region as a consequence of the genocide and the new regime in 
Rwanda3. A diversity of leaders and their armed groups, supported by shifting 
alliances and other countries (Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe) challenged Mobutu, 
himself supported at times by Angola. Finally, Laurent Kabila’s group, that came 
from the East and was supported mainly by Rwanda, made its way to Kinshasa in 
1997, he overthrew the regime and changed the country’s name to Democratic 
Republic of Congo.
Map 1. Map o f the Democratic Republic o f Congo
Source: http://wwp.greenwichmeantime.com/time-zone/africa/democratic-republic-of-congo/map.htin
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Despite L. Kabila’s victory, the situation deteriorated with ongoing warring-groups 
confrontations and population abuse, including massacres, rape and plundering 
leading to hundreds of thousands of refugees. Peace-making became the priority,
3 The Rwandan army and groups (in majority hutu) responsible o f the genocide fled the country as 
Kagame and the tutsi armed groups took power. The conflict between these groups continued as those 
expelled or “in exile” tried to destabilize Kigali, and Kagame’s army attacked the hutu groups with 
frequent incursions into DR Congo and accused Kinshasa of protecting those guilty o f genocide. All 
groups used the mines as financial source and terrorized the populations, who were vulnerable even 
when they were displaced in refugee camps.
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because this “political transition” did not mean the end of conflict, rather the 
opposite (previous allies became enemies). Yet L. Kabila isolated himself from 
international pressure4. The United Nations plans (observation, blue-helmet 
deployment, creation of MONUC) were clearly framed as security-intervention, and 
the Congolese transition process must be understood within this political-security 
framework.
When Laurent Kabila was assassinated (by insiders) in January 2001, his son 
Joseph took over power, inheriting the chaotic situation and the failing agreements to 
stop the war. However, Joseph Kabila’s strategy was to co-opt (or accept to be co­
opted by) the international community as a way out of the conflict, while holding on 
to the government and de facto embodying the official DRC state. Disarmament and 
power distribution agreements often allowed Kabila to keep the lion’s share. 
Meanwhile, in conformity with the democratic triumph, the international community 
had insisted on the organization of elections since 1999, and obstinately crafted and 
supported a challenging electoral process in the failed-state DRC. Indeed, the 
organization of elections underpinned a state-building project where the voters’ lists 
became the census, and the Independent Electoral Commission premises and officials 
became the most important civil presence of the state in decades. In parallel, the 
international community made an effort to disarm “rebel” groups (i.e. factions other 
than Kabila’s) and to create an integrated Congolese army, but the practical and 
political problems in this regard weighed more than the incentives to disarm and 
build a state with the monopoly of the use of violence.
In the end, the presidential run-off election led to the inauguration of Joseph 
Kabila as President of the Third Republic of the DRC in December 2006. However, 
the electoral process could not overcome the link between political parties and their 
armed factions’ constant threats, the importance of ethnic and geographic allegiance 
instead of political programs. Still in 2009, the Congolese state is unable to guarantee 
security for its population, and the efforts to jump-start the economy await results. As 
the run-off map shows, Kabila was clearly supported in the East, while his opponent 
Bemba scored victories of up to 98% of the vote in the regions traditionally loyal to 
Mobutu such as the North-Western Equator. In 2008, Freedom House continued to
4 Since his own groups and himself were under suspicion for war crimes, L. Kabila notably hindered 
United Nations observation and reporting in 1999-2000. He also failed to grant space for other 
political factions even in the legislative or administrative arenas.
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rank the Democratic Republic of Congo as “not free” with scores of 5/7 and 6/7 [7 
being the worst] in political liberties and civil rights, Bemba was in exile, corruption 
was rising and human rights abuses continued.
Map 2. Map o f results from the run-off presidential election, DRC 2006 
Source: BBC News (Mark Doyle), 29 October 2006
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The Congolese transition process and the American and European policies of 
democracy promotion must be understood in this context of a failed-state and an 
electoral process that was especially intense in 2005-6. Most importantly, since the 
country’s implosion (roughly from 1995 on), violence ravages the East but 
destabilizes the whole state, so this process can be described accurately as a case of 
democracy promotion during war (Ahamed, 2006; Barrios & Ahamed, 2008)5.
1. Democratic transition in Zaire / Democratic Republic of Congo: 
American and European democracy promotion confront state- 
failure and war
The Congolese transition process can be divided broadly in three stages: the end of 
Mobutu’s regime, the time of power-vacuum during the Congolese wars and 
instability during Laurent Kabila’s government, and the stage of unsteady but 
incremental instauration of Joseph Kabila in power. The main events in these periods 
are outlined in corresponding chronology-tables below, while I focus on US and EU 
action. Throughout, American and European positions were rather similar and often 
reinforced each other, though they did not result in cooperation. In the US and the 
EU, internal dynamics influenced the policies, and geopolitical rivalry played a role
5 This observation is crucial and introduces new challenges in democracy promotion as there is no 
post-conflict transition in the Congo; instead, the transition happens during the conflict and is actually 
envisaged as part of the strategy to end the conflict.
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in an episode of Franco-American “confrontation” over support for Mobutu or for 
Laurent Kabila in the second stage. In turn, on the ground, some proposals faced 
Congolese resistance to conform to Western ideas on what the DRC democracy 
should look like.
1.1. US and EU end support and aid of Mobutu’s dictatorship
Mobutu felt constrained to propose reforms and a regime opening under pressure
from the West. These included the legalization of traditional opposition leader and 
party (Tshisekedi and his UPDS), the establishment of multiparty politics (which de 
facto led to a number of acolyte-parties), and the co-optation of associations and civil 
society to discuss the new regime in a National Conference. The attempts of 
institutional reform included new legislative and executive bodies, but Mobutu never 
yielded governmental power from the presidency to the appointed Council or Prime 
Minister. Meanwhile, the state gradually fell apart as the dictator lost control, his 
civil and military apparatus disintegrated or revolted, and the economy collapsed.
Box 4. Chronology o f the DRC. Stage 1: end o f Mobutu’s regime
1990-1996 Stage 1. End of Mobutu’s regime
1990 “regime opening” announcement
1991 Episodes of military mutiny and plundering
1991-2 National Sovereign Conference (approx. 2,850 delegates)
Confrontations between Mobutu and other Conference participants (Catholic Church led 
protests)
453-member Council and “new government” receive support from Belgium, France and USA 
1993-4 Economic and security situation continues to degrade, dozens of people die in riots, strikes 
Council fails to put pressure on Mobutu, no division of executive power 
1994 World Bank office closes, IMF suspends Zaire
[1994-5 Genocide and war in Rwanda, conflict spills over the region]______________________________
Democracy promotion started to play a role in US and EU foreign policy towards 
Zaire in the early 1990s as they both stopped supporting Mobutu. While Western aid 
and military and political support had been flowing into Mobutu’s authoritarian Zaire 
during the Cold War and greatly contributed to his corrupted and repressive regime, 
the global turn of the 1990s saw a clear change in US and EU policies (Schraeder et
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al., 1998)6. The new paradigm of democracy promotion was evident in the 
interruption of this flow on the grounds of democratic deficit.
In the US, the pressure came from Congress. In 1990, while George Bush’s 
administration and the State Department had asked for USD 4 million in military aid 
for Zaire and lobbied to get it, Congress denied it and instead authorized 40 million 
in economic aid. In addition, this had to be channeled through agencies non-affiliated 
with Mobutu’s government (Kraus, 1990). In this sense, there was a choice to 
support democratization via civil society. During the Clinton administration, a 
Republican-dominated Congress and Senator Jesse Helms as chair of the Foreign 
Relations Committee regularly checked the presidential policies, at a time when the 
US Africa policy became one of “trade, not aid” (Carothers, 1995). This indirectly 
left Zaire out, for there could be no trade exchanges in a collapsing state where the 
economy was estimated to be 80% informal, the regional authorities (especially the 
richer Katanga and Kasai) counted more and more as official reference for foreign 
companies, and even individuals had been granted the right to exploit diamond 
mines7. The White House left a space that was mainly filled by USAID, and not the 
CIA, the Pentagon or the State Department in view of the region’s low priority. 
USAID policies perpetuated modernization links and emphasized democracy 
prospects (Clark, 1998), but in a context of cancelled official aid and of USAID ever- 
fewer funds, Clinton’s vows for democracy assistance amounted to rhetoric but no 
practice in the DRC. This trend would not be reversed later, as President George W. 
Bush’s Africa policy was one of continuity, focusing on trade. His other original 
development programs, the HIV/AIDS fund for Africa and the Millennium 
Challenge Account, did not apply to the Congo either (Hesse, 2005; Rothchild, 
2001). Indeed, though both Clinton (in 1998) and Bush (in 2003 and 2008) famously 
visited the continent on widely-publicized diplomatic trips, Zaire belonged to the 
parts of Africa where the US was less and less engaged (Michaels, 1992)8.
In the European Union, while European Development Funds (EDF) 
cooperation had been ongoing since 1958, aid was officially suspended in 1992 until
6 Some estimate Mobutu got about USD 1.5 billion in aid from the United States through these 
decades. Schraeder Cold War foreign policy of the US, France and Japan.
7 Mobutu took this measure to legalize what were usual practices, maybe with the intention to gain 
support from individuals and the population and to “punish” the regional authorities and companies 
that had privileges on mine exploitation.
8 As there was no longer a security argument, American diplomacy mainly moved to protect economic 
interests.
155
January 2002. Only some Health and Social programs continued to be funded for 
their humanitarian purposes (Delegation of the European Commission in DRC, 2006, 
p. 6). In the larger picture, Zaire was affected when EU cooperation with Africa 
introduced good governance, human rights, and democratization conditionality 
through the 1990s. This trend was supposed to bring a change to the “special” ties 
that had led the EU (notably under French pressure) to maintain privileged 
cooperation with African countries regardless of the regime, but the preferred 
framework was that of CFSP Dialogue instead of legal sanction9. However, the EU 
did introduce resolutions in the General Assembly/Third Committee on “Zaire and 
human rights” since 1995, in a relatively rare instance of consensus and coherence 
(K. E. Smith, 2006). In sum, European development cooperation became more 
politicized, but Africa was low on the EU agenda of new foreign policy issues. EU 
human rights activism was relatively disjointed, and humanitarian aid by ECHO 
existed in parallel (Arts & Dickson, 2004; Petiteville, 2003; Whiteman, 1998).
The roles of Member States and of the European Parliament help us to get a 
more nuanced view of EU action. Traditionally, Member States have permeated EU 
Development policies for specific geographical areas, and exert pressure via the 
Council and lobbying in community-bodies10. Such area-influence is perpetuated by 
the Commission’s DG Development and Cooperation’s subdivision into regional 
areas, instead of themes (Arts & Dickson, 2004, p. 6). In the case of DR Congo and 
in general in the Great Lakes region, the roles of Belgium and France have been key 
in informing and implementing EU action (McCalpin, 2002) and were generally 
followed by other states. Individual countries’ actions were rather similar to the 
US’s, for instance Belgium suspended its bilateral aid on the grounds of the violent 
repression of a student protest in Lubumbashi (as the US), and France did the same 
though a bit later, in 1993.
9 Numerous EU documents illustrate the trend for conditionality in EU Development Cooperation, 
among them the 1997 Green Paper on EU-ACP relations, the 1998 Good Governance 
Communication, and IV Lome and the Cotonou Conventions. As of Cotonou 2000, ACP-EU 
agreements included the human rights clause as an essential element, before it was part of the 
preamble. Nevertheless, this clause has only been applied rarely and I could not verify that the 
suspension of aid had been formally based on this with its full legal implications.
10 MS interests broadly coincide with former colonial ties. As EDF are voluntary contributions (not 
part of the EU budget) by MS, MS also keep a high hand on the funds through Council decision and 
through comitology, though policies are drafted and implemented at Commission level. In 2009, the 
Commission continues to lobby for EU-budgetization of EDF.
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In the mean time, during the 1990s the European Parrliament increasingly took 
an active role in EU human rights and development policy-making, but its role in the 
Congo was limited as a result of its restricted input in EUF policies. For example, in 
view of the appalling Human Rights reports in 1993, the EH5 went as far as to suggest 
that Member States freeze Mobutu’s assets, showing the EEMPs’ greater disposition 
to punish the dictator. However, MS never followed up om these recommendations, 
and such “aggressive policy” was thwarted because the EP (could only issue opinions.
1.2. French-American rivalry in the Congolese warss and a belated 
security-intervention
With a collapsed economy and the Eastern Congoltese regions increasingly
destabilized as the result of the Rwandan genocide, Motbutu’s became one of the 
parties in the protracted, ever aggravating conflict that lesd the whole Great Lakes 
region to what some called “Africa’s first world war”11. T he transition process, in 
crisis, became increasingly less political and more milittary; neither the National 
Conference nor Council convened again, and their leaderss were powerless. Instead, 
armed groups led by rebels calling on polarized identitiees and regions, took over 
(Young, 2006). This was the case since 1996 when the “Fiirst War” of the Congo led 
to the disintegration of the state in influence-zones, witlh Laurent Kabila’s group 
(AFDL) finally defeating Mobutu, whose national armjy groups had deserted or 
rebelled. The subsequent episode of the “Second War” 03f the Congo saw shifting 
armed groups, alliances and influence-zones further domimated by regional dynamics 
(with interventions from Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, Zimbabwe...), challenging 
Kabila’s new reign (Lanotte, 2003).
11 Quote attributed to Madeleine Albright, source: UN Security Councill Meeting record: DRC, S/PV 
4092, 24 January 2000, p. 4.
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Box 5. Chronology o f the DRC. Stage 2: Congolese Wars, Laurent D. Kabila takes 
power
1996-2001 Stage 2. Congolese Wars, Laurent D. Kabila takes over power
1996 “First war” of Congo. Insurrection of Laurent D. Kabila’s AFDL assisted by Rwanda, later 
Uganda
1997 Laurent Kabila overthrows Mobutu (May), Mobutu dies in exile (September)
1998 “Second war” of Congo or “Africa’s first world war”. L.D. Kabila is unpopular, he forces out 
Rwandan and Congolese (tutsi) military, who stir insurrection in the East. Rebel groups (old 
and new) and foreign armies supporting them fight, i.e.
1999 Beginning of Security Council discussions at the United Nations
1999 Lusaka cease-fire agreement: Kinshasa government, Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Uganda and 
Rwanda, foresees UN peacekeeping mission and exit of foreign troops
2000 MONUC blue helmet operation decided
In these years, the United States and European countries mostly stood by while the 
Great Lakes region bled more than four million victims and the United Nations was 
unable to cope with the millions of displaced and refugees. The international 
community in general dragged its feet, unable to agree and to commit to end the 
conflict and restore the political transition. The Congo and the Great Lakes region 
have traditionally been considered part of a francophone sphere of influence in 
Africa, a situation largely perpetuated by American collusion (Taylor & Williams, 
2004). However, as Kagame (who had fought the Habyarimana regime that had been 
supported by France) became leader of post-genocide Rwanda, the Great Lakes 
international picture changed. Kagame was not only opposed to France, he also 
strengthened ties with the US: in the final days of his administration, Clinton 
publicly regretted the lack of intervention to stop the genocide and stood by the new 
tutsi president. Later, Kagame’s change of sides to a theoretically antagonistic 
anglophone sphere would even materialize in Rwanda’s application to join the 
Commonwealth12. Within this context, American-French rivalry also arose in the 
Congo during the “First War”.
Indeed, though they built up pressure on Zaire to open up and democratize, 
some Western states and especially France were not ready to let go of Mobutu easily. 
The press of that period, including The New York Times, Wall Street Journal and
12 In a conference at the London School of Economics, the Rwandan president insisted on these 
aspects (Kagame, 2007).
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especially Le Monde reported there was US-France confrontation13. This way, during 
the “First War”, the US arguably took the ADFL rebels’ side and supported the 
rebellion led firstly by Ngandu and then by Laurent D. Kabila, and backed by 
Rwanda and (also anglophone) Uganda. Several studies have established that the 
CIA and American military companies trained and funded Kabila’s rebellion and 
their advance towards Kinshasa (Ginifer, 2002); seemingly the United Kingdom 
sided with the US but not actively. By contrast France sought to keep Mobutu in 
power with a conciliatory diplomacy, and in any case supported (as traditionally) the 
Congolese troops, including during open fights against Rwandan troops; it seemingly 
sponsored Serbian mercenaries to fight in Mobutu’s army (Ngolet, 2000)14. In part, 
these moves and later negotiations are explained by the independent policies that 
some groups (troops units) and individuals (civil servants, deployed personnel) had 
in the field. Among these, on the American side the Pentagon/CIA and Clinton’s 
Envoy to the Great Lakes Howard Wolpe were key (Schraeder, 2000)15. Similarly, 
the Africa-unit of the French army, reporting directly to the president (Vasset, 1997) 
and the French-Africa networks and clientelist connections also explain the 
sometimes inconsistent strategies of the Western “allies” (Kroslak, 2004).
Nevertheless, most analysts have reduced the importance of this confrontation, 
and put the US and France on the same side of the larger picture, pushing for 
transition in the Congo from a relative distance (Clark, 2002; Schraeder, 2000). 
Rather pragmatically, France did not stop and regret Mobutu’s fall, and established 
ties with Laurent Kabila once in power. Similarly, though the US had supported 
Laurent Kabila, they fell out as he isolated himself internationally, hindered United 
Nations investigations on massacres in the East, was unable to pacify or unite the 
Congo, and offered no signs of democratization (Schatzberg, 1997).
A European Union position also became increasingly important with the 
appointment of Special Representative for the Great Lakes Aldo Ajello in 1996. He
13 A. J. Fralon and J. Turquoi, "Affique: la fausse querelle ffanco-americaine," Le Monde, 21 Oct. 
1996, p. 6. A. Franchon, "Les querelles entre Paris et Washington ont laisses la France en premiere 
ligne," Le Monde, 11 Jan. 1997, p. 16 and F. Fritscher, "La question du Zaire oppose toujours Paris et 
Washington," Le Monde, 3 Feb. 1997, p. 6. Seemingly Mitterrand did not want to let go of France’s 
influence in Rwanda and the region.
14 Though this kind of information and covert actions is rather difficult to verify with documents, 
these accounts are broadly held as true by academics, negotiators, journalists and diplomats in the 
field.
15 Wolpe was in contact with Kabila and Mobutu’s sides during the conflict, and the US considered 
Mobutu could be part of the solution. Meanwhile, an American political officer from the Kinshasa US 
embassy had actually been stationed at Kabila’s guerrilla headquarters for two months.
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worked to raise a “single EU-voice”, but he admitted he sometimes “had to invent a 
common position” in view of the disparate MS preferences (Ajello, 2007). In this 
regard, Common Foreign and Security Policy debates took place in the European 
Parliament in 1997 to bring France, which had been reluctant to follow the new EU 
democracy promotion principles, to a Council common position within European 
Cooperation Policy (King, 1999)16. The EU unified position of support for Kabila’s 
presidency was symbolized by the Foreign affairs Ministerial troika (Luxembourg, 
Holland and the United Kingdom) visit to Congo in August 1997. Then, as the 
Security Council and broadly the United Nations framework became more active, the 
common interests of French and American policies converged to a multilateral 
setting, and the dispute over French and American influence in the Congo lost 
ground as the “Second War” of Congo unraveled.
Then, the main parties in the conflict became on the one hand Laurent 
Kabila’s, or the government’s (most of the AFDL factions) and on the other Jean- 
Pierre Bemba’s MLC, partly supported by some of the old (Mobutu’s) national army, 
later supported by Uganda and Angola. The RCD-Goma and a diversity of related 
groups (tutsi, strongly backed by Rwanda), who had allied with Kabila in the “First 
War” and were disaffected, challenged the government in the East. There, the Mai- 
Mai militia and other groups (including Rwandan hutu) fought the RCD and 
Rwandan/tutsi forces (International Crisis Group, 2001). The international 
community had by then almost forgotten about the opening and democratization 
process, and shifted to negotiations for a cease-fire with military interlocutors in the 
Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (1999). After Lusaka, the political process came back 
in the framework of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (Chivvis, 2007; Schraeder, 
2002)17.
In the mean time, a new left-wing government (led by Jospin) had been elected in France in 1997 
and President Chirac’s conservative policies and overall French military policies in Africa came under 
new scrutiny and had to co-exist with the government’s reform plans.
17 The roles of the US and the EU in these negotiations and the “brokering” of the democratic 
transition is discussed in Section 2.
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1.3. American and European democracy promotion and “Kabila-state” 
building: conditionality, compound aid, limited influence on the 
democracy-model
Let us now turn to what I see as a third phase of the Congolese transition process, 
marked by the intermittent success of the international initiatives for dialogue and 
scaled-down conflict, and by more intense activity in the political realm. Most 
warring parties were co-opted into peace and transition agreements that at the same 
time safeguarded Joseph Kabila’s power. This stage saw the end of drafting a new 
constitution (ongoing since the National Conference), the design of new institutions 
and power distribution, the electoral process, and a transitional authority that lasted 
until Kabila’s presidential appointment in December 2006.
Kabila’s election was the key turning point for the international community, 
and American and European speeches and documents started to refer to the 
“consolidation” and “post-transition” phase after it. However, the transition process 
is better understood if we do not make a full stop at that election and take into 
consideration, for instance, that in January 2007 extremely serious cases of 
corruption and volatility tarnished the Senate elections18, and that local elections 
have been postponed indefinitely (Vuemba, 2007). There is still no peace in the 
East; the transition is arguably not over, democracy seems elusive.
Box 6. Chronology o f the DRC. Stage 3: Joseph Kabila in power
2001-2008 Stage 3. Joseph Kabila in power
2001 Assassination (January) of Laurent Kabila by domestic guard, Joseph Kabila takes over power
2001 (November) Security Council creation of coordination mechanism for DDRRR -disarming, 
demobilization, repatriation, reinstallation and reinsertion
2002 Inter-Congolese Dialogue of Sun City leading to resolutions
2003 Global and all-inclusive Agreement, sets up institutions of the Transition, foresees elections, 
creates CIAT
2003 Fighting continues in the Eastern provinces. EU operation Artemis
2005 Referendum on the Constitution based on transition parliament text
2006 EUFOR-Congo (June)
2006 Legislative and Presidential election (July) and Provincial and run-off Presidential election 
(October)
2007 Corruption cases concerning senate election lead to riots in Matadi (116 dead)
2007 New cooperation agreements with the EU, World Bank, IMF
Local elections postponed
2007 Kabila accepts China unconditional aid/loan for USD 5 billion condemned by IMF
2008 Fighting resumes in the Eastern provinces, armistice (December)
18 A clearly pro-Kabila provincial assembly “unexpectedly” elected a pro-Bemba senator who had 
bought some assembly-members’ votes at USD 10,000/each. Groups of people gathered to protest and 
the brutal repression led to 116 deaths in Matadi.
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United States and European Union democracy promotion during this period brought 
them together under the international community intervention to pacify the Congo 
with multiparty agreements and to pursue the electoral process, while basic 
development assistance was also urgent. The EU complemented its civil intervention 
with two short but decisive military operations, Artemis (2003) and EUFOR-Congo 
(2006) discussed in Section 3 below. Here I discuss three key aspects of both US 
and EU democracy promotion: conditionality, compound aid and limited influence 
on specific outcomes regarding the democracy model.
First, the dynamic of conditionality (sanctions and rewards) that underlies 
much of international democracy promotion was confirmed in the case of Congo: as 
the transition moved on and in order to make it move, donors allocated more funds 
(World Bank, 2002). It is difficult to estimate how much “international money” has 
been spent in the transition process in Congo; some sources mention over USD 10 
billion for the 2002- 2006 period19. By far the main fimd-providers were the 
European Union (including bilateral aid from Member States), notably in charge of 
80% of the electoral process expenses, and the United States, main financer of the 
MONUC (though Germany was also an important MONUC contributor)20. Most 
funds were channeled through the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
and other international bodies. For example, the World Bank organized a Donors 
conference in Paris in 2002 where about USD 3 million were secured for “capacity 
building”.
Secondly, promoters did not differentiate funds and tasks clearly: peacemaking 
and humanitarian assistance for the thousands of refugees in the Congo were built in 
the US and the EU approaches. The same applies for democracy assistance sub­
divisions and categories: blurry, changing categories and a mix of policies. Indeed, a 
“comprehensive approach” of democracy promotion was explicitly the international 
community’s objective in this transition process (K. Annan, 2003)21. As we get 
closer to the field, democratization questions and dynamics somewhat lose their
19 Estimation from a Financial Times source quoted in (Chivvis, 2007).
20 There were some critiques regarding the fact that the transition, notably the elections, “did not cost 
the Congolese state any money”, which created an adverse effect of a process initiated, wanted and 
sponsored by the internationals and co-opting Congolese stakeholders. However, the engagement and 
successful participation of the Congolese people demonstrated the national drive, support and 
ownership of the transition process.
21 In the words of Kofi Annan, “assisting the transition process in a country as large as the DRC [will] 
require a comprehensive approach in which the UN, the Bretton Wood institutions, and bilateral and 
multilateral donors plan and coordinate their activities to an almost unprecedented degree”. Para. 67.
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“promoter’s” specificity to program complexity and shifting realities, and the 
conceptualizations that were applied a priori, or in assessments a posteriori, are not 
relevant.
Both conditionality and the undifferentiated definition of “democracy 
promotion” are clear in the case of the United Kingdom’s DFID policies, an example 
I choose to illustrate these widespread trends.
Table 7. Democracy promotion and conditionality: funds increased as the transition 
process moves on (illustrated by the United Kingdom’s DFID allocations to the 
DRC)
Period DFID Funding 
(£ million)
2001-02 £5.6
2002-03 £12.9
2003-04 £17.2
2004-05 £29.2
2005-06 £58.8
UK funds allocated for the DRC democracy assistance directed at the Congo show 
increasing support as the transition process developed. The activities included within 
these funds include, among other: humanitarian aid, development aid (e.g. for water, 
transport projects), disarmament, election assistance, and justice reform22. 
Eventually, DFID funds some agents (mostly large and small NGOs) and programs 
to organize and undertake the specific activities, e.g. information and capacity- 
building workshops, roundtable negotiations. Then, for example, DFID would 
finance the American Woodrow Wilson Center (a renowned scholarly institute that 
undertakes some fieldwork), or a Concept Paper by International Alert (medium-size 
NGO based in London)23. Most of DFID funds for election assistance would in turn 
be channeled through the EU mission. The UK contributions to MONUC and to the 
EU operations Artemis and EUFOR-Congo came from different budgets (not 
development-related).
22 Data extracted from DFID website, January 2009.
23 Information I gathered from interview with consultant, Paris 10 December 2007 and I verified in 
publications from these sources (they acknowledge their donors).
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Thirdly, the extent to which democracy promoters influenced the democracy- 
model coming about in the Congo was limited. The international community 
financed and made possible the logistics of the transition process entirely, and this 
should not be underestimated in a failed-state. This way, any computers, expertise, 
ballots, office material, print-outs, distribution, communications, transport, etc. 
depended on a complex network of international interveners (including the US, the 
EU and also South Africa). Content-wise, however, the influence of the promoters 
was more limited24. During the transition process and especially from 2001 on under 
the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, internationals worked in commissions with appointed 
Congolese politicians (members of the assembly, then the parliament); their most 
important task was to draft the Constitution. These democracy promoters were 
mostly private consultants appointed by the United States, some of them via the 
National Endowment for Democracy, some via USAID. For example, USAID 
funded two American NGOs (IFES and the Law Group) to work with a network of 
civil society partners that in the Congo were coordinated by the Catholic Church 
(USAID, 2002b). The Catholic Church has been crucial in the transition process in 
the DRC (in fact, it could be argued that the Church was at some stages the only 
“state-structure”), and it should be noticed that American and European democracy 
promoters worked with the Church on a large number of projects and co-opted it as a 
legitimate partner in the transition. For instance, when the international community 
paid salaries to electoral officials, they channeled the money through the Church or 
private companies instead of through the Congolese state bank or ministerial/civil 
servant structures25. In addition, the EU and European countries, especially Belgium, 
also appointed expert individuals and delegations that contributed to debates and 
proposals for the Constitution.
This way, the EU lobbied in the Congo for the abolition of the death penalty (a 
landmark of European “democracy” policies) but the Congolese commission 
discussing it decided not to abolish it formally. Nevertheless, an informal
24 This made sense for starters in the logic of not imposing democracy promotion. The Independent 
Electoral Commission and other transition institutions plus the many working groups created gave 
leverage to the Congolese, though pressure existed behind the stage and through conditionality.
25 This could be compared to the US and EU reluctance to co-opt Islamic institutions in the Middle 
East and North Africa region.
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26moratorium has been in place since January 2003 , hinting at a relatively important 
influence of the EU. The nature of the regime was also at stake, and the EU and the 
American party foundation NDI defended a shift to parliamentariarism in view of the 
problems that strong-man rule and a winner-take-all system causes in Africa (Young, 
2006). Nevertheless, the final draft kept a strong presidentialism that has de facto 
been confirmed in Kabila’s last two years in power27. Another example concerned 
the definition of the electoral system and districts and the electoral law. The 
internationals encouraged lists instead of individual first-past-the-post systems in 
order to encourage coalitions, and larger electoral districts to assert national 
allegiance. However, the law that passed maintained individual candidacies for 
provincial governor, and gerrymandering has privileged constituencies on ethnic 
grounds28.
These cases show the international efforts to promote democracy with a 
knowledge and “technical” basis, which in turn may be resisted by powerful 
dynamics of the field: politicians in the Congo clearly opted to maximize their power 
when possible29. Overall, both the EU and the US failed to influence the laws and 
institutions in detail as much as they had, for instance, in Eastern and Central Europe. 
Richard Joseph (1997, p. 370) found this trend was generalized in Africa; this is 
partly explained by the minimal interest and efforts devoted to the continent in 
European and American external relations. Indeed, some academics consider the new 
“mission civilisatrice” and shared-sovereignty in failed states create opportunities for 
democratization (Krasner, 2004; Paris, 2002). Nevertheless, local actors have 
potential to affect the outcome and challenge international influence; they can even 
adopt an attitude of shaming the internationals for interfering.
This description of American and European democracy promotion in the 
Congolese transition process will now be complemented by a discussion of the main 
objectives pursued: brokering democracy, fostering security, and enforcing reform.
26 As of April 2008, the last person executed in the Congo was on 6 January 2003. The most reliable 
estimate (local NGO) considers about 450 people are in death row. (RFI (Radio France 
Internationale), 2008).
27 The open provisions of the constitution have resulted in rather weak roles for the assembly and the 
prime minister in 2006-8.
8 Parliamentary elections also considered individual candidacies; according to DFID 9,632 candidates 
ran for a total of 500 assembly seats. This translated in ballots that were hard to interpret (if you did 
not know the individual you could not know the program) and pages-long, as they often included 
pictures of the candidates and not only names. This assistance came from the South African EISA.
9 In his French Sociological analysis of African politics, Bayart describes this strongman-politics and 
family/ ethnic/ traditional allegiances as “the politics of the belly”.
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In the conclusions, I will come back to the arguments on US and EU “universalisms” 
and on the challenges regarding democracy promotion
2. Brokering democracy: from a National Sovereign Conference 
(NSC) to peace agreements to elections
This section argues that a first objective of US and the EU policies was to broker
democracy, which consisted in three main elements. First, the international 
community disregarded the NSC and did not support this option, though in the end 
the Conference failed because of its own internal shortcomings. Secondly, the 
international community intervened in the negotiation of peace agreements, 
introducing a “political transition” of sorts as a factor in the agreements. This 
engagement empowered war-factions as political actors, and involved increased 
legitimization and power for some, notably Joseph Kabila. Thirdly, the international 
community gave priority to elections as a strategy to solve the conflict and to create a 
state.
2.1. Ambiguous support for the National Conference
As ,a way to initiate the transition, Mobutu gave way to a National (Sovereign) 
Conference (NSC)30. It convened mainly during 1991-93 and reached a maximum of 
2,850 delegates, with important participation from civil society groups (labor unions, 
the Catholic Church). The NSC invested the opposition’s leader (Tshisekedi) as 
prime minister and developed a legislative structure and government (High Council) 
that coexisted with Mobutu’s (1993-4), which weakened the regime.
Robinson and Joseph (1997; 1994) have identified National Conferences as a 
classic feature of transitions in Africa, which allow for broader participation and
o 1
consensus compared to models of liberal-democracy representation (Ake, 1993) . 
Zaire seemed to be following upon the models of Benin and South Africa. During the 
National Sovereign Conference, civil society movements played a very important 
role. Analysts and witnesses underline the atmosphere of civic participation,
30 Mobutu opened the “National Conference”, which would later declare itself “Sovereign” and thus 
able and legitimate to challenge his regime and make decisions. This was a self-appointment that 
would not get validated through elections, and was constantly rejected by Mobutu.
31 Many leaders also argue that there is an “African way of democracy” that must privilege 
participation, community and forums to “talk” instead of a result-oriented model with controversial 
elections, most famously the Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere (and also Nelson Mandela).
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unprecedented in the country’s history, as the NSC sessions were transmitted by 
radio, commented in newspapers, etc. They also emphasize the role of the Catholic 
Church, especially in the mobilization during the 1992 March of Hope, and as the 
president of the Episcopal Conference Monsengwo became head of the legislature 
(Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002; Renton, Seddon, & Zeilig, 2007). However, the NSC 
admittedly failed because its openness and inclusion brought in too many side- 
quarrels, because it proved unable to stop the war, and because Mobutu always 
imposed his control. Arguably, though it worked as a civic forum, it had difficulty in 
deciding and validating a new institutional framework for the state (H. Campbell, 
2002; de Villers & Omasombo Tshonda, 2002).
In any case, both the United States and the European Union adopted an 
ambiguous but rather lukewarm position vis-a-vis the NSC. Policy-makers observed 
the talks and demonstrations from the distance; staff from the US Bureau of Africa 
Affairs (Department of State) and Western embassies disregarded this forum of more 
than 2,000 people as inefficient, and apprehended uncontrolled violence32. But more 
specifically, Western countries hesitated between keeping Mobutu (though 
weakening him) and strengthening ties with the opposition leader Etienne 
Tshisekedi. Their signals were mixed: on the one hand, they put pressure on Mobutu 
to maintain the Conference, isolated him diplomatically33, and considered the new 
government as legitimate. On the other hand, the US, Belgium and France did not 
break up with Mobutu even in periods of extreme crisis, such as when the French 
ambassador died in one of the riot-outbreaks in 1993, or when the World Bank 
closed its Kinshasa offices and the IMF suspended Zaire’s aid in 1994.
The NSC could be considered a civil-society driver of the transition, and the 
fact is that both the US and the EU disregarded it. Many in the DRC thought the 
NSC was the original and legitimate transition process, and openly criticized the 
internationals’ disregard (Mbwebwe K., 2005). This way, the US and the EU 
indirectly endorsed elite-led transitions where elections were key, showing a 
preference for procedural democracy [cf. Chapter 1]. In the cases of Eastern and 
Central Europe and Georgia or Ukraine, Western democracy promotion gave a more 
prominent role to civil society and mass movements, but this was not the case in
32 See documentary film Mobutu roi du Zaire (Michel).
33 For example, when King Badouin died in 1993, Mobutu was not invited to the funeral, though they 
had had a friendly relationship for decades.
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Zaire with the NSC. Two reasons may have been that the promoters may not have 
been familiar with the cultural dimensions of civil society in Africa, and that few 
international civil society democracy promoters (e.g. foundations as Open Society) 
had taken action in Africa, with the exception of the Catholic Church and other 
churches. Later in the transition process, important funds would be devoted to 
funding civil society programs that seemed more transparent to Western donors and 
closer to the ECE experience, such as associations and NGOs34.
2.2. Co-opting warring factions as the new political elite and Joseph 
Kabila as transition leader
A second dimension in the policies to broker the transition was to let go of the multi­
party proposals and the political transition because the failed-state and security 
challenges became a priority, for both the US and the EU. The political opposition 
clearly lost ground to the armed, rebel groups that took over the country during the 
wars. Almost inadvertently, the groups who had been attacking the state became 
responsible for building it, as they were co-opted in the process. Yet they were 
clientelist and little worried about the public good, and they privileged ethnic and 
geographical allegiances instead of political programs. The transition thus gave a 
preeminent role to potential spoilers whose legitimacy derived from their armed 
power, relying on a presumed virtuous cycle.
By 1998-99, the US and the EU privileged conflict-resolution over the political 
transition in the 1999 Lusaka Peace Agreement. According to some witnesses, 
Howard Wolpe, Clinton’s special envoy in the region, and the Under-secretary of
35State for African Affairs Susan Rice, played a key role putting in Lusaka together . 
This illustrated the high leverage of American diplomacy in Africa. Arguably, a mid­
way had to be found between warlord agreements (responsible for armed conflict and 
plundering) and the proceedings of the political National Sovereign Conference that 
had attempted a transition from Mobutuism. The Lusaka Agreement was a failure in 
the eyes of most analysts: the cease-fire was never effective, the parties never 
disarmed (Bouvier & Bomboko, 2004). However, this Agreement made the first
34 Nevertheless it can be argued that promoters remained overall skeptical o f participative and also 
privileged elites in all cases (indeed, the Western support in the “color revolutions” of Georgia and 
Ukraine was accompanied by support for selected leaders as Saakasvili and Iushenko).
35 Quote from Gerard Prunier (Lanotte, 2003, p. 251). Other peace negotiations (led by African 
leaders) had been failing in the previous months.
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reference to a political process in its Chapter 5 on National Dialogue and
36Reconciliation, which also called for “free, democratic and transparent elections” . 
The circle was in place: no peace and no international intervention without 
democracy. Seemingly the American negotiators extracted this concession from 
Laurent Kabila, and this importantly became the legal basis for the Inter-Congolese 
Dialogue (ICD) and the ensuing electoral process.
The EU then became the main donor of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, making 
possible mediation sessions in different countries and keeping the different partners 
at the table (Guerrero, 2007). For this, the EU often subcontracted consultants and 
negotiators working individually or for some institutes (as the French Irene). Within 
this framework the EU also financed most demobilization and reintegration 
programs, and humanitarian/ emergency assistance related to the 1996-2001 wars. In
1997-8, the EU Council adopted Joint Actions to create a European Electoral Unit 
and to contribute to the UN Special Fund. Thus, the US and the EU jointly supported 
the initiatives, though the EU financed the Dialogue more clearly.
This way, Lusaka and the subsequent Inter-Congolese Dialogue, Sun-City and 
Pretoria Agreements all proposed compromises that included an intertwined solution 
of the armed conflict (disarmament, creation of a national army) and the political 
transition to democracy. However, this had led to a re-positioning of actors in 
Congolese politics and most importantly the armed factions. Key political actors 
(notably Tshisekedi) lost ground to the armed parties, i.e. Bemba’s MLC and the 
RCD-Goma (which many considered a Rwanda government infiltration). From 2001 
on, the United States and the European powers increasingly supported Joseph Kabila 
as “the” leader to make the transition happen. While Laurent D. Kabila had isolated 
the Congo and irritated the West with an official trip to China, Joseph traveled to 
Washington, Brussels, Paris as soon as he gained power, and was well supported by 
Western leaders and the media (Vircoulon, 2006). In exchange, he promised to 
maintain the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (Tshimanga-Bakadiababu, 2004).
Tshisekedi seemingly remained an alternative, the “non-armed opposition”, 
though he was increasingly seen as a spoiler in EU circles (by Louis Michel and 
Aldo Ajello) because he resented all the new actors’ power. In 2001, he addressed 
the US Congress trying to get a shift in policies:
36 Point 5.5.iv. of the Lusaka Agreement, 1999.
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“The US administration should resist the temptation to once again promote 
and legitimize the “strong-man approach” and a new dictatorship. As the 
only remaining superpower the United States should seize this opportunity 
to support the establishment of strong democratic institutions and credible 
leaders, who have proven their resolute and sincere commitment to the 
democratic ideal”. (Tshisekedi, 2001)
Campbell (2002) underlined the influence that the US (and also Belgium and France) 
had in disregarding non-armed participants and avoiding a return to “the people- 
owned National Sovereign Conference”. Most importantly, according to Lemarchand 
(1998), the Americans were naive to focus on new leaders and believe in their 
democratic potential. Indeed, J. Kabila extracted a very important concession: he 
participated in the ICD as the Government o f the DRC, a category that differentiated 
his party from the others, maintained and strengthened his power, and reinforced his 
legitimacy as the Congolese head of state37.
2.3. The overwhelming importance of elections, impossible EU neutrality
The third important aspect in brokering the transition was that the United States and
the European Union coincided in an approach that emphasized the elections. This 
was especially the case from 2003 on, when a transition period of two years was 
agreed (the elections were finally delayed to 2006). The American and European 
input for the elections was felt early in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, which included 
a series of non-governmental experts on the American side, notably the National 
Democratic Institute and IFES (International Foundation for Election Systems) 
(Bouvier & Bomboko, 2004, p. 121). The EU appointed an official Electoral Unit, 
mostly with personnel seconded by MS and they would all cooperate with the United 
Nations to prepare the process, together with the Congolese Independent Electoral 
Commission (IEC). The IEC was by far the most important (and best endowed) of
37 The ICD, facilitated by ex-president from Botswana K. Masire, included the following delegations: 
the Government, the MLC, the RCD-Goma, the RCD-ML and the Mai-mai (all with armed forces 
behind them), plus the “civil society-live forces” and the “non-armed political opposition”. Grignon 
has also criticized that the ICD “froze time”, in the sense that the participants included at the table 
then remained relevant years later, when they had lost power de facto (Nest, Grignon, & Kisangani, 
2006).
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the transition institutions created in the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement of 
December 200238.
One of the problems on the ground was that the focus on elections was 
perceived as an exit-strategy of the international community, while the IEC and 
many Congolese in the provinces realized that the electoral process could help build 
the state and strengthen Congolese national-feelings and democratic allegiance 
deeply and in the long-run, thus requested more time and investment. For example, 
when the IEC considered it needed to redo the voters’ lists with stricter criteria, 
Western officials insisted that they use the old lists and simply attach addendums in 
order to stick to the election deadline. However, in the failed-state DRC, displaced 
populations and unreachable towns posed logistical problems that needed time and 
funds. The country also has a few hundred thousand voyageurs i.e. people who travel 
intermittently from region to region within the country because of business (notably 
using the river, stopping, buying and selling here and there) and had been registered 
on one list. But if they claimed they were voyageurs and had voter cards, on election- 
day they were often allowed to vote wherever they were instead of their original list. 
This was not only irregular, it led to fraud and violence as individuals were 
encouraged to vote several times.
At EU-level, there were some nuances. Many practitioners deployed in the 
Congo did not necessarily agree with those in charge, and turf-wars abounded in 
Brussels and among MS. For example, EU delegate De Filippi (in Kinshasa) 
criticized the extreme focus on the presidential elections, while Commissioner Louis 
Michel was determined to get them through as soon as possible (Willame, 2007, p. 
171). In general, Louis Michel addressed the Congo as a political, strategic issue for 
the EU, and this annoyed the theoretically neutral, development oriented EuropeAid 
personnel, civil servants at DG Development, and opened conflict with the 
humanitarian branch ECHO.
In sum, “rushing” the elections came to be perceived as a way to put a stamp 
on Joseph Kabila’s presidency. Kabila dominated the (limited) civil apparatus in the 
Congo, financed his campaign illegally, and controlled state-media. Thus, other 
candidates’ sympathizers and many Congolese perceived that the electoral process
38 These institutions were supposed to represent civil society (known as “the live forces” in the 
Congo), and their presidents had a ministerial rank. The other four institutions were the National 
Watchdog on Human Rights, the High Authority of the Media, the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, and the Commission on Ethics and against Corruption.
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was a masquerade wanted and financed by the international community, notably the 
EU, and opposed the intervention.
Another important, related problem came with the organization of Electoral 
Observation Missions, where the European Union mission could not prevent being 
perceived as not-neutral because of the EU’s overall involvement in the process39. As 
usual, the US approach consisted in delegating election monitoring and observation 
mainly to 1EES and the Carter Center. In the Congo, both worked with grants mainly 
from USAID, though they would not identify themselves with an “American” 
approach40. In any case, the US administration did not deploy any official/public 
electoral assistance mission. In contrast, but also as usual, there was a EU 
observation mission. Officially, these missions are independent from the EU and the 
Member States, too; they are free to organize their logistics and are not answerable to 
any EU body. They also insist on more “neutral”, strictly observing positions 
compared to other actors: for instance EU observers had to refrain from helping to 
count votes or any other administrative tasks, while 1EES observers could assist if 
they were invited to. However, the context had forged an image of EU 
interventionism, and even the observation mission became important in local politics: 
its head, the MEP ex-General Morillon (from France) became an important character 
in Kinshasa and appeared in the news. EU observers deployed in provinces or cities 
(including Kinshasa) where Kabila was not the favorite candidate were accused of 
favoritism and were sometimes threatened by the local population.
3. Fostering security as a pre-condition to democracy ...amidst 
Realist calculations
Together with brokering the transition process, a key objective in the international
democracy promotion was to foster security. This section is devoted to the security 
operations that characterized the intervention in the Congo, notably the United 
Nations mission MONUC and the EU operations Artemis and EUFOR, and discusses 
the American and European positions and roles. The operations were framed under
39 This information is based on my own experience with an EU short-term observation mission in 
Equator.
40 Interview with head of The Carter Center electoral observation mission, Kinshasa 3 November 
2006.
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Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter, which legalize intervention and the use of 
force for the sake of international peace -not for democracy. However, both 
Europeans and Americans were reluctant to intervene in the Congolese regional 
wars, highlighting that the Democratic Peace motivation only applied when there is 
an actual risk to Western security. Indeed, the will to intervene with significant 
strength only materialized within the post-9/11 context of the War on Terror 
(Lanotte, 2003), though this also reinforced the premise that peace was a necessary 
precondition for democracy.
Two explanations seem relevant for the Western security intervention in the 
Congo. On the one hand, the virtuous circle of democracy promotion established 
links between state-security and democracy. Peace was a first stage towards the goal 
of democracy, for armed intra-state conflict was simply incompatible with 
democracy. In addition, democracy was also a means to manage and end conflict. 
Hence, democracy promotion becomes a goal but also a means to stop the war and 
achieve a new system, an element of peace-making and peace-building (de Zeeuw & 
Kumar, 2006, pp. 3, 14). The international community adopted this rationale instead 
of the opposite hypothesis: that transitions involve instability and crisis, and 
democratization may actually involve a danger of war, as defended by Mansfield and 
Snyder (1995). This hypothesis had however some credibility in the context of 
regional humanitarian crisis and the convoluted peace-process, so the strategy was 
not straightforward. On the other hand, Realist calculations by the different 
international actors (American and European) underpinned the security operations 
linked with democracy promotion. The two arguments help explain the MONUC 
operation and the American involvement (Section 1) the EU security-operations 
(Section 2).
3.1. Security and MONUC: elections as a condition for American 
involvement
As I depicted above, the late-1990s crisis in the Congo was a security crisis with 
domestic and international causes: different armed parties fed on the rich Congolese 
mines and abused the populations in a spiral of violence (Turner, 2007). MONUC 
was created in 1999 and has since been on the spot for criticism: non-intervention, 
intervention but “too little too late”, accusations of inaction and even scandals about
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sexual abuse committed by its troops. Yet it also became the most important 
peacekeeping operation in UN history, with a USD 1 billion/year budget and 17,000 
personnel, and a key actor in the Congolese transition process present on the ground 
at least until December 2009 (Altwooll, 2005; Ginifer, 2002). The United Nations 
Secretary General and the General Assembly had identified the need for international 
humanitarian and security intervention early on, but as with any peace operation, the 
Security Council was the body responsible for decision and as often it moved very 
slowly (Vircoulon, 2006). American support was necessary here and this involved, 
among others, that democracy and security were connected. Great-power politics in 
the Security Council played a role, and the understaffed and overstretched 
Department of Peace-keeping operations (DPKO) in New York also played the 
“virtuous circle” card.
It was soon obvious that the first MONUC deployment of 500 observers would 
be powerless, and the shadow of the Rwandan genocide led the international 
community to build up intervention and send troops in increasing numbers. The US 
was the main contributor to MONUC (about 1/3), followed by Japan and Germany. 
For example, it contributed USD 74 million in 2001, USD 83,5 million in 2002, and 
there was a request of USD 273,2 million for 2003 in view of the aggravating 
conditions41. It was thus key to raise support from democracy promoters in the 
international community, and it is them and especially the US (rather than DPKO) 
who emphasized the political solutions to the Congolese conflict.
On the one side there was the above-mentioned rationale where transition plans 
became part of the new interventionism. In the Congo, democracy was increasingly 
considered an integral part of international conflict resolution, and the country 
became a lab-test of the new conceptions of security and peace-keeping, following 
the cases of East Timor and Cambodia (Berdal & Economides, 2007; Reilly, 2004)42. 
On the other side there were the domestic considerations regarding American 
international intervention. After the disastrous Somalia experience, Clinton issued 
the Presidential Directive 25, which would shape any future UN-deployment. The 
Directive outlined that support would be limited to “the right peace operations”,
41 Source: U.S. Department of State, “Account Tables,” at www.state.gOv/m/rm/rls/iab/2003/7809.htm 
(March 14, 2005); U.S. Notice that the US commitment was limited to financing and did not include 
providing troops, a usual matter in the international politics of UN peacekeeping operations.
2 These cases also underlined the elections as heart of the political process and the exit-oriented 
strategy.
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which needed clear definition and most importantly, had to be linked to concrete 
political solutions and not an open-ended commitment. Literally, the Directive 
imposed that “each UN peace operation should have a specified timeframe tied to 
intermediate or final objectives [and] an integrated political/military strategy...” 
(Clinton, 1994). The role of Congress was also formalized and strengthened with the 
Directive. Significantly, this led to new Congress laws establishing preconditions for 
US support of peacekeeping operations, and binding the executive’s actions to the 
operations’ political viability, explicitly mentioning democracy and a timetable for 
disengagement (Hesse, 2005). This led the MONUC mandate and the international 
intervention to become much more “democracy promotion” de facto.
As MONUC was discussed and eventually upgraded in 2000, the international 
community took as reference the Lusaka Agreement (which already contained 
democracy-provisions), even though the cease-fire was constantly violated and this 
discredited the agreement in the eyes of those still fighting the war (Laurent Kabila’s 
included). MONUC’s mandate included 4 phases in 2000.
Box 7. Monuc ’s mandate includes the transition as a “fourth phase ” in 2000
MONUC’s mandate43:
1- Forcibly implement the ceasefire agreement
2- Monitor and report violations of the agreement through the proper channels
3- Support the process of DDRRR (disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, 
resettlement and reintegration)
4- Facilitate the transition towards the organization o f credible elections
Source: MONUC official website [http://www.monuc.org/Home.aspx?lang=en]
In the field and on the side of MONUC/ DPKO, security was the imperative and 
elections just a necessary aspect in the diplomatic bargaining. Hence, the United 
Nations DPKO partly instrumentalized the democracy promotion argument so that 
MONUC would have American support for a mandate and for increased troops. Even 
this way, it took more than two years for this mandate and the deployment to become 
effective.
43 My emphasis. Notice the provision 1 “forcibly implementing” leads to a Chapter VH-framework 
authorizing the use of force by blue helmets. Monuc’s mandate also included “to protect civilians 
under imminent threat of physical violence”, with clear reference to the concept of human security.
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At the level of diplomatic negotiations, democracy-bargaining was part of 
DPKO policy-making. As the risk of a humanitarian crisis was rising dangerously in 
2002-2003, the DPKO got serious alarms from the International Emergency Military 
Force already deployed in Ituri. For those on the ground and for DPKO, the crisis 
concerned local security challenges (different local factions and intervention from 
Uganda, exploitation of resources, ethnic massacres) that were not necessarily linked 
to the national process of political transition. Yet as they wanted to boost the 
MONUC mission in Eastern Congo, Jean-Marie Gehenno (head of DPKO) and Meg 
Carey (head of the DPKO Africa division) invoked the democracy-argument for the 
fund-providers. This argument especially targeted the United States. In a public 
interview, Meg Carey acknowledged: “my job was to convince the Security Council 
of investing in Ituri [...] but the US saw this as a kind of Somalia [...] Our job was to 
convince the US that there was a viable plan, that there was a political process” 
(Crown, 2004).
There was a gap between the virtuous circle and the reality in the field, it meant 
that “democracy promotion” was an argument in the bargaining though the 
imperative seemed peace, and there was no strategy (or not a carefully crafted one) to 
make the political transition work. With MONUC, the international intervention 
established the connection to the Congolese political process but its ability to deal 
with the conflict was still limited (Boshoff, 2003). Eventually, the Ituri crisis led to 
the EU operation Artemis in support of MONUC.
3.2. Artemis as an exhibition of French/ European international military
force
The EU Operation Artemis supported MONUC in Northern East-Congo at a critical 
time, proving the international community’s engagement and military efficiency 
within its limited mandate44. However, Artemis was actually never framed as 
“democracy promotion” but as a defense/security operation. This showed that the EU 
did not automatically endorse a link between peace and democracy promotion. In 
addition, I argue, Artemis can be explained as part of a Realist strategy of 
international power-projection for France but also for the EU. In policy-circles in 
both, it was important to establish the EU capability to pursue international military
44 Artemis was an exceptional three-month engagement in the summer of 2003 and had clear 
geographical limits around the capital-city of Ituri, Bunia.
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operations, earning credibility in third countries and most importantly vis-a-vis the 
United States. This meant that the EU would not automatically reject international 
interventions that were clearly not instances of civilian or normative power. 
Moreover, its international clout was enhanced through these, creating a paradox 
with the civilian, democracy promotion universalism.
With MONUC, the US had accepted a resort to UN multilateralism in the 
case of Congo (though it never envisaged its own military action or contributing 
troops), and introduced democracy promotion into the international mandate. By 
contrast, Artemis’ mandate strictly concerned crisis management and ceasefire 
implementation, with the EU as a “military-arm” enforcing UN decisions. Certainly, 
it was not a EU-plan to develop its democratization strategy; the intervention was 
based on humanitarian and security grounds (to stop ethnic mass slaughter). There 
was no mention of democracy in the legislation that framed the operation, a Common 
Action (Council of the European Union, 2003a). This illustrates how the 
securitization of democracy promotion at EU level has often been timid in the realm 
of CFSP, compared with the American rhetoric of intervention. This also matches the 
EU rhetoric that does not contemplate military tools as a means to promote 
democracy; distancing the EU from the premise of a virtuous circle between security 
and transition. The EU position was thus more nuanced in this regard, and in contrast 
with the leverage that democracy-arguments had in the US.
Artemis (summer 2003) was also an opportunity for EU international action; it 
must be understood in the context of the transatlantic drift over the US-led 
intervention in Iraq (2002-2003) and the internal EU divisions over this issue 
(notably France opposed to the US). In addition, significant advances had been 
taking place regarding European Security and Defence Policy [cf. Chapter 2]. 
Elements of both transatlantic cooperation and confrontation were in sight. In this 
operation, France showed cooperation in the UN framework and its ability to deploy 
and finance troops in successful missions. Though this did not make up for France’s 
boycott of the US demands in the Security Council over the intervention in Iraq, it 
introduced an element of transatlantic cooperation “as usual” regarding common 
interests in third places. At the same time, it was an instance of great-power 
confrontation and UN great-power politics. For instance, France insisted on having a 
specific Resolution (SC 1484) to back the EU operation Artemis, hinting that 
resolutions should be preconditions to intervene and indirectly condemning the US-
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led invasion of Iraq. According to UN staff and French diplomats, this gave France 
an opportunity to show international leadership in practice (including military 
action), endorse multilateralism, and also to somewhat redress its role in the region, 
after having supported Mobutu and Rwanda’s hutu-regime45. For this reason, some 
concluded Artemis was “a French operation under EU cover”, for it provided the 
most troops and funds.
Nevertheless Operation Artemis was also meaningful at the level of the EU, 
strengthening ESDP and the EU international clout with the first operation outside 
Europe; France was the military Framework Nation but there was an important 
British contingent. Arguably, the Iraq crisis also pushed Europe to deal with internal 
divisions and show cooperation in reaction, for instance with the creation of the 
Rapid Reaction Force, Solana’s Security Strategy and the 2003 Franco-British 
summit declaration (Ulriksen, Gourlay, & Mace, 2004). Along these lines, the Congo 
was an important precedent in ESDP, and Africa may have been serving as 
laboratory for EU operations more generally, helping it earn recognition as an 
international actor (Youngs, 2004). Indeed, in 1996-7, Europeans had already 
contemplated the participation of the Western European Union to help implement 
Security Council resolutions against the massacres in the East of the Congo. The EU 
considered Artemis met its own military goals satisfactorily (Western European 
Union, 2006), but NGOs criticized that it was unfortunately too limited (International 
Crisis Group, 2006), as if they and the Congolese population were expecting more of 
the EU.
Importantly, the principles of multilateralism and the connection to UN 
mandates were always underlined in the development of EU defense plans (Chivvis, 
2007; Giegerich & Wallace, 2004). These plans also happened in an independent 
policy-making realm that was relatively ad-hoc, isolated from the Commission 
(which was consulted) Development and even from other Council policies such as 
the Political Dialogue. Within the EU, only Denmark clearly opted out of Artemis46, 
but the operation counted on the participation of third countries such as Canada and 
Brazil. These aspects illustrate the somewhat inconsistent trends of Europeans
45 Public interview with head of DPKO Gehenno (Crown, 2004) and interview with French official, 
Paris, 7 July 2006.
46 Dennmark’s exclusion of defense-related policies draws back to this country’s safeguard clauses in 
the Treaty of Maastricht.
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actively defending broad multilateralism in IR but at the same time building up a 
significant role for the EU as an international actor of its own.
Even though there was no official EU declaration in this regard and arguably 
no clear intention, Artemis was key in the process of democracy promotion in the 
Congo because it showed the international community was ready to intervene. It 
stabilized Bunia and fostered security as preconditions for the ongoing dialog, and 
sent Uganda and some warlords clear signals that the internationals would try to 
prevent them from spoiling the process. Importantly, it transformed the EU role on 
the ground from fimd-provider and negotiator to a military intervener with capability 
to impose force, and this challenged the ideas of EU as “soft power” (versus the US 
as hard power) and as “civilian” power. This new EU role was reinforced with the 
second EU security operation, EUFOR-RD Congo, in the 200647.
EUFOR-RD Congo was a second Rapid Reaction Force of about 2,000 troops 
deployed in Kinshasa in the summer-fall of 2006 (one battalion was on call in 
Gabon), but this time the link with the transition process was clearer because its 
objective was to enhance security during and after the Congolese presidential 
elections. Again, the operation was a response to UN demands and was framed under 
a Security Council resolution (1671) (M. Martin, 2007). Though the operation was 
criticized as “cosmetic” by some in Europe (Haine & Giegerich, 2006), all 
peacekeeping operations of this kind have logistical limitations and it is beyond 
doubt that EUFOR conveyed the image of a powerful EU in Kinshasa, notably 
solving one of the worst crisis in August 2006. As the EU defended the main 
opposition party (Bemba’s) against a governmental attack by Kabila’s army, it 
earned credibility for not simply supporting Kabila, but also for its military 
efficiency48. EUFOR enhanced the EU as a unified actor, for though the French still 
played an important role, this time Germany was the Framework Nation, and the
47 Two other EU operations in the Congo were also military-oriented addressed security-aspects of the 
transition process: EUPOL (Congolese police training) and the larger EUSEC (operation to restructure 
the Congolese security sector reform).
48 After the first round of the presidential elections (30 July), J. Kabila was not satisfied with his party 
results (less than 50% when he had expected to be elected), meaning that a run-off against J.P. Bemba 
would have to take place. On August 21, Kabila’s governmental troops attacked Bemba’s residence at 
a time when the latter was hosting a meeting of CIAT members to consider the situation and the 
organization of the new round of elections. EUFOR intervened to safeguard Bemba, evacuate CIAT 
members, and avoid further conflict.
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Polish and Spanish contingents were significant (Dumont, Bergeron, & Nommay,
2006)49.
In addition, EUFOR defined itself “vis-a-vis” the US. For example, the mission 
Fact-sheet indirectly hinted at American disengagement:
“The case of the Democratic Republic of Congo shows how a variety of EU 
missions have helped the UN to stabilize the situation and to support the 
transition process to a political settlement [...]. More generally, EUFOR- 
RD Congo illustrates the importance attached by the EU including through 
ESDP to Africa [...]. It also demonstrates EU’s readiness and ability to 
support UN actions” (EU Council Secretariat, 2006).
In this sense, it can be considered an interesting example of what Michael Smith 
(2004) considered as “institutionalization of difference” regarding power margins 
and discourses of power in transatlantic relations. Instead of starting off from a 
premise of common values and cooperation, the assumption was that the EU is 
different and its action has value-added vis-a-vis the US (here, Africa and the UN are 
important for the EU).
4. Enforcing reform: the International Committee to Accompany the 
Transition (CIAT)
A third objective of international democracy promotion in the Congo was to ensure
that the agreements and reform process really took place, and this led the United 
States and the European Union to “enforce democracy”. This section focuses on the 
committee that the international community introduced in this regard, the CIAT, 
active from June 2003 through December 2006. The CIAT often met in secret and 
involved backstage negotiations among diplomats50. I did not find evidence neither 
of US-EU especial cooperation nor confrontation within the CIAT, but I found they 
were definitely the most important actors in it, together with MONUC. This was 
illustrated, at an individual level, by the roles of William Swing and Louis Michel,
49 A Realist explanation of Germany’s leadership of EUFOR is sometimes invoked with the fact that 
Germany was at the time seeking a seat in the Security Council and that one o f the arguments against 
its candidacy is that Germany does not participate actively in UN peace operations.
50 This research is based on the CIAT’s official communiques and declarations and on information I 
gathered from local press articles (notably Le Potentiel) and on interviews. A number of these 
documents have been made available by a Swiss-financed Documentation Center on the Great Lakes 
region, see http://www.grandslacs.net.
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who were portrayed as the international community’s “peacemakers” (Willame, 
2007). The former had been American ambassador in the Congo and was at the time 
head of the MONUC: this and the constant liaison between Swing and the American 
ambassador underline the role of the US. Michel had been Belgian Foreign Minister 
(1999-2004) and had declared his will to bring Africa back to the agenda, and as EU 
Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid he came to dominate the EU 
position.
I argue here that the US and the EU monitored the transitional government 
and the reform process through the CIAT, an opaque and understudied factor in the 
DR Congo. The CIAT focused on the elites to lead the political process and was 
disconnected from the civil population (funds for civil society were also mobilized, 
but it was very difficult to allocate and audit this). The transition “enforcement” 
happened through the design and imposition of this international authority, whose 
details I discuss first. Secondly, I argue this implied a dynamic of bargaining with the 
Congolese who had been co-opted in the process, and of empowering (even if 
indirectly) Kabila, i.e. “Kabila-state building”.
4.1. Designing the international authority -the Global and all-inclusive 
Agreement (GIA)
As Laurent and then Joseph Kabila arrived in power, the Congo was not pacified and 
negotiations continued under the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (2001-3) and with side 
agreements between the strongest parties (Kabila’s and the MLC’s leader, Jean- 
Pierre Bemba) where the international community played a key role. In December 
2002, this process led to the Global and all-inclusive Agreement (GIA) signed in 
Pretoria -including this time more armed and non-armed factions, and hosted by 
African leaders (Mb web we K., 2005). African and Western leaders were involved in 
these important negotiations (they led to the Transitional Government), and acted as 
brokers and guarantors, for instance South African President Thabo Mbeki, and 
former Botswana President K. Masire (in the ICD). The literature has emphasized 
Mbeki’s role (Landsberg, 2002), but US ambassadors seemingly had the most 
important leverage. On its side, the European Union also undertook a “hyperactive 
diplomacy”, financing the negotiations as part of a Political Dialogue, and issuing as 
many as 9 Declarations on the Great Lakes by the Presidencies in 2002 (Guerrero,
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2007). However, for some witnesses the role of the EU as mediator was less critical, 
even though Ajello followed the negotiations very closely51.
Most significantly, the US and EU influence did not only happen backstage 
and off-the-record, nor remained declaratory. The GIA intended a ceasefire, but it 
focused on the democratic transition adopting as main titles: I “End of hostilities”, II 
“Objectives of the transition”, HI “Principles of the transition”, IV and V “Length” 
and “Institutions of the transition” ("Accord global et inclusif sur la transition en 
Republique Democratique du Congo, Pretoria 2002 -published by CEDAC," 2003)52. 
In addition, the GIA actually foresaw the creation of a committee that came to have 
extremely important power during the transition process, the International 
Committee to Accompany the Transition (CIAT). Notably, the CIAT was in charge 
of three key tasks: guarantor of the implementation of the agreement, security- 
provider, and arbitrator/judge in case of conflict. The role of international 
democracy promoters was thus defined in an appendix.
Box 8. The Global and all-inclusive Agreement foresees creation and tasks o f the 
CIAT
“Appendix IV: International guarantee
1) There will be an International Committee (IC) that will guarantee the good 
implementation of the present Agreement and support the DRC transition program 
( . . . )
2) The IC will provide for active support in the securitization of the institutions 
derived from the Inter-Congolese Dialog and (...) of the Lusaka Agreement (...)
3) The IC will arbitrate and decide any disagreement among the parties of this 
Agreement”
Source: Global and Inclusive Agreement
The GIA did not specify who in the international community would be part of this 
committee, and this was defined ad hoc as a result of diplomatic negotiations. 
According to its own documents, the CIAT (2006) included the following members, 
the permanent members of the UN Security Council (P-5) i.e. USA, UK, France, 
China, Russia; Belgium and Canada; the European Union and the African Union 
(represented by both the Commission and the Presidency), the governments of the 
so-called African “friend-countries” South Africa, Angola, Gabon and Zambia, and
51 Interviews with consultant (UNDP) in Paris 10 December 2007 and 20 February 2008 and with 
head of NGO (UNDP, DFID projects) in Kinshasa 22 October 2006.
52 My translation, idem for the paragraphs in Box 8.
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the MONUC (often represented by W. Swing). This forum illustrates that all major 
geopolitical actors and DRC-neighbors were included, but some of the main financial 
contributors to MONUC e.g. Germany and Japan did not sit at this decision-making 
and advisory table. P-5 countries were often represented by ambassadors, but the 
Chinese and Russian envoyees seemingly adopted a low profile.
The CIAT had no official mandate but it basically decided on the pace and 
funds (allocations and distribution) concerning the national army’s reconstruction 
and the electoral process, which became the two pillars of the transition . Though 
the negotiations happened backstage, the CIAT delivered Communiques and 
Declarations that could be understood -and that was the case in the Congo—as “the 
international community’s position”. Sometimes the CIAT congratulated and 
expressed satisfaction with the trends; sometimes it criticized events and exhorted the 
Congolese actors to behave54. For instance, during the electoral periods of 2005 and 
2006, it welcomed the organization of elections and the participation of the 
Congolese voters, and exhorted the candidates to have clean and fair campaigns 
(CIAT, 2006)55. CIAT members regularly visited cities and sites to “check” the 
implementation of the programs and, in general, to display support for the transition. 
This way, William Swing, Javier Solana, prime ministers (e.g. Belgium), 
ambassadors, and other officials often traveled within the country to Bukavu, Bunia, 
Kisangani and this made for headline news that integrated them as key actors in 
Congolese affairs. Some NGOs found this international leadership diffuse, weak, 
narrow, and insufficient to exert real pressure (International Crisis Group, 2007).
However, though it is true that the Congo was not like Bosnia or East Timor 
and there was no status of international protectorate or a supreme international 
authority for the executive or legislative, the CIAT clearly guaranteed the continuity 
of the process. It exerted effective pressure on Congolese actors in the Transitional 
Government and other bodies in a sort of bargaining where the Congolese denounced 
intervention in domestic affairs, and the internationals often felt that they cared more 
about democratization than the Congolese. This bargaining was part of the dynamics 
in the Congo, and one of the challenges for democracy promoters and overall for the 
transition process.
53 One explanation for this logic is that these were financed by the international community.
54 Though the language used in these documents is careful, their own existence and the rhetoric define 
the international community as tutor/evaluator, and could be criticized as neocolonial.
55 These documents had a significant echo in the local press.
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4.2. Bargaining with Congolese incumbents and empowering Kabila
The Global and all-inclusive Agreement also created “transition institutions” notably
a Transitional Government, and in so doing, it granted legality and legitimacy to 
those in power. Most Congolese actors seized this opportunity to remain within the 
political transition process56. This way, on 20 June 2003 they were able to secure part 
of the power-pie in a large and compound Government that appointed no less than 36 
ministers and 25 vice-ministers! This kind of “solution” has existed in other African 
democratization processes, including the reconciliation government in Kenya after 
the January 2008 post-electoral violence (about 90 ministerial positions) though it 
can hardly be considered efficient.
Within the Transitional Government, he maximum authority laid with those in 
the “1+4 formula” also called the “Presidential Space”: four factions earned first- 
class decision-making power as Vice-presidents, and Joseph Kabila earned the lion’s 
share as the one President57. The GIA became a window of opportunity that only a 
few boycotted either because they weren’t happy with Kabila’s legitimized power 
(Tshisekedi) or because they estimated their power had not been sufficiently 
rewarded (some armed groups in the East). In the negotiations for the Transitional 
Government, only when the US declared its support for this 1+4 formula did the 
agreement come through. However the proposal came from Congolese teams: 
according to a highly-positioned participant in these negotiations, Kabila’s team 
lobbied and convinced the American delegation headed by US National Security 
Advisor Condoleeza Rice that this was a good solution58.
Similar bargaining became the norm between the CIAT and the Transitional 
Government in those years of the transition. The CIAT usually had weekly meetings 
to assess the situation and theoretically met with President Kabila once a month (this
56 By “Congolese” actors I refer broadly to all the parties in the DRC that were militarily fighting each 
other and were coopted in the political process. I make this point because nationalism and identity 
were important factors in the conflict, e.g. some of the factions were accused of being Rwandan and 
not Congolese. These factors are excluded from my analysis.
57 The four vice-presidents were one from previous government (Ndombasi), two of the main rebel 
groups (Bemba from MLC-Mouvement de Liberation du Congo and Ruberwa from RCD-Goma 
Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratic) and one from the unarmed political opposition 
(Ngoma).
58 Attributed to Evariste Boshabe, Kabila’s Chief of Staff at the time, elected member (kasai) in the 
majority party of the National Assembly [interview with Consultant (UNDP), Paris 10 December 
2007]. This was an example of how Congolese actors would often boast about how they got the US 
and EU to do what they wanted and had planned, and not the opposite.
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seemingly happened less regularly). The CIAT also met with the 1+4 “Presidential 
Space” to discuss policies and the state of affairs. For example, in November 2005 
the CIAT attempted to control corruption and denounced that the state authorities 
weren’t channeling food and salaries to the national military groups (CIAT, 2005). 
Indeed, international stakeholders were providing the funds (USD 8 million /month) 
for a massive and expensive program of disarmament and army reintegration, but 
Congolese officials at all levels and from all parties were diverting money and goods. 
Because of the lack of unity between the factions and the weak economic structure, 
each of the armed parties (members of the Transitional Government) was in charge 
of its own staff and payments. In this case, all pretended to have more troops than 
they did just to claim more money, and then diverted most of this salary-money, 
which made the troops (deployed mostly in the East) intermittently revolt and attack 
civilians (International Crisis Group, 2007). The international effort to create an 
integrated Congolese army thus faced (and continues to face) amazing practical 
difficulties because of the generalized corruption that is intrinsic to civil/state 
structures and the absence of non-armed, long-term alternatives (Tshiyembe, 2005)59.
There was constant bargaining between the international and domestic 
authorities, as incumbents jockeyed for power and against each other while the CIAT 
denounced their hidden agendas and exhorted them to “care for the general good of 
the Congo and its people” (CIAT, 2005). This way, incumbents in the ministerial 
branches tried to avoid the pressure actively or passively: new budgets weren’t 
approved (as they meant money would change hands), bills weren’t discussed (for 
instance new laws on decentralization that shifted power away to the provinces), and 
tax-declarations ignored (for instance on government members’ assets). They had 
power to shift decisions and often threatened to spoil the process, while the CIAT 
tried to maintain the Transitional Government in place, which showed the weight of 
the external factors in this process.
Now and then, Kabila’s opponents tried to cancel the whole Government 
agreement, and CIAT leaders prevented it. For instance, in the summer of 2004 there 
were new massacres in Bukavu and Makumba (Eastern Congo) and a group of RCD-
59 Military restructuring became central to the international strategy, which for instance devoted USD 
30 million for the Ministry of Defense and only USD 2 million to the Ministry o f Justice in 2005. The 
official, widespread corruption and the informal economy (Willame estimated that the DRC Central 
Bank worked with only 14% of the money in the country) led the international community to use non­
state actors to distribute allocations to lower-ranking officials in the provinces.
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Goma dissidents rebelled, leading vice-president Ruberwa (RCD-Goma) to quit the 
Kinshasa Government. Thabo Mbeki seemingly flew to Bukavu to bring him back as 
the whole transition would have been jeopardized if the governmental agreement had 
collapsed. Similarly, in January 2005 Bemba had to be convinced to remain in the 
1+4 though he opposed Kabila’s changes in some ministerial positions. The CIAT, as 
the international community overall, came to be seen as biased as this bargaining 
arguably reinforced Kabila as state authority and gave the provisional President an 
advantageous position to be elected. Though there was never formal support, EU 
Commissioner Louis Michel was quoted declaring “Kabila is the DRC’s 
opportunity”, and people disliked MONUC in the parts of the country held by Kabila 
opponents60.
This bargaining also put the CIAT as interlocutor vis-a-vis the broader 
international community, which was financing the policies and supporting the 
transition in front of financial institutions. For instance, the FMI was very critical of 
the expenses allowed for the elites in the Transitional Government. The CIAT 
became a watchdog that was clearly appreciated in the West but only forcefully 
tolerated by the elites in the DRC, illustrating the paradoxes and trade-offs intrinsic 
to democracy promotion. By 2006 most Congolese authorities criticized it, especially 
the President, who denounced that some were “behaving as conquistadores”. In the 
name of national sovereignty, Kabila refused the proposal (from Belgium and Kofi 
Annan) to create a Group of Friends of Good Governance61. By the time he had won 
the Presidential election, Kabila declared to the press:
“From now on we will insist on bilateral cooperation between the Congo 
and other countries. There is no question of having a structure above us all. 
I am determined to take things in my hands, to retake 100% control, and 
the CIAT will not stop me...” (Braeckman, 2006)
By contrast, Western donors started to worry about the future, as illustrated by this 
UK MP intervention in the House of Commons (Judy Mallaber):
60 Kabila dominated the media and was not a fair player (Dumont et al., 2006; Monsa, 2005); I 
witnessed some of these accusations/aggressions to international staff as I was in UN vehicles or with 
EU personnel.
61 Source: Special report of the Secretary General on the DRC elections S/2005/309. In the Security 
Council, Russia, China and Tanzania opposed the proposal.
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“My question is whether we will ensure that there will be a post-CIAT 
mechanism for donor countries. [...] President Kabila may not like it—he 
would like to have the aid without the pressure—but even though we do not 
wish to interfere in how the country is run or carry on in an imperialist way, if 
we are putting in money, resources and assistance, we have a responsibility to 
ensure proper governance, and that requires some mechanism for donor 
countries to be able to work with the country, the institutions and civil 
society” (Mallaber, 2007).
The CIAT illustrated that both the US and the EU privileged short-term, elite-led 
democracy promotion. The Congolese people enthusiastically participated in the 
electoral process yet they also remained skeptical, and not without reason, that the 
transition process might change their lives very little in the end.
Conclusion
The Congolese transition process illustrates the political challenges and limitations of 
international democracy promotion on the ground, as well as the drift and rift in 
transatlantic relations. This chapter has given evidence of the challenges that both the 
US and the EU faced on the ground; democracy promotion was an elusive practice. It 
has also documented the multiple agency in the US and the EU approaches, offering 
interesting hints on the argument of “rival universalisms”.
The DR Congo presented problems regarding peace and development, and also 
a very weak state were strongmen, predation and clientelism were stubbornly rooted 
in the political arena. The international policies focused on brokering the transition, 
providing security, and enforcing the agreements and decisions. In this, democracy 
promotion seemed short-term and excessively focused on the presidential elections 
(procedure). It also seemed to rely on the premise of a “virtuous circle” where all 
problems could be solved together; the link between security and democratization 
was understood not only as the former being a precondition for the latter, but as 
democratization itself being a means towards securitization. The policies mainly 
addressed political elites -trying to create and maintain a government—though later 
on democracy promotion sought to include the promotion of civil society. The 
approach was however inconclusive, as the Catholic Church and other political 
actors of the “live forces” took active part in the National Conference and in some
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peace Agreements, as they arguably constituted more stable societal structures than 
the state. Nevertheless, democracy promotion seemed to fail to integrate local and 
African dynamics; the universality of democracy was de facto reduced to a Western 
focus on elections and governmental elites.
This case study also illustrated the dynamics of technical emphasis on 
democracy promotion and the very challenge of “learning by doing”. This way, as 
legislation experts tried to create the “adequate” Constitution and electoral system 
they confronted the opposition of local political actors that bargained to maintain 
their privileges and spheres of influence. Similarly, though the EU electoral 
observation mission was conceived as a neutral, independent mission to support the 
process, on the ground this “technical” intervention could not be separated from the 
extremely political role that the EU seemed to be playing in many aspects of the 
transition process. Finally, the DRC has arguably been a lab-test for democracy 
promotion and conflict resolution, and the policy-makers and practitioners on the 
ground had to adapt their strategies to an ever-changing and extremely complex 
situation: they were “learning by doing”. In this, democracy promotion policies 
needed to be flexible, but the lack of consistent approaches and the assumption of the 
“virtuous circle” led to important trade-offs. For example, democracy promoters 
relied on civil society actors (notably Christian churches) to organize the elections 
and do civic education (among other), but this did not help install a strong and 
democratic state. Similarly, linking security and democracy has proven extremely 
difficult, and reconstituting a Congolese army seemed not only a technical but a very 
political challenge (as it could safeguard the incumbents’ preferences).
All these challenges emanating from the Congolese case show that democracy 
promotion is not clearly American, nor European, nor purely “international”. But the 
chapter has also helped to document and nuance the role of democracy promotion in 
American and European foreign policy. Many positions and policies were similar 
and the US and the EU were powerful actors on the “international community’s side” 
of promoters; yet there was no real, planned cooperation. Similarly, despite some 
elements of competition deriving from economic interests and notably leading 
France to defend its position as international power, there was no bitter confrontation 
between the US and the EU, who mostly drifted along. Nevertheless, the Congo-case 
also confirmed the new European role in global politics in cases connected to 
democracy promotion and peace, as the EU became the main financial source of the
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transition process and even undertook (limited) military intervention to support it. 
The argument of “rival universalisms” was thus corroborated.
However, the evidence on what positions and what policies the US and the EU 
were to adopt was nuanced, the case did not substantiate the elements described in 
Chapter 2 in a straight-forward way. First, the rhetoric was nuanced. EU High 
Representative for CFSP Javier Solana stated “acting together, the EU and the US 
can be a formidable source for good in the world”, while the American section on 
Africa foresaw “coordination with European allies and international institutions is 
essential for constructive conflict mediation and successful peace operations” (G. W. 
Bush, 2002; Solana, 2003a). This got the EU closer to the kind of “missionary” 
foreign policy usually attributed to the US, while the US stated a pro-multilateralism 
that most analysts would attribute to the EU.
Importantly, the United States maintained a high political influence in the DRC 
despite a minimized investment and a very low ranking of the Congo-case in the 
foreign policy agenda, and this illustrated the weight of American leadership in 
contemporary IR. Regarding policy-dynamics, there was Congressional influence 
and an independent traditional diplomacy on the ground, which gave ambassadors a 
high leverage. As rather generally with African policy and within the bipartisan 
consensus on democracy promotion, there was continuity between the Clinton and 
Bush administrations. This translated in policies undertaken by the long-established 
channels of USAID (project-financing) and cooperation with institutions as the party 
foundations, IFES, Freedom House, the Carter Center.
Despite this minimal engagement, the US had a major influence in important 
agreements. However, somewhat paradoxically, for all the democracy promotion 
rhetoric during the Clinton and Bush administrations, the Congo caught nothing 
similar to the attention devoted to the Iraq-case, the post-communist Ukraine and 
Georgia revolutions, or even Egypt’s mild liberalization. Despite non-negligible 
progress, a ground-breaking transition, and a record at least comparable to Iraq’s, the 
Congo was observed from a distance, and US leaders hardly “capitalized” on its 
democratization. The US was a clear democracy promoter, and a necessary party in 
the process, but the case illustrates that Africa still ranks geopolitically low in 
American foreign policy. This relative disinterest in the Congo-case (compared, for 
example to the emphasis given to the case of Iraq after 2003) reinforces the view that 
democracy promotion is used as an instrument in foreign policy and not as
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underlying goal (S. Smith, 2000). The US universalism exists, featuring the 
expansion of a liberal world order where the US is hegemonic, but democracy 
promotion policies still seemed connected to geopolitical interests.
By contrast, for the European Union, the Congo increasingly became a main 
endeavor in EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. Possibly, it will be considered 
a predecessor for defense and for more wide-ranging (even human security?) EU 
action in the world, with a significant level of coherence and using a multiplicity of 
tools. The EU invested enormously in the DRC transition: it financed the electoral 
process, safeguarded the transitional government with continuous negotiations 
among the parties, and manifested leadership with the presence of A. Ajello, L. 
Michel, J. Solana, and MEP P. Morillon. Moreover, it successfully launched the 
military operations Artemis and then EUFOR-DRC in 2006 to support MONUC.
Arguably, the EU made of the Congo a “test” for common foreign policy. 
Some countries, especially Belgium and France, played the most important roles in 
the political arena, while the UK’s DFID became the largest donor in more 
economic/good governance projects. This illustrates how the initiative of some states 
in a relatively uncontroversial issue can propel CFSP, but the policies do not emanate 
as “common” in Brussels centers. The Presidency of the European Council also 
proved to be an important driver of EU initiatives. As Allen (1996) argued, small 
states used it to build up EU leverage, e.g. Belgium in the second half of 2001 and 
the Netherlands in the second half of 2004.
Definitely, the case of Congo illustrated EU assertiveness in the international 
arena (Cox, 2005) and a transatlantic partnership that had no steam. Significantly, 
this happened in the field of democracy promotion, one of the values that bind the 
US and the EU together but which, as Wallace (2001, pp. 27-28) notices, is no longer 
just an exclusivity of the United States. The argument of “rival universalisms” was 
thus corroborated, but the chapter documented important nuances.
Despite the potential and capabilities to do so, the EU had difficulty in owning 
up to its international leadership, and in “boasting” its weight as democracy 
promoter. This case illustrated multiple-agency in European foreign policy, but the 
parallel channels and shifting policy-drivers precluded a long-term, overarching 
strategy. Nevertheless, the EU intervention as democracy promoter in the Congo was 
paramount, spoke clear words and had teeth, and it was acknowledged on the ground 
as such. This means that, despite the rhetoric of “normative power” or “benevolent
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partner”, deeds have been much louder, power rather hard, and Realist explanations 
still apply. The EU universalism existed, but is important to notice the inclusion of 
hard-power support of democracy promotion: the EU drifts away from the 
normative-, civilian- image that is at play in much of the rhetoric as an alternative 
and “rival” to the US.
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Chapter 5. American and European democracy promotion 
in the Middle East and North Africa: differentiated policies 
for an artificial region
“We are witnessing a growing desire for reform in the Middle East 
and welcome recent democratic developments” 
EU-US Summit Declaration (EU-US, 2005).
“We must make sure that the Greater Middle East Initiative and the Barcelona Process 
are complementary and mutually reinforcing” President o f the EU Commission (Barroso, 2005).
In the beginning of 2004, the United States announced plans to promote democracy 
in the Greater Middle East and North Africa (GMENA) region and intended to push 
this agenda on the occasion of the G8 summit it was hosting in Sea Island in the 
summer. Among the G8 partners, there were four European states (United 
Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy) and a EU representative (the president of the 
Commission) who were expected to support the American initiative, which would in 
turn become a Transatlantic / G8 multilateral endeavor. However, as the American 
plans for a GMENA were leaked to the press (Dar al-Hayat, 2004), the European 
Union actually joined Arab countries and journalists to criticize those documents’ 
“imposing tone” and “little realistic” approach (Baroudi, 2007; Crossick, 2004)\
Most importantly on the EU side, the American documents had not even 
mentioned the EU’s regional policy, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP): 
this is how many Europeans (MEPs, national and EU officials) realized that the EU 
policies were totally unknown to most American policy-makers . The Council 
issued a press release, clearly addressed to the US, emphasizing the cooperation 
existing in the EU approach, where partnership and democracy promotion had been 
on the agenda for almost a decade (Council of the European Union, 2004), and the
1 The GMENA document did not mention how to address the Arab-Israeli conflict, which in Arab 
and European spheres has been considered necessarily linked to any regional initiative.
2 Interviews with policy officials from the EU (Brussels 5 June 2007) and from the French and the 
Spanish foreign ministries [Paris 7 July 2006, and Barcelona 10 March 2006].
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EU think tank Euromed issued a report to be used as “background document” 
(Euromed, 2004).
These events could be downplayed to a diplomatic scrap but perfectly set the 
background for this chapter. As the quotes in the beginning of this chapter show, the 
US and the EU welcomed the hints for reform they optimistically perceived in the 
region and were concerned about cooperation, but it is uncertain that this actually 
materialized. This chapter discusses American and European democracy promotion 
towards the Middle East and North Africa, which was addressed as a region. In this 
way, the chapter gives evidence of how US and EU policies did not only address 
countries (as the Congo) but a whole region, when promoting democracy in post- 
Cold War IR.
At the starting point, this region was depicted as an “Other” in clear 
opposition to the West more or less explicitly: non-democratic or even “hostile” to 
democratization trends, and culturally “in contrast” (when not clearly opposed) to 
the West. Hence US and EU universalisms, with democracy promotion at their core, 
sought to overcome this “otherness”. Despite this common premise, I argue here 
that there were distinct policies emanating from the US and the EU, and there was 
no joint action. Indeed, the peculiarities of American and European substantiated the 
distinct universalisms, and a picture of rival approaches emerged. The US clearly 
scaled up its democracy promotion programs towards the MENA as part of its post- 
9/11 policies. The Bush administration arguably expected that Europe would follow 
the US along these lines, but the EU already had a regional policy based on 
reflexivity, long-term socialization and a language of partnership. Nevertheless, as 
in the Congo case, there were overarching objectives that the US and the EU 
seemed to have in common when promoting democracy in the MENA, and the 
challenges on the ground shaped the (rather unsatisfactory) results.
Section 1 discusses the American and European rhetoric and programs for the 
region, underlining some controversial positions. The chapter then focuses on the 
three main objectives of “regional democracy promotion” that both promoters 
pursued. The first objective was to overcome the cultural “Arab-Muslim exception”, 
discussed in Section 2. The second objective was to target the region (instead of the 
state) as democracy-setting according to domino theory (the US) and to 
socialization (the EU), discussed in Section 3. The third objective was to address 
security and economic interests, connected with democracy within a broader setting
193
(Section 4). These sections discuss the promoters’ premises and the challenges their 
plans confronted in the region, illustrating the trade-offs and limits to materialize 
democratization in the Middle East and North Africa. Finally, the chapter concludes 
with a discussion of how regional democracy promotion in the MENA case 
illustrates the EU’s distinct universalism and the transatlantic “drift and rift”.
1. American and European democracy promotion in the MENA 
region: forums with little future and long-term hut innocuous 
socialization
The MENA region has seemed almost immune to the trend of post-Cold War global 
democracy; if one compares Freedom House indexes for 1994 and 2008, the 
difference is minimal (Aliboni & Guazzone, 2004; L. Anderson, 2001; Freedom 
House, 2007). Nevertheless, there have been US and EU policies that intended to 
promote democracy in the MENA, and they became increasingly important in the 
context of global trends and of the security and economic interests potentially linked 
to democratization. When the US and the EU introduced such policies in the 1990s 
and 2000s, both regionalized their approaches to the Arab-Muslim world. American 
democracy promotion in the MENA rose in the framework of post-9/11 policies, 
while the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership arguably included this goal since at least 
1995. My interest here is to unravel the nature and geopolitical significance of the 
democracy promotion component in US and EU policies, while it is beyond the 
scope of this research to analyze the details of programs and allocations (Holden, 
2003; Huber, 2008). In this, I follow Halliday’s (2005) hints for a historical analysis 
that can throw light on the perspectives of power, politics and ideology.
This section discusses the American Greater /Broader MENA policy and the 
Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) first. Next, it discusses the European 
Union “Barcelona Process” officially known as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
(EMP) that later evolved to be part of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). 
Those American policies are indicative of democracy promotion’s inclusion of the 
Middle East within George W. Bush’s “Freedom Agenda”. The Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership is the key policy in EU relations with the Mediterranean in this post- 
Cold War period (Bicchi, 2007) and depicts the EU position and original
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framework. The section concludes with a discussion of how these policies built up 
“universalisms” that distinguished US and EU as democracy promoters in IR.
1.1. American approach -Greater/Broader Middle East and MEPI
During the Cold War, the US already addressed the MENA as a region taking two 
issues into consideration: economic interests (access to oil and to sea- 
communication) and ideological/strategic opposition to potential Soviet influence. 
Yet, US-MENA relations were rather based on bilateral contacts, and policies 
lacked consistency (Quandt, 2001) . This did not entail any democracy promotion 
“active” policies or conditionality. At the end of the Cold War, there was no major 
change in this regard: Clinton dealt with the existing political forces and focused on 
American interests, especially oil and the defense of Israel (Watkins, 1997). His 
strategy of democratic enlargement was only rhetoric without any form of 
implementation in the region (Haas, 1997); even economic opening and free trade 
were low on the agenda.
For most observers, democracy promotion was only brought to the US’s 
MENA policy under the Bush administration, and even those who saw more 
continuity than change in the post-Cold War period admitted that the Middle East 
approach was part of Bush’s originality (Rieffer & Mercer, 2005). Bush clearly 
scaled up the rhetoric in his symbolic 2003 Speech at the 20th anniversary of the 
NED (G. W. Bush, 2003a), and arguably the MENA became the litmus test of his 
“Forward strategy for freedom” as a new grand strategy (Gaddis, 2002). The policy 
materialized with two specific features: the new framing of the “Greater/Broader 
Middle East and North Africa”4 as a target of democracy promotion, and the 
program and budget for the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI)5. Both
3 For Quandt, there was activism and containment of Soviet influence, notably during the “Arab 
Cold War” of the 1960s.
4 The program was first known as the Greater ME and then changed to Broader ME. This change of 
names seemingly responded to a communication strategy (the GME program was renamed after 
the criticism it received in the first half of 2004 that I discussed in the introduction).
5 MEPI has often been analyzed as an instance of democracy assistance. Such approaches focus on 
its content and the policy-process (from budget planning to implementation and then 
feedback/evaluation).
195
emanated from the Department of State and were not framed under USAID, which 
is telling of a “higher interests-related” framework6.
The “Greater” Middle East Initiative was never properly launched, but 
President Bush and other members of his Administration alluded to a plan for 
reform in the region since the beginning of 20047. By mid-February, a draft of a 
Greater Middle East Initiative reached the media informally (Dar al-Hayat, 2004; 
International Crisis Group, 2004). The American authors defended its legitimacy 
because it was based on the Arab Human Development Report, a document “made 
by Arabs” that had been praised internationally for its bold criticism. Those 
documents illustrated an American conception of “democracy promotion” for the 
region within the modernization paradigm but emphasized capitalist reforms: they 
prescribed a development bank and an Economic Opportunity Forum to facilitate 
World Trade Organization accession. The political measures to foster democracy 
were awkwardly specific. These included a “leadership academy”, legal advice 
centers, “discovery schools”, and textbook translations, but also assisting in 
elections, encouraging parliamentary exchanges and developing media and civil 
society organizations. There was a broad definition of democracy promotion, an 
absence of overall strategy for political reform, and most importantly, the measures 
were potentially open to abuse by the authoritarian incumbents who would have to 
enforce them “in cooperation” with the US.
American democracy promotion thus avoided intrusive, direct policy goals 
and sought to develop activities in the region. In this sense, the Plan of Support for 
Reform adopted at the 2004 G8 summit included a new framework, the BMENA 
“Forum for the Future”, which would take place in US- and reform-friendly 
countries: in Rabat in December 2004, in Bahrain in 2005, in Jordan in 2006, and in 
Yemen in 2007. Despite the innovative plans, the Forums epitomized the decay of 
the BMENA initiative to promote democracy. No significant policies were ever
6 There is synergy but also competition between State and USAID, as discussed in Chapter 2. State 
controlled these policies, but two USAID bodies were involved in MENA democracy promotion: the 
Office of Middle Eastern Programs (mostly development-related) and the Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights and Labor (though its tasks have basically disappeared since MEPI). The 2007-12 
Strategic Plan for State and USAID mentioned as an objective “governing justly and democratically” 
and designated several MENA programs. The Department of Defense also allocates a limited budget 
(1%) to democracy promotion though this basically relates to military issues.
7 For example, during January 2004, Senator Lugar gave a speech on “A new partnership for the 
Greater Middle East: combating terrorism, building peace” and Vice-president Cheney mentioned 
the plan in the World Economic Forum in Davos.
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adopted nor budgets allocated, “democracy promotion” emphasized economic and 
trade initiatives (e.g. OECD-MENA Investment), and these events fell dramatically 
on the diplomatic agendas. Notably, though they sought multilateralism, they 
became increasingly “American” and partly covered under the MEPI initiative, 
which was the financial instrument corresponding to Bush’s MENA strategy.
The second strand of the US’s policy, MEPI, is a Presidential Initiative 
created in December 2002 to fund small-scale programs related to the same 
objectives of the BMENA initiative: women’s rights, education, entrepreneurship, 
local government, judicial reform8. These programs were very specific and arguably 
complemented the more development-oriented funds from USAID going to the 
region. One example was the training of young Egyptian party members to employ 
democratic practices inside their parties and do domestic election monitoring; the 
problem was that most participants had to be “known” and approved by the 
authorities, and that Egyptian electoral laws and the electoral process were far from 
democratic. Again, the policy left room for authoritarian incumbents to control the 
opening and “reform” process.
MEPI was conceived as a tool for regional projects but it became increasingly 
country-targeted, raising its profile precisely in the countries where USAID doesn’t 
operate, such as Syria. However, until 2008 MEPI has been funded at a marginal 
total of USD 430 million, with yearly allocations ranging from USD 29m (2002) to 
74m (2005)9 and for this reason it is rather unknown outside a narrow circle of grant 
recipients (Dunne, 2005; Mclnemey, 2008; Wittes, 2006; Yerkes & Wittes, 2004). 
MEPI actually illustrates the gap between Bush’s highflying rhetoric and the limits 
of such Bush-branded policies.
Indeed, MEPI naively sought to ignore that democracy promotion in the 
region was above all affected by Bush’s policy of regime-change in Iraq (Ottaway,
2008)10. A series of papers from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
(CEIP) identified in this a double strategy of American democracy promotion in the
8 At the beginning it was funded from the emergency supplemental appropriations, then through 
annual Congress allocations.
9 “Success stories” are quoted in the Department of State website. This website officially 
acknowledges a budget of USD 293 million for 2002-6, which is significantly smaller than the 
equivalent EU funds, MEDA-democracy.
10 MEPI has been criticized in Washington circles as a Bush-policy that might not survive in the 
new administration; Congress was more reluctant to fund it in 2006 as it considered it opaque and 
possibly duplicating USAID action (Mclnerney, 2008).
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Middle East, combining hard and soft lines in policy-making (Dalacoura, 2005). 
“Hard line” interventions towards hostile regimes, and “soft line” policies towards 
friendly regimes often considered “less undemocratic” (as Jordan) include reframing 
of aid, creation of additional instruments and active diplomatic stands for praising 
reform and criticizing laggards (Carothers, 2000, 2003a). However, the 2003 
intervention in Iraq is likely to remain a unique case of “democracy promotion”, and 
the goals of this intervention were far more complex and related to interests; 
democracy promotion only came up in the justifications of the intervention late in 
time, and second to security. “Hard line” approaches (Iran, Syria) seemingly 
responded to other goals. Most US democracy promotion policies have rather been 
“soft line”, including the Greater/Broader MENA and the MEPI, initiatives openly 
framed under Bush’s “push for reform in the region” (Bureau of Middle Eastern 
Affairs, 2005).
The Millennium Challenge Account featured as an additional asset and can be 
included as part of the US strategy. Conceived as an incentive, this was not “soft” 
in that it underlined strong conditionality [cf. Chapter 3] and offered truly 
substantial funds (for development) in bilateral governmental agreements. In the 
beginning, no MENA countries classified to be potential recipients of the MCA, but 
arguably the US democracy promotion strategy led to the inclusion of Morocco, 
Jordan and Yemen, which all had Compacts by 2008. In these cases, democracy was 
arguably not considered as such a strong precondition to receive funds, because 
reform in these countries had been marginal. Thus instead of using conditionality, 
the MCA was used as “carrot” for democracy promotion in the MENA region. In 
addition, from the perspective of “domino theory”, their economic development 
accompanied by democracy measures was supposed to serve as example for the 
region, more clearly than Iraq.
Boosting transatlantic relations?
The BMENA-MEPI approach arguably peaked in 2003-4, significantly losing 
momentum to military programs and bilateral policies, though it continued through 
2008. Despite their limited scope and the fact that it is hard to evaluate already 
whether they were successful, these policies remain important in the context of this 
thesis because they attempted to boost transatlantic cooperation in the dark hour of 
the crisis over the intervention in Iraq.
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The GMENA initiative illustrated the potentiall for transatlantic cooperation 
after 2003. Think-tank and policy advisers recommemded cooperation (Ahlin et al., 
2004; Yacoubian, 2004), which did unravel but Siomewhat reluctantly. In the 
following years, two summits of the G8 (Sea Island, (Gleneagles), a NATO Summit 
(Istanbul) and two US-EU bilateral summits all incluided the topic of the “Greater 
MENA”. However, in all these forums the Europeans made a point of agreeing to 
cooperation in rhetoric, but emphasized the virtues of ttheir own approach (European 
Commission & Secretariat General of the Council of tthe European Union, 2004). In 
practice, the EU rather sought to cement its own, iindependent position with the 
EMP and the broader European Neighborhood Poliicy, and did not invest in a 
common transatlantic strategy. Moreover, it can be argued that this triggered an 
effort on the EU side to coordinate and present its own policies of MENA 
democracy promotion more coherently. A new Working Group was created in the 
Council in this regard, something unprecedented in thie realm of CFSP11. Arguably, 
this raised the profile of democracy promotion in EUf external relations overall and 
towards the MENA region more specifically. Umtil then, MENA democracy 
promotion had a relatively low profile and was dlispersed, both regarding EU 
institutional branches and the content of EMP policies*, which are discussed now.
1.2. European approach -the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
The history of European Community/European Unicon relations with the MENA 
region goes back in time a few decades, though itt did not include democracy 
promotion in a particularly strong or outspoken wayy. These relations have rather 
existed around economic (opening trade) and political cooperation, and have been 
affected by the geographical proximity and post-collonial history that bind these 
“neighbors” (Bicchi, 2007; Calleya, 1997)12. Indeed, the elements found in EU
11 This group consisted of 6-8 individuals seconded by Membeir States to report to Solana, the 
rotating EU Presidency, and the Council. Individuals and working groups from other EU branches 
(notably in DG Development and in Human Rights group of thee EP) did not particularly welcome 
this MS and CFSP-pillar intervention, and feared that they wouild seize the democracy promotion 
agenda off their hands. Source: interview with EU official, Brmssels 5 June 2007.
12 Spain, Italy or Malta initiated some Mediterranean cooperatioon schemes, while France has often 
kept a high hand in their content -none clearly stressed the deimocracy-element. In the early 1990s, 
the initiatives included a Spanish-Italian led Conference for Seccurity and Cooperation in the 
Mediterranean (CSCM) and a French-sponsored 5 + 5 talks in aa Western Mediterranean Forum.
The Global Mediterranean Policy of the early 1970s (arguably tthe first EU regional approach to the
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democracy promotion i.e. political dialogue, conditionality, democracy assistance 
(K. E. Smith, 2003a) are missing in older EU policies.
The new EU approach materialized in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
(EMP) in 1995, and this became the main policy in region-to-region EU-MENA 
relations in the post-Cold War period (Vasconcelos & Joffe, 2000). Here, the EU 
built its own, distinct position independently from the United States. Seemingly 
Italy and Spain had been in favor of inviting the US as an observer to the EMP, as 
they had done in their previous plans for the Conference for Security and 
Cooperation in the Mediterranean (Satloff, 1997). Yet in the end the EMP did not 
include any transatlantic framework.
Illustrating the new post-Cold War dynamics, the EMP included elements of 
democracy promotion. Yet unlike the MEPI or the BMENA, it was not launched 
with the purpose of promoting democracy only. Importantly, a constructivist view 
underlies the EU approach: the EMP would rely on long-term socialization and the 
creation of a common language on democracy (Aliboni, 2004). The elements of 
democracy promotion existed at three levels, which I discuss here: general 
plans/rhetoric, frameworks/institutions and proper instruments/actions.
First, democracy promotion was present in the general strategy and rhetoric, 
mainly set out in the Barcelona Declaration of 1995 and in the Common Strategy 
adopted by the European Council at Santa Maria da Feira in 200013. The Barcelona 
Declaration is the document underpinning the EMP with three broad objectives: 
peace and security, shared economic prosperity through inter alia a free trade zone, 
and cross-cultural rapprochement through political, social, people-to-people 
exchanges (European Commission, 1995). Its first chapter (or basket) on Political 
and security co-operation included the principle to “develop the rule of law and 
democracy in the political systems”, underlining the EU ’s particular emphasis on 
rule of law. But the chapter also recognized “the right o f each [country] to choose 
and freely develop its own political, socio-cultural, economic and judicial system” 
(European Commission, 1995). The EMP thus enshrined democracy, but at the 
same time set limits on its promotion by recognizing the countries’ “own” choices.
MENA) became outdated as some of the targets of this policy (Southern European countries, 
including Portugal) joined the EU in the 1980s and 2000s.
13 It is important to notice the impulse to the Mediterranean strategies is given during Spanish and 
Portuguese presidencies of the Council, or in 2008 the French presidency. This does not mean that 
these MS favored democracy as part of the strategy, nevertheless.
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Indeed, this could lead to abusing democracy by claiming a country’s own 
interpretation. This clause was the result of difficult bargaining first at EU level, as 
some Member States wanted to go easy on democracy, and then with the 
Mediterranean partners14. This is an example of how democracy promoters tried to 
arrive at a consensual definition of democracy [Chapter 1], but in doing so they 
potentially emptied it of meaning.
The purpose of Common Strategies as CFSP official documents is to set a 
coherent background for whatever policy might be decided in the future, though 
they do not necessarily translate into specific policies. The 2000 Common Strategy 
for the Mediterranean, reference for the region, states the following objectives: “to 
help secure peace, stability and prosperity in the region”, and “the promotion of core 
values such as human rights, democracy, good governance, transparency and the 
rule of law” (Council of the European Union, 2000). The reference to democracy 
promotion is clear, but there is a prioritization of security amd this would also be the 
case in subsequent EU documents (European Commisfsion, 2000, 2003). The 
rhetoric around democracy promotion was increasingly watered down as the EMP 
became increasingly securitized. This was illustrated in the 2005 Summit that was 
supposed to celebrate the EMP’s 10th anniversary but the EMP had by then lost 
ground to security objectives and to the wider European Neighbourhood Policy, and 
the only document endorsed was a Policy Code of Conduct for countering terrorism 
(Euromed, 2005).
Secondly, the EMP put forward an institutional framework that replicated the 
three baskets of the Helsinki Conference for Security andl Cooperation in Europe: 
security/political, economic and civil society. Nevertheless, these baskets are quite 
asymmetrical: the economic aspects are the most developed (with bilateral 
Association Agreements), while the Civil Forum is not even part of the decision­
making framework15. The underpinning logic was Modernization (economic 
development accompanying transition) and the clear reference was the CSCE, 
considered a success of medium-term spill-over. Institutions would also contribute 
to the long-term socialization that would make MENA countries democratize. This
14 Interview with Spanish ambassador, Barcelona 10 March 2006. Spaim, in the first draft, did not 
even mention democracy and the rule of law. Then, it was seemingly Tuinisia that insisted on adding 
the “each their own” safeguard.
15 There are important problems of lack of communication and linkages; between the baskets; MEP 
coordinators were appointed to deal with these.
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way, the EMP institutionalized foreign minister conferences, meetings of civil 
servants (senior officials and experts) and most importantly for democracy 
promotion a Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (Lannon & van 
Elsuwege)16.
The Assembly replicated regional forums such as the Council of Europe and 
the Organization of American States, and notably allowed the European Parliament 
to have direct input on EU democracy promotion. Indeed, the EP played the role of 
EU democracy promoter in the EMP “versus” some Commission and Member 
States’ officials when drafting declarations, policies and budget lines (Gillespie, 
2004). Member States were notably more favorable to traditional diplomatic 
relations, with no additional institutions or positions regarding the domestic 
regimes. Arguably, EP participation explains the inclusion of democratic principles 
in the Barcelona Declaration and the initiatives of parliamentary dialogues, and 
specific measures such as the conditionality clauses that would be generalized in the 
bilateral agreements, and the Democracy program that was pegged to MEDA. The 
European Parliament would come to have the most active role in following 
questions and denouncing problems on human rights and democracy in the region, 
overall (Balfour, 2004; Juenemann, 2004).
The first Euro-Med Parliamentary Forum took plaice in 1998, and by 20D4 it 
became a formal Parliamentary Assembly, but EMP Ministers (i.e. the MS in the 
Council) agreed to give it consultative status only. The parliamentary dimension has 
been problematic within the EU, some demanding participation of MEPs sclely, 
some demanding national parliamentarians. There has also been disagreement as to 
the subjects it was to address, notably the Middle East Peace Process: though the 
EU has included this in its regional approach in contrast to the American 
perspective, the Assembly’s leverage was very limited. Another problem arose in 
terms of active participation or boycott from MENA countries: for instance Syria 
and Lebanon shunned the forum, which is arguably trapped in controversial 
dynamics. For example, the “elected representatives” from most MENA courtries 
are clearly not democratic, and if MEPs denounce human rights violations in the
16 Other activities include training sessions for EuroMed Diplomats, sectoral meetings on water, 
energy, industry, or environment.
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Assembly, Southern partners may reject these “incidents” as illegitimate
17interference in internal affairs and neo-colonial abuse (Stavridis, 2002) .
The EMP strategy complemented such top-down initiatives with bottom-up 
democracy promotion. The participation of the peoples, (third basket) has notably 
been framed in Civil Society forums and thematic networks (notably in education). 
These imply looser institutionalization but according to Gillespie (2004) they 
constitute an originality and potential for European democracy promotion. In 
addition, they have actively contributed to developing international networks of 
civil society, though governments sought to control as much as possible their 
composition and functioning. For this reason, the forums were usually marginalized 
when they were held in parallel with the Summits or the  Assembly, and overall the 
results have been lukewarm in the field of human rights, often suffering from self­
censorship and unproductive debates (Feliu, 2005). M ore generally, this actually 
illustrates a paradoxical “official” promotion of civil society, i.e. bottom-up is 
encouraged from the top-down (the organizing framework), and this involved 
necessary shortcomings [another example will be considered in Chapter 6].
Thirdly, EU democracy promotion under EMP’ has included substantive 
instruments that helped materialize this policy, notably under the allocations from 
Mesures d’Acompagnement MED A and conditionality. MED A included a 
“suspension clause” in case of violation of democratic principles, rule of law, 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, illustrating E1U conditionality. However, 
the clause has never been invoked, which also illustrates this policy’s limits. 
Similarly, the human rights/democracy clauses were supposed to be in all the 
Association Agreements as part of the EU’s “‘mainstreaming” democracy 
promotion. However, this has been implemented unequally and the clauses rather 
illustrate the shortcomings of this rhetorical mainstreaming: the lack of rigor 
backfires and undermines the policy in principle. In h is  study of the Agreements, 
Stavridis argued there were “strong references” to the clauses in the agreements 
with Egypt, Jordan and Palestine, “inspiration” only im those with Morocco and
17 Stavridis mentions the case of a French MEP who denounced the Hiuman rights situation in 
Tunisia; the meeting’s chair then did not allow any more interventioms from parliamentarians from 
the North. The Assembly is this way a controversial, double-edge sword as it seeks democratization 
through long-term socialization but is in the mean time abused.
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Algeria, and no reference at all in the cases of Tunisia, Israel and Lebanon18. In the 
bilateral negotiations before the Agreement, Tunisia went as far as rejecting the 
reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and changed it to a 
domestic reference (Stavridis, 2004). EU democracy promotion thus resembled a 
bargaining process in which MENA regimes effectively boycotted some democracy 
aspects advocating the element of partnership, undermining the EU strategy.
The main financial instrument, MED A, illustrates the bureaucratic division of 
the EU approach, as it was managed at DG External Relations and rather 
disconnected from DG Development and Cooperation; in addition the MEDA- 
Democracy program was subsumed under the EIDHR19. MEDA allocated about 1 
billion/year, of which 232 million went to democracy assistance in 2001-3. These 
figures give an idea of the financial scope of the EU policy, notably in comparison 
with the MEPI instrument, but they should not be taken at face value because of the 
lack of definition of the policies, the changing categorization, and the fact that some 
“democratic themes” allocations actually went to unrelated policies. Most 
importantly, the EU policies may be resisted when MENA incumbents participate in 
decision-making, illustrating the trade-offs of democracy promotion: co-opting and 
giving a say to the target-country might divert or slow down democratization. This 
way, Holden (2003) complained there was little bottom-up or Southern input in 
MEDA, but Youngs (2006) gave the example of how “governance reforms” were 
reduced to innocuous technical training when Arab governments watered down a 
Commission proposal for Democratic Facility.
1.3. Two universalisms face practical trade offs
For Carothers (2008b), the United States “does not really think about Europe” when 
drafting its policies for the Middle East. Conversely, some believe that Europeans 
stand up against American leadership in the region as an effort to consolidate their 
own sphere of influence (Calleya, 1997, p. 173). Overall, American and European 
initiatives have remained isolated from each other, though both targeted democracy
18 The case of Morocco is dubious because it is also mentioned that the clause is an “essential 
element” of the agreement, which could eventually lead to enforcement within the principles of 
international law.
19 About 10% of the EIDHR funds (2004) go to the MENA region, which is indicative of the little 
attention paid to democracy compared to other regions and to EMP projects concerning trade. 
Compared to most of the MEDA financial assistance, the EIDHR introduces a more important role 
for civil society because funds are allocated to NGOs.
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promotion and featured similar goals [Sections 2, 3, 4 below] for the region. These 
separate quests have illustrated the two universalisms, which have not necessarily 
clashed. Moreover, both the American and the European universalisms faced similar 
challenges on the ground, and democracy promotion was challenged by the political 
realities of the MENA region: an opening /reform controlled by the regime leading 
to “liberalized autocracy” rather than democracy, and “democracy” becoming an 
empty shell that yielded no political legitimacy (compared to the rise of Islamist 
proposals for change).
The following table summarizes the main features of American and European 
universalism, based on the policies analyzed here.
Table 8. American and European universalisms towards the MENA region
American European
» Projection of democracy promotion to the 
region as part of the universal quest 
(“MENA is no exception”)
Qualitative shift from exemplarist to 
vindicationist democracy promotion 
(Bush/neo-conservative)
1 Policies dominated by the Executive with 
the Dept, of State (low profile for 
USAID)
• Policies address economic realm because it
is less intrusive 
1 Domino theory underlies strategy
* No regional institutionalization
» Securitization (post 9/11 fight against 
terrorism)
» Limited funding, limited conditionality
• Principles and mainstreaming of democracy
promotion expressed in documents and 
declarations as “common value”
• Ambiguous regionalism: inclusive (Euro-
med region), exclusive (neighbor, 
partner)
• Influence of the European Parliament,
reluctance of some Member States
• Policies complement the main area, i.e.
economic cooperation (Modernization)
• Contagion and socialization (by co-opting
into norms) underlie the strategy
• Institutionalization: CSCE-model, baskets,
EU model (reflexivity)
• Securitization (includes immigration)
• Limited funding, limited conditionality
American democracy promotion in the MENA was founded on the traditional 
projection of democracy as an element of foreign policy, i.e. it fit with the American 
mission, but it was a result from the shift from exemplarist to a vindicationist 
positions under the Bush administration. The discourse was based on the non- 
exceptionalism of the Middle East and of Islam and the strategy was broadly based 
on domino theory (target countries to change the region). The approach was framed 
in a geopolitical understanding of the region (Greater/ Broader Middle East and
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North Africa); it underlined the security policies especially developed after 9/11 and 
addressed the lack of democracy as one of the complementary elements. As such, 
only very limited funding was committed, with the exception of the Millennium 
Challenge Account (that was a carrot more than a reward for democratization). 
These features manifested a universalism of democracy promotion based on 
traditional justifications, a new (post-9/11) rather monolithic understanding of the 
region, and pragmatic priorities that overrode the principles.
European democracy promotion built on the premise of “common principles” 
and the mainstreaming expressed in documents and declarations since the 1990s and 
more specifically in the Barcelona Declaration, grounding a unidirectional 
normative approach where “partners” had some leverage (Bicchi, 2006; Manners, 
2002; Sjursen, 2002) . This universalism proposed democratic socialization, based 
on geographic contagion, through two regionalist views that coexisted but were 
actually ambiguous: on the one hand there was a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
that pretended to be inclusive, and on the other a “Southern Partners/Neighbors” 
approach that was clearly exclusionary. Adopting a reflexive approach, the EU 
institutionalized the project upon previous, own models that prioritized economy 
(main basket and ground of the EMP, as for the European Communities) but 
allowed for security cooperation and some cultural ground for peoples’ exchanges 
(as in the CSCE). This gave the European universalism greater potential and 
broader ground, but security became the main issue (fight against terrorism, 
migration). Substantive funds were allocated especially in bilateral cooperation with 
regimes; this increasingly included conditionality (ENP bilateral agreements).
In sum, both universalisms have strong roots on what and how the promoters 
act in the world and not so much on what the MENA is. In this case both American 
and European policies combined universalism with othering the MENA region 
(Diez, 2004). Democracy promotion was caught in this paradox, as it was based on 
democracy’s universality, but the region was characterized as a distinct entity at the 
same time.
20 For Bicchi, the norm (and policy) is EU’s regionalism, motivated by reflexivity -her analysis 
underlines unidirectionalism. For Manners and Sjursen, the most important aspect is that the norm 
rests on universality, and this way the approach is inclusive, i.e. there is partnership and common 
values.
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Both American and European policies faced similar challenges to make 
democracy promotion work in the MENA region. One initial problem was that 
democracy assistance programs, especially on the American side, were short-term, 
narrow-focused and result-oriented -o r else they did not attract funds from donor- 
agencies (Mednicoff, 2006, p. 264). At the level of implementation and of the 
practitioners (many Western contractors and Arab partner NGOs), US and EU 
policies suffered similar shortcomings, and palliated rather than transformed the 
situation (Carapico, 2000). In addition, both sides emphasized non-intrusive and 
relatively uncontroversial measures. This led the US and the EU to fund women’s 
NGO groups or training for businessmen, judges or parliamentarians, and many 
programs that targeted administrative efficiency and the fields of energy or the 
environment: “neutrality” and expertise were emphasized. They may have relied on 
long-term and Modernization dynamics, but the policies were mainly “politically 
correct”21. In the mean time, the larger-picture of democratization was left aside. 
This emphasized the risk of fa9ade democracy that as Albrecht and Schlumberger 
(2004) warned, could conceal and even perpetuate the authoritarian regimes in the 
MENA. More specifically, democracy promotion policies miscalculated the 
political realities of the region through two inadequate assumptions.
The first problematic assumption concerned the single structure linking the 
state and the regime: promoters presumed that getting the regime to democratize 
would translate into the state’s democratization. This way, regimes may have 
consented to a relative opening, allowing some opposition or organizing limited 
elections. Yet this did not lead to democratization: some institutions may have been 
reformed but patronage is widespread, the state continued to be under the regime 
control (Beilin, 2005). Instead, this policy led to the trap of “illiberal democracy” 
(Zakaria, 2003) or “liberalized autocracy” (Brumberg, 2002) where the regime 
allows for some contestation but still controls the political arena and notably 
continues to thwart freedoms. Rather significantly, though this “trap” has been 
documented extensively and MENA and Western critics insist on reconsidering this
21 Regarding EU funds, only a small percentage of MEDA was dedicated to democracy promotion, 
which was soon included under the EIDHR and comprised about 170 projects in the first 5 years. 
MEDA faced important challenges, including the gap between fund commitment and actual 
disbursement, and the overriding role of the EU (little cooperation with MENA countries or civil 
society). Sometimes policies clearly matched the promoters’ needs: for example, judges were trained 
in intellectual property international laws or alternative dispute resolution. Sources : EU website, 
MEDA, Holden, Mednicoff, Carothers & Ottaway, Carapico.
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premise, American and European declarations have continued to refer to these 
openings as instances of successful democracy promotion (Prodi, 2003; Rice, 
2005a). The diplomatic language is often laudatory and overly optimistic, pointing 
at a glass that is at least half-full where critics see no water, or muddy water.
The second challenge was overstating or misinterpreting democracy as a 
source of legitimacy for non-democratic regimes. Transition scholars have argued 
that state legitimacy is not necessarily founded on democracy, but on the regime’s 
socioeconomic efficiency (Linz & Stepan, 1996, pp. 76-79)22. Hence in the ever- 
degrading economic situation in MENA countries23, the regimes (i.e. the state) lack 
legitimacy, and the ideologies they have endorsed in time have loss credibility too. 
This happened to the Arab-nationalist discourse and socialism, and there was a risk 
that the new ideology (Western-led) of economic structural reforms and democracy 
also became discredited. Area experts and Arab intellectuals, such as the Moroccan 
al-Yabri, warned of this increasing disconnection between the Arab peoples and 
their regimes, and the value of democratic legitimacy (Martinez Montavez, 2004). 
Indeed, democracy seemed to become one element in partisan debates, an ideology 
adopted by very few, elitist groups that do not have any real constituency (Salame, 
1994) (Ottaway, 2005a). Against this background, it became crucial that democracy 
did not oppose the traditional source of legitimacy in the MENA region: Islam. For 
Bromley (1993), Islam was traditionally constitutive of all social structures in the 
region, while states had sought to create a separate administrative apparatus. As 
political Islam and Islamist movements became increasingly important in the 
politics of the MENA (Dalacoura, 2001; Halliday, 2005, pp. 193-228; Kramer, 
1994), democracy promoters reacted by arguing there were positive links between 
democracy and Islam.
The chapter now moves on to focus on the main goals of international democracy 
promotion, applied to the regional level and to the MENA case in particular. I will 
discuss in which way the US and the EU tackled these objectives, whether there
22 It is the socioeconomic prosperity that would eventually erode non-democratic regimes, but the 
general argument (based on Przeworski and Limongi) is that there is a “political economy of 
legitimacy” necessary for transition.
23 According to the Millennium Development Goals Report “even though the Arab world has made 
substantive strides in human development over the past three decades, the region’s overall progress 
has faltered over the 1990s” (United Nations Development Program, 2005).
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were divergent approaches, and what this actually entailed regarding a successful 
strategy.
2. Overcoming the Arab-Muslim cultural exception
The first objective of regional democracy promotion in the MENA was to overcome
what seemed a “cultural exception” to the democratization trends of the post-Cold 
War period. According to Huntington, the MENA region’s “political culture” and 
the Arab-Muslim tradition do not meet the prerequisites for democracy and 
perpetuate a situation of conflict with the West (Huntington, 1997a). Huntington 
and other authors as B. Lewis were accused of “orientalism” precisely for 
stigmatizing the region, and in any case both the US and the EU sought to counter 
those arguments in their MENA policies.
The US and the EU faced the challenge of finding a consensual definition of 
democracy that would allow for its promotion without raising accusations of 
Western cultural superiority or neo-colonial behavior. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
this led to building a compromise definition between three elements: the 
universality of democracy, the Western origin of democracy and Western criteria in 
its promotion, and the inclusion of cultural specificities. There was American and 
European “learning by doing” to develop a positive discourse, notably supported by 
the democracy promotion knowledge community. However, conceptual tensions 
and trade-offs were hard to overcome in practice (as it is with any religion), and the 
actual co-optation of Islam into politics was ambiguous.
2.1. Common ground for distinct US and EU discourses
Both the US and the EU supported claims for the universality of democracy and the
compatibility of Arab/Islamic culture with democracy. The official view on both 
sides was to counter the cultural exceptionalism thesis, but the US and the EU 
constructed different discourses of democracy promotion, with the American 
rhetoric flying high under George W. Bush, while the European language 
maintained a lower profile. For example, in his speech on the occasion of the 20th 
anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, Bush chose to focus on the 
MENA region. In this speech, he claimed there should be no Western “cultural
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condescension” regarding Islam, and he insisted on Islam’s “consistency with 
democratic rule” (G. W. Bush, 2003a)24. He made similar declarations in London in 
a speech about Iraq that underlined the importance of democracy promotion in the 
Greater Middle East. As if seeking to build transatlantic consensus on this subject, 
he claimed: “in the West, there has been a certain skepticism about the capacity or 
even the desire of Middle Eastern peoples for self-government. We are told that 
Islam is somehow inconsistent with a democratic culture” (G. W. Bush, 2003b).
In the EU, this language has not been so straightforward and direct 
references to the potential problems of cultural incompatibility are hard to find. 
Some critics have even suggested that the EU rhetoric is too shy and concedes to the 
cultural exceptionalism thesis (Meyer, 2003). However, it is more likely that this 
reticence is explained by the tradition of secularism; overall, the EU language is 
extremely diplomatic and careful. Even so, EU documents and declarations about 
democracy promotion reach out to the region as they make reference to “dialogue 
between cultures and religion” (European Parliament, 2004) and to how “each 
society must find its own path” (Solana, 2005). This is a European stand to 
conciliate the West with the Arab-Muslim world. Another reason for a smoother 
tone (other than the tradition to avoid religion in public speech) may be that the 
European Union has a considerable Muslim population itself, and even a friendly 
reference would seem antagonistic (Amghar, Boubekeur, & Emerson, 2007). In 
addition, a straightforward position of “othering” the MENA region emphasizing its 
Arab-Muslim character would actually be contradictory with the EMP’s approach of 
a common cultural ground. Rather, EMP documents emphasized common “values 
and principles” of the MENA-EU (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 2005). Though
25it may seem derisory, democracy is clearly among these values .
2.2. Building consensus: the knowledge community’s normative 
approach
The US and EU defense of the compatibility of Islam and democracy has been 
substantiated with a vast academic literature and with policy documents from think
24 Bush reminded that the American stand to avoid “cultural condescension” was nothing new, as this 
term dated back to Ronald Reagan. This also illustrates the continuity in Bush’s democracy 
promotion.
5 The 2005 EMP Code o f Conduct to counter terrorism stated “we must not imperil the democratic 
values to which we are committed”.
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tanks. This point illustrates the leverage of these non-state actors that influence the 
policy-making process [stages 3 and 4 of the process, cf. Chapter 3]; they sought to 
counter Huntingon’s “Clash of civilizations” and the fear of rising Islamist 
fundamentalism.
Countless publications (articles, journal special issues, books) and events 
(seminars, round tables, workshops) have supported the view that there is no reason 
to suspect this cultural-ideological bias (Aliboni & Guazzone, 2004). Larry 
Diamond argued “both the US and the EU are too afraid of Islamization to push 
hard for democratization” while this should not be the case (Ibrahim, Ibrahim, 
Diamond, Nasr, & Gershman, 2005). Conferences and special issues of the main 
journals in the discipline documented the compatibility of democracy and Islam, for 
example Democratization (issue 9:1, 2002), The Journal of Democracy (issue 14:2,
2003), and the Conference on Development, Democracy and the Islamic World 
(University of California at Irvine, 2003) . This discussion often raised the question 
of interpretation in Islam, underlining its diversity and the traces of liberal thought 
(Ehteshami, 2004; Filali-Ansary, 2003; Hourani, 1962; Seleny, 2006)27. In view of 
the contacts between these sources of expertise and US and EU policy-makers, it 
can be argued that a positive trend countering the Clash fed into their policies and 
their discourse.
A critique of this normative literature and its epistemology is in order here. By 
referring to political culture, analysts and promoters have often adopted the same 
standpoint as Huntington’s explanation of the Islam-West clash and Lewis’s 
account of Arab “backwardness”. Here, political culture is also considered an 
explanatory variable; the authors just seek to substantiate the opposite claim i.e. that 
there can be compatibility with democracy in the MENA. This claim reflects the 
universalism in the liberal view of post-Cold War International Relations, which 
according to Brown (1999) has sought to impose itself as “an alternative story” to 
the one of clash and confrontation [cf. Chapter 1]. Part of the democracy promotion 
knowledge community has adopted a similar normative perspective with the goal of 
building consensus and overcoming the argument of the MENA cultural exception.
26 Other examples include the journals Middle East Policy, The Middle East Quarterly, and Arab 
Studies Quarterly; the scholarly /think tank discussions have been countless.
27 There is also an interesting distinction between “the Muslim” and “the Arab” in some analysis, 
based on the cases of democratic compatibility in Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia, India and Mali.
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Instead, a more useful approach should focus on the region’s political culture 
as the dependent variable, i.e. as the object and not the explanation of our analysis 
of democracy promotion. If we observe certain incompatibility, the key is to explain 
why this is so and what could change -this debate has more to do with history and 
politics than with theology. This perspective is present in some of the Transition 
literature (Linz & Stepan, 1996; O'Donnell et al., 1986), and it is especially useful 
because the evidence that culture matters at all for democracy is at times weak 
(Dahl, 1989, pp. 262-263). In his overview of IR in the Middle East, Fred Halliday 
(2005, p. 39) endorsed this analytical perspective. He argued, more specifically, that 
the MENA region shares a political culture illustrated among others by the 
countries’ political systems and forms of legitimation. These aspects constitute a 
better focus to gather knowledge and more powerful explanations of the challenges 
the US and EU face when promoting democracy.
2.3. Reluctant compromise: US and EU failure to materialize Islam co­
optation in democracy promotion
A final point related to this question is that the positive American and European 
discourses and the analysis from the knowledge community have actually not been 
matched with the practice of actively supporting political Islam. Many policy­
makers remained reluctant to co-opt Islamists, as they saw a link or at least a 
potential connection between Islamism and terrorism, and overall perceived 
political Islam as an anti-Western ideology. Though the consensus was built in 
principle, decision-makers were reluctant to allocate funds and cooperate with either 
Islamist political parties or civil society groups. This was an example of the gap 
between democracy promotion discussions in theory and the practice on the ground.
Democracy promoters worked on a compromise by seeking to avoid 
conflation and focusing on moderate political Islam, which they recognized by its 
relatively liberal and Western-friendly views (Richards, 2005). A new sensitivity to 
this position made its way in American and European policy-making circles, which 
slowly sought to co-opt these groups into the transition process. Again, the US and 
EU adopted a similar view. De Vries, European Council’s coordinator of Anti- 
Terrorist policies at the time, declared:
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“I want to stress the fact that there are important moderate Muslim 
communities that we should strengthen, and the EU and the US should 
work together on this. I don’t think our strategies should or need to differ 
on that score” (de Vries, 2005).
Yet in practice democracy promotion policies avoided support of religious 
groups. Instead, the GMENA, MEPI, and EMP privileged cooperation with the 
regime in power, which was often itself hostile or suspicious of the Islamist 
challenge (Tibi, 2005). Alternatively, they financed secular NGOs that often seemed 
disconnected from the people and lacked credibility (Ottaway, 2005b). In many 
MENA countries the main political opposition to the incumbent authoritarian 
regimes came from Islamist groups, e.g. Egypt, Morocco, and Jordan. US and EU 
democracy promotion mostly cooperated with the regimes, though there they 
explored ways to co-opt Islamists and made some ambiguous declarations 
(Schlumberger, 2000).
Moreover, the cases of Algeria and Palestine showed the ambiguity of 
Western support. In Algeria, elections were aborted in 1991-2 as the FIS was going 
to be the clear winner (the West supported the military’s take over), and in Palestine 
the elections of 2006 that gave a majority to Hamas led to a government boycotted 
by the West. This set a clear precedent of Western opposition to Islamists in power, 
in these cases because of the links with terrorism for both FIS and Hamas. But more 
generally, there is still suspicion that “moderate” political Islam might hide anti­
democratic and anti-Western positions28. In a way, this practically brings into 
question the objective of showing that democracy is compatible with Islam29. In 
Turkey, which could possibly be considered an example of this compatibility, the 
political history and current system had a strong component of secularism.
As a mid-way, promoters explored the possibility to cooperate with Islamic 
groups on scenes other than the political, i.e. in the realm of civil society. USAID 
and the MEPI have included among their recipients some groups connected to 
religious activism, but this has been rather exceptional (Dunne, 2005). Arguably, 
the EMP also included Islam and democratic compatibility as part of its third basket 
(Silvestri, 2005), i.e. within the institutional frame of culture and not of politics.
28 By contrast, the case of Turkey and Erdogan’s “moderate Islamist party” in power has led to 
nuanced experience. Turkey’s EU membership candidacy place it in a difficult position to generalize 
the arguments to the MENA region.
291 am thankful to Professors Smith and Kaldor for bringing this point to my attention.
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However, this posed a conceptual problem regarding the definition of “civil 
society”, with important authors and sectors in the MENA region arguing that their 
societies’ concept must be related to religion, and emphasizing collective rather than 
individual civic rights (Juenemann, 2004). Juennemann identified two other aspects 
of EU policies in the MENA (they also apply to American democracy promotion) 
that emptied the concept of “civil society”. First, state-regimes broadly created, 
controlled and infiltrated the associations and NGOs that received democracy 
assistance, which undermined civil society’s essential role of “independent check” 
on the state. Second, entrepreneurs and businesses have been co-opted as civil 
society partners, which counters some of the definitions of “civil society” and 
notably reinforces the state-regimes because of their domination of the economy. 
Indeed, according to Bromley (1993) the MENA states do not even qualify as 
capitalist because the appropriation of surplus labor (economic power) has never 
been separated from the political institutions and ruling class.
In sum, the efforts on the US and the EU sides to overcome the MENA cultural 
exception to democratization were one first objective in their approaches. 
Nevertheless, the implementation of Islamic-friendly democracy promotion was 
rather complex (because of potential links with Islamist terrorism) and this 
translated into American and European reluctance to co-opt political Islam. The first 
goal of democracy promotion policies thus seemed inconclusive, though the 
questions (theoretical and practical) were not that different, from those arising with 
other religions, from the definition of a positive civil society in general, or from the 
case of the Catholic Church’s role in the DR Congo [cf. Chapter 4]. For these 
reasons, it can be argued that the MENA region was treated as an “other”, though 
the US and the EU policies sought exactly the opposite. A similar dynamic was 
underpinning the artificial regionalization of the MENA, to which I now turn.
3. Encouraging a democratic MENA region: but what MENA 
region and how to diffuse reform?
The second patent objective of American and European initiatives to promote 
democracy was to address the region as a whole and not only states. This fitted in
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well with the trends of regionalism and interregional cooperation observed in 
contemporary IR (Buzan & Waever, 2003; Hettne, 2003)30. However, the Middle 
East and North Africa is hard to classify according to Hettne’s degrees of 
regionness or to functionalist and integration theories. The geographical basis of the 
MENA region is blurred, there is no unified actorness, and organized cooperation 
(institutionalized) has failed. However there is a rich shared basis at cultural and 
civil society levels, which in Hettne’s categories only comes at a later stage of 
regional identity-building. To this day, intra-MENA trade amounts to only to 5% of 
all regional trade, the alliances and conflicts between states are complex and 
numerous, and there is no political will to build up a region -instead, one observes 
centrifugal tendencies (Calleya, 1997, pp. 89-136) where states remain the main 
actors (Dodge, 2006)31. Finally, in the existing regional frameworks, African Union, 
Union of the Arab Maghreb, Arab League or Gulf Cooperation Council (S. Smith & 
Levasseur, 2005), democracy does not appear as precondition or goal. This 
distinguishes the MENA from European organizations or the Organization of 
American States where democracy is a common reference.
An alternative perspective regarding the MENA was presented by Michelle 
Pace in her analysis of region-making that focuses on discourse and process, rather 
than on existing entities (Pace, 2006, pp. 22-35). I follow her perspective here to 
unravel the second objective of US and EU democracy promotion: to create and to 
sustain a concept of the MENA region “from outside”. Democracy promotion 
intertwined with this process of regionalization, becoming an essential element of 
the discourses and practices. First, this section discusses geographical constructions 
of the MENA and the visions underpinning those maps. Secondly, it argues that this 
MENA-building corresponded to the argument of regional “contagion” or 
“diffusion” in democracy promotion. This way, both US and EU policies applied 
the Transition studies that had focused on regional challenges to democratization 
(L. Diamond, Plattner, Chu, & Tien, 1997; Hawthorne, 2001; Linz & Stepan, 1996).
30 Buzan and Waever considered regionalism as the most valid theoretical perspective to explain 
post-Cold War IR, based on a constructivist approach and focusing on security. Hettne differentiated 
up to five degrees of “regionness”: geographical, social system, cooperation, civil society 
cooperation, actorness in IR.
31 The Israeli-Palestinian is the most important one, but the conflict over the Western Sahara 
confronting Algeria and Morocco also poses important problems in the MENA. In addition, there is 
an element of competition among individual countries in their relations with the US and/or the EU, 
e.g. privileged partnerships with Egypt and Morocco, US “special relations” with Jordan and Saudi 
Arabia, EU sympathy for the Palestinian cause and connivance with the Tunisian regime.
215
Nevertheless, and this is the key distinction here, the US privileged “domino 
theory” while the EU approach relied on long-term socialization.
3.1. American and European constructions of the MENA region
Rather than relating to the domestic proposals of self-imagining in the MENA
region, American and European constructions responded to a diversity of goals in 
the promoters’ views. This regionalization was relatively new in the American 
approach to the MENA and must be understood in the context of post-9/11 policies 
and the War on Terror, that required to frame security in larger terms than country- 
threats. For the EU, the history of treating the MENA as a region is longer: the first 
policies date back to the 1970s and the last proposal thus far has been the 2008 
“Union for the Mediterranean”. It is also more complex, as the approach sometimes 
referred to one common European-MENA region (e.g. “the Mediterranean”), and 
other times referred to the MENA as a neighboring region, an Other. Because of the 
links developed with migration, diaspora communities and business/holidaying 
(together with the colonial past), Europe’s relationship with the region was more 
intricate than America’s32. This also helps understand the ambiguous trends of “one, 
common” region (Euro-med) coexisting with the “othering” embedded in the 
neighbors approach.
The following maps illustrate the concepts of the MENA region that 
American and European democracy promotion initiatives have included. They give 
evidence of a sort of variable geometry of the MENA region; they also hint at how 
any common policy of democratization was a difficult if not impossible puzzle.
Map 3 represents the Greater or Broader MENA region as it was conceived in 
the American working documents of 2004 and the declarations by George Bush and 
Condoleeza Rice (2005) to promote democracy. It included 23 countries that 
arguably had little in common, ranging from Mauritania to Pakistan33. The inclusion 
of Sudan was not clear (it depended on the status of negotiations with the 
government notably regarding Darfur), but Mauritania was usually included because 
it was part of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue since 1994. The Western Sahara is 
excluded in this map because the US official position is to avoid siding with the
321 am thankful to Professor Lord Wallace for these observations.
33 Map elaborated by the author based on the information from the Sea Island G8 documentation 
(2004).
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Moroccan claim (and thus to avoid a clash with Algeria) and to respect the 
international process; the topic is not mentioned in GME plans. Nevertheless, the 
map officially used by the State Department for MEPI includes it (see below).
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Map 4. Map o f “Near Eastern Affairs ” that the Department o f State includes in its 
information about MEPI
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Map 3 shows a broader conception of the region that relates to the War on Terror 
(inclusion of Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan). Map 4 shows the countries where 
MEPI was supposed to invest in democracy promotion34. As of 2008, about 450 
projects have been funded in 17 countries but there is no action in for instance Iran, 
though it is included in the map. These maps constituted the references for 
American democracy promotion policies. However, they reflect a trend of MENA 
region-making that amalgamates very different countries that sometimes are in 
conflict. As such, it is hard to envisage a regional strategy and policies that could fit 
all countries or at least draw them together. In fact, despite the regional rhetoric and 
initial plans, MEPI programs have targeted countries separately in the end.
The European Union approach of MENA region-making has also been complex,. 
As of 2008, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership included 39 members: 27 EU 
Member States and 12 Mediterranean Partners: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Albania and 
Mauritania35.
Map 5. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 2008: not one Euro-Med region, 
“just neighbors ” 36
34 Source: http://mepi.state.gov/cl0128.htm
35 An important feature o f the EMP that it creates an institutional framework where Arab countries, 
the Palestinian territories and Israel can sit together.
36 Source: Euromed website o f  the DG External Relations, European Commission, accessed on 1 
August 2008. According to the recent developments, in this map Romania and Bulgaria should be in 
blue as the other MS; Albania and Mauritania should be in brown.
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Up until 2005-6, Euro-Med maps in the EU website and documents usually 
portrayed all the countries in one color (EU Member States and partners), which 
enhanced the idea on one region. By contrast, Map 5 underlines the shift in the EU 
trend, where the concept of Euro-med evolves towards separate “partners” of the 
neighborhood. I thought this development was symbolic of how the EU shifted from 
region-making of a “common EU-MENA region” to the ENP -the most recent 
image for media and communications from the EU underlines the othering in color. 
This is quite important for MENA region-making in view of Pace’s focus on 
discourse and processes.
This map of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) must be understood in 
view of the 2004 enlargement, when the Euro-Med was subsumed in the larger ENP 
with Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia to underline the 
fact that no EU membership should be expected. However, that factor is the only 
thing they have in common (except for Turkey), and as in the US case we find a 
wide diversity among the countries in this region, which brings Turkey, Libya,
37Mauritania, and Albania into one forum (European Commission, 2005, p. 17) .
37 Turkey is a member of the EMP but it receives funds and has bilateral relations as a candidate 
country in the accession process (different from the Euro-med partners). While Libya had observer 
status in the EMP since 1999, European rapprochement has been undergoing since 2004 and Libya is 
now eligible to benefit from ENP assistance despite no progress in the realm o f democratization. 
Mauritania had been part o f the ACP-countries in its relations with the EU but it has acceded to EMP 
recently, showing certain replication of the American MENA region approach. In view of the 2008
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These recent inclusions, not yet materialized in policies, have been welcomed by 
some commentators (Calleya, 2008) but they actually show the inconsistency of 
European region-building. Indeed, the ambiguous trend from the EU (common 
region vs. “othering”) is perpetuated in the French Presidency initiative of a “Union 
for the Mediterranean” (2008) that groups, again, EU and MENA countries under 
one regional framework.
More specifically and relevant for this research, it was hard to envisage 
common, regional democracy promotion for such different cases. Smith and Bicchi 
have argued that the reflexivity (to replicate one’s own nature) of EU external 
relations led to region-making and to democracy promotion in the MENA (Bicchi, 
2006; K. E. Smith, 2003a, pp. 75-77). Nevertheless it has also been argued that the 
EU approach was increasingly motivated by the perception of broad threats 
stemming from the MENA, including terrorism (as for the US) and also a 
securitized conception of migration (Bicchi, 2007; Soravilla Fernandez, 2006). In 
any case, all American and European regional maps emanated from the promoters’ 
perspectives, and not from within the MENA.
3.2. Regional contagion in Transition studies: American domino theory 
and European long-term socialization
Transition studies consider that the external context influences a country’s potential 
for transition through diffusion or “contagion”. This happens either at global level 
through the waves of democracy or at regional level as in Eastern and Central 
Europe (Whitehead, 1996). The importance of the regional context has been 
demonstrated with historical and statistical analysis: there is a high correlation 
between democracy and spatial proximity (Wejnert, 2005), and more specifically 
the region can indicate the potential for transition in one country (Skrede-Gleditsch 
& Ward, 2006). In the case of the MENA, this theory holds true since there is a 
consistent lack of democracy in the region, with the exceptions of Israel and maybe 
Lebanon. On these grounds, conceiving the MENA as a region made sense as an 
objective of democracy promotion. Interestingly, the United States and the 
European Union adopted different policies on this common ground of contagion:
coup, Mauritania’s status can now be considered as “frozen”. Albania was admitted to the EMP in 
2008.
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the American approach was based on the potential of domino theory, the European 
one on long-term international socialization.
The United States sought to change some actors in the region, hoping that this 
would lead to contagion and even imitation effects, much like the Cold War domino 
theory that led to intervention against Communist regimes. According to Kopstein 
(2006), this differentiated the US approach from Europe, and was emphasized in the 
rhetoric of the intervention in Iraq in 2003. Though Iraq became important in recent 
years, MENA policies in the post-Cold War period rather illustrate the US focus on 
Jordan and Morocco, and to a lesser extent Egypt and Kuwait. These countries were 
considered pivotal in the US strategy of “domino effect” for democracy promotion 
(Carothers, 2003b; Haas, 2003). However, domino theory actually means that the 
regionalization of the US approach is rather weak, for the focus remains on 
targeting specific countries. The MEPI is thus only a regional complement that, as 
discussed above, actually relies on country-programs. The problem with this 
strategy is that the domino effect of democracy promotion is contingent and far 
from systematic, and thus regional democratization is elusive (Leeson & Dean, 
2007). This has also been proven in the longer term, as the US confronted similar 
ethical and strategic trade-offs in Vietnam. Indeed, the US support of South 
Vietnam as “democracy promotion” had been increasingly criticized in the late 60s 
and early 70s, and it was confirmed that Saigon’s regime was not freer nor more 
democratic (Kissinger, 1994, p. 667). The contemporary support for some regimes, 
such as Mubarak’s Egypt, corresponds to similar strategic “democracy promotion”. 
Though the regional approach for the MENA region only appeared explicitly in US 
policies in the GMENA and the initiatives under the Bush administration, it seems 
that the domino theory was somehow underlying earlier geopolitical moves.
By contrast, the European Union’s EMP was a policy of common structures 
based on democracy as a common value: an institutionalization of “soft power”. 
This approach involved replicating the EU regional setting for the MENA region 
and creating a Euro-Med space, which has been considered the example par 
excellence of EU normative power, with an institutional turn (Bicchi, 2006). Here, 
democracy promotion is not only based on socialization but, as Pevehouse (2005) 
analyzed, on regional organizations actually constraining and locking members into 
the democratization process. In this way, in view of the European geographical 
closeness to the MENA, contagion was planned as a sort of community
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convergence that would be rather unique to EU trends in external relations (Volpi,
2004).
Nevertheless, as I discussed above, in reality there was not one “common 
region” but two: on the one hand the EU was always more prosperous and more 
democratic, and on the other the MENA seemed locked in an opposite circle. The 
ambiguous EU approach (one Euro-Med region or cooperation between two in the 
ENP) created an additional tension and skepticism in the MENA, because either 
option was dominated by the EU and the MENA was at best co-opted into the 
common identity (Pace, 2006). This EU-domination undermined its legitimacy and 
challenged the regional policies of democracy promotion. Yet the attempt to solve 
this implied the co-optation of authoritarian regimes in the MENA: the paradox was 
evident and there could not be a “virtuous circle” between these securitization and 
democracy promotion.
This will be studied in the next section. The artificial regionalization and the 
underlying dynamics of contagion as a form of democracy promotion have thus far 
not succeeded in either the US or the EU approach. Despite their specificities, both 
had in common the fact that they rather responded to the promoters’ (and not the 
MENA) reality, including EU reflexivity and socialization. We now turn to study 
the third objective of democracy promotion policies, which were to go hand in hand 
with security and economic interests.
4. Addressing security and economic interests within “partnership”
A third important objective of US and EU democracy promotion was to foster
security and economic interests; this implied complex trade-offs and a broader 
question i.e. could this actually happen? Democracy promotion in the Middle East 
and North Africa region has not only been ideological and normative as discussed 
above; it has also been driven by interests. In the logic of a “virtuous circle” and the 
premises of Modernization and the Democratic Peace, it was assumed that it all 
could lead or be related to democratization. These security and economic interests 
were better framed in a regional approach because the Islamist terrorist threat was 
clearly transnational, and because economic growth should rely on open, free trade 
according to liberal principles.
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But security and economic factors would at times take over the agenda and 
when they were in conflict with democracy promotion, downgrade this to mere 
rhetoric. Though it is normal for foreign policy to try to conciliate diverse interests, 
the inconsistency was clearer in the Western relations with the MENA than in other 
regions. Potentially this implied vicious (instead of virtuous) dynamics as, in order 
to downplay the promoters’ image of domination and intervention, democracy 
promotion became a policy of “partnership” with autocratic regimes.
4.1.An exceptionally “soft” democracy promotion, based on spill-over 
and securitization
The MENA case has raised the harshest criticisms for double standards and hidden 
agendas (L. Anderson, 2001; Schlumberger, 2000), discrediting the task of 
democracy promotion as much as the actors, and maintaining a sort of “exceptional” 
treatment (Beilin, 2008; Carothers, 2008b; Ottaway, Brown, Hamzawy, Sadjadpour, 
& Salem, 2008). For example, in his analysis of policy papers informing USAID 
action, Carothers (1997, pp. 26-27) observed there was a particular focus on 
interests in the MENA case, and that USAID was even ready to use special methods 
of assessment for the status of democracy there, instead of a standard list of 
component institutions. Similarly, the European Union fostered the Agadir 
Agreement signed by Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco in 2001 to enhance free 
trade and harmonization with EU rules, which mentioned the potential of an Arab 
Common Market but no reference to democracy ("Agadir Agreement establishing a 
free trade area amongst Arab Euro-Mediterranean countries," 2004); this was 
different from the Cotonou and Lome agreements with ACP countries. According to 
Youngs (2002), EU democracy conditionality has clearly been weaker towards 
MENA than other regions: there was no real monitoring such as that established for 
the Copenhagen criteria for ECE, and no sanctions (suspension of aid, intention to 
use the human rights clause of bilateral agreements) such as those applied to some 
ACP-countries.
The MENA has thus been a sort of infamous exception in the American and 
the European approaches to democracy promotion. It is usual to have competing 
interests in foreign policy, but in this case addressing security and economic 
interests was misleadingly portrayed as compatible and benefiting from other
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policies when there was no evidence in this regard. The BMENA and MEPI 
specifically targeted democracy and the EMP allowed for cooperation for 
democracy as a principle, but this often materialized in a diversity of projects in 
areas such as energy, the environment, control of weapons of mass destruction, 
translation and information exchange. This pragmatic, compromise-bound 
“problem-solving” relied on the premise that there would be spillover from these 
policies into political reform. In this, US and EU policies towards the MENA region 
were typically functionalist; yet contrary to what Karl Deutsch and neofunctionalists 
observed, they gave too much importance to external factors instead of internal 
regional dynamics (Calleya, 1997; K. E. Smith, 2004, pp. 17-20). Indeed, policy­
makers were well aware of the little progress that existed or could be expected in 
practice both regarding democracy and MENA regionalization in view of some 
projects, concerning for example wind energy38. Eventually, in the EMP the 
thematic labels started to replace the regional, political objectives that were 
mentioned in the strategies (Lesser, 2004), confirming the downscaling of explicit 
EU democracy promotion.
Increasingly, security became the main objective of democracy promotion 
policies. The American rhetoric insistently linked democracy to security, despite the 
contested idea that democracy could combat terrorism [see Chapters 1 and 2]. The 
main policies and the more meaningful budgets were not adjusted to the democracy 
rhetoric, including bilateral aid packages, trade agreements and military joint 
ventures (Wittes, 2006). As a result, democracy promotion was harmed as a credible 
policy in the long term.
The European Union did not use the democracy rhetoric in the fight against 
terrorism as freely, but clearly targeted many of the same issues as the American 
approach. For Bicchi, securitization actually led the EMP “policy outburst” of the 
mid 1990s, deriving from concerns about migration and terrorism (Bicchi, 2007, pp. 
130-144). Indeed, in 2005, the EMP summit could only agree on a Declaration to 
Combat Terrorism, which showed the shortcomings of the EMP, the salience of 
security and by default the demise of democracy promotion as a goal. According to
38 In a research project with Notre Europe and Tunisian civil servants [October 2004], I participated 
in a discussion about a EU-Tunisia project on wind energy, and participants agreed to leave out the 
topic o f democracy promotion though in theory it had to be included.
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Gillespie (2003), cultural cooperation existed in the third basket, but there was a 
trend to de-politicize civil society requests.
This allowed co-existence with autocratic regimes that theoretically 
consented to reform, while promoters cashed in benefits in mainly three areas. First, 
economic advantage derived from open trade and safe energy supplies; second, 
security cooperation both to fight against terrorism and to scale down the Israeli- 
Arab confrontation; third, migration control in Europe. These issues were brought to 
the table as priorities and allowed the “partners” to bargain on democracy 
promotion with governments and in the Euro-Med Parliamentary Assembly. In the 
latter, the situation was discouraging for many European Parliamentarians and for 
some reform-minded MENA representatives39 because they had little power on the 
“hard issues” and could not move democracy up the agenda.
4.2. “Partnership” undermines credibility
American and European initiatives were framed as “partnership” to establish 
cooperation on equal terms and more specifically to rid democracy promotion of the 
shadow of Western interventionism. However, the framework was not truly 
reciprocal: it has been established that both for the MEPI and for the EMP 
(especially in its first years), all policy input and decision-making came from the 
promoter and not from the MENA countries (Dunne, 2005; Youngs, 2002). 
European Union documents built up the rhetoric of partnership (Euro- 
Mediterranean Study Commission, 2004), sometimes to the extent of unimaginable 
EU-MENA “exchanges regarding electoral practices” (Euromed, 2005)40.
In fact, partnership became a source of tension and a practical problem for 
democracy promotion. Though partnership safeguarded the sovereignty of the target 
country and took some emphasis off the Western predominance, in practice it 
translated in cooperation with laggard incumbent regimes. This was different from 
former European experiences of engagement with Eastern and Southern Europe; the 
post-Cold War era had led to an enthusiastic rhetoric and ambitious projects that 
were not upheld. This failure in turn undermined the prospects of democracy
39 Interview with Official, DG External Policies, European Parliament, Brussels 22 June 2005.
40 Indeed, no MENA teams have ever come to observe any European elections, while the EU and the 
US have significantly supported the processes in Morocco, Egypt, Bahrain, Kuwait and Palestine.
The “exchange” is obviously rather unidirectional.
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promotion, and there was evidence on both the promoters’ side and the target 
country’s.
On the one side, for the sake of “partnership”, Western leaders co-opted 
undemocratic leaders and overly praised the limited democratic progress in MENA 
countries [see 2005 EU-US Declaration quoted at the beginning of this chapter]. 
This undermined the policies’ credibility and arguably the US and EU leverage on 
the region, because this meant that even “soft power” was very limited. George W. 
Bush was swift to enumerate the reforms in the region in his speeches, emphasizing 
the elections in Kuwait and Bahrain (G. W. Bush, 2003a). By contrast, there was a 
crying absence of criticism regarding the most reluctant regimes. A 2008 example 
was Secretary of State Rice’s article “New American Realism”, that spoke of 
democracy promotion and the MENA region but conveniently ignored Saudi Arabia 
and Egypt (Rice, 2008). European leaders have shown similar support for MENA 
“partners”; Tunisia is one of the clearest cases. For example, Spanish President 
Zapatero praised “the Tunisian path to democracy” in a visit in 2004 (Soravilla 
Fernandez, 2006) and French President Sarkozy did the same during his visit in 
200741. This kind of discourse during official visits illustrates that European leaders 
have been themselves co-opted into acknowledging democratization for the sake of 
“partnership” [another, less harmful option could be not to make any declarations 
on this subject]. Indeed, throughout the post-Cold War period, Tunisia has 
continued to lack freedom of expression, and President Ben Ali’s repressive state- 
structure is (in)famous. As an example, if one compares Freedom House’s annual 
reports, in 1994-5 Tunisia scored 6 in Political Rights and 5 in Civil Liberties (7 
being the worst), and for 2008 the scores were 7 and 5 respectively42.
On the other side, the MENA regimes also bargained on “partnership” 
according to their own interests and resisted democratization (as if this were not an 
interest for the country). In practice, when the US and the EU intended to finance 
civil society (mainly NGOs) without state authorization (MEPI and the EIDHR both 
allowed for direct non-governmental applications), this was prevented by the 
regimes in power. For instance, Syria blocked international access to civil society 
altogether, and Egypt and Tunisia enforced NGO laws that allowed them to control
41 Sarkozy declared “Tunisia is making progress in the road of democracy” [Agence France Presse, 
Tunisia -Sarkozy’s perspective of the Mediterranean (Tunisie -La Medi terranee vue par Sarkozy),
11 July 2007].
42 Source: Freedom in the World, Freedom House, years 1994-5 and 2008.
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potential aid beneficiaries. This meant that democracy promotion funds went to the 
governments, which in turn controlled and limited reform to protect their own 
position (Beilin, 2008; Ottaway et al., 2008).
This also had important consequences to undermine democracy promotion, 
because it seemed merely rhetorical. One option was that the authoritarian regimes 
were clear “partners” in democracy promotion, the enterprise lost credibility for 
more honest reformers and the people in the countries. Another option was to 
(implicit or explicitly) oppose democracy promotion at large, because it was a 
policy of Western intervention and aggression: there could be no trust and 
“partnership” should be refused. This is based on an ideological argument that 
Halliday termed “regional narcissism” of the MENA, which authoritarian leaders 
have used to defend their legitimacy. According to  this, the West would be 
“endemically hostile to peoples in the region” and Ithe world can’t seize, and it 
should simply respect, MENA “uniqueness” (Halliday, 2005, pp. 10, 194). The 
European Union found itself in a more sensitive position to this argument because 
of its Member States’ colonial past, and EU policies have sought to handle these 
relations with care. Ottaway and Hamzawy think that the post-Cold War American 
imperialism and the 2003 Iraq intervention now put th(e US and the EU on a similar 
level as “aggressors” (Ottaway & Hamzawy, 2004). This is an inadequate 
generalization, but most importantly the real challenge is that this ideology sustains 
undemocratic legitimacy in the region and makes the objective of “partnership” 
backfire in democracy promotion policies.
Conclusion
Democracy promotion in the MENA region illustrated the evolving international 
roles of the United States and the European Union and the existence of 
“universalisms” in this regard. This was the case evem if their policies do not seem 
to have succeeded: throughout the post-Cold War period, internal regionalization 
did not develop, and the MENA continues to be domimated by autocracy. Regarding 
transatlantic relations, the joint declarations did not translate into common policies 
or a unified approach to the region. This was due tto the complex role that the 
MENA region played for Europe compared to the overly geopolitical, Realist 
approach from the United States (emphasized after 9/11). It was also due to the
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principles and dynamics of the two universalisms: divergent, if not opposed, 
democracy promotion approaches existed, even if both faced similar challenges 
emanating on the ground.
The chapter first introduced the main elements of the American 
Greater/Broader Middle East and MEPI and of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. 
This gave evidence of the multiple-agency in foreign policy and the way non-state 
actors also shaped democracy promotion policies. This case illustrated some 
nuances in this regard. For example, US presidential administrations (policy-cycles) 
required “short-term” policies and resulted in programs that may not last (e.g. 
MEPI), while the EU’s bureaucratic stability allowed for a “long-term” approach. 
The European longer-term, broader, process-oriented approach towards the MENA 
region materialized in policies of socialization, compared to American reliance on 
incentives and on Domino Theory. As the policies got closer to the implementation 
phase, the US-EU differences were blurred: many of the actors and democracy 
assistance programs in the field (sponsored by MEPI and MEDA-Democracy or 
EIDHR) were under both the US and the EU influence43. Along these lines, the 
view that US-EU differences shouldn’t be overestimated is shared by many Western 
policy advisors, including most participants of a CEPS conference on “American 
and European approaches to democratization in the European Neighbourhood” 
(Emerson, 2005) and of a similar conference at Stanford in October 2004.
The chapter discussed the three main features of the regional policies. Both 
American and European democracy promotion in the MENA region intended to, 
first, overcome the view of this Arab-Muslim region as a “cultural exception” to the 
third wave of democracy. Second, the US and the EU artificially encouraged a 
region to create democratic synergies, while the MENA-intemal regionalization 
remained weak. The EU was ambivalent, featuring a rhetoric of a “common” Euro- 
Med space but also a practice of othering the MENA as partners in the ENP. Third, 
the promoters made up “partnerships” for democracy with the region, but these
43 Indeed, there are many similarities among, for instance, the work undertaken by the American 
party foundations IRI and NDI and the British Westminster Foundation. In the field, many Western 
organizations and the organizations they co-opt in the field depend on the same Western public 
funding from American and European sources. As discussed in Chapter 2-3, at this level of the 
democracy promotion policy-chain, the different approaches are blurred. The overall themes of 
contracts and grants were similar; there was little European leverage regarding the abolition of the 
death penalty in practice, for instance, though this had been included in the 2000 EU Common 
Strategy.
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actually concealed unbalanced power-relations and economic and security interests; 
the “partnership” undermined the policies’ credibility. The chapter showed that 
American and European approaches had similar objectives, though for the EU they 
were more complex. Both devoted only limited resources to these policies (though 
the EU devoted more, and in a broader framework), and included security-oriented 
or purely administrative activities (translation, training on organizational skills, etc.) 
as “democracy promotion”. Unlike for the case of intervention in the DRC [Chapter 
4], EU hard-power means were never an option for the region.
This chapter documented the absence of meaningful transatlantic cooperation 
to promote democracy in the region. This happened despite policy advisers’ and 
academics’ arguments in favor of cooperation in the MENA; indeed, many had 
thought this could create new Western aims and restore transatlantic relations after 
the 2003 US-led intervention in Iraq (Ahlin et al., 2004; K. Campbell & Carroll, 
2005; Kupchan, 2007; Lugar, 2004; Sarotte, 2005). It is not accurate to speak of a 
confrontation, but there was a transatlantic disconnection regarding how to approach 
the MENA and how to promote democracy, strengthening the argument of “rival 
universalisms”.
On the one hand, the US carried more weight in the region: its hegemonic 
position had grown stronger after the end of colonialism and since the end of the 
Cold War (Satloff, 1997). US leadership was unquestionable, yet democracy 
promotion was low on the agenda and policies were contingent. A NATO 
Mediterranean Dialogue existed since 1994, but it remained marginalized in 
Washington. Then, in the light of the War on Terror, the US awakened this latent 
hegemony, intensifying its scope in the regional GMENA and MEPI initiatives. But 
this broad, transcontinental scope gave evidence of a geopolitical view that 
privileged interests and unilateralism. Importantly, the US sought European 
approval and association for its policies, failing to seize the complexity of Europe’s 
relations with the MENA and underlining the Europe’s own position.
On the other hand, for Europe the MENA was not a strategic choice but “a 
strategic reality” (Menotti, 2006). This chapter substantiated how Europe developed 
an original framework (reflexivity) towards the region, an illustration of its 
universalism [Chapter 2], This approach predated US regional strategies and only 
got stronger in the post-Cold War period, and the contrast (if not the competition) 
with the American approach was evident. In the 1990s, Southern Member States
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succeeded in creating a European position that was not unified from the beginning, 
but increasingly set up a structure inspired from the CSCE to which the EU 
committed a significant budget. On the basis of CFSP objectives, EU synergies 
made room for democracy promotion; here the Commission’s hand on policy design 
and the European Parliament’s interest on this theme were determinant. This state of 
affairs hinted at a consolidation of the MENA as a EU sphere of influence (Calleya, 
1997, p. 172; Hollis, 1997), and substantiated the EU’s role and identity as an 
international actor.
The MENA case illustrated the structural change of transatlantic relations, 
with European independent action throughout the period, and including tacit 
divergence from a common project to favor its own in 2003-4. Yet this did not mean 
“EU power” really manifested that significantly, because the EU-MENA relations 
did not overcome larger geopolitical dynamics or internal tensions within the 
region. Indeed, many Americans only discovered the EMP when the Europeans 
complained about their unilateral Greater Middle East and North Africa initiative in 
2004.
This chapter also threw light on the challenges that both promoters faced to 
trigger and support democracy in the MENA, which were linked to conceptual and 
procedural debates. These challenges affected the definition of democracy 
promotion, bringing in religious and cultural considerations. They also affected the 
(lack of) coherence of the US and the EU approaches, which were trapped in not 
such a positive “partnership” with the incumbent regimes. The chapter illustrated 
the gap between democracy promotion as an element in both American and 
European foreign policies, and as a complex practice that involves controversial 
political options and trade-offs.
The problems regarding the MENA’s prospects for democratization stemmed 
from the history of the state and the structure of society, with undemocratic elites 
leading politics and Islamist movements (not always or clearly favorable to 
democratization) often providing the only alternative profile. This case gave further 
evidence that there are no easy links to promote democracy in a “virtuous circle”. 
Economic Modernization (leaving behind clientelism and a economic-political elite 
domination) and security (in this case, the fight against terrorism) did not seem to 
easily match democracy promotion; instead, political compromising and trade-offs 
undermined US and EU policies. The chapter demonstrated that these challenges
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could not be addressed as “technical”, either reforming institutions or engaging 
incumbents. The focus on elections (procedural democracy) also proved its potential 
to backfire, as the case with Hamas’s 2006 victory in Palestine. It was observed that 
the promoting civil society was also conveyed as an expertise, yet importing lessons 
from other cases did not work. Democratic activism of civil society was ambiguous: 
broad, popular support for democratization was missing, and the strategy of 
Western support for NGOs was mixed. Similarly, he US and EU strategies did not 
adequately relate to the religious context in the region. Despite the rhetorical 
objective to defend the universality of democracy (and its compatibility with Islam), 
democracy promotion programs failed to be effectively open and inclusive. In the 
MENA, “learning by doing” in democracy promotion was also evident. The 
promoter’s strategy was patchy and required flexibility; practitioners on the ground 
had to adapt to imperfect situations on the ground, which sometimes translated into 
a picture of stalemate.
As democracy promoters, the US and the EU disregarded the potential for a 
transatlantic approach in the MENA region, and grounded their separate, “rival 
universalisms” and independent roles. This hypothesis was explored in the policies 
towards a country, the DR Congo, in Chapter 4, and here it has been substantiated 
vis-a-vis a region, which allowed discussing additional features and nuanced 
pictures of the US and the EU. Now the thesis moves on to a final case of US and 
EU democracy promotion with the study of a global initiative, the Community of 
Democracies.
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"hapter 6. Democracy promotion worldwide: American 
initiative and European reluctance in the Community of 
Democracies
“We will continue to work cooperatively to promote democratic governance around the world
and are prepared to encourage multilateral initiatives such as the Community of Democracies.”
(Declaration EU -  US Summit, Brdo 10 June 2008)
In their 2008 summit, the US and the EU adopted a Declaration where they 
supported the Community of Democracies as an effort to promote democracy 
“around the world” (EU-US, 2008). Bom as an American initiative in the second 
half of the Clinton administration, the Community of Democracies (CD) 
materialized in 2000 with a Ministerial Conference and the Warsaw Declaration, 
where more than one hundred countries met to uphold and promote democratic 
values and practices. This group included some controversial “democracies” such as 
Tunisia or Russia, but excluded for instance China. It also included most European 
countries, with Poland and the Czech Republic as members of the leading 
Convening Group.
The Warsaw Declaration was notably shunned by France. The French Foreign 
Minister Hubert Vedrine addressed the Conference to actually disapprove of the 
“triumphal, imposing” democracy promotion rhetoric. Vedrine later argued that he 
had meant to “correct the hubris of a West that should not forget its own history” 
and that he was not ready to give his blessing to “a holy alliance of democratic 
nations chosen by the Department of State alone, and on dubious grounds” 
(Vedrine, 2000). Rejecting this “new doctrine” was for him a way to stand up to the 
United States and search an alternative to “defend our own fundamental interests, 
French and European”. An American official censured this incident arguing that 
“107 countries came to the conference to support democracy, but only 106 really 
did it” (Krauze, 2000). The other Western European countries, which had adopted a 
low profile, considered this an unimportant anecdote.
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The Community of Democracies raises important questions about the 
potential and shortcomings of promoting democracy at global level. First, what 
would “democracy” mean in content, in such a universalized setting? Second, what 
would the CD mean in practice, notably vis-a-vis the global institution of the United 
Nations, would it substitute it or should it? Third, what would be the reaction of the 
world -European, and non-European countries—to this manifestation of American 
hegemony?
Overall this topic has received limited attention in academia, possibly because 
it has not had much success despite its potential for democracy promotion. Indeed, 
it is significant that the Warsaw event did not lead to a stronger institution in the 
context of the post-Cold War democratic excitement. CD conferences were 
organized as follow-up but they had limited weight in the diplomatic agendas; to 
this day, the CD is very little known of policy-makers. In this thesis, it provides for 
a pertinent case study to analyze US and EU democracy promotion at a global level, 
complementing the country case of the DR Congo (Chapter 4) and the region case 
of the Middle East and North Africa (Chapter 5).
This case study explores the functioning and policies of the CD and American 
and the European approaches in it, as well as the challenges of democracy 
promotion at this global, system-level. Since the Transatlantic alliance and NATO 
have themselves often been referred to as a “community of democracies” (Kupchan, 
1996; Risse-Kappen, 1995, p. 15), the chapter also assesses how the CD resonated 
with US-EU cooperation and/or confrontation. The chapter is structured as follows. 
Section 1 introduces the Community of Democracies, initiated by the US and 
triggering ambivalent European positions. Sections 2, 3 and 4 consider the three 
main goals that democracy promoters pursued with this initiative: to universalize 
and de-Westemize their policies, to seek agreement on a definition of democracy 
and its promotion, and to somehow institutionalize democracy promotion in the 
world. These objectives belonged to this initiative to promote democracy at the 
global level, and involved important shortcomings and challenges in practice. In its 
conclusions, the chapter unravels what this meant for American and European 
democracy promotion approaches, the transatlantic relationship, and underlines the 
controversies of such worldwide policies.
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1. The American initiative of the Community of Democracies: 
development and European ambivalence
The Community of Democracies is an ongoing international initiative to promote 
democracy at a global level, building on the momentum created after the Cold War 
and emanating from American policy-making circles. Along the same lines, there 
have been other calls to create a League of democracies or a Concert of 
democracies during the last decade, and these multilateral initiatives resembled the 
Community of Democracies very much (Ikenberry & Slaughter, 2006; Kagan, 2008; 
The Economist, 2007).
The Concert originated in Democratic circles, with such supporters as 
Daalder, Ikenberry, Lindberg and Slaughter. The League was defended by the 
Republican candidate John McCain in the 2007-8 presidential campaign; it received 
notable attention in the media and in Washington circles, and support from Kagan. 
McCain strongly criticized the limits of the United Nations and called for enhanced 
cooperation within a League (McCain, 2007). In this conservative line, a February 
2009 paper from The Heritage Foundation proposed a creation of a Global Freedom 
Coalition and the practical abandonment of the UN (Carafano & Brands, 2009). The 
Democratic plans also responded, to a certain extent, to the US frustration with the 
United Nations, but their critiques have been more careful. They mostly see the 
need for an alternative framework where democracies can agree to act when the UN 
will (or can)not, but the liberal universalism underpinning this is wider: “[The 
Concert would be] the institutional embodiment and ratification of the democratic 
peace” (Ikenberry & Slaughter, 2006, p. 25).
These plans usually mix two themes: to create an exclusive (democracies- 
only) multilateral framework to manage international security, and to promote 
democracy worldwide, which leads to dilemmas about inclusion (the ideal is large- 
N and eventually the whole world) and about conditionality (carrot, sticks and 
rewards). These multiple themes and other conceptual and pragmatic challenges 
also existed in the CD, which is analyzed in detail in this section. First I assess the 
ministerial conferences, the promoters in the Convening Group and the main
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documents. I then move on to discuss the American and the European positions in 
it.
1.1. Ministerial Conferences, a Convening Group, American 
management bodies, and declaratory documents
The CD has mainly consisted of a series of Ministerial Conferences and has lacked 
a permanent structure. In between the conferences, and especially during the months 
before conferences take place, there was active preparation from diplomatic and 
also from non-governmental forums. The main actors in the CD have been a series 
of countries in a “Convening Group”, they had the initiative and also had decision­
making power, notably regarding the invitation process, i.e. deciding which 
countries could be included in the gatherings of the Community of Democracies. It 
must be noticed that the country hosting the conference on each occasion also had 
significant leeway, both regarding final invitations and the drafting of documents.
Table 9 summarizes the main information about the four Conferences (2000- 
2008), the countries in the Convening Group, the documents adopted, and the main 
actions/events in the institution from one Conference to the next, in chronological 
order.
For the first conference, the United States and Poland decided initially which 
countries to invite to co-convene the Warsaw Conference; subsequently the 
Convening Group decided on the new members they added by consensus but 
arguably without strict criteria: they went on to be seven, ten, and sixteen (2007) 
countries in the Convening Group. The group composition illustrates the objective 
of an “internationalized” and “de-Westemized” initiative: though the US was the 
clear leader, it emphasized multilateralism and especially brought in non-Westem 
democracies. The Convening Group decided on the invitation process for the 
conferences and was dominated by bargaining between conference organizers, fund 
providers for specific initiatives (e.g. an Indian project for micro-credit, a Hungarian 
research center) and the main driving force of the United States.
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Table 9. Community o f Democracies Ministerial Conferences -chronology, membership o f Convening Group, Documents adopted
Venue
(number of 
countries)
Date Convening Group Documents) adopted
Warsaw
(107)
June 2000 Czech Rep, Chile, India, the Republic of 
Korea, Mali, Poland and the United 
States
Declaration: Toward a Community of Democracies
-> Council for a Community of Democracic 
-> creation of Task Force for research 
creation of the Democracy Coalition Pro
;s continues in charge of management 
ect
Seoul
(105)
November 2002 governments above + Portugal, South 
Africa, Mexico Plan of Action: Democracy: Investing for Peace and Prosperity 
Statement on Terrorism
-> Global strategy for Democracy Education, 2003 (project led by CCD)
Democracy Coalition Project + Freedom House issue assessment /recommendations on invitations 
first convening of the United Nations Democracy Caucus, 2004 (Chilean chairmanship) 
Non-governmental Process regional roundtables established
Santiago de 
Chile
(122)
April 2005 shifting 1
Commitment: cooperating for democracy
-> Democracy Fund in place
International Advisory Committee
International Steering Committee of the Non-governmental Process
Bamako
(147)
November 2007 (16 as of 2006) governments above + the 
Philippines, Mongolia, Morocco, El 
Salvador, Cape Verde, Italy)
Consensus on Democracy, development and poverty reduction
-> Permanent secretariat created in Warsaw
Source: primary documents from the conferences and the diverse bodies of the CD (CCD, 2006a, 2006b; Community of Democracies Ministerial Conference, 2000,2002a, 2005,2007;
Convening Group, 2003).
1 During these years, Italy and Romania played important roles leading some initiatives, and Peru was among the conveners for some of the UN Democracy Caucus activities. 
Yet, the membership of the Convening Group (from 10 to 16) was made official only in 2006.
236
It is widely acknowledged that US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright played a 
key role organizing the first meeting of the Community of Democracies in 
Warsaw (2000), together with the Polish foreign minister Bronislaw Geremek1. 
Poland and the Czech Republic (EU candidate countries at the time) were among 
the most involved in the CD initiative. The Council for a Community of 
Democracies (CCD) developed and monitored the agenda. Subsequently, a Task 
Force was created to further research on the possibilities of global democracy 
promotion. This task force was associated with the Council on Foreign Relations, 
which regularly informs American foreign policy. Other informal settings had 
been foreseen, such as “a cadre of trained experts to assist countries facing a threat 
to democracy”, but were never really in place (Community of Democracies 
Ministerial Conference, 2002a).
Instead, CD-specific bodies would be constituted later, including the Council 
for a Community o f Democracies, the Democracy Coalition Project, the 
International Advisory Committee, and the Non-governmental Process (Halperin 
& Bagley, 2002). A permanent Secretariat in Warsaw was foreseen for 2009. This 
series of “management” bodies was important for two reasons. First, it gave 
evidence of the technical point of view of this global democracy promotion 
project; they claimed to achieve the common, public good of democracy. Second, 
many others perceived these activities as the clear “American hand” on the CD, 
because they were all based in Washington, D.C., mostly using American (public 
and private) funds and personnel. This American leadership happened to a certain 
extent by default because that is where the initiative stemmed , and this was the 
case even if these bodies were proactively open and inclusive, and even if this 
angered their directors3.
The Council for a Community o f Democracies has a long history as a 
platform or group of individuals working on democracy initiatives, including the
1 The project counted many other supporters within the Democratic party, such as Anthony Lake 
(Assistant to Clinton for National Security policy), and also benefited from George Soros’s 
support. In Poland, as in the rest of Eastern and Central Europe, the context of “one decade after 
the Berlin Wall fall” was symbolic.
2 For example, the Malian embassy in Washington D.C. worked with the CCD, the DCP and the 
LAC to organize the 2007 conference. The only time the US influence was maybe less important 
was around the 2004 Santiago conference, when the Chilean organization Participa played an 
important role in the non-governmental process.
3 The DCP Executive Director strongly disagreed with my argument that these bodies did show 
the “American hand” over the CD [email exchange with DCP, 10 January 2008].
Association to Unite the Democracies of the early 1990s and a network of CCDs 
at different cities4. The CCD connects non-governmental and governmental action; 
it is an independent body mainly working with grants from foundations, but it has 
actually contributed to the institutionalization of the CD with the preparation of 
the Conferences and the implementation of some decisions. This way, on the one 
hand it was able to support dissidents in non-democratic countries, and coordinate 
CD non-governmental action internationally i.e. the Non-governmental Process. 
On the other it helped diplomats plan the Conferences, and briefed the UN 
Democracy Caucus meetings. In the period 2000-2005, the CCD funding 
amounted to USD 1,15 million, 62% came from foundations donations [CCD own 
sources].
The Democracy Coalition Project begun in June 2001 as an NGO funded 
with a grant from the Open Society Institute, and has contributed to the CD with 
research and advocacy, roughly as a think tank. On the one hand it undertook 
independent research projects on democracy, notably a Report/Assessment on 
whether and how countries were promoting democracy (Herman & Piccone, 
2002). On the other hand, it sought to influence CD action, for instance shaming 
CD members for failing to side with the Democracy Caucus at the United Nations 
as they had agreed. The DCP was especially important in enhancing CD visibility 
and support, coordinating some activities and overall participating in a wide 
network of think tanks, NGOs and other organizations such as the Club de 
Madrid5. This illustrated the connections between actors (networks of activists) 
and the multiple influences of non-state actors in democracy promotion policy­
making [Chapter 3]. The DCP was independent and also supported the CD goals 
with assessments and academic study, insisting on the “technical” aspects of
4 The Association to Unite the Democracies was established in 1992 and later became the 21st 
Century Foundation. In 1989, advocacy/policy support groups called “CCD” existed in London, 
Seattle, Paris, Stockholm, Tokyo, Cote d’Ivoire, Sydney... but without a common goal. The 
individuals include (former) officials from the Foreign Service, such as Mark Palmer and Bob La 
Gamma, with long careers in democracy-related activities. For instance Palmer was one of the 
authors of Ronald Reagan’s famous Westminster speech in 1982. This illustrates the complexity 
of non-state actors (networks of civil society activists, at times members of government or 
bureaucracies) in democracy promotion.
5 Founded in October 2001, the Club de Madrid gathers former heads of state and government 
from democratic countries. Representatives of the Club de Madrid have participated at CD 
Conferences independently, too: a 9-member delegation attended the Santiago CD and presented 
the Madrid Agenda document to the meeting, former French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin gave a 
speech at the Bamako CD. In addition, the DCP has partnerships with, among others, the Madrid- 
based think tank FRIDE, and key NGOs in the democracy promotion arena as Freedom House 
and the NED-sponsored World Movement for Democracy.
238
democracy promotion; however, it was also affected by domestic politics [Chapter 
2]. Though not openly, the DCP sympathized with Democratic approaches, 
opposing and seeking to influence some Republican policies during the Bush 
administration6.
The DCP also supported and gave wider clout to the International Advisory 
Committee (IAC) work in 2006-7. The IAC was a group of non-partisan, 
prestigious personalities who sought to depoliticize the CD invitation process, 
advising the Convening Group on the countries that should be invited. This 
Committee and the DCP (which acted as Secretariat and hosted the research 
project) elaborated their own assessment for the invitations to Bamako 20077.
In addition, the CCD and the DCP also fostered and supported the Non­
governmental Process o f the Community o f Democracies. The Process was a clear 
illustration of the transnational networks of activists that have come to define 
contemporary democracy promotion [Chapter 3], as it was meant to 
counterbalance the ministerial conferences with civil society participation. This 
movement became increasingly coordinated thanks to an International Steering 
Committee, and it issued advisory documents in parallel with ministerial events. 
Here American and some European party foundations became dominant in 
agenda-setting and organization, though there was an important effort to include 
civil society activists from all regions8. The Non-governmental Process had a 
double role: to watch and influence public policy and to enhance bottom-up 
democracy. For example, they prepared a Handbook fo r  Diplomats that gave 
practical ideas on how to engage with grassroots organizations, and they sought to 
finance NGOs and, somewhat controversially, political parties on the ground 
(Barrios, 2007, pp. 4-5).
The CD is characterized by these bodies, but also (more officially) by the 
documents it has adopted. As they were the result of compromise and consensus, 
and they have been declaratory, they did not contribute to raise the CD’s
6 The DCP (with Madeleine Albright’ s-leadership and Soros-fiinds) was, for some critics, the 
cradle for the Democrats affiliated to the Community of Democracies initiative. Among them, 
executive directors Morton Halperin and Ted Piccone had worked as officials during the Clinton 
administration.
7 Internal Methodology note of the Secretariat of the IAC available at 
http://www.demcoalition.org/pdJ7II_Methodology_note.pdf
8 In a first stage, the Open Society Institute and Participa did not underline the role of party 
foundations, but these seemed very important in Bamako. Notably, European participants were 
co-opted this way (Italian, Dutch, UK party foundations were represented).
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international profile or grant it teeth. Yet these documents offer interesting insights 
on how democracy promotion worked at this level. In 2000, participant states 
issued a Declaration that constituted the founding document of the CD and 
intended to become a reference to democracy promotion worldwide. The 
subsequent documents were shaped by the conference hosts or the general 
international atmosphere. Thus, in the light of 9/11 and the subsequent War on 
Terror, the Seoul Conference (2002) brought up the link between democracy and 
peace with a Statement on Terrorism. This Statement acknowledged that 
“terrorism is a threat to democratic societies” and also that “democratic principles 
and institutions [...] are crucial elements in endeavors to combat terrorism” 
(Community of Democracies Ministerial Conference, 2002b), replicating the 
paradigm of a “virtuous circle” underpinning democracy promotion.
Though documents adopted by the CD were declaratory (Plan of action, 
Commitment, Consensus), the wording and clauses were carefully debated and 
agreed upon. For example, when debating the Bamako Consensus in the formal 
session, the initial draft said that the CD’s objective was “to protect democracy” 
(Article 2). However, some states opposed thinking this could lead to intervention 
in the name of democracy. This was changed to the more politically correct “to 
support democracy” in the final document, thereby thwarting any potential for 
intervention legitimized under CD principles.
1.2. Disconnection in the CD: American initiative, European division 
and reluctance
American leadership in and management of the initiative were clear from the 
events and structures discussed above, but the evidence of American-European 
competition in the Community of Democracies was not conclusive. On the one 
hand, Europe was divided and Eastern European countries were overall 
supportive. On the other, more than opposition, there was a reluctance to support 
the initiative in some Western European states; they were unenthusiastic about the 
initiative when not outright critical. The context of EU enlargement adds some 
nuance here, as Western MS were investing heavily in democracy promotion in 
Eastern Europe (future MS). With the CD, Eastern European countries had a
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chance to become democracy promoters instead of targets, and increase their 
international clout by allying with the US.
It is an important observation that Europe failed to build a unified role under 
the European Union regarding the Community of Democracies; there was no 
common reaction or coordination of positions whatsoever. According to an EU 
official, this item never even made it to the Council’s agenda, and there are no 
records of it in the European Parliament9. At Bamako, another EU official 
admitted that “the Conference was solely a Member State issue”, though a discreet 
representation of the Commission Delegation in Mali attended one of the 
sessions10. The Commission Delegation in the field thus kept track of the event, 
but it could not channel policy-advice or initiative up to Brussels institutions. This 
lack of unity and of interest could seem paradoxical in the hypothesis of an 
enhanced role for the EU as international democracy promoter. However, the EU 
reluctance may have derived from the CD being an American-led initiative with 
low profile that was seemingly “dividing” Europe -the passivity was possibly an 
active strategy if not repositioning the EU, at least clearly not positioning it as an 
unconditional follower of US democracy promotion.
The content of the policies themselves was not the reason for this lack of 
cooperation. For example, one important aspect of the CD has been its support for 
the individuals, i.e. political activists (in the opposition), compared to fostering 
structural, institutional changes. As I argued in Chapter 1, the support of dissidents 
has sometimes been framed as an “American” method of democracy promotion, 
but this can’t be considered an exclusivity. Indeed, Europeans have often 
supported these initiatives (sometimes indirectly, through funding) and Polish, 
Czech and traditionally British and Nordic states’ policies have all supported 
political dissidents. But in any case this was an important aspect in this global 
initiative, illustrating usual dynamics of democracy promotion: many dissidents 
attended the CD as part of the Non-Governmental Process. Some individuals were 
invited even though, or precisely because, their country had not been invited e.g. 
from Venezuela and Myanmar (in Bamako 2007). Other dissidents were also 
invited, even if they came from countries that actually had official representation
9 Email exchange with official from the Council, 20 September 2007.
10 Interview with political advisor, Delegation of the European Commission [Bamako, 16 
November 2007].
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at the CD, such as Egypt and the Philippines. American non-governmental 
institutions (e.g. Freedom House) invited these individuals. They sometimes met 
in private with American officials, including under-Secretary of State Paula 
Dobriansky in Chile in 2005 (Committee on International Relations, 2005).
If it was not the policies content, it seems that the method of “fake 
multilateralism” explained Western European capitals’ reluctance during these 
years. Some European officials plainly stated “the CD is no multilateral enterprise, 
just an American project”11. Despite American impetus, the fact is that the CD 
conferences remained “low profile” events, often attended by low-ranking officials 
in the foreign ministries. The Warsaw conference was by far the best attended 
one12. By Santiago, only one foreign minister from Western Europe attended13, 
though the foreign ministers of Hungary, Ukraine and Croatia attended. By 
contrast, foreign ministers from all South America and from Canada, Mexico 
usually attended, and either Deputy Secretaries or the Secretary of State 
represented the US.
On the US side, the CD resonated with the American, bipartisan mission. As 
presidential candidate John McCain declared in his defence of the idea of a League 
of Democracies:
“When our nation was founded over two hundred years ago, we were the 
world’s only democratic republic. [...]We were right to struggle for 
democracy then, and we are right to do so now. The vision [...] is not a 
Republican vision, not a Democratic vision, it is an American vision. 
(McCain, 2007)
But on the Western European side this did not really sound “multilateral”, so 
transatlantic cooperation was elusive. This reticence was however ambiguous, and 
in many occasions the rhetoric of transatlantic democracy promotion, including for 
global initiatives, kept coming up as if the Community of Democracies did not 
exist (Timothy Garton Ash, 2007; Miliband, 2008; Rasmussen, 2008). For
11 A Dutch official maintained that this spirit was generalized in European foreign ministries 
[interview Bamako, 15 November].
12 According to Hubert Vedrine (French foreign minister at the time), Geremek and Albright 
ardently invited high representations (i.e. foreign ministers) and personally asked him to attend.
13 Moratinos, from Spain; yet this was exceptional and probably due to the links between Spain and 
Latin America, since he did not attend the Bamako conference in 2007.
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instance, in a speech that introduced the EU as a reinforced power and praised
transatlantic cooperation (especially NATO), the Danish Prime Minister called for
“a strengthened transatlantic partnership [that] should form the nucleus of 
an alliance of democracies”, “a global alliance [that] would be more 
powerful than the sum of its participants” (Rasmussen, 2008).
Clearly this completely ignored the CD, but it seemed it sought to re-invent it: 
would it this time be framed as an idea coming from Europe, an alternative 
universalism?
In the American bodies of the CD, officials had been aware that the Western 
European lack of interest was problematic. The Council for a Community of 
Democracies acknowledged:
“It is vital that Western Europe and the institutions of Europe and Asia 
become more deeply involved. So far Western European countries and 
EU institutions are much less active in the Community of Democracies 
than the US and some Eastern and Central European countries.” (CCD, 
2006b)
They then sought to co-opt European countries, allocating part of its budget 
exclusively to “building a European network” (CCD, 2006b). As an example of 
this policy, Charles Heck was dispatched to a number of European capitals in July 
2003 and October 2004 to gather support for the CD. As North-American Director 
of the Trilateral Commission, Heck’s diplomatic tour was an important symbol of 
the CD for cooperative transatlantic relations. This policy implied that both United 
States and European support were needed as promoters for a multilateral CD to 
work.
2. Globalizing and de-Westernizing democracy promotion
Promoting democracy at the world level implied one important first objective: to
globalize but also to “de-Westemize” this quest. This meant that, in the post-Cold 
War period, universal democracy had to be inclusive, but also not “owned” and 
spread by the West [Chapter 1]. The premise of democratic universalism meant 
that the CD could target all countries or most (“large-N”). Ownership by non- 
Westem countries would also increase the legitimacy of international democracy
243
promotion. Thus the CD sought to dilute the Western “core” in this initiative14. 
This was also interpreted as an opportunity for countries as Japan and Australia to 
move closer to the Atlantic alliance (The Economist, 2007). Similarly, for Benner 
(2007), the UN Democracy Caucus that was associated with the CD was a chance 
to move away from “the atmosphere of ‘the West vs. the rest’ that currently 
poisons the United Nations”. The CD thus sought to raise its international profile 
with policies of broad inclusion and of multilateralism (regional organizations and 
the UN).
2.1. Inclusion to the largest-N and non-Western conference venues
The objective of globalization and “de-Westernization” of the Community of
Democracies was pursued with two policies. First, the CD aimed to include the 
largest number of states from the world possible. Second, it sought to appoint non- 
Westem countries for the conference venues, and to open space for their 
leadership and decision-making in the Convening Group15.
Table 10. Non-Western conference venues and large-N inclusion in the 
Community o f Democracies
Ministerial Conference 
venue
Number of states 
represented
Warsaw 107
Seoul 105
Santiago 122
Bamako 147
As the Table above shows, the total number of countries attending each 
conference rose for each Ministerial Conference, though obviously they were not 
all democratic. For Santiago de Chile this included many of the island states in the 
Caribbean, and for Bamako (Mali) many African states that until then had not 
attended CD meetings (precisely because of low democratic standards).
14 At the beginning the participation of Western Europe was taken for granted and the real driver 
was to include countries from the rest of the world. Nevertheless, as discussed above, the CD later 
included some lobbying in Western Europe, so the “de-Westernization” was relative.
15 Membership in the Convening Group also tried to be representative of all continents, see Table 
10.
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The logic behind this large-N inclusion of the CD was to increase its clout 
by becoming truly global, and this aspect differentiates the CD from other 
initiatives that arose in American policy debates. The Democratic proposals of the 
Alliance (Daalder & Lindsay, 2004) or the Concert o f Democracies (Ikenberry & 
Slaughter, 2006) sought a mid-way, open to large inclusion but determined to keep 
non-democratic states out. The proposals coming from Republican think-tanks, as 
the Global Freedom Coalition (Carafano & Brands, 2009) or Kagan’s (2008) 
League o f Democracies purposely reduced the membership of the group to 
confirmed, Western-friendly democracies.
The CD was also different in that it increasingly focused on democracy 
promotion, and reminded with this policy of the method of socialization. However 
it was not easy to practice exclusion and globalization simultaneously (Carothers, 
2008a; Halperin & Piccone, 2008). The policy of large-N inclusion implied 
important trade-offs for the Community of Democracies, as it endorsed a frail 
definition of “democracy” by co-opting maybe too many states with dubious 
credentials [see 3.2. below]. Yet again, once some dubious democracies were in, 
leaving others out was increasingly difficult, and the political preferences of the 
organizers would be exposed (for example, Mubarak’s Egypt OK, but not 
Chavez ’ s V enezuela).
The large-N inclusion of the CD is also undermined by the paradox of 
creating a “community” that actually seeks comprehensive, worldwide inclusion 
as a goal. Indeed, any community implies exclusion vis-a-vis some “other” who is 
not a member16. In the CD, democracy would be the distinctive element and 
commonality, even the community’s raison d’etre -but if the CD assumed global 
inclusion as its achievable goal, there is potentially no “other” in the long run, so 
no logic in calling for a “community”.
Secondly, it is relevant that the Community of Democracies did not celebrate 
its first venue (or any other, thus far) in Washington D.C. where it was initiated. 
The choice of Warsaw for the co-organization was symbolic in 1998-9, when the 
initiative gathered momentum: not one of the classical Western European allies 
but at the same time Europe, and a new democracy. This gave evidence of the will
16 The literature on security communities acknowledges this element, even when there is no 
narrowly defined enemy against which the community organizes. For this reason, notions of 
security community are close to alliance (e.g. NATO), and in this sense the initiative o f a 
Community of democracies is conceptually different.
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to make post-Cold War transatlantic relations evolve, while projecting an image of 
newly successful, globalized democracy promotion. It was not accidental that the 
Community of Democracies subsequently brought its ministerial conferences to 
Seoul (South Korea), Santiago de Chile, and Bamako (Mali). In this global tour of 
democracy, the effort to downplay Western leadership and management in the 
process was evident.
Along the same lines, the Convening Group sought to include countries that 
were instances of non-Westem democracies in all continents, such as India (2000), 
South Africa (2002), or Mongolia (2006). The CD thus earned some valid points 
as a “manifestation of the global agreement on democratic values” (Krauze, 2000).
This inclusion and focus on non-Westem countries had other implications. 
First, it ceded some agenda-setting power to the host countries, who shifted the 
CD debates to fulfill their own perspectives and priorities. Two important 
examples of this were Chile’s emphasis on regional multilateralism (notably the 
Organization of American States) to drive democracy promotion, and Mali’s 
emphasis on development and poverty reduction. The documents adopted in these 
venues reflected these priorities (Community of Democracies Ministerial 
Conference, 2005, 2007). For example, Latin American participants were very 
active in 2005, to the extent that the Commitment adopted explicitly mentioned the 
“inter-American system for the protection of human rights and the inter-American 
Democratic Charter” as a model to replicate in other regions. Indeed, regional 
organizations and poverty reduction were not classical elements in American 
democracy promotion.
Host countries also had the last word on invitations to the conferences. For 
example, Mali decided to invite many African countries that were previously left 
out or their low democratic standards. Mali also denied entry-visas to members of 
a Taiwanese NGO that had participated in previous CD conferences as part of civil 
society17. This was a clear friendly signal to undemocratic China, but a 
problematic sign for the CD (Diallo, 2007). Western NGO activists and some 
American organizers felt deceived with these dynamics.
17 Taiwan has attempted to join the Community of Democracies formally but it has been a non­
invitee in all conferences. Reports from Democracy Coalition Project have recommended to invite 
Taiwan since 2004, which is quite a daring, controversial position.
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Another implication of shifting the focus away from the West was that this 
partly condemned the CD to a lower international profile, because Western 
leadership is often a powerful driver in the world. This way, an international 
ministerial conference at Washington D.C. is likely to draw more ministers and 
wider communication coverage than one in Bamako. In sum, these elements 
attempted to “de-Westernize” the CD, but it is uncertain that it benefited the CD 
because of some of the implications and because it was still perceived as an 
American project.
2.2. Multilateralism in the CD: regional organizations and the United 
Nations
The objective of globalization and “de-Westemization” was enhanced with the 
calls for an increased role for regional organizations and the incipient work 
undertaken within the United Nations. This policy derived from liberal circles in 
the CD policy-making, in contrast with the traditional opposition of American 
conservatives. This brought the CD closer to conventional multilateral methods, 
but a number of challenges arose when this was put into practice.
Regionalism as a method in global democracy promotion had already been 
mentioned in the Seoul Plan of Action of 2002, but it materialized in the run-up to 
the Santiago conference. Then, there was very active involvement of the 
Organization of American States (OAS), which had already offered to coordinate 
action by regional institutions back in 2000. The OAS held meetings and one 
conference to organize the CD in 2004, it circulated preparatory material, and 
sponsored the participation of small states such as St. Lucia, which had not 
attended the previous events. Notably, there were discussions for the OSCE to 
replicate this CD preparatory and organizational work in Europe. Other than the 
lack of enthusiasm in Western European capitals, this posed the problem of 
Russian hostility to democracy promotion activities (including electoral 
observation) in the OSCE, but American organizers thought that precisely this 
would be a way to co-opt Russia, which was participating in the CD. Finally, there 
was no follow up of this OSCE idea.
The role of regional organizations to safeguard and promote democracy 
through contagion and conditionality had been documented widely (Pevehouse,
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2005). Thus, it made sense to develop democracy promotion through the OAS or 
any other organization, and this also constituted a way for the CD to anchor 
multilateralism. Nevertheless, when the CD sought to develop cooperation with 
other regional institutions, this brought in new difficulties regarding the potential 
division of tasks and duplication of forums. The African Union and ASEAN did 
not respond actively, and within Latin America MERCOSUR saw potential 
rivalry. Another main problem was the fact that the European Union was absent 
from such discussions, since it was considered the model of regional cooperation 
and democracy promotion. Clearly its absence thwarted this CD effort.
Multilateralism was then enhanced in the cooperation between the CD and 
the United Nations, but “multilateralism” means that the UN is a diplomatic forum 
where states negotiate, and inclusion of non-democracies is its cornerstone. This 
topic is of special interest in this thesis because of the post-Cold War challenges to 
this conception and the pro-democracy stands of Secretary Generals and 
documents from the General Assembly [Chapter 1]. The vision of a United 
Nations safeguarding non-intervention and state-sovereignty has been challenged 
by calls for the UN to participate in democracy promotion, eventually as an 
institution made up of democracies (Newman & Rich, 2004). In this sense, the UN 
would become the Community of Democracies, but Newman’s claim is that 
democracy was supposed to be a cornerstone of the United Nations when it was 
created, and that in this sense the post-Cold War period could actually allow a 
return to this original purpose. However this may have been the American original 
idea of the UN, but the post-World War II reality led to a UN of clear state 
sovereignty and non-intervention. These principles continue to be unchallenged, 
and this is why some projects such as the Concert or the League are usually 
opposed and alternative to the UN (Daalder & Lindsay, 2004; Kagan, 2008). By 
seeking to work with the UN (and trying to influence it), the CD tried a more 
conciliatory approach.
In the rhetoric, CD documents have made clear that this forum does not 
intend to substitute for the UN. Along these lines, the Warsaw Declaration made 
reference to “cooperation with international organizations” and UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan himself addressed the forum on that occasion. All the 
subsequent documents adopted at the ministerial conferences have explicitly 
referred to respecting the UN. In practice, the CD sought to influence the UN and
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was involved in the creation of a UN Democracy Fund and a UN Democracy 
Caucus. These proposals reflected American projects of cooperation among 
democracies within the UN, some going back to the 1980s (Convening Group, 
2003; Piccone, 2005). The plans to reinforce a CD-group and CD-initiatives within 
the UN already appeared in the communique issued right after the Warsaw 
Conference (CCD, 2006b) and have continued throughout, but with limited 
success.
Regarding the Fund, the Santiago Commitment still “looked forward to the 
creation of the Fund” in 2003, and in a speech before the UN General Assembly 
on 21 September 2004, George W. Bush reiterated this wish. Eventually, the UN 
Democracy Fund has been established in July 2005, but difficulties in the 
processes of appropriation and allocation have nevertheless haunted it up until 
200818.
The UN Democracy Caucus convened for the first time in September 2004, 
led by the Chilean foreign minister in her capacity as chair of the CD. Until then, 
there had been an informal democracy caucus at the Commission of Human Rights 
(Democracy Coalition Project, 2002). In 2004, the Caucus formally endorsed four 
thematic resolutions, on torture, cooperation among religions, regional cooperation 
to strengthen democracy, and women’s status. However, CD members continued 
to prioritize regional or North-South alliances when casting their votes in the GA, 
as is traditional in the UN system. The thematic, cross-regional caucus on 
democracy made little headway against that. Thus, Western countries continued to 
ally regularly on democracy issues, but countries that were supposed to be CD 
“leaders” such as South Africa or India also kept their traditional alliances even if 
this meant going “against” the CD [despite the intention of CD “de- 
Westemization”, the caucus corresponded with traditional Western allies]. For 
example, the Democracy Caucus sought to make a difference in cases such as 
Sudan, Myanmar or Zimbabwe, but votes from the dozens of non-Westem 
members of the CD did not automatically follow (Democracy Coalition Project, 
Freedom House, CDD -Ghana, & Bertelsmann Institute, 2007).
18 Information and data on current projects available from http://www.un.org/democracyfund/.
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3. Defining democracy promotion: a consensual definition 
“subject to interpretation” and low standards derived from 
inclusion de facto
The second goal that the Community of Democracies pursued was to agree and 
establish some common global grounds on what democracy meant, as a basis on 
which to promote it. In this regard, the CD proposed a definition of democracy and 
sought to provide “technical” answers to the controversial questions on how to 
identify and “measure” democracy, disregarding the conceptual debates and 
inherent normativity of democracy promotion [Chapter 1]. In practice, the CD run 
into problems because as it included among its ranks many states with their own 
“democratic” characteristics, it endorsed a hollow definition. This section 
analyzes, first, the CD proposals of democratic assessment and the challenges this 
involved. It then discusses the large-N inclusion of the CD where the definition of 
“democracy” was watered down.
The CD struggled with two main problems. On the one hand, each country could 
potentially “interpret” the terms of the definition agreed upon. On the other hand, 
the CD introduced categories of CD members to try to respect democratic 
principles, and to use them as incentive or sanction: it differentiated between “full 
participants”, “observers” and “not-invited” countries. This was nevertheless 
hampered by inconsistency and politicized decisions.
3.1. Definition of democracy: different interpretations and controversial 
methods
Academic definitions of democracy have tended to focus on the procedures and 
achieved significant consensus on the essential elements (Schmitter & Karl, 1991). 
By contrast, democracy promotion initiatives, and the CD among them, adopt such 
definitions but have enormous difficulty to apply them: to trigger reform, to make 
states and elites comply, and to make sure that the implementation is not in 
disagreement with other basic elements (human rights, rule of law, development, 
security). The CD upheld a definition of democracy that allowed different 
countries to focus on different things, and created its own assessments and an
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Advisory Committee to establish this consensus. But this also involved some 
problems.
In the Warsaw Declaration and the Seoul Plan of Action, the CD proposed a 
definition of democracy that all signatories could agree upon, as follows 
(Community of Democracies Ministerial Conference, 2000, 2002a).
Box 9. Definition o f democracy promotion according to the CD
The essential elements of representative democracy in all its forms are:
- respect for human rights -  civil, political, economic, social and cultural -  including freedom of 
expression, freedom of the press, and freedom of religion and conscience;
- access to and free exercise of power in accordance with the rule of law',
- the holding of periodic free and fair elections based on secret balloting and universal suffrage 
monitored by independent election authorities;
- freedom of association including the right to form independent political parties;
- separation of powers, especially an independent judiciary;
- constitutional subordination of all state institutions, including the military, to the legally- 
constituted civilian authority.
In theory the principles in this definition are consensual, and the CD insists 
that this does not lead to any specific model. In this sense, there was no distinction 
between a European and an American view of democracy, though this could have 
been a forum to defend, for example, the European position on the abolition of the 
death penalty (a theme usually put forward in United Nations forums).
In practice however, the definition and its accompanying list of nineteen 
“principles and practices” could lead to diverse interpretations and emphasis. 
Europeans emphasized the need to always speak of “democracy and human rights” 
together; the French delegation at Bamako insisted on this wording for the final 
documents. But even “human rights” could have different interpretations. Indeed, 
R. J. Vincent (1986) identified different traditions that gave priority to civil, 
individual rights instead of socio-economic, collective rights. Though he framed 
his vision along the Cold War lines of West-East, he also observed a North-South 
divide that continues to be valid in contemporary IR.
Along these lines, the example of Mali’s defense of socio-economic rights 
was symptomatic. The Bamako Consensus underlines the links between 
democracy and development, establishing that democracy is “an essential means to
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reduce poverty and support equitable and sustainable development” -notice 
democracy becomes a means rather than as a goal on its own. This document 
reminded CD members of their commitments regarding the UN Millennium 
Declaration, Development Goals, Johannesburg and Monterrey documents 
(Community of Democracies Ministerial Conference, 2007). During the 
Conference, the discussion included specific references to Amartya Sen’s work on 
“Development as Freedom” to support some clauses of the document, illustrating 
how some research influenced policy-making [cf. Chapters 1 and 3]. Indeed, Mali 
has had free elections since the early 1990s and there is ample freedom of 
expression, but it still ranks 175 out of 177 in the Human Development Index and 
last among the 102 countries included in the Human Poverty Index19.
This way, the CD served as a forum where states could pursue a diversity of 
agendas, and democracy-issues were understood very broadly and, in view of 
some Americans, not clearly prioritized20. In another example from the Bamako 
conference, Brazil made some remarks on how the West was posing problems at 
other international forums, such as the World Trade Organization. Clause 64 on 
“open, rule based and non discriminatory trade...[and] conclusion of the WTO 
Doha Development Round” was then included in the Consensus (Community of 
Democracies Ministerial Conference, 2007). The celebration of the conference in 
Mali was itself “politicized”, as Mali-US relations had depended on the final 
concession of the US-funded Millennium Challenge Compact, worth USD 460.8 
million (Barrios, 2007). As usual, many other diplomatic interests coexisted with 
democracy promotion, and the CD must be understood in this context -here at 
global level.
The objective of “defining democracy” was intrinsically connected to how to 
assess democracy and then include only “democratic” countries in CD 
conferences. The organizers (host countries but mainly the CDD and the DCP) 
tried to apply the definition from the documents to the selection process. However, 
this entered in conflict with the other objective of large-N inclusion, and in general 
involved methodological problems. In turn, this undermined CD credibility.
19 Source: UNDP 2004 http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_MLI.html.
20 Some of the American organizers had ambiguous feelings about this: they understood the 
importance of this flexibility and that this rendered “ownership” to non-Western countries, but their 
own priority was to work on civil and political rights. Interview with participant from Non­
governmental process, Bamako 15 November 2007.
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This also posed important problems in some circles in the United States, 
notably in Congress. In a hearing at a US Committee, Congressman Lantos 
expressed his concern about the CD “lightly giving the label of democracy” 
(Committee on International Relations, 2005, pp. 32-35). Under-Secretary of State 
Dobriansky then shared the diplomatic backstage feeling that:
“The selection process need[ed] to be modified. A recommendation that 
has been specifically made is to set up an independent body that would be 
comprised of NGOs and also by former leaders. They would make 
determinations based on, in fact, the Freedom House ranking structure. 
We do use their ratings at this time but the Convening Group makes the 
decisions” (Committee on International Relations, 2005, pp. 30-35)
This comment gives evidence of a double approach to defining democracy at the 
CD: on the one hand the supposedly technical, neutral definition from Freedom 
House, on the other hand the decisions of the Convening Group that seemed 
necessarily politicized and that led to the controversial inclusions of Russia, 
Venezuela, Morocco, Turkey and others.
By 2006, such an independent assessment body was created, the 
International Advisory Committee (IAC). It was composed of 13 personalities, 
emphasizing the “expertise” in democracy promotion [cf. Chapter l]21. The CD 
sought to counterbalance this sort of “elite” judgments with civil society 
endorsement, i.e. opinions from the International Steering Committee of the Non­
governmental Process on the IAC’s work (2007)22. The IAC based its analysis on 
a working group based in the DCP. They developed a methodology that 
considered hard data from Freedom House’s Freedom in the World surveys [cf. 
Chapter 3], and from a report coming from Europe that had increasingly gained 
prestige in the field, the Bertelsmann Index (itself partly based on World Bank 
data). In case of “middle democracy rankings”, the IAC made case studies (up to 
35 in 2006) (Democracy Coalition Project, 2007).
21 The 13 members of the International Advisory Committee for the Community of Democracies 
Invitations Process had profiles combining political experience and expertise/participation in 
democracy promotion: Genaro Arriagada (Chile), E. Gyimah Boadi (Ghana), Cesar Gaviria 
(Colombia), Morton Halperin (United States), Rima Khalaf Hunaidi (Jordan), Asma Jahangir 
(Pakistan), Josef Janning (Germany), Hong-koo Lee (Republic of Korea), Antonio Mascarenhas 
Monteiro (Cape Verde), Nadezhda Mihailova (Bulgaria), Mark Palmer (United States), Sonia 
Picado (Costa Rica), and Ghassan Salame (Lebanon). Wim Kok (the Netherlands) served as an 
advisory member; Ambassador Martin Palous (Czech Republic) was an observer.
22 The Process however lacked means to effectively check the IAC’s work, an its own 
representativity of “true” civil society was also questioned.
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However, democracy measurement methodologies are unavoidably subject 
to criticism as they rely on sometimes opaque sources and what seems arbitrary 
assessment, compared to ideal criteria established in academic definitions (Munck 
& Verkuilen, 2002). In this case, the IAC tasked specifically Freedom House with 
the expert review of Arab-Muslim countries, but critics denounced that this could 
have been done by “non-Americans”. Indeed, Freedom House has at times been 
accused of not providing enough information on sources, and even having a bias 
towards some regions (Latin America) compared to others (Foweraker & Krznaric, 
2000). In any case, despite the careful work done at these institutions, non- 
Westem countries criticized that this remained a Western-centric and Western- 
dominated method. Moreover, they resisted these judgments in the diplomatic 
realm, i.e. by keeping the Convening Group’s and host country’s prerogatives on 
the invitation process.
Ultimately, the problem with this attempt to invest the CD with a technical, 
professional input was that the states’ Convening Group made the decisions it 
judged politically best on the occasion. This concerned both the United States and 
non-Westem countries. For example, the IAC recommended exclusion in the case 
of Iraq, and “observer” status for Afghanistan, but both were accepted as full 
members of the CD at the Bamako conference as a result of American pressure23. 
Mali, the host country, in turn invited African countries such as Cameroon, Guinea 
Bissau, Rwanda and Uganda (as observers), despite their dubious democratic 
status and the fact that the IAC had advised against it. In sum, despite many efforts 
the CD’s definition of democracy was in practice far from consensual, and the 
category of “observer” was also plagued by inconsistencies- this is discussed next.
3.2. “Democracies” in the Community: “who’s in the CD” depicts what 
democracy means
The CD allowed a great number of states to participate in it, and this reflected or 
indirectly constructed a meaning of “democracy”. This section proposes to 
compare “who was in the CD” with the countries’ status as democracies. This 
exercise led to two main findings. First, though it was expected that only (or 
mostly) democratic countries participated in the CD, the correlations show that
23 The decision on Iraq was echoed in the international press (The Washington post, AFP, Turkish 
Daily News 13 April).
254
“non-democratic countries” made up for an important percentage of participants in 
the conferences. Second, it was also expected that the “non-democracies” that 
participated in the CD would have had the status of “observers” instead of full 
participants. However, it was found that only a limited number was downgraded as 
“observer”, meaning that this category was not used systematically.
As assessment of the status of democracy, I have used Freedom House’s 
Freedom in the World for two main reasons: its widespread use in the discipline 
makes it (as well as its shortcomings) transparent, and the fact that the CD itself 
used it, at least in part. Even in case of disagreement with some of Freedom 
House’s ratings, which I do not endorse automatically (Barrios, 2004), the two 
basic findings hold true.
While it is beyond the scope of this research to discuss each case, some 
cases are discussed to illustrate the politicization of the invitation process. In 
addition, the cases of Russia and of the Arab-Muslim world deserve special 
mention here. On the one hand, including Russia was key in the course of the CD, 
for it meant inclusion of the former “enemy” to the West and of a non-Westem 
great power. This inclusion was the result of the co-optation undertaken by the 
West during the 1990s. However, during the Putin years, as his style and policies 
vis-a-vis the West became more confrontational and Russia’s status as a 
democracy degraded, the CD faced increasing pressure to exclude Russia24. 
Russia’s “uncooperative” behavior was also evident in the UN Security Council, 
and overall the optimism of the beginning of the post-Cold War era had faded by 
2008. On the other hand, contemporary debates on democracy required countering 
the Clash of Civilizations, especially after 9/11 and policies sought to include the 
Arab-Muslim world in the global dynamics of democratization [cf. Chapter 1, 
Chapter 5]. Along these lines, bringing in the Arab-Muslim world and some 
countries was key, for American organizers of the CD this was a way to co-opt 
Morocco and notably Egypt in a diplomatic, multilateral forum. These two 
aspects, drivers of the CD, would be present in the conferences.
24 Putin was elected in April 2000.
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The tables elaborated for each Ministerial Conference correlate participants
25with their scores for the corresponding year of the Freedom House survey . They 
shed light on two issues: first, each table includes the CD states that were 
considered only “Partly Free” or “Not Free”, indicating the number of “non­
democracies” that participated in each conference. Second, the tables indicate 
whether the countries were considered “full participants” or “observers” (in 
italics), showing the relative use of this category.
Table 11. “Non-democracies ” in Warsaw 2000, Freedom in the World 2001
Total of countries 
participating
%
not democracies26
“partly free” 
Countries (33)
“not free” 
Countries (6)
111:
106 signatories of 
the
declaration + 
4 countries 
signed it a 
posteriori+ 
France
36%
Albania, Argentina, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Bangladesh,
B osnia/Herzego vina, 
Brazil, Burkina Faso, 
Colombia, Georgia, 
Guatemala, Indonesia, 
Honduras, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lesotho, FYR 
Macedonia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, 
Moldova, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Nepal, 
Nicaragua, Niger, 
Nigeria, Paraguay, 
Russia, Senegal, 
Seychelles, Tanzania, 
Turkey, Ukraine, 
Venezuela, Yugoslavia
Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, 
Qatar, Tunisia, Yemen
33 participants of the Warsaw conference were considered “Partly Free” by 
Freedom House, and six (Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, Qatar, Tunisia, Yemen), outright 
“Not Free”, meaning that up to 36% of the participants were not democracies.
25 It was not easy to access the information of participants and the different categories: some 
documents were made available by the Council for a Community of Democracies, and I got the 
document of participation circulated in Bamako during fieldwork.
26 This is the % of countries either “Partly Free” or “Not Free”.
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Table 12. “Non-democracies” in Seoul 2002, Freedom in the World 2003
Total of countries 
participating
%
not democracies
“partly free” 
Countries (29)
[includes observers]
“not free” 
Countries (7)
[includes observers]
105 36%
Albania, Argentina, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Bahrain, Bangladesh, 
Bosnia/Herzegovina, 
Colombia, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Indonesia, 
Jordan, Kuwait, FYR 
Macedonia, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Nepal, 
Nicaragua, Niger, 
Nigeria, Paraguay, 
Russia, Seychelles, Sri 
Lanka, Timor-Leste, 
Turkey, Tanzania, 
Ukraine, Venezuela
Afghanistan, Algeria, 
Haiti, Oman, Qatar, 
Tunisia, Yemen
The overall correlation between democracy and participants remained 
similar, with 34% of CD participants not qualifying as “Free” for Freedom House. 
The category “observer” was introduced in the Seoul conference. It was used as a 
carrot or incentive in the case of Afghanistan, which was included in the CD as 
observer. However, it was mostly used to downgrade some of the former 
participants, e.g Armenia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine and some Arab states. If we 
correlate the invitees’ status with their rating in the Freedom House ranking, we 
find consistency in that all the states that had been rated as “Not Free” were only 
observers. However, it was inconsistent that most “Partly Free” states were full 
participants while others were downgraded to observers. Among the Arab states, 
Bahrain, Jordan and Morocco were kept as full participants.
The Seoul “Plan of Action-Democracy: investing for peace and prosperity” 
contained a clause claiming “wide consultations as possible with participants” in 
order “not to include those countries where there is currently a disruption of 
constitutional rule or severe, persistent erosion of or lack of essential elements of 
democracy” (Community of Democracies Ministerial Conference, 2002a). The CD 
was already aware of the lack of credibility of its notion of “democracy” in the 
rhetoric, but in practice the leverage of the United States in the Convening Group 
seemingly led to indulgent positions, especially vis-a-vis Afghanistan and 
Morocco.
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At Santiago (table 13), the percentage of state participants that were not 
considered “Free” for that year rose to almost 42%. The inconsistencies to use the 
“observer” category remained, for instance, both Armenia and Azerbaijan 
continued to be “observers” though Freedom House found the democratic situation 
in the latter was significantly worse (“Not Free”) than the former. One could argue 
that bringing in Azerbaijan was a “carrot”, but maybe the “stick” of exclusion 
could have sent a more useful signal to condemn the lack of reform. This time, 
Afghanistan was upgraded to full participant despite its great democratic 
instability. The most delicate case was that of Russia, that became the only “Not 
Free” state to be included as full participant in the CD. This happened because of 
the diplomatic blow that it would represent to Russia, which already threatened to 
boycott the initiative. The choice of the Convening Group was to compromise, 
though this underlined CD inconsistencies.
Table 13. “Non-democracies ” in Santiago 2005, Freedom in the World 2006
Total of % “partly free” Countries “not free”
countries not democracies (42) Countries
participating [includes observers] (9)
[includes observers]
122 42%
Afghanistan, Albania, 
Armenia, Bahrain, Bolivia, 
Bosnia/Herzegovina, Burkina 
Faso, Colombia, Djibouti, 
Gambia, Timor-Leste, 
Ecuador, Fiji, Guatemala, 
Guyana, Honduras, Jordan, 
Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon,
FYR Macedonia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Malaysia, Moldova, 
Morocco, Mozambique, 
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, 
Papua-New Guinea, Paraguay, 
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, 
Singapore, Sri Lanka, 
Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey, 
Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia
Algeria, Azerbaijan, 
Egypt, Haiti, Iraq, 
Oman, Qatar, Russia, 
Tunisia
Another problem became increasingly noticeable: the fact that “observers” 
actually could play a very important role in the negotiations and propose 
initiatives. Since there was no constraining delimitation or formal distinction in the 
meetings, many observer countries occupied the center CD stage. For instance,
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Yemen (very active since 2005) stood out as it proposed to draft an Inter-Arab 
Democracy Charter, though it was an observer.
At the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Bamako (Table 14), again 39% of 
participants were countries outside FH’s category of “Free”. After long 
discussions, Russia (again classified as “Not Free” by Freedom House) was finally 
downgraded to observer. Russia reacted by canceling its formal representation at 
the conference. Tunisia (“Not Free”) and Venezuela (“Partly Free”) had been 
present at the previous round but were now outright excluded27. However Iraq 
(“Not Free”) was included as full participant, again as a result of American 
influence in the Convening Group. Yemen was arguably compensated with an 
upgrade to “full participant” (no longer observer) though its Freedom House score 
had not significantly changed.
Similarly, the problem of the active participation of “observers” continued in 
Mali. Indeed, I observed the delegations of Algeria, Egypt and Cameroon all took 
the floor repeatedly during the formal discussions, and made suggestions on equal 
footing. This meant that they actually influenced the document that would be 
adopted, which gave them a rather important say and was indeed contradictory 
with their status28.
27 Bangladesh, Thailand, Fiji, Singapore and Qatar (all with previous affiliation to the CD) were 
not invited either.
281 was able to observe this during my fieldwork (attendance to CD sessions). In my view, the host 
of the conference (Mali) did not enforce any strict rules on how “observers” should behave because 
it privileged inclusion and large-N for the CD, especially inviting African countries at least as 
“controversial” as some of the excluded non-democracies. Because these discussions are 
considered “closed-doors” I haven’t been able to verify the minutes from the other conferences, but 
according to witnesses there was no significant difference with the one in Bamako.
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Table 14. "Non-democracies ” in Bamako 2007, Freedom in the World 2008
Total of 
countries 
participating
%
not democracies
“partly free” 
Countries (48)
[includes observers]
“not free” 
Countries (6) 
[includes observers]
147 39%
Afghanistan, Albania, 
Armenia, Bahrain, Bolivia, 
Bosnia/Herzegovina,
Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Colombia, Djibouti, Ecuador, 
Georgia, Guatemala, Guinea- 
Bissau), Haiti, Honduras, 
Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, 
Kyrgyztan, Lebanon, Liberia, 
Macedonia, Madagascar, 
Malaysia, Malawi, 
Mauritania, Moldova, 
Montenegro, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Nepal, 
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, 
Papua New Guinea,
Paraguay, Philippines, 
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Sri 
Lanka, Tanzania, Timor- 
Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Turkey, Uganda, Yemen, 
Zambia.
Algeria, Azerbaijan, 
Cameroon, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, 
Egypt, Iraq, Oman, 
Russia, Rwanda
In sum, the CD only discredited the definition of democracy it “embodied” 
by allowing this large-N inclusion, and arguably this was an trade-off that 
undermined the initiative in essence. Despite its attempts, the CD was unable to 
implement an invitation process or an “observer” category consistently, and was 
dominated by political influence from a variety of states (mainly the US). In this it 
illustrated the struggle to promote democracy at the global level when the 
international system is still dominated by states, to which we now turn.
4. Institutionalizing dem ocracy prom otion: international system  
and Am erican hegem ony
The third goal that the CD pursued was to institutionalize democracy and its 
promotion in the international system, i.e. to ground the post-Cold War democratic 
values and support with institutions. This way, it sought to confirm the 
international expansion of liberal values, which had been on the rise arguably
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since the 18th century and clearly, with American input, throughout the 20th 
century (notably after World War II). This institutionalization could be seen from 
both Constructivist and Functionalist perspectives. On the one side, by its own 
existence the Community of Democracies constituted a unique attempt to 
institutionalize democracy as a norm in the international system, as it gathered 
states around it as a common value, and established its promotion as a common 
goal. On the other, as an international organization, the CD sought to establish 
commitments from the participating states and to defend and support democracy 
around the world with a diversity of tools.
Nevertheless, the Functionalist attempts to create standards of the definition 
of democracy, and a platform to support it internationally were not successful. 
This was the confirmation that democracy and its promotion is intrinsically 
political and thus difficult to conceive from a consensual, “technical” point of 
view. Instead, the CD seemed to rely on a Constructivist dynamic where, as 
Barnett and Finnemore (1999) argued, international organizations exercise power 
and eventually create their own synergy -so there is agency and also constitution 
of a “new” international reality. Against this background, the CD clearly relied on 
American hegemony in contemporary IR (Ruggie, 1998) to institutionalize 
democracy promotion.
This section argues that on the one hand the CD illustrated the changes in the 
post-Cold War international system (a new international regime of democracy 
promotion), but that on the other hand these changes were driven by the United 
States, confirming the hegemony of “liberal institutionalism” but also its 
shortcomings.
4.1. Democracy promotion as a norm in the international regime
In 2001, two American scholars observed the CD was “one more manifestation of
the global agreement on democratic values” (L. J. Diamond & Plattner, 2001, p. 
xvi), hinting that there was an institutionalization of democracy and its promotion. 
This section focuses on the systemic perspective, and argues that this attempt at 
institutionalization of a regime that would follow the norm of democracy faced 
important difficulties.
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A widely accepted definition of an international regime is “a set of implicit 
or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which 
actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner, 
1982, p. 186). In Hedley Bull’s (1977, p. 54) classical perspective, international 
organizations are created with the purpose of securing adherence to the norms29.
The Community of Democracies can be understood as a regime where states 
agree on the value of democracy, to the extent that it “embodies” the convergence 
of IR actors towards democracy. Regime Theory is Realist in that it usually 
disregards that this norm-convergence may happen out of common values or 
identity. Instead, it gives priority to actors’ interested and rational behavior as 
explanation for the creation of a regime, and that actors (states) agree to create or 
reform the international system this way. In addition, Regime Theory somewhat 
disregards the drivers for long-term transformation. Other works in IR theory have 
corrected these trends. Two interesting alternatives have focused on great power 
strategies and order-creation (Legro, 2005), and on liberalism as an ideology 
embedded in the post-World War II regime (Ruggie, 1982). These perspectives 
prove more helpful to establish the role of the United States (vis-a-vis other actors) 
in the international system, and introduce important nuance in the case of the 
Community of Democracies (see below).
Still, from the perspective of the international system, the CD has two 
important shortcomings. First, it has proven to be a very weak binding institution. 
Due to its lack of permanent and independent structure, its functioning based on 
consensus, and it has also failed to issue other than declaratory documents. Indeed, 
the CD has not been successful in advancing democracy in the world; either as a 
carrot or as a stick, its leverage has been negligible. It has not had much success in 
making democracies work together or in binding participant states either. Notably, 
the CD bodies (CCD, IAC) have not been able to constrain states’ leverage during 
the invitation process, when the countries in the Convening Group imposed their 
choices against the institution’s recommendations.
Secondly, the CD intended to make its members’ preferences evolve towards 
democracy and affect policy-making through socialization (Ikenberry, 2001).
29 This definition is more accurate to the Community of Democracies than a Functionalist or 
Neoliberal Institutionalist approach that would focus on specific fields for more efficient action and 
on the internal structure and functioning of the institution (interdependence): “thicker” institutions 
are developed for a purpose, and convergence helps maximize a result (Keohane and Nye, Haas).
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However, there has been no convergence towards the norm: many of the states that 
agreed to the Warsaw Declaration perpetuated their authoritarian regimes. 
Moreover, it can be argued that the CD may have had a negative influence in the 
international system. In a way, the CD contributed to institute a social world where 
democracy was downgraded to a minimum-degree and became symbolic, and 
where many non-democracies were actively co-opted in the system of a 
“Community of Democracies”. This way, many states instrumentalized the CD to 
convey their support for the American initiative, but this hardly advanced the CD’s 
objective to institutionalize democracy promotion in the international system.
4.2. Liberal institutionalism: the institutionalization of American 
hegemony?
This chapter has documented the protagonism of the United States as driver of the 
CD, establishing the extent to which the Community of Democracies was an 
instance of American democracy promotion. This section discusses how this 
corresponded to the US’s “liberal grand strategy”, and argues that US agency 
counted more than systemic change. The work of G. John Ikenberry on Liberal 
Institutionalism illustrates this point, offering two important arguments about 
American hegemony. On the one hand, America has shaped the international 
system; on the other, the system (the liberal order) also contains and even 
constrains the United States.
For Ikenberry, contemporary International Relations must be understood in 
the light of Liberal Institutionalism, which he sees both as a “grand strategy” and 
an international order where the liberal principles of capitalism and democracy 
have triumphed (Ikenberry, 1999, 2006). Ikenberry acknowledges democracy 
promotion is of American origin and has pervaded American history and foreign 
policy in the long-term, but where Smith (1994) saw an American “mission” tied 
to political identity and culture, he argues there is a universalist strategy. Creating 
institutions such as the Community of Democracies is actually part of the strategy 
that leads to and maintains the liberal order. The order then supports itself. This 
premise would explain the policy of large-N expansion in the CD, as the objective 
is to change the international system.
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This perspective of grand strategy clearly led by the US came across clearly 
in documents from the Council for a Community of Democracies; it also pervaded 
US officials’ speeches at CD events (opening and closing ceremonies), including 
Albright’s and Rice’s. In this quote from Deputy Secretary of State John 
Negroponte’s speech, notice the vague use of the “we”: does it mean “we, the 
United States” or “we, the Community of Democracies”?
“We must remind those who are elected democratically that they have a 
responsibility, to their people and to the international community, to 
govern democratically. And if they do not, then responsible democracies 
everywhere must hold them accountable. We are making progress in 
using this Community as a platform for promoting democratic values and 
best practices”. (Negroponte, 2007)
Importantly, Ikenberry argues that the United States may be a hegemonic 
force in the liberal order, but that it is actually constrained by the system. The 
system is “constraining” because of its democratic and institutional nature: it must 
remain open, decentralized, and it actually binds the US as all the other members 
(Ikenberry, 1989, 2001). There is evidence of such a liberal system in the way that 
the CD sought to open up its administrative and decision-making bodies to non- 
Americans, and strongly sought to co-opt Europe and other non-Westem nations 
in the initiative. Arguably, the US also had to abide by some of the decisions taken 
in the system (for instance, Mali’s focus on development rather than democracy, 
and the “deviance” of CD members when voting “in disagreement” with the UN 
Democracy Caucus).
Critics of Liberal Institutionalism argue that this theory is normative and it 
should not be overestimated as an explanation for American policies, because 
“strategic constraint” might simply serve a purpose for the US too (Patrick, 2002). 
Indeed, while Ikenberry (2006, p. 148) considers there is American benevolent, 
non-coercive hegemony in Liberal Institutionalism, the CD has some aspects of 
“empire” as an expansionist political project. First, there is a global geography that 
reminds of imperial quests, and there is imperial ideology in the implicit links 
between democracy promotion and American exceptionalism (Cox, 2003). In 
addition, there are also imperial means in the imposition of some decisions (such 
as the invitation and “status” of countries as observers or full participants). Finally,
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the CD administration and management is exerted from Washington, D.C. and 
most funds come indisputably from American public or private sources.
Thus, it is accurate to nuance the “neutral” regime that is the Community of 
Democracies. As Susan Strange (1982) argued in her critique of “international 
regime” as a falsely neutral analysis of systemic IR, the notion of regime is valid 
when it implies an authority dictating some precise rules and discipline. This 
nuanced analysis sheds light onto the lukewarm acceptance of Western European 
partners and the open rejection that many diplomats admitted in private (and also 
the notable, public case of France’s Foreign Minister in 2000). Post-Cold War 
American hegemony is manifest in the CD, and the European reluctance in this 
forum is a form of passive resistance to this hegemony.
Conclusion
This chapter discussed the Community of Democracies as a global initiative to 
promote democracy. This research shed light on the debates on the global 
definition of democracy and its promotion, and the gap between theory and 
practice. This case study of American and European democracy promotion 
allowed testing the hypothesis of “rival universalisms”, substantiating that a 
disconnection and some rivalry existed between the transatlantic partners. The fact 
that the CD remained a low-key international initiative witnessed the limits of 
democracy promotion at a global scale.
In this case, policy-making was dominated by states and by the diplomatic 
corps; declarations were issued, but there were very few programs to materialize 
the initiative. Indeed, this level of multilateral cooperation did not easily translate 
into policies; states were reluctant to allocate funds and did not create common 
frameworks to develop or implement policy beyond the Convening Group that 
decided on CD participation. Additional policy-making circles existed in the form 
of Washington-centered think tanks, such as the Council for a Community of 
Democracies and the Democracy Coalition Project, but these struggled to 
influence the process and to advance specific programs. Importantly, a civil 
society forum arose as a complement to the ministerial conferences of the CD,
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giving evidence of such networks and emphasizing the non-state, transnational 
aspect of democracy promotion.
The CD faced important challenges to make democracy promotion work, 
strengthening this thesis’s arguments on how this is an elusive practice. First, it 
developed a definition of democracy that was relatively open to interpretation in 
order to be consensual. While this sought to install democracy’s universality, the 
“interpretations” and the will to include as many states as possible in the CD 
potentially watered down the meaning of democracy. Second, the CD sought to 
focus on democracy, human rights and rule of law, and links with other themes 
were also brought to the table. Significantly, the link between security and 
democracy was invoked in the aftermath of 9/11, and non-Westem states insisted 
on the links between democracy and development (with emphasis on the latter). 
This provided additional evidence of the premise of a “virtuous circle” whereby all 
policies would work towards the same goal.
Third, the emphasis to pursue democracy as a “technical” policy where 
expertise and neutrality could exist was evident in, for example, the development 
of a working group with an original methodology to measure the state of 
democracy. In turn, these ratings were supposed to lead to inclusion or exclusion 
in the CD. Instead, there was evidence of the politicization of defining such 
criteria, the use of double standards and privileged decision-making (while Iraq 
was invited, Venezuela was excluded). Finally, this case study documented how 
democracy promoters were “learning by doing” as they sought to implement this 
global initiative. The Non-govemmental Process had increasing weight as it got 
more organized, but political support -and funds—were volatile. This was the 
case, for example, when CD members did not adopt common positions in the 
United Nations, despite their engagements.
Focusing on the side of the promoters, the CD was characterized by 
American leadership, programs and support, and it was somewhat resisted by 
Western European states. General comparisons of the US and the EU under 
George W. Bush emphasized the US’s unilateralism vs. the European preference 
for multilateralism. Yet the US has often favored multilateralism, and US-EU 
relations themselves are bound by a net of multilateral organizations, mainly 
NATO, but also the OSCE, OECD, etc. (Hiatt, 2006; W. Wallace, 2002).
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The initiative illustrated that there was no open confrontation between the 
United States and Europe, i.e. transatlantic relations drifting along. Even if some 
instances of overt disapproval led to moments of tension, most transatlantic 
criticisms happened in the diplomatic backstage. Rather than confrontation, the 
Community of Democracies illustrates the absence of collaboration between the 
transatlantic partners, and there were elements of rift. The difference between 
Eastern and Western European countries was important. On the one hand, the US 
sought and found unconditional, enthusiastic support in Eastern Europe and 
notably in Poland, that according to the Department of State is the most pro- 
American country in the world (Applebaum, 2005).
Regarding the American position, the CD illustrated bipartisan agreement 
and continuity over democracy promotion in the post-Cold War period, as it 
extended during the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations. No significant 
change was triggered by 9/11, and though Bush’s neoconservative ideology 
translated in increased unilateralism during his first term, this did not affect the US 
position at the CD in general. Arguably, the American leadership defended in 
neoconservatism (Williams, 2005) was already at the heart of the CD, though the 
large-N, multilateral emphasis came originally from policy-making in Democratic 
ranks. Yet the Bush Administration exerted some privileges, such as formally 
inviting Afghanistan and Iraq despite their dubious democratic status.This chapter 
discussed how one of the problems was precisely that Europeans purposefully 
disregarded the initiative despite efforts from the American leaders to “sell” the 
project for co-ownership. Notably, they remained skeptical vis-a-vis the project 
overall, and specially beware of the possibility that any such Concert or League of 
Democracies may in turn undermine the United Nations. In this, the European 
universalism favoring multilateralism and standing independently from the 
American position was asserted.
On the European side, the Community of Democracies remained an 
intergovernmental, interstate initiative in which different states took different 
positions. As an interstate project, it took off with a US-Poland core, it co-opted a 
diverse group of Convening States (including the Czech Republic and, in time, 
Portugal and Italy), and then sought to have global reach. It did not envisage a 
European group within it, neither in the form of European Union position nor of 
Member-State coordination at any stage, before or after the EU Enlargement to
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Eastern and Central Europe. For critics, the CD was an instance of American 
“divide and rule” in Europe (Alessandri, 2008).
Yet, the fact was that the European side also lacked political will to 
coordinate Member-State positions or to create a EU stand (and even single voice 
or institutional participation) at the Community of Democracies. This could have 
been a common position (or even a joint action) within the CFSP pillar; 
democracy promotion could remain intergovernmental (not “communitarized”) 
and probably rely on enhanced cooperation (Jaeger, 2002; White, 2001)30. With 
this case, the discourse and narrative on a strong international EU were evident 
(Benjamin Tonra, 2003), and the potential for capabilities too. Yet, the 
Community of Democracies showed that when it came to translating this into 
efficient CFSP, there was no political agreement. Notably, EU Eastern members 
insisted on cooperation with the US (Whitehead, 2004) and refused to consider it a 
“rival”, unlike some officials in the EU and some member states who are reluctant 
to simply “follow up” (Harries, 1993). This brought in a new characteristic of the 
evolving EU that will necessarily affect the prospects of universalism -maybe not 
the discourse, but definitely the practice.
A final consideration in this regard is that this global initiative to promote 
democracy seemingly needed the EU support for it to take off. CD officials 
insistently planned to co-opt and boost the role of Western European countries; the 
Council for a Community of Democracies saw itself precisely as “a companion 
[...] to enhance Transatlantic cooperation at a time when the relationship has been 
under great strain” (CCD, 2006a, p. 7). Russell Mead spoke of the international 
“value of Europe” as a mantle that provided legitimacy to US action and disguised 
unilateralism (Mead, 2005): this may explain both why there was American 
insistence but also European reluctance. In any case the important implication was 
that such premise actually re-centered democracy promotion as a Western quest, 
thus hindering the “de-westernization” and universalization that the CD claimed to 
seek.
30 It could be a common position or joint action on the grounds of “constructive abstention” (no 
blocking action by others, but with the possibility to opt out). Since the Treaty of Amsterdam 
(closer cooperation) and of Nice (enhanced cooperation), this framework has been rather flexible.
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Conclusions: American and European universalisms face 
political challenges on the ground
This thesis on American and European democracy promotion sought to move 
forward our academic discussions both on contemporary American and European 
foreign policy and on democratization. It argued that there is pluralism and two 
“universalisms” of sorts, instead of unified Western action. It also substantiated 
that, despite the plurality of approaches, democracy promotion challenges stem on 
the ground and depend on each specific case, which in the end makes promoters 
and practitioners confront similar problems on what to promote and how to do it. I 
have adopted an original research framework combining Foreign Policy Analysis 
and Transition studies, and undertaken case studies at three levels: a country (the 
DR Congo), a region (the Middle East and North Africa) and the global initiative 
of the Community of Democracies. The different levels gave evidence of the large 
scope of American and European democracy promotion, giving ground to the 
argument of “universalisms”. Instead of comparing policies towards different 
countries, the thesis explored democracy promotion as US and EU projections at 
the three main levels used in the study of International relations: state, region, 
world. Nevertheless, it was found that the conceptual and pragmatic challenges to 
promote democracy existed across levels.
One major objective in the thesis was to depict the American and European 
approaches of democracy promotion with nuance. Two important preconceptions 
were challenged in this portrait: American unilateralism and European civilian 
power. Indeed, though these seemed to be inherent to US and EU universalisms, 
the reality was much more complex. On the one hand, the United States had a 
unilateral “instinct” in policy-making, but the practice challenged this position. In 
the DR Congo, it acted as part of the “international community”; in the MENA 
region, it sought European cooptation for its Greater Middle East strategy in 2003-
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4; in the Community of Democracies, it undertook global cooptation and found 
that the initiative was failing because of Western European lukewarm support. 
Still, American policies were independent and, in the context of American 
hegemony, carried more leverage than the European Union’s. Yet this did not 
mean efficacy for democracy promotion. On the other hand, the European Union’s 
picture of “civilian power”, which has been intrinsically connected to its role as 
democracy promoter and to the construction of the EU universalism, did not prove 
totally accurate. In the Congo, the EU coordinated to intervene with wide-ranging 
support, from negotiations to elections to, importantly, military support to pacify 
the country and guarantee the electoral process. In the MENA region, its approach 
was ambiguous and underpinned by reflexivity and long-term flexible institutions 
instead of the blurry “civilian” aspect. In the Community of Democracies, the EU 
failed to rally around the theme of democracy promotion at global level and 
Western Member States defended classical multilateralism while Eastern 
European countries supported the American initiative more easily. As with the 
American approach, there was a gap between the policies and the field reality, 
though the diversification of policies and actors, the longer-term perspective and 
the EU’s own historical experience allowed it to claim more potential for success 
regarding democratization. Yet this did not necessarily correspond to the 
universalism it sought to construct around this theme.
The second major objective in this thesis was to check the practical 
challenges that US and EU universalisms against the realities on the ground. For 
this, it used case studies and rooted the analysis on “objectives of democracy 
promotion for each case”, which allowed for specificity and nuance. Not only did 
these objectives depict US and EU policies more accurately, they also illustrated 
the general, practical problems of democracy promotion in practice. The thesis 
grouped these problems around four general observations, which are summed-up 
here in connection with the main case-study findings accumulated in the thesis.
The first challenge on the ground regarded the quest for a balance between a 
universal consensus on democracy promotion and the cultural and country 
specificities, observed with the non-support for the local DRC transition 
conference, the theoretical defense of the compatibility between democracy and 
Islam that did not follow through with political and civil society groups in the 
MENA region, and the risk that non-democratic countries in the Community of
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Democracies defended their regimes as “own interpretations”. The second 
argument regarded the premise of positive links between policies to foster 
security, economic development, and political reform. Though all three seem 
compatible objectives, the policies to foster them may imply trade-offs and 
political choices. The practical challenges were clearly observed in the DRC’s 
democratization during conflict, as well as in the “double standards” leading the 
West to cooperate with non-democratic incumbents in the MENA region, and the 
diverging priorities of underdeveloped countries in the CD.
The third argument underlined the promoters’ emphasis to present their 
policies as “technical” and expert so that intervention were more effective and, 
arguably, neutral. This approach underestimated that the problems on the ground 
were usually political and affected the policies’ outcomes. Thus, the transition’s 
implementation involved empowering the Kabila government (and army) in the 
DRC, the MENA did not become a real “region” despite the regionalization 
fostered by the promoters, and the CD had to accept Iraq and Afghanistan as full- 
range participants at America’s request despite their not meeting the institution’s 
definition of democracy. The fourth observation regarded the volatility and 
evolution of the promoters’ policies as they were “learning by doing”. This 
required adapting policies in all three cases: the practitioners had limited resources 
and limited scope for action and the challenges were multiple. Here, the gap 
between the promoters’ universalisms and the limited budgets, decision-making 
autonomy, and coherent strategy was evident in the Congo, the MENA initiatives, 
and the global CD.
This work has been grounded on empirical analysis of the United States and the 
European Union approaches, and of the three case studies. Two main themes 
framed this research throughout: post-Cold War transatlantic relations, and the 
potential and shortcomings of democracy promotion. Along these lines, this 
conclusion brings together the findings and key contributions from previous 
chapters: these nuances brought in innovative arguments, and open up new 
avenues of research. After introducing this concluding picture, two sections with 
final thoughts on the transatlantic “drift and rift” and on whether and how 
democracy can be promoted follow.
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1. Findings and key contributions in the thesis
The first part of the thesis (Chapters 1, 2 and 3) focused on democracy promotion 
and the American and European approaches. Chapter 1 proposed a working 
definition of “democracy promotion” sensitive to the promoter’s peculiarities and 
to the complexities of implementation (definition, links). This chapter called our 
attention to some specific challenges, explored in the rest of the thesis. The first 
one was the universality of democracy: this was the basis for democracy 
promotion, but how to reconcile universality with the policies’ Western origin and 
with the cultural specificities potentially arising on the ground? Second, as an 
element of foreign policy, democracy promotion was portrayed in a sort of 
“virtuous circle”, the premise being that democracy, security and economic 
development all went hand in hand; yet this proved to be a quick assumption, for 
trade offs and prioritizations were part of the policies on the ground. Finally, two 
other observations were advanced: that democracy promotion was often conceived 
as a “technical” or neutral exercise and the political difficulties were 
underestimated, and that the field was necessarily undergoing a process of 
“learning by doing” in which practitioners on the ground had to adapt their 
policies to political situations far from ideal.
Chapter 2 discussed how democracy promotion contributed to the 
construction of distinct American and European identities and roles with two 
“universalisms”, where the EU defined itself, at least in part, vis-a-vis the US. This 
did not just spring up in the 1990s; it was embedded in historical experiences one 
side and the other of the Atlantic. In the post-Cold War period, the allies 
maintained a rhetoric of cooperation, common principles and values, but in the 
international context they also distinguished themselves with particular roles as 
democracy promoters. I contended that transatlantic relations evolved within a 
complex drift and rift during this period: there was a positive inertia in the 
partnership but also reserve and demarcation for meaningful, new international 
actions. American “liberal hegemony” brought democracy promotion to the fore, 
though as with the rest of foreign policy there was a shift with 9/11 and George 
Bush’s War on Terror. The European Union crafted a narrative as a “civilian” 
power where democracy promotion seemed to fit well. It undertook a major
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enlargement to Eastern and Central Europe (further strengthening its role and 
identity as democracy promoter), and unraveled new instruments and meaningful 
plans for policy Europeanization. Despite the lack of confrontation, distinct 
positions emanated one side and the other of the Atlantic regarding democracy 
promotion.
Chapter 3 presented a comparative analysis of US and EU democracy 
promotion along four locations of policy-making: inspiring, informing, designing 
and implementing the policies. I discussed the roles and politics among the main 
actors: the presidential office, Congress, NED and USAID in the US, and 
Member-States, the Council, the Commission (including EuropeAid) and the 
European Parliament in the EU. I argued that democracy promotion policy-making 
was characterized by fragmentation and by the input of academics, activists, and 
practitioners at different levels, which illustrated the significant role of 
transnational networks in this field. This blurred the peculiarities of US and EU 
policies regarding implementation, but the dominant roles of political institutions 
and bureaucracies in policy-making exposed key differences.
This chapter set the background to explore the main policy-drivers and how 
they shaped democracy promotion in the DRC, the MENA region, and the 
Community of Democracies. Regarding the United States, this hinted at potential 
differences depending on the case: USAID, diplomats, together with non-state 
actors (designing and implementing democracy promotion) were relevant overall, 
but in the case of security interests (notably in the MENA region) the executive 
branch dominated. Regarding the European Union, its multi-level governance 
would create complex webs of policy-input that also varied on each case. While 
the MENA case exposed the many potential branches of EU policy-making with 
another region, the CD case underlined the shortcomings to create a EU joint 
output. Overall, the Commission and the European Parliament sought to 
Europeanize democracy promotion and kept this policy up on the agenda, while 
member states de facto shaped the policies more effectively and were, overall, 
more compromising.
The second part of the thesis sought to check this picture against the practice of 
democracy promotion, introducing the case studies of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, the Middle East and North Africa region, and the Community of
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Democracies. The cases brought in a necessary awareness of the historical and 
political context of the policies, as well as of the paradoxes and inconsistencies 
arising at the stage of implementation. With similar structures, they all began with 
an overview of US and EU democracy promotion. In the Congo case, that section 
followed three chronological stages. In the MENA case, it discussed the US 
policies (GMENA, MEPI) and the EU’s Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, and then 
the transatlantic implications. In the CD case, it discussed the ministerial 
conferences, main agents and documents of this American initiative and the 
division and reluctance in Europe. These depictions of the policy-processes 
demonstrated the general dynamics observed one side and another of the Atlantic, 
but there was no particular strategic thinking or policy-design structure adapted to 
promote democracy at country, regional or global level.
Each chapter focused then on the three main objectives of democracy 
promotion, setting out a clear structure to discuss the dense, case-specific contents 
of the policies. This allowed for a discussion of the American and European 
specificities in the accurate context, underlining the main trade-offs and political 
challenges on the ground.
The case studies also contributed to a more nuanced understanding of 
American and European democracy promotion: different aspects of the 
universalisms, instances of transatlantic rivalry and, frequently, lack of 
coordination or of initiative for joint action. They also illustrated the many and 
diverse challenges to trigger change, to create a positive context where peace, 
socio-economic preconditions, institutions (state, rule of law) and political actors 
contribute to democratization and to finally consolidate democracy. There is a vast 
literature on this, ranging from political theory and comparative approaches; 
academic writings and practitioners have contributed to an ideal of “virtuous 
circle”, a paradigm where any policy could contribute to the rest [Chapter 1]. This 
research has demonstrated this is a misleading premise in democracy promotion, 
as trade-offs and political challenges are intrinsic to this phenomenon. Moreover, 
instead of virtuous, there are sometimes “vicious” circles of abuse of democracy, 
nepotism, and violence.
In the DR Congo (Chapter 4), the United States and European countries (and 
the EU) halted their support of Mobutu in the early 1990s, illustrating the common 
Western principle and the “democratic hype” of the post-Cold War period. Later,
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though the US was reluctant to support international intervention, it made 
transition a central element in the peace agreements and the MONUC mandate. 
The Congo case illustrated limited US interests and low priority. This mission had 
limited presidential input and was driven by diplomats deployed on the ground, 
with input from public agencies (USAID), the NED and the party foundations; 
corporate and security interests were in the background. Regarding Europe, the 
Congo case confirmed the possibility for the EU to undertake significant 
international action (it notably funded the electoral process to 80%). Yet this case 
clearly supported the necessity of “hard power” and not simply a “civilian” role 
for a universalist Europe, for its international clout increased significantly with 
operations Artemis, EUFOR 2006 and the ongoing programs of police and 
military restructuring. The DR Congo was a lab-test for a renewed role for Europe 
in the world, but the shadows of neocolonialism could not be dissipated as the 
main influences came from France and from a very active EU Commissioner who 
was a former Belgian foreign minister. This illustrated how the colonial past may 
invite itself into the debates and attempts for a post-Cold War EU universalism.
Chapter 4 also discussed the debates on “African” notions of democracy that 
emphasized collectivity and dialogue, e.g. a large National Conference in the early 
1990s. I argued that there was a definition of democracy based on elections, to the 
extent that after the appointment of President Joseph Kabila democracy promoters 
already started to refer to the post-transition or the consolidation stage. At the 
same time, there were policies to promote civil society participation, in an effort to 
support the “bottom-up” factor. In the DR Congo, many NGOs and forums were 
created with these policies, while the Catholic Church continued to be one main 
interlocutor for international organizations, active in civic education and to gather 
and transmit information1. This illustrated some reluctance to support local 
processes (the conference) instead of quicker and exit-oriented elections, but also 
the need for the promoters to adapt their policies to the field. Nevertheless, as this 
experience fed back into the policy-making debates, two criticisms could be 
raised: that democracy promotion was election-oriented in practice, and that 
religious actors sometimes played key roles in democracy promotion. Such
1 The role of the Catholic Church in the Congo was crucial for American and European democracy 
promotion because of its widespread geographical reach and its intricate knowledge (Barrios & 
Ahamed, 2008).
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feedback was often missing, probably because such experiences countered some 
premises in the democracy promotion rhetoric of “more than elections” and 
“secularism”. The Congo case also raised basic but relatively new questions on the 
role of the state and institutions. These had been considered preconditions for 
democracy, but with the promoters’ attempts there was a dynamic of co­
development of the Congolese state and institutions with and through democracy -
i.e. elections to establish legitimate government, and democratization assistance to 
shape institutions for better governance and rule of law. More time and research 
will be needed to assess this dynamic, but here political features will be 
necessarily tied to success in basic security and socio-economic standards for the 
population.
The presence of democracy promotion in American and European 
universalisms and the development of a specific EU post-Cold War universalism 
were also illustrated in the case of the MENA region (Chapter 5). Here, it was 
significant that the EU exported regional identity-building and functionalist 
cooperation as a model for the MENA region. Nevertheless, EU institutions and 
some Member States with interests in the region contributed to an ambiguous 
policy of either inclusion under a common Euro-Med region, or of a more 
disconnected Neighbourhood Policy. In these policies, democracy promotion was 
key as a core aspect of the EU universalism in principle, but the practice amounted 
to squaring the circle. Indeed, the EU but also the US preferred respectful 
“partnerships” with authoritarian regimes in the region, and combined security and 
economic priorities with some carrots but no stick. The EU was relying in its 
normative, diffusion power and a long-term strategy of socialization for the 
MENA democratization. By contrast, in the light of the post-9/11 War on Terror, 
the US under the Bush administration scaled up its rhetoric of a Greater-MENA 
and an Arab-Muslim region, and traditional drivers as domino theory and 
development aid were brought in the picture. However, the rhetoric and the 
military intervention in Iraq in 2003 clearly harmed the credibility of American 
democracy promotion in the region. In the field, MEPI programs could actually 
diverge very little from the programs funded with EU aid, though the EU financial 
investment was much more significant and the inter-regional structures much more 
complex and original (including parliamentary and civil society forums). Again, 
there was a picture that made US and EU policies of democracy promotion
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confront similar shortcomings, despite the very different and unrelated approaches 
they emanated from.
On the implementation side, Chapter 5 illustrated the difficulties for liberal 
democracy because of the MENA states’ weak capitalist basis (Bromley, 1993) 
and their clientelistic regimes. For the sake of interests and the principle of 
partnership, the policies involved the non-democratic incumbents in MENA states, 
which in turn led to “illiberal” or “fasade” democracies at best. This case study 
also documented the artificiality of the “MENA region”, which somewhat 
perversely created an “other” defined by the lack of democracy and implicitly to 
the Arab-Muslim culture in view of the promoters; by contrast, intemal-MENA 
regionalization is de facto null. I claimed that despite their shortcomings, bottom- 
up policies and civil-society forums (as the Euro-Mediterranean “third basket”) 
seemed to open important doors to protect and channel dissent, and to trigger 
domestic reform. Yet democracy promoters (the executive, more than 
parliamentary bodies) have privileged relations with incumbents, and this was 
replicated again in the most recent European initiative for a “Union for the 
Mediterranean”.
Finally, the case of the Community of Democracies (Chapter 6) threw light 
on the political controversies and difficulties around US universalism. It 
documented how the CD stemmed in American foreign policy, supported in 
bipartisan fashion. The CD illustrated the complexity of the European reaction to 
American policies. Poland and the Czech Republic supported the cause 
enthusiastically, while Western European policy-makers did not rally around it, 
much as they had been reluctant to the proposal of a “Greater Middle East” 
(tainted of American unilateralism and ignoring the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership). This was partly because the CD was clearly managed by the United 
States, but also because proponents of this kind of initiative (as the Concert or the 
League of Democracies) sometimes sought to undermine the United Nations, a 
pillar of EU multilateralism. This case confirmed three of the new transatlantic 
trends. First, European alignment to American initiatives would not be automatic 
in the post-Cold War period, and Europe would consider democracy promotion 
instead of automatically rally to US initiatives. Second, Eastern European 
countries are nevertheless more ready in principle to align with America. This 
would change the dynamics in EU CFSP in a way that needs to be explored
277
beyond US Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s “old vs. new Europe” (Levy, Pensky, 
& Torpey, 2005). Third, the EU is not indifferent to democracy promotion 
worldwide and may eventually defend its own universalism, but it does not seem 
easy to raise the political will or capabilities for this. Member States were divided 
over the pertinence and interest of such an initiative, and they failed to empower 
EU institutions to act in a unified and influential way either to shape it or to 
propose an alternative.
Chapter 6 analyzed this ambitious and unprecedented attempt to gather 
democracies in an international organization, which seemed to foster the liberal 
order that would derive from the post-Cold War “democracy hype” and American 
hegemony. This initiative faced paramount conceptual and practical challenges, to 
the extent that the CD’s potential contained its shortcomings: a dynamic of open 
and inclusive promotion (co-opting non-democratic states) led to abusive 
interpretations of “democracy”. Importantly, the CD was not an initiative for 
universal democracy in the supranational sense. The role and sovereignty of states 
remained capital; as such the CD was closer to a normative quest to influence the 
international system promoting a liberal order, and it did not subscribe to 
democratic dynamics beyond the state. At the same time, civil society forums and 
a Non-governmental Process existed in parallel to the ministerial proceedings. Yet, 
importantly, this form of “transnational democracy activists” may not be the 
clearest or healthiest ground for non-state democracy, as its representativity, 
legitimacy, and potential role in policy-making are uncertain. Civil society actors, 
and likewise “practitioners” and the “epistemic community” that also influence 
international democracy promotion may have their own conceptions and agendas; 
and this thesis called for a more nuanced assessment of their input that unravels 
these politics of civil society, too.
Original arguments for further research
This framework and the fieldwork undertaken for this research also allowed me to 
analyze new material and arguments, adding value to the existing literature and 
opening doors to further research: three important ones are indicated here.
One original contribution in Chapter 4 was the study of the CIAT as an 
international authority that facilitated but also monitored the transition in the 
Congo. This antagonized the internationals and the local elites in the compound
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government; the former insisted on democracy, while the latter sought to 
maximize their power. Such bargaining over democracy promotion is paradoxical, 
and it is uncertain that the conditionality works in the long run. For example, 
Western promoters worried about the new aid and investment from China into the 
DR Congo (non conditionality attached).
In Chapter 5, I studied the tension between overcoming what seemed a 
“cultural exception” in the MENA (an Arab-Muslim, undemocratic “other”) but 
not knowing whether to co-opt Islamist movements in practice. Democracy 
promoters have often focused on establishing a positive link between Islam and 
democracy, and portrayed this as an independent variable (a “cause”) that can lead 
to democratization. Instead, I suggested addressing this element of political culture 
as the dependent variable, i.e. something we need to understand and explain in the 
processes of transition.
A particularly interesting contribution of Chapter 6 was the study of the 
dilemma that American agents in the Community of Democracies and the West in 
general face when seeking to universalize and scale down their protagonism in 
democracy promotion. They opened up membership to other countries but this 
watered down the meaning of “democracy”; they ceded visibility to Seoul, 
Warsaw, or Bamako for conferences in non-Westem capitals, but this did not 
change the underpinning leadership in the initiative and just downgraded these 
events to the bottom of diplomatic agendas. Important theoretical implications 
derived from these cases, as there were “good intentions” on the side of the 
promoters but also a gap with the reality, due to the misinterpretation of political 
challenges.
2. Democracy promotion and the transatlantic drift and rift
American-European relations clearly hinted at divisions that were not about
democracy and its promotion, but about the transatlantic structure and dynamics as 
a potential source of cooperation but also, more and more, of competition (Kanet, 
2008). Along these lines, the thesis substantiated this original claim: that 
democracy promotion arose from, and strengthened, universalist trends from the 
United States and Europe. The thesis claimed that the US and EU universalisms
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arose from a context of shared Western identity and history and evolved towards 
further differentiation, even rivalry, in the post-Cold War. It has argued that 
democracy promotion not only emerged from and illustrated this international 
context of transatlantic “drift and rift”, but it also played itself a role in the 
construction and consolidation of the US and EU “rival universalisms”.
On the one hand the relationship drifted along, without open 
confrontation; on the other there was a rift that may have existed for long, but now 
became increasingly evident with the development of a European position and 
policies. The case studies substantiated the argument of “rival universalisms”, but 
important nuances and implications for transatlantic relations arose.
Inconclusive transatlantic trends but no division of labor
During the Cold War, Western universalism had been unified against the 
competing universalism projected from the Communist world, and one of the key 
themes was democracy and its promotion i.e. “the Free World”. In the new era, 
this common ground would paradoxically become a source, and an objective, for 
separate action in the world. As Chapters 1 and 2 showed, the new context allowed 
for divergence between the US and Europe. On the one hand democracy 
promotion was the “new” American mission in an era of hegemony, and on the 
other, a key feature that the EU assumed as its own in its Common Foreign and 
Security Policy and in Development and Cooperation policy, officially outlined in 
the Treaty of Maastricht.
The thesis argued that transatlantic cooperation was minimal: there was no 
confrontation, but there was no transatlantic pursuit of democracy promotion 
either in strategic thinking or in practice. This failure to develop transatlantic 
democracy promotion derived only partly from the passive absence of cooperative 
enterprises. Indeed, the US and the EU actually significantly increased their own 
policies of democracy promotion, both the intensity of the rhetoric and the 
programs (including higher budgets). In this they neglected the potential for 
bonding, and went for the alternative choice not to act together: there was “rifting 
apart” and, with the separate universalisms, the assertion of independent, distinct 
roles. This hints at a continuation of transatlantic partnership in contemporary 
International Relations, but not the strengthening of a transatlantic relationship 
itself.
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The theories and policy recommendations that insist on a division of labor in 
the transatlantic relationship (Everts, 2003; Nuland, 2008) fail to grasp the nuance 
of the evolving roles of the US and the EU in contemporary IR. It is not about the 
US doing the “hard security” and the EU the “soft security” tasks when 
intervening abroad, and it is not only about the EU “footing the bill” and “doing 
the dishes”, though those times may not seem totally past. The novelty in the 
transatlantic relationship came from the more open and purposeful assertion of EU 
dissent and autonomy: the distinct role of the EU as “democracy promoter” and in 
turn the projects of EU identity seemed reinforced one another.
Ideological historiography of Europe: discourse matters
Yet EU-unified action was not always manifest and the European Union was no 
monolith regarding the promotion of democracy: the complexity of its approach 
derived partly from the polity’s complex nature. Along these lines, the thesis 
documented the diversity of institutional drivers for policy, and the politicization 
of the processes (in Brussels and with the Member States) and of each of the case 
studies. In addition, and against this background, the thesis argued that democracy 
promotion and the EU universalism also contributed to forging EU “international 
actomess”. Democracy promotion policies were embedded in a powerful narrative 
that corresponded to an ideological historiography of Europe that did not always 
correspond to the reality.
As a narrative, the European universalism notably rose around the key 
concepts of “normative power” and “civilian power” that, as Chapter 2 showed, 
went hand in hand with the promotion of democracy in the world. In addition, they 
clearly substantiated an idea of Europe as opposed to the United States; the terms 
seemed especially accurate as the Bush administration led the war in Iraq in 2003 
and the cause of democracy promotion was (belatedly) thrown in the picture for 
intervention.
It has long been established in the literature that democracy promotion as 
“the mission” has been used in the construction of universalist narratives of the 
United States as an international actor. This is also documented in this thesis, and I 
underlined the long tradition of American exceptionalism and the “vindicationism” 
that characterized the Bush administration. But it was the EU construction of a 
universalism based on democracy promotion that raised questions regarding
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transatlantic relations and that deserved special attention as an original argument 
here. But in the end the two trends do not seem so different in form, though they 
are distinct in content -indeed, any universalism needs to reflect uniqueness and 
teleology.
In a nuanced picture, the discourse of European democracy promotion must 
be analyzed together with its practice, much like American democracy promotion 
has been in the past decades. Here, these first findings hint at the existence of an 
ideology, a discourse developing within the EU as part of the internal political 
dynamics and against the international context. Along these lines, the notion of 
“civilian” or “normative power” seemed to have been endorsed (and partly 
construed) in Brussels, but any analysis of democracy promotion and EU 
universalism should not take for granted that the EU will be “civilian”, that this 
will yield “power”, or that it will succeed on the ground. The European 
experiences of democratization in Southern and Eastern Member states have 
confirmed the potential of EU democracy promotion by inclusion. In this light, 
conceiving successful democracy promotion could be connected to broader but 
similar dynamics with globalization. Yet foreign policies and exclusionary trends 
continue to be a reality of our contemporary world. Transnational and 
cosmopolitan trends seem to nevertheless constitute a real challenge, so in turn it 
will be necessary to conceive more positive connections (conceptual and mainly 
pragmatic) between those trends and democracy.
3. Democracy promotion: whether and how
This thesis documented the complexity of democracy promotion when American 
and European policies were implemented in the field, and the gap between their 
universalisms and the reality that imposed imperfect decisions and restricted 
policies. In this regard, the thesis pitched its findings at a mid-range level above 
specific programs and allocations, and below larger theoretical questions on the 
paradigms linking democracy, economic development and conflict, such as 
Modernization theory or the Democratic Peace.
This empirical analysis and some of the arguments developed have 
contributed to characterize democracy promotion as a contemporary international
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phenomenon of “learning by doing”. This has been the history of democratic 
experience, and this seems to apply to this policy that, since the end of the Cold 
War, has rallied ever more significant funds and numbers of political elites and 
activists from civil society, policy-makers on the ground and from abroad, and 
academics as part of a broader epistemic community.
Political and not technical challenges
Democracy promotion is a normative policy that has been based on accumulated 
experiences and scientific knowledge about transition and democratization. Yet 
this should not construct an image of democracy promotion as a technical, neutral 
policy where efficiency and success will be predictable.
The main reason why cumulative knowledge is marginal and transferable 
lessons are limited is that democracy promotion is an eminently political 
phenomenon. While practitioners often have a genuine worry to improve their 
programs, their professional expertise and advice will be conditioned by each of 
the cases in point. It is uncertain that segmented thematic specialization (judiciary 
reform, electoral observation, NGO projects...) is preferable to area-expertise, and 
that procedures and benchmarks can usefully influence sociological and historical 
determinants.
This thesis documented this phenomenon of “technicization” of democracy 
promotion. On the one hand, international promoters sought to achieve models and 
policies that worked. On the other, they sought to invest their intervention with a 
legitimacy that they seemed to derive more easily from formulas and indicators in 
reports. Instead, this legitimacy could derive from the historical experiences where 
peace, democracy and economic prosperity have been in clear correlation (though 
we are still uncertain about causes and explanations), and from the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights or the values of human security and democracy that 
have indeed achieved greater international status in this post-Cold War period. I 
found the widespread belief on the ground was that, even if at times it reminded of 
former “mission civilisatrice” (Paris, 2002), democracy promotion was usually 
benign. Moreover, a picture of professional, expert, short-term assistance could in 
this sense do more harm than a less pretentious and equally pragmatic political 
engagement for individual freedoms and democratic rules and institutions.
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“Support” rather than promote
Democracy promoters worried about these policies becoming a new sort of 
imperialism because of the complex dynamics of what to promote and how to do 
it. More importantly, “double standards” continued to marginalize this aspect of 
foreign policy when it entered into competition with some others -especially those 
considered vital interests (security). It is along these lines that a recent report 
based in interviews with American democracy promotion experts suggested a shift 
to more basic “democracy support” instead of “promotion” (Lennon, 2009). Yet 
the underlying argument was that “democracy promotion” had been overused and 
discredited during the Bush administration. Indeed, highflying rhetoric such as 
George W. Bush’s in Iraq post-2003 may not do a favor to implementing policies 
that need discretion and cooptation on the ground (Carothers, 2008b).
In reality, “more basic” referred to downscaling the rhetoric so as to 
avoid the argument of double standards. Along the same lines, the new 
administration should better use a new label, and “democracy support” take over 
the now politically incorrect “democracy promotion”. This reinforces the premise 
in this thesis that debates on democracy promotion concern rhetoric and discourse 
as much as practice. This thesis showed how the rhetoric was key in the role- 
construction of American and European universalisms, insisting on a profile as 
“civilian” power in the case of the EU. In the downplaying of “democracy 
promotion” and the potential choice of other terms by the new Obama 
administration, we witness how the American universalism is projected with 
different political nuances. Democracy promotion is composed of rhetoric and 
practice, and the debates on terms and concepts e.g. “support”, “assistance”, 
“promotion” do not necessarily move forward the pragmatic debates on what is 
more successful to promote democracy.
Pragmatic debates on how to make democracy promotion work do exist, 
nevertheless, and this thesis has addressed some of the challenges that make it 
such an elusive practice. The policies emanating from US and EU “rival 
universalisms” confronted similar shortcomings. This research contributed to 
document that such a “virtuous circle” of peace, democracy, and socioeconomic 
prosperity was not self-evident. The premises of Modernization and of the 
Democratic Peace thesis offer important hints for political change, but it will be 
the political specificities that carry more weight, either at country-level as in the
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DR Congo, a regional level as in the MENA, and for worldwide initiatives. The 
meaning of democracy and the links with preconditions beg additional research 
and more carefully adapted policy-making. Here, backlash should not be 
considered just a risk. Indeed, its occurrence has been demonstrated in many and 
diverse ways throughout the long history of democracy, to the extent that 
promoters should include it in their studies and policies as one of the factors (to 
avoid) by default.
This thesis has addressed democracy promotion as an element of American and 
European foreign policy, analyzing its role and influence in the transatlantic 
relationship, and the gap with the complex and challenges dynamics of transition 
on the ground. The scope of my research led me to forgo (or at least not treat with 
as much depth as deserved) what I consider three key aspects, potential avenues 
for further research.
First, further detailed analysis of European and American policies in content 
and outreach is much needed. We need to know more about the nature of the 
policies on the ground (good governance, electoral assistance, women’s rights, 
etc.) i.e. what is really done, but also about the terminology, categorization and 
design that is imbued in the policy-making process. As these policies have 
suffered from the trends of expertise and “technicization” in democracy 
promotion, it might be useful to give further thought to the real utility of the terms 
and to gain better knowledge about what they really meant in the implementation 
stage. The second item in this research agenda would involve the links between 
the state and the political model of democracy in our globalizing world, a theme 
that needs reconsideration from the perspectives of political theory but also, 
importantly from sociology and anthropology. Contemporary democracy 
promotion policies, rooted in Western, liberal history, confront essential dilemmas 
(conceptual and practical) because our knowledge on what “works” about the state 
is elusive, and because policies either strengthen or undermine it. Since this is 
extremely consequential, research that considers innovative approaches but also 
case-study realities is in my view essential. The third avenue would lead us to 
study, broadly, the drivers and consequences (ideological and material) of the 
internationalization of liberalism in the past decades and centuries. This thesis was 
informed by many of the debates on the essential components of democracy and
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on the potentially negative dynamics of the different models as they seek to 
balance out individual freedoms and collective goods. Here, further research on 
the history of ideas and the political history in Europe and the United States is 
needed to unravel the meaning of democracy as an idea and a practice.
Personally, this research brought up many questions on democracy as a 
practice, but also a valuable positive answer about it as an idea. I was bom in 
Spain as my country made the transition to democracy, so as I finish this work I 
still ponder the complexity that is to promote freedom for others, but I understand 
better this paradox.
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